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SUMMARY
Summary
In February 2014, West Africa became the first African region to conclude an 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union. Given the huge 
asymmetry of power between the EU and West Africa, the agreement was 
surprisingly reflective of West African interests. Five months later, the SADC EPA 
Group became the second African region to conclude an EPA. Although Southern 
African states are better situated to negotiate with the EU, the region’s final 
agreement did not reflect their original negotiating objectives as well as the West 
African EPA. This outcome presents a puzzle: how could a group of structurally 
weak and marginalized states negotiate an agreement with the EU that better 
reflects their interests than their more developed peers down south? This puzzle 
is investigated within the framework of interregionalism: institutionalized 
cooperation between two (or more) world regions, each coordinated to a greater or 
lesser degree. In contradistinction from prior research, which mainly focussed on 
explaining the drivers and functions of interregionalism, the research presented 
here shifts the focus onto explaining variations on the outcomes of interregional 
cooperation. Specifically, the research asks why, given similar background context 
and structural constraints vis-à-vis a much more powerful region, has West Africa 
been more effective in its interregional trade negotiations with the EU than the 
SADC EPA Group?
I argue that it is regional actorness – the ability of regions to become identifiable, 
to aggregate the interests of member states, to formulate collective goals and 
policies, and make and implement decisions – that accounts for variation in 
interregional outcomes. Regions with higher levels of actorness are more likely to 
obtain ‘good’ outcomes than those with less. However, when analysing regionalism 
and regional actorness in the context of developing countries, one should keep in 
mind that the EU can exert a powerful integrative or disintegrative force on 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) regions through the external influence of its 
trade and aid policies. Regions that receive a large amount of European development 
funding aimed at encouraging integration and institutional capacity are likely to 
enjoy higher levels of regional actorness than those that receive less. Likewise, 
EPAs that cohere with the borders of pre-existing integration projects are likely to 
encourage the evolution of actorness. On the other hand, the EU may have a 
disintegrative effect on ACP regions if there are conflicting bilateral trade 
agreements with individual member states and if the proposed EPA does not 
cohere with pre-existing integration projects. This has the effect of undermining 
actorness.  
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X
SUMMARY
Using a most-similar systems research design, I investigate the actorness and 
effectiveness of West Africa and the SADC EPA Group in relation to the EPA 
negotiations with the EU. I also examine the (dis)integrative effect of the EU’s 
trade and aid policies on those two regions. The analysis is informed by archival 
research and interviews with African policy-makers and negotiators. The findings 
illustrate how, despite being composed primarily of poor, underdeveloped states, 
West Africa was more effective on important negotiating issues than the SADC 
Group, due to its higher degree of actorness. Its actorness was the result of more 
homogenous member state preferences at the outset of the negotiations, and 
stronger and more autonomous regional institutions with the mandate to 
negotiate on behalf of member states. The SADC Group’s actorness was undermined 
by disparate member state preferences and a lack of regional institutions or 
leadership, leaving the region unable to formulate a common position for the bulk 
of the negotiations. West Africa’s higher degree of actorness can be partly 
attributed to the EU. The EU has provided large amounts of development funding 
targeted at regional capacity building and promoting regional integration, while 
there were no pre-existing trade deals with individual member states to undermine 
cooperation. As a result, West African states are incentivized to cooperate at the 
regional level, enhancing actorness and effectiveness, while the fact that the EPA 
closely cohered with the boundaries of ECOWAS helped to preserve the integrity of 
the region’s existing integration projects. The SADC Group’s actorness was low due 
to the prevalence of overlapping regional initiatives and an insufficient amount of 
EU funding to alter member states preferences in favour of regional cooperation, 
while a bilateral trade agreement with South Africa contributed to behaviour not 
conducive to regional integration. The group’s lack of cohesion contributed to its 
less-than-expected effectiveness in EPA negotiations, and the result is a sub-optimal 
interregional agreement that contributes to the ‘locking-in’ of fragmented 
regionalism in Southern Africa. 
The findings highlight the importance of supranational institutions and the role 
of regional powers in producing actorness, as well as the EU’s role in contributing 
to regional integration, institutional capacity, and the patterns of behavior 
displayed by regional powers. Focusing on the actorness of regional organizations 
helps us to understand the outcomes of interregional cooperation, as well as the 
role of regional organizations in the provision of global governance. This rare 
comparative case study of two cases of asymmetric interregionalism shows that 
regionalism and regional organizations have a stronger role than ever in the 
global trade and developmental agenda, taking us ever closer towards a ‘world of 
regions’.  
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SAMENVATTING
Samenvatting   
In februari 2014 sloot West-Afrika, als eerste Afrikaanse regio, een Economisch Part-
nerschapsakkoord (EPA) met de Europese Unie. Het verdrag was verrassend genoeg 
een goede afspiegeling van de belangen van West-Afrika, ondanks het enorme 
machtsverschil tussen die regio en de EU. Vijf maanden later werd de SADC EPA 
Groep de tweede Afrikaanse regio die een dergelijk verdrag sloot. Ondanks de betere 
onderhandelingspositie van Zuid-Afrikaanse staten ten opzichte van de EU, 
reflecteerde het uiteindelijke verdrag in mindere mate de aanvankelijke onderhan-
delingsdoelen van die landen dan het West-Afrikaanse EPA. Deze uitkomst vormt 
een puzzel: hoe kan een groep structureel zwakke en gemarginaliseerde staten 
een onderhandelingsresultaat bereiken dat hun belangen beter weerspiegelt dan 
de meer ontwikkelde Zuid-Afrikaanse landen? Die vraag wordt onderzocht binnen 
het raamwerk van inter-regionalisme: geïnstitutionaliseerde samenwerking tussen 
twee of meer wereldregio’s, welke in meer of mindere mate zijn gecoördineerd. 
In tegenstelling tot eerder onderzoek, dat zich vooral richtte op de veroorzakers en 
functies van inter-regionalisme, is dit onderzoek gericht op het verklaren van 
variatie in de uitkomsten van interregionale samenwerking. De specifieke onder-
zoeksvraag is: waarom, gegeven een vergelijkbare context en structurele beperkingen 
ten opzichte van een machtigere regio, is West-Afrika effectiever geweest in haar 
interregionale verdragsonderhandelingen met de EU dan de SADC EPA Groep?
Mijn argument is dat regional actorness – het vermogen van regio’s om identificeer-
baar te worden, om de belangen van lidstaten te aggregeren, om collectieve doelen 
en gezamenlijk beleid te formuleren en om besluiten te nemen en te implementeren 
– voor variatie in interregionale uitkomsten zorgt. Regio’s met een hogere mate 
van actorness hebben een grotere kans op ‘goede’ uitkomsten dan regio’s met 
minder actorness. Bij een analyse van regionalisme en actorness in de context van 
ontwikkelingslanden is het belangrijk in het achterhoofd te houden dat de EU, 
door externe invloed van haar handelsbeleid en hulpgelden, sterke invloed kan 
hebben op Afrikaanse, Caribische en Pacifische (ACP)-regio’s – zowel richting 
integratie als desintegratie. Regio’s die grote hoeveelheden Europees hulpgeld 
gericht op het stimuleren van integratie en institutionele capaciteit ontvangen, 
zullen waarschijnlijk een hogere mate van regional actorness hebben dan regio’s 
die minder ontvangen. Bovendien zullen EPA’s die samenvallen met de grenzen 
van al bestaande integratieprojecten de ontwikkeling van actorness van die 
projecten stimuleren. Aan de andere kant kan de EU een desintegratie-effect op 
ACP-regio’s hebben wanneer er conflicterende bilaterale overeenkomsten bestaan 
met individuele lidstaten en als het voorgestelde EPA niet samenvalt met een 
bestaand integratieproject. Deze factoren ondermijnen actorness. 
Processed on: 19-7-2016
504439-L-bw-Hulse
XII
SAMENVATTING
Met een most-similar systems onderzoeksdesign onderzoek ik de actorness en 
effectiviteit van West-Afrika en De SADC EPA Groep in relatie tot de EPA onderhan-
delingen met de EU. Ik bekijk ook de (des)integratie-effecten van het Europese 
handelsbeleid en Europese hulpgelden op de twee regio’s. De analyse is uitgevoerd 
met behulp van archiefonderzoek en interviews met Afrikaanse beleidsmakers en 
onderhandelaren. De bevindingen illustreren dat West-Afrika, ondanks dat het 
een regio is die bestaat uit arme en onderontwikkelde staten, door de hogere mate 
van actorness effectiever was op belangrijke onderhandelingsthema’s dan de 
SADC Groep. De actorness is het resultaat van meer homogene preferenties van de 
lidstaten aan het begin van de onderhandelingen, en sterkere en meer autonome 
regionale instituties met het mandaat om te onderhandelen namens lidstaten. De 
actorness van de SADC Groep werd ondermijnd door uiteenlopende preferenties 
van lidstaten en een gebrek aan regionale instituties en leiderschap, waardoor de 
regio niet in staat was een gezamenlijk standpunt te formuleren voor het overgrote 
deel van de onderhandelingen. De hogere mate van actorness in West-Afrika kan 
voor een deel worden toegeschreven aan de EU. De EU heeft veel ontwikkelings-
geld gestoken in het promoten van integratie en institutionele capaciteit, terwijl 
er geen bestaande handelsovereenkomsten met individuele lidstaten bestonden 
die samenwerking in de weg konden staan. Hierdoor kregen West-Afrikaanse 
staten een prikkel voor samenwerking op regionaal niveau, wat bijdroeg aan de 
actorness en effectiviteit, terwijl het feit dat de EPA nagenoeg samenviel met de 
grenzen van ECOWAS hielp om de integriteit van de bestaande integratieprojecten 
te bewaken. De actorness van de SADC Groep was laag door overlappende regionale 
initiatieven en onvoldoende EU-geld om lidstaten te prikkelen meer te gaan 
samenwerken, terwijl een bilaterale handelsovereenkomst met Zuid-Afrika 
bijdroeg aan gedrag dat verdere integratie niet bevorderde. Het gebrek aan cohesie 
in de SADC Groep zorgde voor minder effectiviteit dan verwacht in EPA-onderhan-
delingen; het resultaat is een suboptimale interregionale overeenkomst die ervoor 
zorgt dat Zuidelijk Afrika blijft vastzitten in gefragmenteerd regionalisme.
De resultaten laten het belang zien van supranationale instituties en de rol van 
regionale machten (zoals Zuid-Afrika) in het produceren van actorness, alsook de 
rol van de EU in het beïnvloeden van regionale integratie, institutionele capaciteit, 
en de gedragspatronen van regionale machten. Onderzoek gericht op de actorness 
van regionale organisaties helpt ons de uitkomsten van interregionale samen- 
werking en de rol van regionale organisaties in global governance beter te begrijpen. 
Deze unieke vergelijkende case study van twee gevallen van asymmetrisch inter- 
regionalisme laat zien dat regionalisme en regionale organisaties een grotere rol 
dan ooit spelen in de wereldwijde handels- en ontwikkelingsagenda. Een ‘wereld 
van regio’s’ komt steeds dichterbij.
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We need a global political response capable of rivalling the globalized market in which  
we are living. One way to achieve this goal is to replace the G8 of rich countries with a G8  
of regional groupings… I think the European Union could serve as an example in this respect 
(Guy Verhofstadt, Belgian Prime Minister and European Council President, 
quoted in Global Development Briefing Newsletter, 13 May 2004)
We want regional groups of countries to act in their own interests by creating stable and 
transparent regional rules…To attain this, what matters is the political will of EPA regions to 
cooperate internally and respect their own intra-regional treaties. But we stand ready to help 
(Peter Mandelson, EU Trade Commissioner, 19 April 2005)
It is true that Africa has many suitors now. And it is true that our traditional partners… 
may have to work a little harder to persuade us to work with them (Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, 
Nigerian Finance Minister, quoted in France24, 4 December 2013)
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3
INTRODUCTION
1
1.1  Introduction 
In February 2014, West Africa became the first African region to conclude an 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union. Even after 14 
long years of negotiations, the conclusion of an agreement came as a surprise to 
many observers. The majority of West African states had little material interest in 
signing the deal, and many deadlines in the past had been missed without serious 
consequences. Yet nevertheless, West African states agreed to open their markets 
to European goods in exchange for commitments on development financing, 
improved rules of origin, a guarantee that subsidized goods would not be exported 
to the region, increased transparency on the EU’s agricultural policies, and legal 
certainty regarding the trade preferences between the two regions. Given the huge 
asymmetry of power between the EU and West Africa, the agreement was 
surprisingly reflective of West African interests. Five months later, the SADC EPA 
Group became the second African region to conclude an EPA. Although Southern 
African states are better situated to negotiate with the EU, the region’s final 
agreement did not reflect their original negotiating objectives as well as the West 
African EPA. This outcome presents a puzzle: how could a group of structurally 
weak and marginalized states negotiate an agreement with the EU that better 
reflects their interests than their more developed peers down south? 
This puzzle is investigated within the framework of interregionalism: institution-
alized cooperation between two (or more) world regions, each coordinated to a 
greater or lesser degree. The Economic Partnership Agreements form the trade 
pillar of the Cotonou Agreement, and together the EPAs and Cotonou constitute 
the world’s longest-running and most extensive example of interregional 
cooperation, which takes place between the EU and the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) Group of States. Not only do ACP regions and the EU sign region-to-re-
gion trade deals with each other, the EU also heavily promotes regionalism in the 
ACP as part of its policy of ‘regionalism through interregionalism’. The EU spends 
millions of euros every year encouraging ACP regions to integrate, yet at the same 
time many observers have accused the EU and the EPAs of being detrimental to 
regional integration within the ACP. Interregional cooperation with the EU thus 
plays a large and important role in the making and unmaking of regions within 
Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. As regional cooperation and integration are 
considered one of the cornerstones of Africa’s future growth and development, 
interregional relations with the EU can play a key role in the achievement of the 
Millennium Development Goals and their post-2015 successors, the Sustainable 
Development Goals.
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Previous research on interregionalism (cf. Hänggi et al. 2006; Doidge 2011; Baert et 
al. 2014; Telò et al. 2015) has focused on explaining the emergence and functions of 
interregionalism. This manuscript shifts its focus onto explaining variations on 
the outcomes of interregional cooperation. It asks why, given similar background 
context and structural constraints vis-à-vis a much more powerful region, has 
West Africa been more effective in its interregional trade negotiations with the EU 
than the SADC EPA Group? The existing literature on interregionalism offers some 
insights into explaining the degree of ‘bindingness’ of interregional regimes, and 
the extent to which they complement or advance multilateral rules. Yet there are 
no insights into how regions are able to shape interregional agreements to fit their 
interests, and why otherwise similar regions are able to obtain better outcomes. 
The manuscript argues that it is regional actorness – the ability of regions to 
become identifiable, to aggregate the interests of member states, to formulate 
collective goals and policies, and make and implement decisions – that accounts 
for variation in interregional outcomes. Regions with higher levels of actorness are 
more likely to obtain ‘good’ outcomes than those with less. 
The following 200-odd pages do not offer a definitive theory or explanation of 
interregionalism as a general phenomenon. Rather they have a more modest 
ambition of offering some understanding of the particular form of interregional-
ism practiced between the EU and the ACP regions. The research presented here 
represents a semi-explorative attempt to understand the potential and actual 
outcomes of interregional cooperation, by constructing a hybrid theoretical model 
based on both rationalist and constructivist insights into regionalism and inter-
regionalism. I hope this approach can be of assistance in driving the research 
agenda on interregionalism forward. For far from being a ‘redundant’ area of 
study (Robles 2008; Camroux 2010), for as long as states perceive some value in 
banding together under the auspices of institutionalized regionalism, we can 
expect the attendant phenomenon of interregionalism to continue to contribute 
to the increasingly ‘regionalized’ nature of international affairs.  
1.2   The Rise of Interregionalism: as an empirical 
phenomenon 
EU-ACP relations have been conducted on a proto-interregional basis since the 
1950s, while the first ‘pure’ interregional relationship, between two regional 
organizations, was established in 1972 between the EU and ASEAN. Instances of 
interregional cooperation have greatly increased since then, particularly so during 
the post-Cold War period. Mathew Doidge (2011) identifies eight instances of 
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‘bilateral interregional dialogues’ prior to 1990, all involving the EU. In the 
post-1990 period he identifies over 30 examples, more than half of which do not 
involve the EU. The proliferation of institutionalized interregional relations is 
related to a number of trends and changes in the international system during the 
post-Cold War period. 
Firstly, the democratization of many states has resulted in a decline in the 
relevance of security and the armed forces as a goal and instrument of international 
politics (Zürn 2002: 241). In 1972, 29 percent of all states were full democracies; 
today 45 percent of states practice a full range of civil and political rights (Freedom 
House 2014). As democratic states are less likely to fight each other (Doyle 1986; 
Maoz and Russet 1993), the increasing number of democracies reduces the potential 
for violent resolution of inter-state conflict. There has been a steady decline in 
inter-state conflict since 1989, although intra-state conflict and transnational 
non-state challenges to state authority remain as substantial sources of armed 
conflict (Ramsbotham et al. 2011). As a result it has increasingly been the acquisition 
and exercise of economic power and influence that drives inter-state relations in the 
post-Cold War milieu.1
Second is the increasing prevalence of regionalism, the state-led process of 
delegating political authority to regional institutions in order to promote closer 
economic, political, security and cultural linkages between geographically 
proximate states (Börzel 2011). Recent decades have seen the emergence of 16 new 
‘multiple issue’ regional organizations, as well as the broadening, deepening and 
strengthening of existing organizations in a so-called ‘third wave’ of regionalism 
(Börzel 2011; Mansfield and Milner 1999). Regionalism can help small or 
marginalized states to increase their visibility and voice in economic and political 
international affairs, and can also provide a framework in which states attempt to 
address collective action problems associated with globalization, such as climate 
change, terrorism, organized crime, and other threats that do not respect the 
borders between nations. States have both economic and political reasons to 
delegate authority to the regional level, but the extent to which they are willing to 
do so varies a great deal between regions. Nevertheless, the fact that regional 
organizations around the world are increasingly being granted greater 
competencies means that they are also increasingly being viewed as relevant 
economic, political and security actors by external states and international 
organizations, which seek engagement with these regions. For example, since 
1 Perhaps Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and involvement in the Ukraine will take us ‘back to 
the future’ of traditional power politics.  
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2005 the UN offers explicit support for formalized relationships with regional 
organizations, including engagement with the Security Council where appropriate 
(Wunderlich 2012). Such developments are both a response to the increased global 
relevance of regions, and simultaneously create further opportunities for regions 
to become more influential as economic, political or security actors in the 
international realm.
Thirdly, the increased interdependency and financialization of the global economy 
causes states to seek out new methods to manage economic globalization. The 
quantity and speed of economic transactions between countries has greatly 
increased, while at the same time governments have less control over financial 
markets and flows of information, money, and people across borders. The result is 
a decline in the territoriality of governance, particularly in the economic realm 
(Doidge 2011: 11). The third wave of regionalism is a response to economic 
globalization and the deterritorialization of economic governance. It is outwardly 
orientated and seeks to integrate regions into the global economy through 
export-led development. This is in contradistinction to the ‘old regionalism’ of the 
Cold War era, in which regionalism was inward orientated and protectionist, and 
often intended to compliment import substitution industrialization policies. 
The outward-looking, global orientation of contemporary regionalism encourages 
regions to seek partnerships with external partners, be they states, other regions, 
or international organizations. Interregionalism, in which regions seek partner - 
ships with entities similar to themselves, is almost an inevitable consequence 
of economic globalization and the accompanying outwardly-orientated ‘new 
regionalism’.   
Lastly we might consider the rise of developing countries and concurrent changes 
at multilateral institutions. The rise of the BRICS and other emerging economies, 
plus the sheer increase in the number of actors has contributed to a state of 
deadlock at the WTO. Increasingly the balance of economic power is shifting away 
from the ‘traditional’ economic powerhouses in favour of emerging economies. 
In 2000, developing economies accounted for one fifth of global GDP; in 2010 their 
share was one third (Ahern 2011). This is leading to increased competition for 
trade and investment opportunities, with the advanced economies of the ‘global 
North’ less assured of their dominant positions than in the past. Interregionalism 
offers states and regions a means to advance their interests outside the deadlocked 
multilateral system as well as balancing against other powerful competing 
interests, whilst also managing the complexities of globalization.
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1.3  The Rise of Interregionalism: as an object of study   
Even though interregionalism in some shape or form has been around for a while, 
scholarly interest in the phenomenon only arose around the mid-1990s, triggered 
by the establishment of the EU-Mercosur relationship in 1995 and the Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM) the following year. A flurry of publications in the mid-2000s 
explored the EU’s ‘interregionalization’ of its external relations, with a heavy 
focus on EU-Asia and EU-Latin America relations. The suspension of EU-Mercosur 
relations seemed to put a dampener on the study of interregionalism, but the 
resumption of negotiations in 2010, the conclusion of several EPA agreements in 
2007 and 2014, and a series of new publications seeking to ‘reanimate the research 
agenda’ (Rüland 2014) have lent a new impetus to the field (cf. Baert et al. 2014; Telò 
et al. 2015). 
Previous scholarly explorations of interregionalism were often descriptive, focused 
on producing typologies of interregionalism, and unclear if interregionalism 
constituted a new level of analysis, a European foreign policy, or a geopolitical 
strategy of competing regional blocs. Many studies looked at interregionalism 
through the prism of ‘traditional’ theories of International Relations such as 
structural realism, liberal institutionalism and constructivism, concluding 
variously that interregionalism is the result of institutional balancing and 
bandwagoning, multilateral deadlock, or attempts at regional identity building 
through engagement with an external ‘Other’. These approaches may have 
explained something about the when and why of the emergence of interregional-
ism, and what ‘functions’ interregionalism might fulfil, but they didn’t do much 
as regards telling us something about the potential outcomes of such interregional 
relationships. 
This manuscript departs from previous studies of interregionalism by shifting the 
focus from explaining the emergence and functions of interregional relations in 
favour of explaining outcomes of interregionalism. At a general level the manuscript 
asks, in a given case of interregionalism between two regions, why are some 
regions more effective in their interregional relations than others? It may seem 
obvious that when we look at examples of interregionalism involving the EU and 
regions in the developing world: it is simply a case of power asymmetry. It is hardly 
surprising that the EU, the world’s largest single market and a well-integrated 
regional organization with common policies on trade and foreign policy, is better 
at obtaining outcomes in line with its objectives than Mercosur or ECOWAS. But 
what about when we look at two more-or-less similar regions that engage with 
interregional relations with a far more powerful partner? What then makes the 
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difference between one being more or less effective than the other? In order to 
answer this, the manuscript looks to interregionalism between the European 
Union and two of the more successful examples of regionalism within the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific group of states: ECOWAS (aka West Africa) and SADC.2 
1.4   Interregionalism between the European Union  
and the ACP
EU-ACP Interregionalism
The EU is undoubtedly the world’s chief practitioner and preacher of interregion-
alism. It was the first region to engage others on an interregional basis, and it also 
has a greater quantity and quality of interregional relationships than any other 
region. In the Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union, the EU sets out a 
vision for itself, in which it is to play ‘a leading role in the new world order’, 
providing both a stabilizing global role and ‘seeking to set globalization within a 
moral framework…to anchor it in solidarity and sustainable development’, thereby 
‘pointing the way ahead’ for many countries and peoples (European Council 2001). 
The EU spreads this vision through the promotion of certain principles of political 
order, which can be grouped into three main types: constitutional norms such as 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law; market liberalization; and 
regionalism, an approach that has been termed ‘Europeanization beyond Europe’ 
(Schimmelfennig 2009). However this label may be a little misleading, as there are 
many other states and international organizations that actively work to promote 
democracy, human rights, the rule of law and market liberalization, so it is 
difficult to attribute democratization or market reform in other parts of the world 
to the EU over that of other norm entrepreneurs. The EU may in any case be subject 
to the same global trend of democratization and market liberalization as any 
other part of the world, and is not the locus of such change. Regionalism, however, 
is different. The promotion of regionalism is the most consistent and distinctive 
feature of the EU’s external relations (Schimmelfennig 2009; Lenz 2013). No other 
actor has so consistently and comprehensively encouraged or professed support for 
regionalism in other parts of the world, and it is in its relations with the African, 
2 A brief note on the nomenclature of the two African regions: although ECOWAS is undoubtedly 
the lead organization in West Africa, in its dealings with the region the EU prefers to use the 
term ‘West Africa’ in order to be inclusive of UEMOA, a smaller organization whose members are 
also all members of ECOWAS. Throughout the manuscript I follow the EU’s example and refer to 
‘West Africa’, albeit with the understanding that West Africa is effectively ECOWAS. Although the 
EU uses the term ‘SADC’ to signify relations with the seven Southern African states with which 
it signed an EPA, I distinguish between ‘SADC’, the 15-member state group, and the ‘SADC EPA 
Group’, the smaller subset that chose to negotiate with the EU under the SADC name.  
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Table 1.1  Agreements governing EU-ACP relations, 1957-present
Agreement European entity ACP entity Main features of the 
agreement 
Treaty of Rome 
(1957) 
EEC 6 founding 
members 
31 overseas colonies 
and territories of 
founders of the EEC
Creation of the EDF 
mechanism, external tariff 
set by the EEC
Yaoundé I (1963) EEC 6 18 Francophone  
ex-colonies in Africa
Reciprocal trade preferences, 
African states agree to 
preferential treatment 
for European services and 
investment
Yaoundé II 
(1969)
EEC 6 18 Francophone 
in Africa, plus 
Madagascar and 
Mauritius 
Lomé I 
(1975)
EEC 9 46 ACP states Non-reciprocal duty free 
quota free market access for 
the ACP, STABEX mechanism 
guaranteeing commodity 
prices, no political 
conditionality 
Lomé II (1981) EEC 10 59 ACP states Reduced commitments 
under EDF 
Lomé III (1985)  EEC 12 66 ACP states Introduction of nominal link 
between human rights and 
development aid 
Lomé IV (1989) EEC 15 70 ACP states Use of EDF to support 
structural adjustment 
programmes, enhanced 
political conditionalities on 
human rights
Cotonou (2000) EU 15 (expanding 
to 28 by 2013)
79 ACP states Introduction of reciprocity 
and differentiation 
Economic 
Partnership 
Agreements 
(2002 – 
ongoing) 
EU 28 West Africa (16) 
Central Africa (8)
ESA (11) 
EAC (5)
SADC (7)
Caribbean (15)
Pacific (14)
Varies by region 
Source: own compilation
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Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states that the EU’s interregional approach 
and promotion of regionalism is most apparent. 3  
The roots of EU-ACP cooperation date back as far as the 1950s, and the relationship 
has evolved over time to cover cooperation between more than 100 countries (see 
Table 1.1). The 1957 Treaty of Rome established a collective European development 
policy regarding the 31 colonies and overseas territories of the founding members 
of the European Economic Community (EEC). The European Development Fund 
(EDF) was created to provide financial and technical assistance to these 31 
territories, while trade preferences were based on the French colonial system, with 
an external tariff set by the EEC (Jones 2014). With the independence of the 
Francophone African colonies, the relationship was renegotiated and formalized 
under the First Yaoundé Convention of 1963. Mauritius and Madagascar joined the 
Second Yaoundé Convention in 1969. In 1973 The United Kingdom joined the EEC, 
which required a reformulation of EEC-ACP relations so as to better reflect the 
interests of the Commonwealth countries. The First Lomé Convention (1975) 
expanded the membership of the ACP to include the former UK colonies, and 
granted the ACP non-reciprocal trade preferences, as well as development funding 
via the EDF mechanism and guaranteed prices for certain commodities via the 
STABEX mechanism, an excellent deal for the ACP Group. Subsequent renegotiations 
of the Lomé Convention saw the increasing use of political conditionality and the 
use of EDF money to support structural adjustment programmes, developments 
more reflective of European concerns than ACP ones. 
International developments in the 1990s made the provisions of the Lomé 
Agreement look increasingly untenable. The European Commission set out its 
concerns and rational for a renegotiation of EU-ACP relations in a 1996 Green Paper 
on Relations between the European Union and the ACP Countries on the Eve of the 21st Century. 
The report noted that the conclusion of the Uruguay round and the establishment 
of the WTO in 1994 meant that the non-reciprocal trade preferences granted to the 
ACP under Lomé were no longer compatible with the multilateral trading system, 
leaving both the EU and the ACP vulnerable to challenges under WTO law. Indeed, 
the long running ‘banana wars’ between the USA, Latin America, and Europe 
3 The UN is also a major promoter of regional integration in Africa via its Economic Commission 
for Africa (UNECA). The UN also increasingly recognizes the relevance of regional organizations, 
even granting them a temporary seat at the Security Council should circumstances require it. 
Yet the character of the founding Charter is more universalist than regionalist, it seems likely 
that the increasing prominence given to regionalism within the UN is more a reaction to global 
developments than an active attempt to shape them. Likewise the UNECA agenda on promoting 
regionalism is framed in terms of supporting African-led initiatives rather than actively shaping 
them. The UN’s approach to regionalism is more reactive than proactive.
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culminated in 1995 when the US challenged the Lomé preferences at the newly 
established WTO dispute settlement mechanism. The US argued that the Lomé 
Convention allowed Caribbean bananas to enter the European market duty-free, 
thereby unfairly discriminating against bananas originating in Latin America. 
The WTO upheld the complaint, effectively forcing the EU to renegotiate its trade 
preferences with the ACP in order to become WTO-compliant. The report also 
argued that the highly favourable Lomé preferences had not resulted in an increase 
in the ACP’s exports to Europe, and there had been no appreciable improvement in 
the levels of poverty and development in the ACP, a fact that left several European 
member states dissatisfied with the existing EU-ACP relationship (Taylor 2010: 103). 
Hence a new agreement was negotiated and signed in 2000 in Cotonou, Benin. 
The Cotonou Agreement represents a substantial departure from Lomé. It is a 
broader, more politicized agreement based on five central principles: 
•	 Equality of partners and ownership of development strategies;
•	 Participation of non-state actors (civil society, parliamentarians, private sector 
groups) in addition to central governments; 
•	 Dialogue and the fulfillment of mutual obligations concerning EDF disbursement 
and political conditionality; 
•	 Differentiation of ACP states according to their level of development, granting 
special preferences to Least Developed Countries, and vulnerable landlocked or 
island states;
•	 Regionalization, which emphasizes the importance of regional integration for 
economic development and peace and stability. 
The agreement rests on three pillars: development cooperation funded by the EDF; 
reciprocal trade preferences under Economic Partnership Agreements; and regular 
political dialogue. The most substantial changes from the Lomé Convention are 
the introduction of reciprocity in trade, and the shift from an all-ACP approach 
to a region-to-region approach. The Cotonou Agreement reconfigures EU-ACP 
relations on an explicitly interregional basis. There are two key aspects to this new 
interregional relationship. The first is increasingly ‘regionalized’ development aid, 
in which EDF money is directed both through and at regional organizations in the 
ACP, partly in order to achieve economies of scale, but also in the normative belief 
that regionalism is an appropriate solution to the economic, security and 
environmental challenges faced by ACP states. The second aspect is the negotiation 
of reciprocal free trade deals, negotiated on an interregional basis. The ACP has 
been broken up into seven regional groups, represented by one or more regional 
organization(s) (see Table 1.2), and in 2002 embarked for the first time on reciprocal, 
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multilevel trade negotiations with the EU, for which there is no precedent and 
little or no previous experience for ACP regions to draw on. In this respect the 
Cotonou Agreement represents the height of the EU’s promotion of regionalism in 
other parts of the world. Regionalized aid under the development pillar should 
build institutional capacity and physical infrastructure at the regional level, while 
the prospect of regionalized trade deals as part of the trade pillar should encourage 
deeper integration within ACP regions, resulting in stronger overall regimes of 
regional governance in the ACP. Many observers have termed the approach taken 
by Cotonou as ‘regionalism through interregionalism’ (Hänggi 2005; Doidge 2007), 
yet as the empirical chapters illustrate, EPA configurations do not in all cases 
cohere with existing regional initiatives, in which case the EU’s trade policy may 
actually play a role in undermining its own development policies. 
Main actors in EU-ACP interregionalism 
Although the EU is a highly integrated region it is not always a unified actor in its 
external relations, even in its long-standing relationship with the ACP. The EU’s 
institutional structure for conducting relations with the ACP, not to mention the 
greater diversity of member state preferences since the successive enlargements of 
the Union, means that is not always the coherent and unified international actor 
it would like to be. This may result in apparent inconsistencies and contradictions 
in its external policies (Portela and Raube 2012; Lurweg 2011), as well as offering 
bargaining partners the ability to exploit institutional divisions with divide-and-
rule tactics (see Chapters Five and Six on the economic diplomacy and lobbying 
efforts of West Africa and SADC). 
In the past, EU-ACP relations, including trade policy, were the preserve of DG 
Development. After the signing of the Cotonou Agreement, responsibility for the 
forthcoming EPA negotiations was handed to DG Trade, while DG Development 
(renamed EuropeAid in 2011) retained responsibility for development programming, 
a competency it shares with member states. Unsurprisingly, the Trade Directorate 
is perceived as having a more mercantile approach towards the ACP, and is 
typically less concerned with the developmental concerns of the ACP than DG 
Development (Hardacre 2009; Ravenhill 2004). Nevertheless, the Trade Commission 
may draw on relevant expertise from the other Directorates of the Commission, 
and DG Development is still involved in the EPAs through its input at the technical 
level of negotiations. 
The European Commission has exclusive competency for the EU’s external trade 
policy and DG Trade is solely responsible for conducting EPA negotiations. The 
Council of the European Union grants the negotiating mandate to the Commission, 
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Table 1.2  EPA configurations and associated regional organizations
 
EPA 
configuration
States Associated 
regional 
organization(s) 
Status of EPA 
negotiations
Caribbean Antigua and Barbuda, 
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, 
Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Grenada, Guyana, 
Haiti, Jamaica, St Lucia, St 
Vincent and the Grenadines, 
St Kitts and Nevis, Surinam, 
Trinidad and Tobago
CARICOM Concluded full 
regional EPA in 
2007
West Africa Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape 
Verde, Côte d’Ivoire , Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, 
Mauritania 
ECOWAS (primary)
UEMOA (secondary)
Concluded full 
regional EPA in 
Feb 2014
SADC Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Mozambique, Namibia, South 
Africa, Swaziland
SADC 
SACU (unofficially) 
Concluded full 
regional EPA in 
July 2014
East African 
Community 
(EAC)
Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, 
Burundi, Rwanda
EAC Concluded full 
regional EPA in 
Oct 2014
Central Africa Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
(Kinshasa), Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, São Tomé & Principe
CEMAC (primary)
ECCAS (secondary)
EPA yet to be 
concluded. 
Cameroon 
ratified iEPA in 
2014
Eastern and 
Southern Africa 
Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Seychelles, Sudan, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe
COMESA (primary)
IOC (secondary) 
IGAD (secondary)
EPA yet to be 
concluded. 
Madagascar, 
Mauritius, 
Seychelles and 
Zimbabwe
implemented 
iEPA in 2012
Pacific Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, 
Marshall Islands, Micronesia, 
Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua 
New Guinea, Samoa American, 
Samoa Western, Solomon 
Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, 
Vanuatu
PIF EPA yet to be 
concluded 
Paua New Guinea 
and Fiji have 
implemented 
iEPAs
Source: own compilation
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and thereafter keeps a close eye on the Commission via the Trade Policy Committee.4 
The Commission reports back to both the Council and the European Parliament 
after each round of negotiations. Scholars of the EU are divided on how independent 
the Commission actually is from the influence of the Council. Some authors 
emphasize the Commission’s autonomy via its informational advantages, 
agenda-setting power, and the general costliness of using a veto within the Council 
(Dür 2006). Others emphasize the many opportunities for the Council to influence 
the Commission through its monitoring function, the requirement that the 
Council ratify all trade agreements concluded by the Commission, and the 
Commission’s desire to maintain or increase its future competencies in trade 
policy, therefore preventing it from overstepping its mandate (Dür 2006). According 
to this school of thought, member states only have to voice their concerns to the 
Commission in order to remain in control of negotiations (De Bièvre and Dür 
2005). Nevertheless, obvious differences of opinion between the Commission and 
Council are rare. Neoliberalism is the dominant economic doctrine among 
European elites since the end of the Cold War (Orbie 2009, Hurt 2003), and Trade 
Commission officials and member state representatives on the Trade Policy 
Committee recognize each other as part of the same epistemic community (Orbie 
2009: Bretherton and Vogler 2006). Here it is worth pointing out that the European 
Commission is the strongest supporter of interregional cooperation with other 
world regions (Hardacre 2009). This is partly because ‘institutions tend to export 
institutional isomorphism as a default option’ (Bicchi 2006), but also because an 
interregional foreign policy legitimizes the Commission’s role in European foreign 
policy and expands the potential for the Commission’s future competencies. The 
Council typically has a less acute interest in ‘regionalism through interregional-
ism’ and has not always been willing to back up the Commission’s interregional 
strategy with concrete action (Hardacre 2009: 226), which may be a factor in the 
occasional inconsistency of the EU’s interregional foreign policy.  
In addition to the Council, the European Parliament (EP) also has some influence 
over the Commission’s activities in trade negotiations. The Parliament has been 
granted an enhanced role in the EU’s external trade negotiations since the passing 
of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. It now has the ‘hard power’ to veto EU trade 
agreements, as well as the ‘soft power’ to influence the content and direction of 
negotiations through the provision that the Commission keep the EP fully 
informed on the status of on-going negotiations (Richardson 2012). Nevertheless, 
4 Prior to the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the Trade Policy Committee was officially known 
as the Article 133 Committee, so named after Article 133 of the Amsterdam Treaty. Article 133 was 
replaced by Article 207 of the Lisbon Treaty, and the monitoring committee was renamed the Trade 
Policy Committee. 
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the EP’s influence over trade policy remains less than that of the Council, and 
when voting it tends to follow the Commission’s pro-liberalization agenda (Van 
den Putte et al. 2014). 
The main actors on the ACP side – asides from the 76 central governments – are the 
seven EPA configurations with their varying internal structures. Some 
configurations have granted a negotiating mandate to a supranational regional 
agency (West Africa, the Caribbean), while others opted for an intergovernmental 
approach (SADC, the EAC, ESA, Central Africa). In addition to the regional 
configurations, the ACP Secretariat was tasked with playing a coordinating and 
informational role between regional groupings. However even the Secretariat’s 
own Secretary General admitted that it was ‘not on the frontline of negotiations’ 
(Mohammed Chambas, quoted in Trade Negotiations Insights 2010a), while several 
commentators note that the ACP as an organization risks falling into irrelevance 
as the focus has shifted to the regional level (Laporte 2014). The African Union, 
although it is not formally a player in the EPA negotiations, informally stepped in 
to help coordinate and harmonize the efforts of African countries and regions in 
the EPA negotiations by hosting regular meetings of African negotiators.  
The EPA negotiations
The EPA negotiations commenced on 27th September 2002 in a first phase of all-ACP 
– EU consultations intended to address horizontal issues of interest to all parties 
(see Annex I for a chronology of the negotiations). Both the ACP and EU agreed that 
the central principles of the Cotonou Agreement would guide the EPA negotiations, 
including the provision that
EPAs must support regional integration initiatives existing within the ACP and not 
undermine them. EPAs will therefore need to be based on the integration objectives of the 
regions concerned. EPAs should also contribute to reinforcing regional integration, in 
particular by contributing to the regional harmonization of rules. In this perspective, 
EPAs’ first emphasis should be to consolidate ACP markets, before fostering trade 
integration with the EU (Joint Report on the all-ACP – EU phase of EPA Negotiations, 
2003: 3).
It was also agreed that no ACP state should be worse off under the EPA than they 
were before. However the ACP and the EU disagreed on a number of other key 
points, including the level of market access opening the ACP should commit to, the 
appropriate role of service liberalization and other trade-related issues in the EPAs, 
the level of development financing to accompany EPAs, and whether political con-
ditionalities should be included in the text of the EPAs.  
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Phase II of the negotiat ions was conducted on a region-to-region basis, with start 
dates varying according to ACP regions’ preparedness to transition from the 
all-ACP phase to the interregional phase. Initially, 31st December 2007 was chosen 
as the deadline for the conclusion of Phase II of the negotiations, as this was the 
expiry date on the EU’s special WTO waiver allowing the extension of the Lomé 
preferences. The Caribbean was the only region to conclude a full regional EPA by 
this deadline, while 18 African and two Pacific countries initialed individual 
interim EPAs in trade in goods only, so as to avoid disrupting their exports to the 
EU. In 2008 the EU initiated Market Access Regulation 1528 to allow ACP states 
that have initialled interim EPAs to maintain their access to European markets 
while negotiations towards full regional EPAs continued. December 2008 was set 
as a new deadline for the signing of EPAs (interim or full). ACP states that had not 
signed by that date would lose their market access. Ten African states took this 
threat seriously and added their signature to the interim agreements, although 
those that didn’t did not immediately lose their market access. After various 
efforts to impose deadlines for the conclusion of negotiations, all of which were 
missed, in May 2013 the EU finally issued a unilateral declaration that Market 
Access Regulation 1528 would be revoked as of 1st October 2014 for those states that 
have not taken the appropriate steps to sign and ratify EPAs. West Africa 
subsequently concluded a deal in February 2014, SADC in July 2014, and the EAC 
initialed a regional EPA in October 2014. The ESA, Central Africa and Pacific EPAs 
remain outstanding, while several states within these regions have started the 
ratification and implementation processes on their individual EPAs. 
The West African and SADC configurations have been chosen as the main focus of 
this research project as they are, at the time of writing, two of the three African 
regions to have concluded a full regional EPA. The West African and SADC 
negotiating configurations are represented by two of the more prominent and 
successful examples of regionalism within the ACP: ECOWAS and SADC. Both of 
these regional organizations are located on the African continent and share many 
structural characteristics vis-à-vis the EU, yet they do not share any overlapping 
membership, removing a potentially confounding factor. Finally, both regions are 
recipients of European Development Funding intended to promote and facilitate 
regional cooperation and integration, albeit to varying degrees. Additionally, West 
Africa represents a case where the negotiating mandate was granted to a 
supranational agency, whereas SADC adopted an intergovernmental approach. 
Finally, although access and availability of information are problematic in both 
West Africa and southern Africa, these difficulties are less acute in relation to 
ECOWAS and SADC than other ACP regions (see Chapter Four). 
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1.5  The ‘Problem’ of Regions as Unitary Actors
As the above discussion on the internal dimension of the EU’s policy-making 
towards the ACP illustrates, any scholarly investigation of interregionalism almost 
immediately runs into the problem of whether regions can be considered actors in 
their own right. ‘Traditional’ approaches to IR theory, such as structural realism 
or neoliberalism, dismiss outright the proposition that regional organizations are 
actors in their own right, perceiving them as little more than the aggregate 
interests of their member states. This project takes a different approach. It works on 
the assumption that international institutions, including regional organizations, are 
meaningful in international relations, and have the capacity to alter their member 
states’ interests and behaviour, via the provision of material costs and benefits, 
but also via processes of socialization and persuasion. Secondly, it assumes that if 
regions are engaging in relations with external parties, they must de facto possess 
some minimal actor quality. But how are we to conceive of this actor quality? 
Traditional IR theory privileges states as the central actors in international relations 
and tends to assume they are single, monolithic actors. Yet as the literature on 
liberal intergovernmentalism, bureaucratic politics and the second-image reversed 
illustrates, in reality ‘the state’ is not a unitary construct, rather a collective of 
institutions, interest groups and individual actors pursuing sometimes contradictory 
aims. Yet the assumption of a unitary state is a useful theoretical construct for 
explaining and predicting inter-state relations, and as Alexander Wendt points 
out, even if states do have ‘multiple personalities’, they tend to find a way to act as 
one when engaging with outsiders (1998: 221).   
Yet patently it is problematic to assume that regions are unitary actors in the same 
way that we commonly assume states are. The literature on interregionalism and EU 
external relations recognizes this, and in an attempt to solve this conceptual 
difficulty developed the concept of ‘actorness’: the capacity of a regional organization 
‘to become identifiable, to aggregate interests, formulate goals and policies, and 
make and implement decisions’ (Rüland 2002: 311). This is not a binary variable, 
but rather one located on a spectrum from high to low, and is essentially a way of 
 conceptualizing the ‘power’ of a region as it is projected onto the external world. 
The actorness literature has become something of a ‘cottage industry’ (Drieskens 
et al. 2014), yet there are a number of limitations to its usefulness, as it currently 
exists, to a research project wishing to explain interregional outcomes. First of all, 
the vast majority of the literature is in relation to the EU. Since the 1970s scholars 
have grappled with the questions of to what degree the EU is an international actor, and 
what kind of actor is it? Various conclusions have been reached, including that the EU 
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is not a relevant actor (Bull 1982), it is a relevant actor but suffers from a mismatch 
between external expectations and internal capacity (Hill 1993), or that it’s a 
normative actor with the ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international 
relations (Manners 2002). Rarely have scholars asked similar questions of other 
regions. Surely if we want to understand something about interregional relations 
it is pertinent to ask to what degree other regions are actors, and what kinds of 
international actors they are? The problem with existing conceptualizations of 
actorness is that they tend to be Eurocentric and lack applicability beyond the 
borders of the EU. This manuscript addresses this by developing a generalizable 
model that allows one to assess the respective levels of actorness across different 
regions. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three. 
1.6  Actorness, Effectiveness and External Influence 
The theoretical framework developed in this manuscript posits that a region’s 
degree of actorness influences its effectiveness in interregional negotiations. This 
is not a new insight, as the relationship between actorness and effectiveness has 
previously been explored in relation to the EU as a global actor. However, this is 
the first time this causal relationship is investigated in the context of non-European 
regions as global actors, and in comparative perspective in two cases of inter-
regionalism. However, in the context of regionalism in the developing world, there 
is an important background variable affecting actorness and effectiveness: the 
influence of powerful external actors, especially the European Union. 
Actorness is a composite variable consisting of regional identity; formal and informal 
modes of decision-making, which includes institutionalized decision-making 
structures and the degree of leadership from a regional power; the degree of 
convergence of member state preferences; and the resources and diplomatic tools 
available to the region. Actorness is operationalized and assessed (see Chapter 
Four) in such a way as to allow us to say whether a region has high, medium or low 
actorness. Note that actorness varies by issue area and over time. As cooperation 
deepens and regions become more integrated, member states come to identify more 
with each other, thereby facilitating even greater cooperation and integration, 
and hence increasing regional actorness across all issue areas. Nevertheless, a 
region may remain a giant in one realm and a pygmy in another due to the fact 
that identity, institutions and leadership, preference convergence and resources may 
be considerably greater in some realms compared to others. Since the interregional 
negotiations of interest in this manuscript concerns trade, actorness is assessed in 
terms of trade actorness. 
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Effectiveness, or the extent to which regions are able to shape outcomes in 
accordance with the objectives they have adopted on particular issues, is related to 
the degree of actorness a region can deploy in interregional negotiations. 
Determining how effective a region has been in interregional negotiations involves 
comparing the agreed outcome to the region’s original ‘true’ objectives. Since 
trade negotiations are by nature a secretive affair in which actors may be 
incentivised to misrepresent their true intentions, there are some methodological 
difficulties in accurately determining just how effective a region has been in the 
negotiations (see Chapter Four for a greater explanation of these difficulties and 
the measures taken to compensate for them). As with actorness, effectiveness is 
not a dichotomous variable. Interregional outcomes can range on a continuum 
from hardly effective to highly effective. In the context of EPAs, the outcome of a 
specific issue in the negotiations is assessed from the perspective of the ACP region 
as effective, moderately effective, or not effective. Process tracing explores whether the 
outcome is a result of actorness or other unrelated factors. For example, the EU’s 
decision to phase out agricultural subsidies on food items imported into West 
Africa may at first glance and when viewed in isolation look like a major win for 
the region, but in reality it is a unilateral concession granted to all ACP regions in 
line with the EU’s internal reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy. 
Consequently we cannot attribute that particular ‘win’ to West African actorness. 
While some previous studies have explored the influence of external actors on the 
causal link between actorness and effectiveness through a consideration of the 
effect of particular bargaining configurations (cf. Conceição-Heldt and Meunier 
2014), explicit accounting of external influence on actorness is rarer. External 
influence is a particularly important contextual variable for regions in the 
developing world because of their member states’ structural weakness and 
dependence on aid and trade with the developed world. The logic of regional trade 
integration in the developing world is thus somewhat different from that in 
Europe or North America, as it is motivated more by the potential for extra-regional 
gains than intra-regional ones. As a result, interregional relations are of major 
importance for regionalism in the developing world (Krapohl and Fink 2013), and 
an assessment of actorness and effectiveness of regions in the developing world 
must take this into account. For ACP regions the influence of the EU is far greater 
than that of any other actor. The EU is the number one trading partner of most 
ACP states, while the Cotonou Agreement oversees the provision of large amounts 
of development funding, much of it dedicated to promoting regional cooperation 
in trade. As such the EU positions itself as an external paymaster to regionalism in 
ACP regions. To the extent that the provision of EDF money provides incentives for 
member states to cooperate, and builds institutional capacity at the regional level, 
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EU influence can enhance the actorness of ACP regions, leading to increased 
effectiveness. Yet on the other hand, under certain conditions ACP regions may 
experience the EU’s influence as disruptive. The EU can contribute to disintegrative 
tendencies within the region by offering individual member states (especially 
regional powers) attractive trading options outside of the interregional framework. 
This reduces their incentive to cooperate at the regional level, and where the 
defecting state is the regional power, deprives the region of an internal paymaster 
to drive regionalism forward (Krapohl and Fink 2013). Secondly, the European 
Commission’s use of divide-and-rule tactics during EPA negotiations may weaken 
already low levels of actorness, resulting in decreased effectiveness.
This theoretical framework is used to analyze the interregional dynamics between 
the EU and the West Africa group, represented by ECOWAS, and the EU and the 
SADC EPA Group. In a first step, their respective levels of effectiveness in the EPA 
negotiations are analyzed (variance on the dependent variable). The eight most 
important issues for each region are determined using a modified liberal-intergov-
ernmental theory of preference formation, which takes into account the specific 
context of the African state and African regionalism (see Chapter Four). The 
outcome of each issue is assessed from the perspective of SADC or ECOWAS as 
either effective, moderately effective, or not effective. Process-tracing of the negotiations 
analyses how the final agreement was reached, and whether effectiveness was the 
result of region’s actorness, or other factors in the environment. Finally the EU’s 
influence on the actorness of the respective regions is assessed by looking at the 
levels of EDF, the presence or absence of differentiated trading options, the 
coherence of EPAs with the borders of pre-existing regional organizations, and 
divisive negotiating tactics. 
1.7  Main Aims of the Study 
Investigating the puzzle of West Africa and SADC’s varying effectiveness in 
interregional negotiations with the EU was initially inspired by a desire to move 
away from the Eurocentric approach of previous studies of interregionalism and 
focus more on the ‘other’ side of the equation. Consequently the manuscript is 
situated somewhere in the gap between EU Studies and Comparative Regionalism. 
The project rejects the claim common within EU Studies that the EU is a sui generis 
political entity that is incomparable to other political entities. Instead it adopts the 
Comparative Regionalisms position that the EU is not necessarily a qualitatively 
unique example of regionalism, but rather a more advanced case of regional 
integration than exists elsewhere in the world. At the same time the project 
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acknowledges that bridging the gap between EU Studies and Comparative 
Regionalisms is more complicated than simply transposing the theories and 
concepts of European integration into non-European contexts. If the gap is to be 
successfully bridged it is necessary to take into account the reality of structural 
inequalities between the industrialized, developed countries of the ‘global North’ 
and the developing and emerging countries of the ‘global South’. So while there is 
no ontological or epistemological limitation on translating concepts and theories 
from EU Studies to cases of non-Western regionalism, there is a theoretical and 
empirical need to take into account the different context faced by developing 
states, which may alter the logic of regionalism and interregionalism in the 
developing world as compared to Europe. That said, this manuscript does aim to 
translate concepts and theoretical insights originally developed in the context of 
the EU and its external relations, and applying them – with modifications where 
necessary – to examples of African regions and their external relations. In doing so 
the manuscript tests the usefulness of these concepts in a Comparative Regionalism 
setting.  
Methodologically and empirically, the project aims to contribute to existing 
knowledge by presenting a comparative case study of two cases of interregional-
ism. As Chapter Two points out, the existing literature on interregionalism suffers 
from a dearth of comparative studies, limiting the development and testing of 
theories about interregionalism. Furthermore, the vast majority of studies focus 
on the internal preferences and institutions of the EU, and how these shape its 
external policies towards other regions. The regions that are the targets of the EU’s 
interregional policies are perceived as passive recipients of EU policy, rather than 
active participants in shaping the final outcomes of interregional cooperation and 
negotiation. It has also been pointed out that ‘little is known about EU negotiations 
with emerging markets, and only very few studies compare more than one case of 
trade negotiations involving the EU’ (Dür and Zimmerman 2007: 775). What 
studies do exist tend to focus exclusively on the EU side, neglecting the negotiating 
partner. This manuscript instead aims to focus on unpacking the intra-regional 
preferences and decision-making processes of the weaker regions involved in 
interregional relations with the EU. In doing so the project aims to generate 
empirical knowledge on trade negotiations between the EU and developing 
nations, while comparing the two cases aims to generate theoretical insight into 
interregional cooperation. The manuscript also aims to draw attention to an 
emerging level of analysis in International Relations, and contribute a non-Euro-
centric understanding to the literatures on interregionalism and comparative 
regionalisms.
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Finally, as relatively little is known about interregionalism from the non-European 
perspective or trade negotiations involving the ‘global South’, the findings and 
conclusions of the manuscript may prove useful to practitioners and policy-makers 
in both Europe and Africa. On the European side the manuscript highlights the 
occasional inconsistency of EU foreign policy, which can have the effect of 
undermining the EU’s stated goals, and may give an indication of the conditions 
under which the EU foreign policy of support for regionalism in other parts of the 
world is (un)successful. From the African perspective, the research may be helpful 
in understanding and realizing the potential of regionalism in increasing the 
‘voice’ of African countries on the global stage and better promoting their interests. 
The EPAs and Cotonou Agreement represent far-reaching changes to the 
relationship between Europe and Africa (and indeed the wider ACP), which are 
likely to set a precedent for relations with the wider world.5 As such, it is clear that 
interregional cooperation with the EU holds great potential sway over the future 
developmental agendas of the African, Caribbean and Pacific regions. 
1.8  The Way Ahead 
The manuscript follows a fairly standard structure for hypothetico-deductive 
research projects, with the current chapter serving as a general introduction to 
the topic, framing the research agenda and acquainting the reader with relevant 
background information, and pointing the way ahead for the following 200-odd 
pages. 
Chapter Two surveys the existing literature on interregionalism and the EU’s 
promotion of regionalism in its external relations. The chapter argues that 
while the EU is not a sui generis example of regionalism per se, it is sui generis actor 
in interregionalism because of its explicit promotion of regionalism in other 
world regions. While efforts to move away from the oft-noted Eurocentrism that 
characterizes the field are laudable, it is still necessary to make an analytical 
distinction between interregionalism involving the EU and South-South inter-
regionalism. The chapter also argues in favour of moving away from a ‘functional’ 
understanding of interregionalism to instead focus on the outcomes of inter -
regional cooperation and negotiation, for which actorness is a key concept. 
5 The USA has indicated that it wishes to reform its AGOA programme with African states in order to 
make trade preferences reciprocal. 
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Chapter Three details the theoretical framework explaining the relationship 
between actorness and effectiveness in the context of regions in the developing 
world. First it outlines the conceptualization of actorness used in the manuscript 
(independent variable); second it relates actorness to effectiveness in regions’ 
external relations (dependent variable). Thirdly the assorted contextual variables 
and scope conditions that affect the relationship between actorness and 
effectiveness are explored. Fourth, the specific contextual variable of EU influence 
on African, Caribbean and Pacific regions can have positive and negative 
implications for their actorness, thereby impacting on their external effectiveness. 
Chapter Four lays out the methodological approach and design of the research 
project. It adopts an ontology of ‘constructive realism’ in which actors engage in 
mutually constitutive interaction from which they derive meaning and interests, 
but that social interaction is nevertheless rooted in an independently existing 
empirical reality. As such a positivist epistemology is adopted, in which it is 
possible to draw (probabilistic) conclusions about the social world. The two cases 
are selected on a most-similar systems research design, while the empirics of the 
cases are drawn from documentary analysis and interviews, and supplemented 
with secondary sources where necessary. The chapter also discusses the 
methodological difficulties and constraints associated with doing research on 
trade negotiations and African regional organizations.
Chapters Five and Six dive into the empirics of the two case studies and show how 
higher levels of trade actorness in West Africa contributed to the region’s greater 
effectiveness in interregional trade negotiations with the EU than the SADC EPA 
Group, and how the EU’s influence in each of the regions contributed to or 
undermined regional actorness. Chapter Five details how, despite being composed 
primarily of poor, underdeveloped states, ECOWAS was fairly effective in the EPA 
trade negotiations with the EU. The region was (partially) effective on six out of 
eight key issues, and obtained major concessions from the EU on its two most 
important issues, due to its higher degree of actorness. The EU has positively 
contributed to ECOWAS’ actorness through the provision of large amounts of 
development funding targeted at regional capacity building and promoting 
regional integration, while there were no pre-existing trade deals with individual 
member states. As a result West African states are incentivized to cooperate at the 
regional level, enhancing actorness and effectiveness, and preserving the integrity 
of ECOWAS’s regional integration. 
Chapter Six focuses on the Southern African case study and shows how the SADC 
EPA group’s actorness was undermined by disparate member state preferences and 
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a lack of regional institutions or leadership, leaving the region unable to formulate 
a common position for the bulk of the negotiations, during which time the region 
was hardly effective. Actorness improved somewhat from 2010 onwards due to 
South Africa enforcing its leadership position, but even so the group was less 
effective than West Africa. Although it was also (partially) effective on six out of 
eight issues, it was less effective on its two most important issues. The region’s 
actorness was low due to the prevalence of overlapping regional initiatives – 
a factor inflamed by the EU – and an insufficient amount of EU funding to alter 
member states preferences in favour of regional cooperation. South Africa’s selfish 
behaviour in the negotiations can be partly explained by its pre-existing free trade 
deal with the EU. The group’s lack of cohesion contributed to its less-than-expected 
effectiveness in interregional negotiations, and the result is a sub-optimal 
interregional agreement that contributes to the fragmentation of regionalism in 
Southern Africa. 
Chapter Seven, the final and concluding chapter, compares the empirical findings 
of the two case studies and reflects on the their implications for theories of inter- 
regional cooperation and negotiation, as well as the idea of the EU as a normative 
power. It argues that, at least when it comes to the promotion of regionalism 
through interregionalism, it is perhaps more accurate to think of ‘Market Power 
Europe’ rather than ‘Normative Power Europe’. The chapter concludes with policy 
implications for African and European policy-makers, and suggestions for future 
research.  
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2.1  Introduction 
Although (proto-)interregionalism has been a feature of the international system 
since the 1950s, the topic did not attract much scholarly attention until the late 
1990s and early 2000s due to the small number of cases of interregional cooperation. 
The signing of the EU-Mercosur Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement 
in 1995, the establishment of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) the following year, 
and the increasing number of interregional relationships not involving the EU (see 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2) finally caught the attention of scholars. Due to its promising 
economic and political spoils, and the controversy surrounding the so-called 
‘Asian values’, the EU-Asia relationship is the most researched and written about 
case of interregionalism, with EU-Latin America a close second. However the 
suspension of EU-Mercosur trade negotiations in 2004 and the expansion of ASEM 
membership to the point that it was no longer a relationship between the EU and 
ASEAN seemed to put a dampener on the study of interregionalism. Several 
scholars declared interregionalism irrelevant and hardly worthy of study in its 
own right (Camroux 2004; Robles 2008), while others noted a fading away or 
replacement of interregionalism in favour of multilateral or bilateral cooperation 
(Doctor 2007; Hardacre 2009; Baert et al. 2014). However, the resumption of 
EU-Mercosur negotiations in 2010 and the conclusion of several interregional 
trade agreements between the EU and ACP regions in 2014 suggest that 
pronouncements on the ‘irrelevance’ of interregionalism are unfounded. For as 
long as states continue to pursue regional cooperation and integration we can 
expect the attendant phenomenon of interregionalism to be a feature of 
international cooperation. For as Mathew Doidge (2007) points out, regionalism 
and interregionalism are ‘joined at the hip’. Yet despite a renewed interest in inter-
regionalism, some geographic regions remain relatively neglected, while there is 
hardly any research on South-South interregionalism. The existing literature is 
also overly concerned with the systemic drivers of interregionalism and neglectful 
of the actual outcomes of interregional cooperation. 
With that in mind, this chapter explores the existing literature on interregional-
ism, with a focus on the supposed ‘functions’ of interregionalism, which has to 
date been the most popular approach to understanding the phenomenon. However 
this is not an analytically useful approach, as it is not clear whether these functions 
refer to the causes of interregionalism, interregionalism as a process, or the 
outcomes of interregional cooperation. Although I reject the skeptic’s view of 
interregionalism as unworthy of study in its own right, I agree with their critique 
that the field suffers from theoretical underdevelopment and stagnation, which 
‘goes a long way in explaining the misrepresentation that interregionalism is of 
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decreasing significance in world politics’ (Baert et al. 2014:2). As the ‘functional 
approach’ to interregionalism mostly tells us something about the when and why 
of the emergence of interregionalism (interregionalism as dependent variable), 
I advocate moving on from a functional approach to interregionalism in favour of 
an approach that examines the role of actorness – identified in the literature as an 
important aspect of interregional cooperation (see Section 2.5) – in impacting the 
outcomes of interregional cooperation (interregionalism as independent variable). 
Section 2.2 addresses the conceptual and definitional confusion that characterizes 
the literature and argues that although interregionalism between two regional 
organizations (with a free trade area or common external tariff) represents the 
ideal or ‘pure’ form, we should not necessarily exclude regions lacking formal 
institutions and/or integration. Excluding more informal regions or regions 
struggling to implement an even integration agenda risks a Eurocentric bias and 
the exclusion of more informal arrangements that are common in non-Western 
regions. Section 2.3 explores the European origins of interregionalism and the 
difficulties in moving away from a Eurocentric bias, while Section 2.4 outlines 
Rationalist and Constructivist approaches to interregionalism that are often 
combined to explain the ‘functions’ of interregionalism. It also examines the 
Critical IPE and New Regionalisms Approach treatment of interregionalism. 
Figure 2.1  Network of Interregional Dialogues Pre-1990 
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Section 2.5 highlights the importance of actorness in understanding interregional 
relations and undertakes a brief survey of the previous work on (EU) actorness. 
Finally, Section 2.6 summarizes the main research gaps and paves the way for the 
theoretical framework laid out in Chapter Three. 
2.2  Defining Interregionalism
As Fredrik Söderbaum and Luk van Langehove (2005) note, interregionalism, as a 
scholarly subject, is a relatively new phenomenon. As with any newish research 
agenda, the study of interregionalism has suffered from a degree of conceptual 
‘fuzziness’ as researchers struggle to grasp ‘a moving target’ (Baert et al. 2014). At a 
bare minimum all scholars agree that interregionalism consists of ‘interaction 
between two specified regions’ (Baert et al. 2014: 4), but lurking behind this 
deceptively simple formulation are questions over what exactly is meant by a 
‘region’, and whether said regions can be considered meaningful actors capable of 
interaction with other regions. This has resulted in a confusing proliferation of 
Figure 2.2  Network of Interregional Dialogues Post-1990 
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concepts and terminology, often used to describe similar subset or types of inter-
regionalism, as illustrated in Table 2.1. This conceptual proliferation is not 
particularly useful in an analytic sense, nor does it encourage researchers to build 
upon each other’s work.     
Pioneer of interregionalism research Heiner Hänggi was one of the first to 
systematically categorize the variants of interregionalism, distinguishing between 
interregionalism involving regional organizations, more diffuse ‘regional groups’, 
and individual states and regions in order to differentiate between ‘interregionalism 
in the narrow sense’, ‘quasi-interregionalism’, and ‘megaregional relations’ 
(Hänggi 2006). Regional groups are looser, more informal associations of states 
than a regional organization, such as the ‘Latin America’ of EU-LAC relations or 
the ACP Group of states, which ‘have in essence been formed for the sole purpose 
of engaging in a specific interregional relationship’ (Hänggi 2006: 39). This involves 
an understanding of regions as diffuse, without clearly defined borders, and low 
(or even non-existent) levels of regional agency (Baert et al. 2014), which fits with 
the New Regionalism Approach (NRA) that emphasizes the fact that ‘the formal 
and informal aspects of regionalization are often closely intertwined’ (Söderbaum 
2007: 186). NRA theorists argue for the inclusion of more diffuse ‘regions’, as 
regionalism in the developing world tends to be less institutionalized as in the 
Table 2.1  Types of interregionalism described in the literature 
Empirical category Terms used
RO – RO Bilateral interregionalism (Rüland, 2002) 
Pure interregionalism (Aggarwal and 
Fogarty, 2004) 
Biregional interregionalism (Chen 2005) 
Interregionalism in the narrow sense 
(Hänggi, 2006) Complex 
interregionalism 
(Hardacre and 
Smith, 2009) 
RO – single country Quasi-interregionalism (Hänggi, 2006)
RO – regional group Interregionalism in the narrow sense 
(Hänggi, 2006)
Hybrid interregionalism (Aggarwal and 
Fogarty, 2004) 
Intergroup interregionalism (Chen, 2005) 
Regional group –  
Regional group
Transregionalism (Aggarwal and Fogarty, 
2004; Rüland; Chen, 2005) 
Mega-regionalism (Hänggi, 2006) 
Source: own compilation
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West, and we would otherwise miss many examples of South-South interregionalism 
(Hänggi 2006). Given that the informal economy accounts for about half of Sub- 
Saharan Africa’s GDP and 80 percent of its labour force (African Development 
Bank, 2013), NRA theorists certainly have a valid point about the importance of 
informal networks, but one might question whether informal regions are actors in 
the same way as formally institutionalized regional organizations. 
Aggarwal and Fogarty (2004) categorize interregionalism based on the unity or 
plurality of each region. A unified region is one that is integrated to at least the 
level of a Free Trade Area, while a plural region signifies a looser alliance of states 
within a given region, encompassing both regional organizations that have not yet 
implemented an FTA, or looser regional groups such as the ACP. Pure interregionalism 
takes place between two ROs with FTAs, while hybrid interregionalism covers 
interregionalism involving a less integrated RO. Transregionalism covers a broader 
range of cooperation between more diffuse, plural regional actors. Their distinction 
and classification of pure interregionalism as the ‘ideal’ form of interregional 
cooperation is useful, as it highlights the economic motivation underlying many 
cases of interregionalism, and the fact that higher levels of integration makes a 
region both a more attractive negotiating partner for other well-integrated 
regions, and more likely to seek interregional cooperation as it searches for new 
markets for the region’s exports. They are certainly correct that, ideally, inter-
regionalism would take place between two regional organizations, preferably 
characterized by a free trade area or common external tariff, as such clearly 
delineated borders and shared rules on trade make interregional cooperation 
easier and more fruitful. Yet the emphasis on the presence/absence of a FTA as a 
qualifier glosses over the struggle of many regions, particularly in the developing 
world, to implement their integration agenda, and that integration may take place 
on the basis of variable geometry. Most ROs aspire to FTAs and deeper integration, 
so most examples of hybrid interregionalism between two ROs have the potential 
to become pure interregionalism, if and when the less integrated partner is able is 
able to implement their planned agenda. As Section 2.4 and Chapter Three point 
out, interregional cooperation with a stronger partner may help or hinder this 
process.  
In principle I am in favour of limiting the definition of interregionalism to 
relations between two or more regional organizations, excluding region-to-region 
relations in which regions are not represented by a regional organization. This is 
based on distinction between regionalization as the growth of formal and informal 
socio-economic transactions within a given region, and regionalism, ‘the establishment 
of formal organizations resulting from the top-down political response of states to 
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bottom-up processes of bottom-up regionalization’ (van der Vleuten and Ribeiro- 
Hoffman 2013). Regional organizations, which are characterized by legally-binding 
treaties, legal personality, a secretariat, and some sort of mandate to oversee the 
coordination of members states’ policies, are the result of regionalism and the 
formal expression of a region; a region being a geographical area with socially 
constructed, geo-political boundaries, which embodies a claim to common identity 
based on shared history and some combination of cultural, economic, linguistic 
and political ties (Mansfield and Milner 1999). Given that the field of interregion-
alism is currently under-theorized, and suffering from conceptual overstretch, 
the inclusion of diffuse/informal regions in addition to regional organizations 
makes for a typology that is perhaps too complex for making in-roads into a 
meaningful explanatory analysis of interregionalism (Ribeiro- Hoffman, 2016). 
Furthermore, several researchers have argued that diffuse regions do not possess 
agency in the same way as regional organizations, and for this reason interregion-
alism and transregionalism (region-to-region relations) are separate phenomena 
(Gilson 2002: 3). 
Yet while relations between two ROs each characterized by an FTA or common 
external tariff would certainly represent the (theoretical) ideal, at the same time 
we should be aware that this is not what necessarily takes place empirically. 
As NRA theorists point out, regions in the developing world may rely more on the 
informal aspects of regionalism and regionalization, and this may also extend to 
their interregional relations. And secondly, the constraints on formal institution-
alization and integration faced by many regions that engage with other regions 
should not automatically mean that these regions/regional organizations are not 
‘doing interregionalism’. So following Doidge, interregionalism is here defined as 
‘institutionalized relations between groups of states from different regions, each 
coordinated to a greater or lesser degree’ (2014: 38). States within a region can be 
coordinated formally or – in line with the NRA’s insights on non-western 
regionalisms – informally. Ideally states would be represented by a formalized 
regional organization and have obtained a free trade area or higher level of 
integration, but interregional cooperation can and does take place without the 
presence of formal regional institutions or functional free trade areas. However a 
lack of intra-regional coordination may challenge the feasibility and potential 
gains of interregionalism (see Section 2.5 on actorness and interregionalism). 
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2.3  The EU and Interregionalism 
 
One cannot consider interregionalism in isolation from the European Union. 
The EU has been engaging in interregional relations in some shape or form since 
the 1950s, and during the Cold War period was the sole practitioner of inter-
regionalism. As a result, the vast majority of existing literature concerns EU-led 
interregionalism, and as noted in Section 2.1, empirical or theoretical investigations 
of South-South interregionalism are practically non-existent. Unsurprisingly, the 
literature is often accused of harbouring a Eurocentric bias (Baert et al. 2014; 
Rüland, 2014). It is certainly true that the study of regionalism is often hampered 
by a tendency to hold up the European example as a yardstick against which to 
measure all other cases of regionalism, contributing to a failure to understand the 
logic of regional cooperation in other parts of the world (Krapohl et al. 2014). But it 
is also the case that the EU perhaps engages in interregionalism in a different 
manner, and for different reasons, than other regions. Like other regions, the EU 
engages in interregionalism in order to manage interdependence, secure market 
access and balance against economic competitors (van der Vleuten and Ribeiro- 
Hoffmann 2013). But it also engages in interregionalism for normative reasons. 
The EU presents itself as a normative power in the world, and uses interregionalism 
as a foreign policy strategy that not only allows the EU to enhance its legitimacy 
as a regional actor in a world in which Westphalian states are generally considered 
the central actors of international affairs, it also allows it to promote the legitimacy 
of regionalism as an ordering principle, thereby remaking the international 
system in its own image, from a world of nation-states to a world of regions. 
The EU is the world’s most integrated region, in both depth and scope. It represents 
the largest and wealthiest single market in the world, and with the passing of the 
Lisbon Treaty in 2009, is also growing in importance as an international political 
power. As an economic giant almost entirely lacking in military power, the EU is 
motivated to exercise international influence through the application of soft 
power and economic incentives. Soft power is ‘the ability to affect others to obtain 
the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment’ 
(Nye, 2008: 94), and as the most ‘successful’ experiment in regionalism, in which 
integration helped European countries to overcome the devastation of the Second 
World War and become peaceful, prosperous and stable, perhaps it is only natural 
that other regional initiatives might look to Europe to emulate this successful 
experiment. Cognizant of its lack of ‘hard power’, the EU seeks to capitalize on 
this, and develop a comparative advantage as an international actor via its support 
and promotion of regional cooperation in other parts of the world. To a certain 
extent, this framing of the EU’s ‘role’ in the world works by positioning the EU as 
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the ‘Other’ to an American hegemony based on military superiority and coercion 
(Kagan 2004). As several authors have pointed out, the European Union’s foreign 
policy is largely guided by domestic analogy (Bicchi 2006; Wetzel and Orbie 2011). 
The nationalism and militarism of the past were disastrous for Europe; it was 
regional cooperation and integration as well as redistribution to poorer parts of 
Europe that led to the pacification and prosperity of modern day Europe. If this is 
what worked for Europe, why wouldn’t something similar serve as well for other 
parts of the world? Based on this external projection of its historical experience 
and institutionalism, the EU has become the world’s most distinct and consistent 
promoter of regionalism in other parts of the world (Schimmelfennig 2009: 14; 
Lenz 2013). As a result of this ‘regionalized’ approach to foreign policy and global 
governance, the EU was the instigator and inventor of interregionalism (see Figure 
2.1). Its regionalized foreign policy is most prevalent in relations with the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of countries, and notably absent in relations 
with North America, where relations are instead conducted on a bilateral basis 
(Aggarwal and Fogarty 2005). In recent years interregionalism has transcended its 
European roots, but the EU remains the only international actor that attempts to 
diffuse the norm of regional cooperation and integration to other parts of the 
world via interregional frameworks. In that sense we can legitimately consider 
regionalism – unlike democracy or human rights – as a distinctly ‘European’ 
norm. Therefore an examination of EU influence on regional integration in other 
regions poses an ideal subject area for considering the extent to which the EU 
truly is a normative, transformative or ‘structural’ power (Manners 2002; Börzel 
and Risse 2009; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008). But why does the EU engage 
in the promotion of ‘regionalism through interregionalism’? What are the Union’s 
underlying motivations in spreading regionalism as an ordering principle? Broadly 
speaking, there are two understandings of Europe’s motivations in spreading 
regionalism. The first is a normative understanding that conceives of the idea of 
regionalism as a good in and of itself, and a more instrumental understanding 
that conceives of the spread of regionalism as a something akin to the spread of 
European spheres of influence. 
Normative Power Europe
The first perspective – in which regionalism is a good in itself – is drawn from the 
Normative Power Europe literature, in which the EU is considered as a force for 
good, and in which its global ‘role’ is to diffuse ‘universal’ norms to the external 
world. Most of this literature has focused on the EU’s support for processes of dem-
ocratization and human rights, but as Ian Manners has argued, the real core of 
Europe’s Normative Power is its ‘ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in 
international relations’ (2002: 239), and the EU ‘promotes regionalism as the 
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‘normal way’ for neighbouring countries to address issues of common interest’ 
(Bicchi 2006: 87). Certainly, regionalism as an organizing principle has become a 
normal state of affairs. Most countries in the world belong to at least one such 
organization, and regional organizations are increasingly recognized as actors 
and observers at multilateral international organizations. In this understanding 
of EU foreign policy, support for regionalism is driven by causal beliefs that 
regional integration is a good in itself: the ‘best way to ensure (regional) security, 
stability and prosperity at the EU’s borders and beyond’ (Börzel and Risse 2009: 5). 
This belief is informed by Europe’s own past, as the Commission’s Development 
and Cooperation Directorate makes clear: 
[T]hanks to its own experience, the European Union knows the value of regional 
co-operation as an engine of economic growth, development and security. It is keen to 
help other areas of the world make the most of co-operative activities and supports a 
number of programmes and initiatives that serve to benefit whole regions, rather than 
individual countries (from EuropeAid website).
 
There are a number of problems with this normative understanding of the EU’s 
promotion of regionalism. First of all, it privileges Western European history and 
the lessons learnt from it above that of others, and thus risks been perceived as 
condescending or patronizing, perhaps even neo-colonial, by those that are the 
‘subjects’ of EU foreign policy, particularly if that policy is perceived as inflexible 
or inconsiderate of local history and customs. Furthermore, the NPE approach 
conceives of the EU as an ideal type of political organization, in which there is 
little room for understanding ‘deviant’ behaviour. From the NPE perspective, 
when the EU fails to act in accordance with its principles, it is usually attributed 
to a ‘failure’ of foreign policy, due to a lack of actorness, or the oft-cited capabil-
ities-expectations gap (Hill 1993). Certainly any region composed of sovereign 
states will have limitations on regional foreign policy, and even the EU’s foreign 
policy, while more integrated than any other region, is still a sector with shared 
competencies. But perhaps the reason why the capabilities-expectations gap is 
frequently noted has more do with scholars’ unrealistically high moral 
expectations of European foreign policy, rather than a lack of the EU’s actual 
capabilities. It is entirely possible that the EU sometimes fails to act in accordance 
with its self-professed principles for self-interested strategic reasons, or as a result 
of competing, contradictory or contested norms (Diez 2013, see also Krasner 1999; 
Lipson 2006 on the concept of organized hypocrisy). However, the NPE approach to 
European foreign policy glosses over this possibility in favor of privileging a 
Utopian perspective on Europe and its foreign policy. This failure to recognize the 
possibility of ‘bad’ behavior is deeply biased and contrary to the spirit of scientific 
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inquiry, and brings us uncomfortably close to an almost neo-colonial understanding 
of international affairs, in which Europeans consider their way the best way, 
‘burdening’ themselves with the task of civilizing less enlightened parts of the 
world (Onar and Nicolaïdis 2013)
Market Power Europe, structural diplomacy, or ‘empire’  
through integration?  
An alternative understanding of the EU’s policy of ‘regionalism through inter-
regionalism’ attributes the EU with more mercantile self-interest. Several authors 
have explained EU norm promotion in terms of the expectation of material benefit, 
rather than pursuit of some universal ideal (cf. Youngs 2004; Hyde-Price 2006). 
Promoting regionalism in other parts of the world via interregionalism can benefit 
the EU by delivering economic benefits such as improved terms of trade and access 
to new markets (Bicchi 2006), but also a means of exporting regulatory standards 
in trade and trade-related issues that give Europe a first-mover advantage in the 
global economy. Regionalism through interregionalism can also deliver security 
benefits for Europe if regional cooperation contributes to sustainable development 
in the global South, thereby reducing negative externalities for the EU.
This understanding of the EU’s motivations resonates with the concept of 
‘structural diplomacy’, which refers to ‘the process of dialogue and negotiation by 
which actors in the international system seek to influence or shape sustainable 
external political, legal, economic, social and security structures at different 
relevant levels in a given geographic space’, with structures understood as ‘the 
organizing principles, rules of the game and institutions that determine how 
actors relate to each other’ (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 145-6). The EU’s 
promotion of and support to regional organizations can be considered a prime 
example of structural diplomacy in action. If other regions can be persuaded to 
adopt EU-style regional integration, including regulations on trade and 
trade-related issues that align with EU preferences, the EU will have a head start 
on other powerful economic actors in future multilateral negotiations. This 
rationale can be seen in the European Commission’s 2006 strategy paper Global 
Europe: Competing in the World, which notes that 
In all these areas [services, investment, public procurement and competition], 
transparent, effective and respected rules are essential. The proper enforcement of such 
rules at home is the foundation of our competitiveness. But we also need to work with 
others to ensure their rules and standards are of similar quality (European Commission 
2006: 8).    
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The strategy paper identifies interregional and bilateral FTAs as a means for going 
‘further and faster in promoting openness and integration’ than the multilateral 
system, and serving the strategic interests of European firms (European 
Commission 2006: 10), lending credence to Bicchi’s claim that the EU exports 
norms it expects to benefit from (2006: 291), and Chad Damro’s (2010) conceptual-
ization of the EU as a ‘Market Power’ that seeks to externalize its internal 
market-related policies and regulations. Ultimately, both the structural diplomacy 
and Market Power Europe concepts are about altering the rules of the game in 
favour of the strongest player; asserting a form of ideological hegemony in which 
the free market regionalism promoted by the European Union eventually becomes 
the only game in town; a game in which the EU knows the rules better than any 
other player. 
In security terms, parallels can be drawn between the EU’s ‘regionalism through 
interregionalism’ policies and the USA’s support of European integration through 
the Marshall Plan. The USA supported European regionalism in order to constrain 
Germany, contain the Soviet Union and the spread of communism, and reduce the 
USA’s burden in policing international security (Lundestad 1998). American 
foreign policy makers saw support for the EEC as the most efficient manner in 
which to influence Europe and further American interests on the European 
continent whilst incurring the smallest possible expense to themselves. Now that 
the EU has become an economic power to rival the US, the EU likewise positions 
itself as a paymaster to regionalism in the developing world, where underdevelop-
ment, insecurity and instability contributes to terrorism, illegal migration, and 
illicit trade in goods. In such a context, the promotion of regional cooperation 
through interregional frameworks can help to contain potential security threats, 
outsource some of the costs associated with global governance, and act as a conduit 
for the pursuit of European interests in Africa, Asia and Latin America. 
These normative and instrumentalist understandings of EU foreign policy differ 
in their explanation for the EU’s motivations to pursue a policy of ‘Europeaniza-
tion beyond Europe’. The NPE approach understands EU motivations as driven by 
a belief in the inherent ‘goodness’ of democracy, human rights, market 
liberalization, and regionalism. The more instrumentalist approach understands 
EU motivations as driven by a mixture of strategic interest and comparative 
advantage vis-à-vis other actors. As for the ‘true’ motivations of the EU, whether 
this foreign policy of creating a world of regions modelled after its own image is 
instrumental or normative is difficult to say. Arguably it is a bit of both, and 
probably best conceptualized as a policy of enlightened self-interest. The point is 
that the above discussion matters for the study of interregionalism as it highlights 
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the transformative intentions underlying the EU’s participation in interregional-
ism. Unlike other world regions, which participate in interregionalism primarily 
in order to strengthen their position vis-à-vis other economic regions and reduce 
bottlenecks in global governance, the EU participates in interregionalism specifically 
to promote regionalism in other areas. As ‘the “makability” of regions through the 
promotion of a set of norms connected to (inter-)regionalism seems to be primarily 
an EU concern’ (van der Vleuten and Ribeiro Hoffmann 2013), one should make a 
categorical distinction between interregionalism involving the EU, and cases of 
South-South interregionalism. It also suggests that efforts to move away from 
Eurocentrism in the study of interregionalism (Baert et al. 2014) are extremely 
difficult (if not impossible) precisely because of the EU’s qualitative difference 
from other interregional actors. The EU, in and of itself, is not a sui generis example 
of regionalism. But it is perhaps a sui generis actor in interregionalism, because it 
promotes regionalism in its partner regions where others do not.
2.4   Theoretical Approaches: the ‘functions’  
of Interregionalism 
Analysis of interregionalism has largely taken place through the standard lenses 
of contemporary International Relations theory – realism, liberal institutionalism 
and constructivism. Many contributions combine one or more strands of theorizing 
in contemplating the ‘functions’ of interregionalism (cf. Rüland 2002; Chen 2005; 
Hardacre 2009; Doidge 2011; Baert et al. 2014). These ‘functions’ are commonly 
considered to be balancing, rationalizing, agenda setting, and identity-building. 
Delineating the functions of interregionalism cannot really be considered explanatory 
theory of interregionalism, but each function can be associated with realist 
(balancing), liberal institutionalist (rationalizing, agenda-setting) or constructivist 
(identity-building) approaches to IR. Beyond this set of ‘standard’ IR theorizing are 
critical IPE and New Regionalisms Approaches (NRA) to understanding regionalism 
and interregionalism, although these remain somewhat underdeveloped on theorizing 
specifically on interregionalism. 
Realist approaches
Realist approaches take an outside-in perspective and locate the drivers of inter-
regionalism in systemic pressures at the global level. Interregionalism is associated 
with the pressures of globalization, and motivated by the desire to enhance one 
region’s geo-economic position and influence vis-à-vis other regions. In a world in 
which the relevance of security and the armed forces as a goal and instrument of 
international politics is reduced (Zürn 2002), control of international institutions 
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and ‘institutional power’ become important resources for states (Rüland 2010). 
Competition for institutional power and geo-economic influence causes nation 
states to turn first to regionalism and then interregionalism as a defensive strategy, 
thus interregionalism has the character of a strategic alliance, and follows the 
logic of balancing and bandwagoning (Roloff 2006: 28). The more economically 
powerful regions – Europe, Asia and North America – attempt to maintain a 
geo-economic equilibrium between them, using interregional forums as a means 
of institutional balancing, and forming a ‘Triad’ of interregional relations. The 
formation of the EU’s single market can be viewed as the trigger for balancing 
moves in Asia and the formation of APEC. European fears of being locked out of 
Asian markets lead to the formation of ASEM, while for Asian countries ASEM was 
an institutional mechanism to balance the economic influence of the US and 
Japan in APEC (Hanggi 1999; Rüland 2014). The competitive dynamics between the 
powerful players leads them to seek out alliances with weaker regions in an 
attempt to tip the balance of economic power in their favour, or alternatively to 
exclude competitors from gaining a foothold in emerging economies (Farrell 
2005). Indeed, EU-Mercosur relations were partly motivated to balance US 
dominance in Latin America (Bajo 1999; Doctor 2007), while competition between 
Europe and China for access to Africa’s raw materials has been a latent feature of 
the Economic Partnership Agreements. Peripheral regions in the developing world 
have little choice but to adapt themselves to the dynamics of the powerhouses of 
the global economy (Rüland 2006). Bandwagoning with a powerful region can 
allow them special advantages, such as access to markets and development aid, as 
well as acting as leverage to extract more favourable terms from other powerful 
actors. South-South interregionalism is likewise used as a means to balance the 
influence of more powerful actors. Interregional dialogues such as the Latin 
American- Africa forum, initiated by Brazil, have been launched to counter Western 
dominance of international institutions (Rüland 2014) and develop economic 
cooperation between the continents.
If interregionalism is indeed driven by institutional balancing and bandwagoning, 
we should expect shallow, non-binding and flexible institutions as the most likely 
outcome of interregional cooperation. Institutional balancing and bandwagoning 
requires actors to react quickly to evolving circumstances, making investment in 
strong, legally binding institutions costly (Hardacre 2009: 31). Certainly many 
interregional relationships are thinly institutionalized ‘dialogues’, which allow 
for flexibility and adaptability to shifting alliances and balances of power. These 
thinly institutionalized arrangements are particularly prevalent in South-South 
interregionalism (van der Vleuten and Ribeiro Hoffmann 2013), but this may be 
the result of a lack of actorness in both partner regions, or a cultural preference for 
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informal arrangements, rather than a feature designed to react to global and 
regional fluctuations in the balance of institutional power.  
Empirically, balancing and bandwagoning is probably the best-supported 
motivation for interregional cooperation (Rüland, 2010; van der Vleuten and 
Ribeiro Hoffmann 2013). Yet the realist focus on systemic drivers of interregional-
ism ignores potential ‘inside-out’ drivers of interregionalism, which may account 
for variation in the strength of interregional outcomes. Furthermore, it remains a 
highly state-centric perspective. The rational, utility-maximizing state remains 
the central actor in realist approaches to interregionalism, with regional and 
interregional institutions little more than vehicles for the interests of the most 
powerful states involved. State-centric theories that function on the assumption of 
a unitary central actor struggle to explain the sometimes-inconsistent behaviour 
of non-unified international actors such as the EU and other regions engaging in 
interregionalism.
Liberal institutionalist approaches 
Liberal institutionalist approaches view interregionalism as a means to manage 
complex interdependency, increasing trust and reducing uncertainty for the 
mutual benefit of both partners. Inspired by the perspective that international 
institutions decrease conflict and encourage cooperation by building trust, inter-
regionalism can be thought of as formalized ‘dialogue structures’ that aim to 
facilitate discussion of issues that ‘may not otherwise feature on an agenda for 
dialogue between the states and regions in question’ (Doidge, 2011: 36). Neoliberal 
institutionalism locates the drivers of interregionalism at both the systemic and 
domestic levels. The first strand of theorizing posits that interregionalism emerges 
as a reaction to deadlock in the multilateral system (Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004; 
Faust 2006) and provides rationalizing and agenda-setting functions intended to 
solve problems associated with multilateral cooperation (Doidge 2011). As the 
number of states participating in global institutions such as the WTO has grown, 
and the issues under discussion have become more contentious, multilateral deci-
sion-making has become increasingly slow. Attempts to rationalize multinational 
negotiations at the WTO through informal ‘Green room’ discussions, which tend 
to favour the participation of larger and higher-income countries, have been sorely 
criticized by small and developing countries as unrepresentative and lacking in 
transparency (Blackhurst 2000; Jones 2009). The numerical supremacy and 
increased resistance of developing countries has reduced certainty in the timely 
conclusion of multilateral negotiations, and regions turn to interregionalism as 
an alternative. Interregionalism can provide a rationalizing function, acting as a 
clearing house for multilateral issues by ‘divid[ing] negotiations on global issues 
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into a staggered bottom-up process which may start at the regional level before 
being elevated to the interregional and finally to the global level’ (Rüland 2010: 
1277), thereby reducing bottlenecks and streamlining the multilateral system. 
Viewing interregionalism in terms of a rationalizing function predicts that 
deadlock at the multinational level will result in increased activity at the 
interregional level, and that any agreements at the interregional level should be 
compatible with existing multilateral rules. Such a bottom-up rationalizing 
approach to solving multilateral problems via smaller subgroups of region-to-re-
gion consultations can also give developing states greater representation and 
voice, prevent their exclusion from informal backroom negotiations, thus 
enhancing the overall legitimacy of the multilateral system. However there is not 
much empirical evidence to support this supposed function of interregionalism. 
Although some scholars have drawn a correlation between the rise and fall of 
EU-Mercosur interregionalism and advances and slowdowns at the WTO (Hardacre 
2009: 186), others have noted that there does not seem to be a substantial link 
between interregionalism and multilateralism. For example, Aggarwal and 
Fogarty (2004) find that there is surprisingly little evidence that WTO compatibility 
is a major consideration in the EU’s interregional relations. A notable exception to 
this is EU-ACP interregionalism, where the EU insisted on the renegotiation of 
trade preferences on the grounds of WTO incompatibility, however the validity of 
the EU’s claim has never been proven and may have been little more than a handy 
excuse to renegotiate an agreement reaping rapidly declining returns (Aggarwal 
and Fogarty 2004: 374; Ravenhill 2004). 
Neoliberal institutional approaches also suggests that interregionalism may 
provide an agenda-setting function, in which interregional cooperation is used to 
advance multilateral rule change by building coalitions and consensus at the 
interregional level (Doidge 2011). The agenda-setting function fits with the EU’s 
tendency to pursue a WTO+ agenda in its interregional trade negotiations, asking 
for liberalization commitments far beyond what is required for WTO compatibility, 
leaving developing countries less policy space for traditional development 
cooperation under multilateral schemes such as the Generalized System of 
Preferences (Santander 2005). Several authors have pointed this out as an 
instrument of ‘divide-and-rule’, in which developing countries are persuaded to 
negotiate interregional trade agreements with rich industrialized regions without 
the numerical supremacy they have at the WTO (Hurt 2003). This perspective 
resonates with Critical IPE approaches to interregionalism (see below), which 
views interregionalism as a means of asserting a global neoliberal hegemony, 
diminishing the possibility of trade regimes that benefit developing countries 
(Santander 2005: 291). 
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The second neoliberal institutionalist perspective, which is not included in the 
oft-cited ‘functions’ of interregionalism, identifies the mobilization and competition 
of domestic interest groups, through lobbying at the national and regional levels, as 
the primary drivers of interregionalism (Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004; Doctor 2007; 
Camroux 2010). Strong support for interregionalism by domestic interest groups 
should be correlated with a rise in interregionalism, while decline of support should 
be correlated with their stagnation (van der Vleuten and Ribeiro Hoffmann 2013). As 
for the content and scope of interregional arrangements, interest groups best placed 
to advance their interests (for example, the influential European agricultural lobby) 
should see their preferences reflected in interregional policies towards other regions 
(Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004). Interregionalism can therefore be conceived as a 
four-level game in which the interests of the private sector, civil society, trade 
unions, national leaders, national and regional bureaucrats and parliamentarians 
on both sides must be taken into account to explain interregional outcomes 
(Camroux 2010). To the extent that interest groups are well organized, vocal and 
there are clear winners and losers, domestic and regional interest groups can play 
an important role in determining regional preferences and enhancing the 
negotiating power of a region. This perspective rejects any novelty in the phenomenon 
of interregionalism: it is not a new form of international behaviour, but rather an 
extension of Putnam’s well-worn formulation of two-level games in international 
affairs. Focusing on the EU’s interregional policy, empirical investigations have 
found a correlation between strong business group mobilization and the rise of 
interregional regimes (Bajo 1999; Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004). Likewise, a 
subsequent waning of interest and lobbying is correlated with the failure of 
interregional negotiations to progress (Faust 2006; Doctor 2007). National and 
regional NGOs and other civil society groups are other interested parties in 
interregional policy making, particularly in EU-ACP interregionalism, yet to date 
there are few works that comprehensively study the role of such groups in inter-
regionalism (see Silke Trommer’s 2014 analysis of West African civil society in EPA 
negotiations for a notable exception). Yet while interest group mobilization can go 
some way to explaining the progress and ‘bindingness’ of interregional regimes, it 
does not account for the (EU’s) preference to opt for interregionalism when 
bilateralism or multilateralism would equally suffice (Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004: 
370). The EU’s interregional policy is therefore better understood as ‘a normative 
goal or process promoted by the EU and linked to its self-projection in a global 
context’ (Camroux, 2010: 72). Undoubtedly this is an important aspect of the EU’s 
participation in interregionalism. However this perspective sheds little light on the 
motivations underlying South-South interregionalism, where countries could easily 
opt for bilateralism, and whose regional secretariats are presumably not driven by 
the same normative motivations as the European Commission.  
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If interregionalism is driven by the desire to increase trust and certainty between 
regions, we should expect interregional cooperation to result in robust and 
long-term institutions (Hardacre 2009: 31). If a rationalizing function is the 
primary motivation we should expect interregional outcomes to be compatible 
with and nested within existing multilateral rules (Aggarwal 1998), while 
agenda-setting motivations are more likely to result in agreements that go beyond 
existing multilateral rules. To date there is no empirical research comparing 
interregional agreements and whether they are nested in or go beyond multilateral 
agreements, yet several studies note that the rule-bindingness of interregional 
relations, even in cases where bindingness is least likely to be costly (i.e. with 
weaker and relatively unimportant partner regions), is not particularly high and 
has even been declining in the case of EU-ACP interregionalism (Ravenhill 2004). 
Neoliberal institutionalism illustrates how interregionalism can address problems 
of multilateral cooperation amongst a large number of state actors, while the 
pluralist interest group approach highlights the role of domestic and regional 
interest groups, which as we know from the vast literature on trade negotiations 
and EU integration are important in determining the form and content of 
international agreements (cf. Moravcsik 1998). Yet the approach cannot tell us why 
interest groups might prefer interregionalism to bilateralism or multilateralism, 
and there is little empirical support for the supposed rationalizing and 
agenda-setting functions of interregionalism. As the robustness of interregional 
institutions is generally low, it seems likely there are other factors at play in 
determining interregional outcomes. 
Constructivist approaches 
Constructivism focuses on how inter-subjective practices between actors result in 
interests, ideas, and identities being formed through processes of social interaction, 
instead of assuming they are a prior and exogenous to interaction (Söderbaum 
2004: 15). Constructivist approaches to interregionalism look beyond the purely 
‘rational’ explanations of interregionalism to analyze the role of identity, norms 
and values in region-to-region relations, and examine how interaction within the 
context of interregional dialogues effects processes of internal and external iden-
tity-formation Much of the constructivist theorizing about interregionalism 
seems to have been inspired by EU-ASEAN relations and the debate that arose in 
the mid-1990s about ‘Asian values’ and the ‘universality’ of human rights. 
Although those that identify collective identity formation as a function of inter-
regionalism do not clearly differentiate whether it is a driver or outcome of inter-
regionalism, the ideational drivers of interregionalism can be broken down into 
three closely related analytic components. Regions may engage in interregionalism 
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to strengthen their external identity as an international actor, to strengthen their 
internal sense of regional identity, or lastly, to deliberately construct other regions 
via the diffusion of norms. 
Firstly, regional actors may use interregional dialogues as a means to enhance the 
region’s international presence and recognition by others as a foreign policy actor 
(Rosamond 2000; Hardacre 2009; Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2010). The literature on 
EU actorness identifies the recognition and perceptions of outsiders as factors 
relevant to the EU’s foreign policy identity. The more often the EU acts internationally, 
or develops the internal competencies to act within a specific realm, even if it 
hasn’t yet done so, the more outsiders expect it to act, thereby giving it more 
opportunity and legitimacy to take action (Bretherton and Vogler 2006). For 
example, Asian policy makers may have used interregionalism to cement the ‘idea’ 
of East Asia as a global region (Rosamond 2000; Gilson 2002), while the EU uses its 
interregional relationships as a means of normatively distinguishing its behaviour 
from that of the United States (Grugel 2004). However it would appear that the 
strength of the EU’s self-imposed role conception varies according to the degree of 
asymmetry with the interregional partner (Hettne and Söderbaum 2005). The EU 
is more normative in its relations with weaker regions, suggesting that material 
power plays a role in when and why interregionalism is used as a means of 
constructing the EU’s normative foreign policy identity. Additionally, these 
perceptions may not be line with the image a region attempts to create for itself. 
Studies on the external perceptions of the EU suggest that despite the best efforts 
of the EU to construct a normative image for itself, there is little evidence that 
outsiders actually perceive of the EU as a ‘force for good’. Outsiders primarily 
perceive the EU as an economic powerhouse whose actions are driven by 
commercial self-interest (Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2010, Chaban and Holland 
2014). 
Secondly, regions may participate in interregionalism to strengthen their internal 
sense of identity. The cognitive rationale underlying this that it is only through 
‘self-conscious interaction with comparable “others” [that] the conception of “self” 
takes place’ (Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004: 15). Interacting with other regions 
requires a common regional policy which embodies certain norms and values, 
which – once put into action – trickle down to the citizens of the region who then 
adopt those norms and values as constituent parts of their own sense of 
‘regionalized’ identity (Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004). Thus interaction with other 
regions via interregional dialogues serves to hold up a mirror to internal region- 
building processes, consolidating a regional political identity (Lucarelli and 
Fioramonti 2010: 4). However empirical instigations find little evidence to suggest 
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interregionalism has any effect on internal identity (how ‘European’ citizens feel) 
(Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004). So while it may be the case that interregionalism 
does little to foster a sense of common identity among the inhabitants of a region, 
interregionalism may be able to promote the actorness of regions by strengthening 
their external identity and presence in the international system, even if outsiders 
don’t cohere with the image a region projects, they still recognize it as an actor. 
Finally, a region may use interregionalism as a means to deliberately construct 
internal coherence in a partner region, by offering incentives to a partner region 
to adopt particular norms and institutions. The establishment of interregional 
relations allows the EU to convey norms, values and interests to other parts of the 
world (Söderbaum et al. 2005: 376). This function of interregionalism is, in theory, 
not limited to the EU, but in practice the great power asymmetries between the EU 
and any other region mean that it is the only region able to employ interregionalism 
in this fashion. Indeed, the EU has used its external relations – in the form of 
 interregionalism – to export the idea of regionalism (along with other norms) to 
other world regions via the mechanisms of coercion, incentivization, socialization, 
persuasion and emulation (Börzel and Risse 2009). In doing so the EU constructs 
for itself a unique foreign policy identity premised on civilian or normative power 
(external identity-building), while at the same time exporting a particular form of 
governance to other parts of the world and transforming identities and institutions 
in other regions. The EU’s attempts to use its interregional relations to diffuse 
regionalism as an ordering principle has met with some success. It has developed 
a sophisticated toolbox to diffuse its script on the virtues of regional cooperation 
(Börzel and Risse 2009), and many regions in the developing world depend on the 
EU’s financial and technical assistance in implementing their own regional 
agendas. Certainly there has been increasing convergence in the governance 
standards promoted by regional organizations round the world (Börzel et al. 2013), 
which lends credence to the ‘regionalism through interregionalism’ function 
ascribed to EU-led interregionalism. Yet the persistent differences between regions 
highlights the limits of diffusion via interregionalism. Regions that are the targets 
of ‘regionalism through interregionalism’ have their own agency (however limited 
in comparison to the EU) and retain the ability to selectively adopt, adapt, or resist 
external norm diffusion. 
As for outcomes, participation in interregionalism may spur processes of unintended 
collective identity formation within regions as a response to a particular aspect or 
act of the interregional partner (Doidge 2011). This may be reactive and oppositional 
if one partner perceives the relationship as a means for the other to establish or 
consolidate superiority (Rüland 2006: 308; Doidge 2011: 47), triggering an internal 
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identity-building process that seeks to distinguish the ‘Self’ from the ‘Other’ in 
negative terms (Flockhart 2006). To a certain extent this dynamic was present in 
the debate over the universality of human rights, when the idea of ‘Asian values’ 
emerged as a counterpoint to the normative hegemony of Western conceptualiza-
tions of human rights. On the other hand collective identity formation may be 
adoptive (Doidge 2011). Instead of a hostile, reactive response of oppositional 
identity building, a region may come to increasingly identify with the partner 
region, perceiving the interregional relationship in terms of a ‘Significant We’ 
instead of ‘Self/Other’ relationship (Flockhart 2006). The EU’s emphasis on a 
‘partnership of equals’ between itself and the ACP makes it clear that this is one of 
its intended outcomes of its cooperation with the ACP regions, yet the skepticism 
and at times downright hostility of ACP regions to aspects of the Cotonou 
Agreement and EPAs suggests that the opposite may in fact take place. 
Constructivist approaches present several methodological problems. Regional 
identity and determining the point at which regions achieve a sense of ‘we-feeling’, 
and the extent to which this might be the result of interaction with an external 
partner as opposed to endogenous processes of identity-formation, is extremely 
difficult to accurately assess. This has led to contradictory empirical findings. For 
example in the case of East Asia, Hanns Maull and Nuria Okfen (2006) have found 
little evidence that ASEM has been a significant factor in the construction of 
European or Asian identities, while Julie Gilson (2002) claims the direct opposite, 
that ASEM has provided first-hand experience of the nature of regionalism and 
regional integration for the member states of ASEAN, strengthening regional 
identity in East Asia. While the norm diffusion approach has been suggested as a 
promising means to ‘revitalize’ the study of interregionalism (Rüland 2014), the 
existing literature on norm diffusion has a tendency to focus on international or 
Western norms that are presumed to be ‘good’ and universal, and which ultimately 
prevail over ‘bad’ local beliefs and practices (Acharya 2004), and the assumption 
that interaction will lead to increased socialization and convergence between 
partners. However it is equally possible that ‘bad’ or inappropriate norms are 
diffused between regions, and that interaction may in fact lead to conflict rather 
than convergence (cf. Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations thesis).
Critical IPE approaches 
Critical approaches to international political economy consider interregionalism 
‘problem solving’ (in the Coxian sense) institutions designed to soothe over the 
tensions inherent in global capitalism. Theorists have characterized EU-Asian 
relations in particular as driven by an alliance of states and multinationals 
intending to advance a neoliberal agenda (Richards and Kirkpatrick 1999) and 
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assert the hegemony of (Western) capital over (non-Western) labour (Cammack and 
Richards 1999; Cammack 1999; Richards 1999; Ranald 1999). This approach shares 
some commonalities with that of neoliberal institutionalism, in the sense of 
understanding interregional institutions as a means to resolve conflicts of interest 
between regions, and thereby contribute to global governance. However, as a 
normative perspective, Critical IPE considers the maintenance of the current 
economic system an undesirable outcome, and advocates for the potential of inter-
regionalism to generate transregional counter-hegemonic projects that bring 
together different emancipatory movements (Ranald 1999; Richards 1999; Briceño 
Ruiz 2010). This approach also rejects the relevance of regional culture or identity 
in interregional relations, with the much-debated ‘Asian values’ dismissed as an 
ideological justification of authoritarianism and social inequity (Freeman 1999). 
Conflict within and between regions is not so much due to differences of culture 
or identity, but rather the inherently conflictual nature of capitalism. Like 
neoliberal institutionalism, Critical IPE highlights the role of interest groups in 
the construction of interregional policies, and how the establishment of inter- 
regional forums can provide new platforms for the organization of civil society, 
in some cases allowing non-state actors to bypass repressive regimes at home. 
Yet the emancipatory goals of Critical IPE research are beyond the more modest 
explanatory ambitions of this research project, and as the problem solving function 
of interregionalism as conceived by Critical IPE is adequately covered by the 
rationalizing and agenda-setting functions as conceived by neoliberal institution-
alism, I will not further engage with Critical IPE theorizing on interregionalism. 
The New Regionalism Approach 
Finally, the New Regionalism Approach (NRA), which falls beyond the oft-cited 
functions of interregionalism, can be considered a sub-category of constructivism 
as it is concerned with the making (and unmaking) of regions and regional agency. 
NRA departs from more traditional approaches in its prioritization of regionaliza-
tion over the state-led project of regionalism, and its emphasis on historical 
context (in this respect it has some links with Critical IPE). One of NRA’s biggest 
contributions is to realize the role of the informal in regionalism and regionaliza-
tion – which is particularly pertinent when studying regionalisms in parts of the 
world where states are ‘weak’. As Fredrik Söderbaum notes, NRA ‘obviates the 
artificial separation of state and non-state actors associated with traditional or 
conventional regional approaches and also recognizes that formal and informal 
aspects of regionalization are often closely intertwined’ (2007: 186). NRA theorists 
also point out that regionalism in some parts of the world may have more to do 
with boosting the legitimacy of incumbent regimes than market integration, thus 
explaining the proliferation of overlapping initiatives in Africa and elsewhere. 
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What Eurocentric scholars perceive of as the ‘failure’ of various regional initiatives, 
in the sense of failing to integrate or implement policy, is not actually a failure, as 
these regional initiatives were never actually conceived for these purposes. 
NRA scholars suggest that EU-Africa interregionalism is driven (on the European 
side) by the EU’s self-image as a civilian power promoting norms such as 
regionalism, democracy and human rights, but that this can also be understood as 
‘soft imperialism’ when examining the European Union’s underlying (economic) 
motivations (Hettne 2007; Söderbaum 2007). It suggests that interregionalism – 
both for the EU and its weaker partners – may be something of an exercise in 
symbolic politics. Geir Olsen (2006) argues that the EU-Africa dialogue is motivated 
by the EU’s desires to portray itself as a normative actor in international politics 
and be seen to be ‘doing something’ about poverty in Africa. At the time of the first 
EU-Africa Summit in Cairo in 2000, support for development policies was high 
amongst the European public, but the high-profile Cairo process did not actually 
introduce any new substantive issues, and the Europeans refused to discuss debt 
relief or new financial instruments for financing development, lending substance 
to the idea of (EU-Africa) interregionalism as an exercise in summitry and symbolic 
politics intended more to boost the status and legitimacy of the relevant actors, 
rather than achieve substantial goals on development. This may help to explain 
why so many interregional dialogues are thinly institutionalized and frequently 
fail to make progress on substantive objectives. However this may apply more to 
political and development-orientated interregional cooperation than economic 
interregionalism that aims to culminate in interregional trade deals. It seems 
unlikely that regional and national elites would agree to unpopular sweeping 
liberalization schedules in order to boost their domestic status. 
2.5  Interregionalism and Actorness
Traditionally IR has considered states the only relevant actors, but as we move 
away from Westphalian orthodoxy it is becoming apparent that states are not the 
only actors capable of swaying international affairs. IR scholars increasingly 
recognize the influence of non-state actors, including transnational advocacy 
groups, multinational corporations, and organized criminal networks. Yet regions 
and regional organizations are neither non-state actors nor state-actors, but 
inter-state political systems occupying the middle-ground, and deriving both 
their strength and weakness from this status, being as strong as its constituent 
parts accept it to be (van der Vleuten and Ribeiro Hoffmann 2013).  
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Within the study of interregionalism it quickly became apparent that scholars 
required some way of conceptualizing the ‘power’, or capacity to act, of regions. 
But regions are not the unitary actors that IR commonly assumes states to be, and 
it is not really feasible to apply the same assumptions used to conceptualize state 
power (military power, GDP etc) to regions. Hence the adaptation of the concept of 
actorness from the study of EU foreign policy to interregionalism more generally. 
Actorness refers to regional agency: the ability of regional organizations to act 
‘deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system’ (Sjöstedt 1977: 
16), as well as the ability to exert influence and shape the perceptions and 
expectations of others (Allen and Smith 1990). There is already a substantial body 
of literature discussing the EU’s actorness (cf. Sjöstedt 1977; Allen and Smith 1990; 
Hill 1993; Jupille and Caporaso 1998; Bretherton and Vogler 2006), but very little 
on the actorness of regions beyond the European Union, and some scholars are 
skeptical of the very notion that non-European regions may possess the attributes 
of actorness at all. However, if regions can engage with other actors in the 
international system then they must de facto posses some capacity to act: ‘regions 
need to achieve a degree of actorness before interregional interaction – in any 
form – can take place’ (Rosamond 2000: 80). Likewise, several authors within the 
interregionalism literature have recognized that ‘counterpart coherence’ is 
important in determining the form and outcomes of interregional cooperation 
(Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004), even if they don’t explicitly refer to actorness.   
The study of actorness thus far has largely been confined to the realm of EU studies, 
as its emerging actorness is the most noticeable and influential on the international 
stage. Within the discussion of EU actorness, some scholars have emphasized the 
primacy of institutional set-up (Nuttall 1992; Chaban et al. 2006), ideological 
factors (Dûchene 1973; Manners 2002), or (the lack of) military capacity (Bull 1982; 
Larsen 2002). This has led to various conclusions, from ‘Europe is not an actor in 
international affairs, nor is it likely to become one’ (Bull 1982: 151), to Europe 
having the ‘ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations’ 
(Manners 2002: 239). Perhaps the problem lays in identifying the ‘nature of the 
beast’. The EU is ‘neither a state nor a non-state actor, and neither a conventional 
international organization nor an international regime’ (Ginsberg 2002: 432). 
However, many conceptualizations of EU actorness fall into the trap of comparing 
the EU, either implicitly or explicitly, against the ideal of the nation-state. As ‘the 
recognition rules that accord an entity significance within the international 
system tend to be governed by highly state-centric norms’, there is a tendency to 
measure the external projections of the EU – or indeed any region – in terms of 
success or failure to conform to the norm of ‘stateness’ (Rosamond 2005: 466). More 
recent scholarship (Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Groenleer and Schaik 2007; 
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Hettne et al. 2008; Doidge 2011) has moved beyond comparing the EU to the 
nation-state ideal or placing an exclusive emphasis on one particular aspect of the 
Union’s make-up. These studies tend to include some sort of joint consideration of 
internal policy-making processes, third party expectations of the EU, and the 
capability to carry out foreign policy through the use of instruments of persuasion, 
socialization, incentives, and coercion. Some scholars also emphasise the 
importance of a shared identity in establishing international actorness: Charlotte 
Bretherton and John Vogler (2006) consider a shared commitment to an overarching 
set of values one of the basic requirements of actorness, while Jens-Uwe Wunderlich 
notes that the EU’s self-image as a source of peace and security permeates every 
aspect of its external relations (2012: 7). 
While scholarship on EU actorness has evolved into a more comprehensive affair, 
analysis of regional actorness beyond the EU remains in a putative state, despite its 
acknowledged importance for understanding interregional cooperation and 
negotiation (Hettne 2007; 2014). There are only isolated studies on the actorness of 
ASEAN (Wunderlich 2012), SADC (Adelmann 2009), and East and Southeast Asia 
(Hettne 2014). Thus far actorness is neither a systematic nor a truly comparative 
concept, nor does it allow one to say whether one region has more actorness than 
another (Hulse 2014). Yet actorness is an important concept for interregionalism 
because ‘the stronger the counterpart (in terms of actorship), the more concessions 
are made by the EU… with weaker partners, the EU seems to dictate far more of the 
conditions for interregional cooperation’ (Rignér and Söderbaum 2010: 56). Thus 
the issue of regional actorness clearly has implications for interregional outcomes, 
yet the lack of a systematic, generalizable and comparative concept of actorness 
inhibits our understanding of such outcomes. 
2.6  Conclusion 
Having surveyed the existing literature on interregionalism, and the EU’s role in 
it, this chapter identifies six lacuna in the state of the art, which this project aims 
to address. 
First, there is a lack of clarity whether interregionalism should be considered a 
level of analysis, a theory, or a foreign policy strategy. Some consider interregion-
alism a mere fourth-level game in multilateral negotiations: nothing new 
requiring new or additional concepts and theories (Camroux 2010). Others consider 
interregionalism a ‘new’ phenomenon, something qualitatively different from 
other forms of multilateral cooperation that requires theoretical innovation 
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(Hänggi et al. 2006), while still others view interregionalism as a (European) 
strategy to spread norms associated with a particular model of regional governance 
(Lundestad 1998; Manners 2002; Schimmelfennig 2009; Börzel and Risse 2009; 
Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008). Perhaps this lack of clarity is due to the fact 
that different regions participate in interregionalism for different reasons: for the 
EU interregionalism is a foreign policy strategy, while other regions are often 
pushed into interaction at the interregional level more for immediate reasons 
than satisfying long-term strategic thinking. I think it is most useful to think of 
interregionalism as a level of analysis requiring a degree of theoretical innovation 
in understanding the collective behaviour of the states and regions that constitute 
interregional cooperation, keeping in mind that different regions are motivated 
by different drivers.
Second, the proliferation of different conceptualizations of interregionalism is 
contributing to conceptual overstretch and the theoretical stagnation of the field. 
While interregionalism would ideally take place between two or more regional 
organizations that have obtained a minimal level of integration, in practice 
real-life interregionalism often fails to adhere to the neat boundaries of pre-existing 
regional organizations and integration. The cases explored in this project focus 
on interregionalism that was intended to take place between two regional 
organizations (the EU and ECOWAS/SADC). However as the empirical chapters 
illustrate, in practice one of the African regions devolved to the point that half 
of the member states were not included in the final agreement. For that reason 
the manuscript adopts the more pragmatic definition of interregionalism as 
institutionalized relations between groups of states from different regions, each 
coordinated to a greater or lesser degree. 
Compounding the conceptual and theoretical fuzziness surrounding the study of 
interregionalism is the focus on the ‘functions’ of interregionalism. It is not clear 
whether a ‘function’ of interregionalism refers to causes (independent variables), 
consequences (dependent variables) or processes (mechanisms). Skeptics have 
questioned whether the functions as described actually exist, although this 
criticism stems from a belief that the different theoretical understandings implicit 
in the supposed functions are incommensurate (Robles 2008), rather than a lack of 
clarity of where ‘function’ falls in the chain of causality. I advocate moving away 
from a functional approach in order to consider the outcomes of interregional 
relations. The functional approach (implicitly) tells us something about the when 
and why of the emergence of interregionalism (as a response to systemic pressures, 
mostly), but with the exception of Aggarwal and Fogarty’s work, very little about 
the actual outcomes (or lack thereof) of engaging in interregional cooperation. 
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Surely regions participating in interregional relations expect to benefit in some 
way, but how, or why some regions benefit more than others from similar forms of 
interregional cooperation has remained unexplored, but is particularly interesting 
where the results of such cooperation are codified in legally-binding agreements 
with far-reaching consequences for the states and regions involved. 
Fourth, the application of state-centric theories to the phenomenon of interregion-
alism is problematic. These theoretical approaches were originally developed to 
explain inter-state behaviour and outcomes, and rest upon the assumption of a 
rational, unitary actor (i.e. the Westphalian state). However, as any student of EU 
foreign policy will attest, it is problematic to assume that regions are the unitary 
actors that states are. Even the most integrated and well-developed example of 
regionalism (the EU) struggles to implement vertical and horizontal coherence in 
its external relations (Portela and Raube 2012), with the result that it often 
implements inconsistent or even contradictory foreign policies (cf. Lurweg 2011). 
Most traditional realists or neoliberal institutionalists would reject the notion 
that regions can be actors in their own right, instead viewing them as containers 
or conveyor belts for state interests. Yet most scholars of interregionalism note that 
for regions to engage in interregional relations they must have de facto developed 
at least some minimal actor qualities. However the literature still lacks a 
generalizable model of regional actorness that can be used to compare and contrast 
the actorness of different regions. Chapter Three addresses this shortcoming by 
developing such a model.    
Fifth, the field has been characterized by a lack of empirical and methodological 
rigor and a lack of comparative case studies. Many studies ‘fail to provide 
convincing empirical evidence that supports their theoretical claims’ (Robles, 
2008: 11), while other contributions have been ‘descriptive and policy-orientated 
in an often narrow and at times even anecdotal way’ (Hänggi et al. 2006, 7). 
Comparative case studies are few and far between (Ribeiro Hoffmann, 2016). This 
research projects addresses at least part of this problem via a comparative case 
study of two cases of asymmetric interregionalism, and comparing the differences 
in interregional outcomes between two fairly similar regions (SADC and West 
Africa) in their interactions with a much stronger partner region (the EU), whose 
preferences and capabilities remain more-or-less similar across both cases. In 
doing so, the research sheds some light on the motivations of non-European 
regions for participating in interregionalism, while the comparative approach 
moves us beyond the anecdotal and descriptive.  
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Finally, the study of interregionalism is characterized by a great deal of 
Eurocentrism. Most are associated with EU Studies and a concern with the 
European Union’s external relations and evolution of the Common Foreign and 
Security Framework (Rüland 2014: 19). To the extent that the EU is the inventor 
and main practitioner of interregionalism, and engages in interregionalism 
(partly) in order to promote a particular model of regionalism in other parts of the 
world, this observed Eurocentrism is both understandable and difficult to escape. 
Even though this project does involve a comparative case study of two cases of 
interregionalism involving the EU, I try to retain an awareness of the Eurocentrism 
in much of the research on regionalism and interregionalism. The research is 
focused on the agency of the ‘other side of the equation’; those regions that are the 
targets of the EU’s policy of ‘regionalism through interregionalism’, and will 
contribute to a small but growing literature on non-European regions as 
international actors. The framework outlined in Chapter Three also recognizes 
that the logic of regional cooperation in the developing world is often different 
from that followed in Europe/the developed world, with important ramifications 
for the development of regional actorness, and by implication, interregional 
outcomes. 
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3.1  Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined how the functional approach to interregionalism 
tells us little about the outcomes of interregional cooperation and negotiations. In 
order to understand the outcomes of interregionalism, one needs a way to 
conceptualize the relational power, or capacity to act, of the regions that engage in 
interregionalism. For this the concept of actorness is important. Actorness is 
already an established concept in EU foreign policy studies, but existing models 
have limited applicability to regions beyond the European Union. With that in 
mind, Section 3.2 develops a generalizable model that can be used to assess the 
actorness of any region in relation to a specific policy field. The model illustrates 
how shared identities, formal and informal institutions, member state preferences 
and capabilities interact to produce higher or lower degrees of actorness. Section 
3.3 draws a causal link between actorness and how effective regions are when 
engaging external partners. Regions with higher degrees of actorness are more 
likely to reap the benefits of interregional cooperation as they are more likely to be 
successful in obtaining outcomes in line with their objectives. However, the actor-
ness-effectiveness equation is complicated in the case of ACP regions. Section 3.4 
outlines how ACP regions are motivated by an extra-regional logic in their efforts 
at regional cooperation and integration. This makes them susceptible to external 
influence, particularly that of the European Union, which can boost or undermine 
their actorness. 
3.2  Actorness6
Actorness – the ability of regions to become identifiable, aggregate interests, 
formulate goals and policies and make and implement decisions (Rüland 2002) – 
has already been identified as an important concept in interregionalism 
(Söderbaum and van Langenhove 2005). The EU’s foreign policy actorness has been 
extensively discussed since the 1970s (see Drieskens et al. 2014 for an overview of 
this literature), but to date there are exceptionally few examinations of the actorness of 
other regions, even as they become increasingly relevant in international affairs. 
6 Much of Section 3.2, as well as significant chucks of Sections 5.2 and 6.2 have been previously 
published as Hulse, M. (2014) ‘Actorness beyond the European Union: Comparing the international 
trade actorness of SADC and ECOWAS’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 52 (3) pp. 547-565. 
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However, adapting the literature on EU actorness to a non-European context 
presents a number of challenges. First, many scholars view the EU as sui generis: a 
unique institution incomparable to other political entities (Manners, 2002; 
Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Cămakalová and Rolenc, 2012). EU actorness is often 
defined in terms of its ‘competencies’: who gets to decide what in an institutional 
setting. While the EU’s institutional makeup is certainly an important factor in 
its actorness, the focus on EU-style competencies when looking at other regions 
leads to a tendency to dismiss regions that do not conform to the ‘standard EU 
model’ (Wunderlich 2012). This cognitive bias often leads to the conclusion that 
non-Western regions that develop along alternative institutional paths, such as 
ASEAN or Mercosur, are weak, inefficient, and not relevant actors in international 
affairs. For this reason informal institutions are here included alongside formal 
ones in considering regional actorness, as informal practices that occur within the 
overall institutional setting of regions also are important in examining actorness, 
especially in regions characterized by ‘presidentalism’ or other informal practices. 
The second problem of this literature is a methodological one, in which (effective) 
behavior is taken as analogous to actorness (cf. Bretherton and Vogler 2006; 
Groenleer and van Schaik 2007), which muddies cause and effect and ignores cases 
of ‘non-barking dogs’.7 This tends to lead to the conclusion that when the EU (or 
any other region) does not act, or acts ineffectively, it is because it lacks the ability 
to do so, when in reality there may be other factors inhibiting effective action 
(Thomas 2012). 
More recent scholarship has begun to move in the direction of a generalizable 
framework of regional actorness and empirical investigations of the actorness of 
non-European regions (cf. Adelmann 2009; Doidge 2011). Jens-Uwe Wunderlich’s 
(2012) comparative framework – based on self-understanding, recognition and 
presence, and institutionalization and decision-making structures – successfully 
challenges the notion that actorness is unique to the EU, and illustrates how 
actorness may emerge in different institutional settings. The New Regionalism 
Approach (NRA) also implicitly recognizes the relevance of actorness in its 
five-stage conceptualization of ‘regioness’. Lower levels of regioness are 
characterized by territoriality and interdependencies between peoples, but as 
processes of regionalization and regionalism take hold, regions ‘increasingly 
7 The case of the non-barking dog, aka ‘the curious incident of the dog in the nighttime’, refers to 
the story Silver Blaze by Arthur Conan Doyle. In it, Sherlock Homes infers that because a dog did not 
bark while a crime was committed, the perpetrator was most likely someone known to the dog. In 
a scientific context it refers to a piece of circumstantial evidence that could reasonably have been 
expected to be present, but for whatever reason is absent (Sheperd 1999).  However, its absence does 
not mean that a crime was not committed (i.e. deny the presence of the independent variable). See 
Collier 2011 for more on Silver Blaze and process tracing in political science.  
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develop into active subjects with distinct identities, institutionalized or informal 
actor capability, legitimacy and structures of decision-making… implying a 
convergence and compatibility of ideas, organizations and processes within a 
particular region’ (Hettne and Söderbaum 2000: 21). New Regionalists also consider 
the role of transnational civil society in producing regioness, and their emphasis 
on the informal practices and non-state interactions that are common in 
developing regions provides a welcome counterbalance to the dominance of insti-
tutionalist (and arguably Eurocentric) approaches to conceptualizing regional 
actorness. These are certainly welcome developments, however they do not really 
allow one to say whether one region has more or less actorness than another; a 
prerequisite if one wants to compare interregional outcomes. 
With that in mind, the conceptual model of actorness developed here formalizes 
actorness into a characteristic of regions, rather than a behavioural outcome. 
Some conceptualizations of actorness include ‘opportunity structure’: the factors 
in the external environment that constrain or enable action, as an integral 
element of actorness (cf. Bretherton and Vogler 2006). I exclude such external 
factors from actorness as they lay beyond the borders of the region and are not in 
fact elements contributing to actorness, but rather factors mediating whether 
action is effective or not (see Section 3.3 below). Many authors also include 
recognition by others as an element of actorness. While the perceptions and 
expectations of external parties are relevant to explaining the emergence of 
actorness, I leave it out of the formulation because recognition, in the context of 
interregionalism, is a given. If regions are participating in interregionalism, then 
they are de facto recognized by others.   
Actorness is a composite variable consisting of identity, formal and informal 
institutions for decision-making, the homogeneity of member state preferences on 
a given issue, and the resources available to a region for putting decisions into 
action (capabilities) (see Figure 3.1). Although this model can be used in a general 
way to assess the overall actorness of a region, it is more meaningful to apply it in 
an issue-specific way and think in terms of trade actorness or security actorness, 
for a number of reasons.8 Firstly, few regions employ the same modes of institutional 
decision-making across their entire mandate. Decisions relating to trade policy 
may be entirely given over to a supranational entity, while political decisions may 
require unanimity from all member states. Secondly, the extent of the initial 
8 Since the primary focus of this manuscript is interregional trade agreements, actorness is assessed 
in economic terms. Additionally, the primary focus of the EU’s inter-regionalism is trade, and the 
great bulk (70-80 percent) of EU assistance to regional organizations in the ACP group is focused on 
promoting economic integration. 
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preference convergence between member states is likely to vary according to the 
issue area. One should also note that the actorness of regions varies not only by 
issue area, but also over time. As cooperation deepens and regions become more 
integrated, member states come to identify more with each other, thereby 
facilitating even greater cooperation and integration, often via treaty-changes and 
strengthening of formal institutions, and developing greater instruments for 
action, and hence increasing regional actorness across all issue areas. 
Regional identity 
As others have noted (Manners 2002; Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Doidge 2011), 
the regional identity, or culture, of a region is an important factor in actorness. 
When we speak of a ‘region’ we generally refer to a geographically contingent 
social space. Mountains, rivers, oceans and deserts form physical barriers to social 
interaction. Before the advent of high-speed and low-cost travel and telecommuni-
cations, human interaction was more or less confined to the boundaries of these 
geographically defined spaces, giving rise to the development of a geographically 
specific culture and shared experience. In some cases, cultural and economic 
development may have been mitigated by waves of migration in, out, and within 
the region. Globalization and technological advancement have contributed to a 
reduction in the relevance of distance and physical barriers, but it will take more 
Figure 3.1  Model of regional actorness 
Actorness
Identity
Formal
and informal
institutions
Capabilities
MS
preferences
Source: author’s illustration
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than a few decades of globalization to replace centuries of geographically 
constrained cultural development. Indeed, almost all regional organizations refer 
in their founding treaties to a sense of geographically based identity, built on some 
combination of cultural, economic, linguistic or political ties (Mansfield and 
Milner, 1999). 
Geography is a relevant but not necessarily determining factor, as regions are 
political constructs given meaning and relevance through some conception of a 
collective identity based upon varying degrees of interdependence, common fate, 
homogeneity, and self-restraint (Wendt 1999). It is identity that determines the 
boundaries of a region; the division between insiders and outsiders; ‘Self’ and 
‘Other’. Collective memory plays an important role in the construction of regional 
identities (Katzenstein 2005). As collective identities tend to be path dependent 
(Wendt 1999), the history of a region is relevant to the formation of regional 
identity. Although some authors deplore the lack of empirical rigor in studying the 
links between identity and regionalism (Checkel, 2016), recent research indicates 
that identity is a statistically relevant variable in explaining the emergence and 
form of regional institutions (Hooghe et al. unpublished manuscript; Marks et al. 
unpublished manuscript).9 Several other publications emphasize the role of shared 
identity and culture in the design of regional institutions (Acharya 1997; Williams 
2007; Barnett and Solingen 2007; Duina 2010; Wunderlich 2012, see section on 
formal and informal institutions below).
In his analysis of collective identity formation at the level of the nation-state, 
Alexander Wendt (1994) distinguished between the corporate and the social 
identity of international actors. Corporate identity provides the motivation for 
engaging in action in the first place, in pursuit of physical and ontological security 
and welfare maximization. Institutionalized regions, as far as their corporate 
identities are concerned, are thus all roughly similar: they are all vested in creating 
a predictable international space and generating some overall benefit for member 
states. Where regions differ from each other is their social identity: the set of 
‘meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others’, 
which influences how a region frames and pursues the interests generated by its 
corporate identity (Wendt 1994: 385). If a region considers itself democratic or 
9 Liesbet Hooghe et al. find that political community (conceptualized as continental location, 
religion and shared ‘civilization’) has a robust effect on the design of dispute settlement 
mechanisms, while Gary Marks et al. find that incomplete contracting in regionalism (which has 
an effect on institutional flexibility) is rooted in shared historical experience. It seems clear that 
‘identity’ matters for regionalism in some shape or form, but the problem remains that thus far 
the measures of regional identity (religion, ‘civilization’, history of colonial occupation, etc) are 
perhaps somewhat crude and unsatisfactory. 
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committed to human rights, this is likely to influence its behaviour. Van der 
Vleuten and Ribeiro Hoffmann (2010) show how possessing a democratic identity 
can cause an RO to intervene in member states in support of democratic norms. If 
the region has a democratic identity, it perceives intervention as being in its 
interest, as non-intervention may ‘shame’ it and result in a loss of credibility both 
domestically and internationally. In this way, identity influences not only a 
region’s degree of actorness, but also what kind of actor it is on the international 
stage. 
In Europe, regional integration was posed as a solution to the wars of the 20th 
century: institutionalized economic interdependence would foster peace, 
democracy and prosperity. This successful experiment has contributed to a 
contemporary European identity based upon regionalism, free market economics 
and advocacy of certain political and cultural values (Schimmelfennig 2007; 
Doidge 2011: 24), which has influenced both the internal functioning of the EU, 
and its international behaviour. In postcolonial regions, the fact that sovereignty 
is ‘hard won and jealously guarded’ (Herbst 1996) contributes to an identity often 
based on anti-imperialism, opposition to outside influence and internal operating 
norms such as non-interference, which in turn frequently contributes to a 
preference for intergovernmental decision-making institutions (Williams 2007). 
The Organization for African Unity was founded on the principles of Pan-
Africanism, and the League of Arab States on the basis of a Pan-Arabic, Islamic 
identity (Barnett and Solingen 2007). Scholars of regionalism in Asia have argued 
that diversity, as a core component of ASEAN identity, has led it to tolerate a variety 
of regime types (Checkel, 2016), while so-called ‘Asian values’ led to a preference 
for the looser and more informal type of institutional framework that characterized 
ASEAN until relatively recently. 
Member state preferences
If, as Wendt (1999) contends, interests are partially constituted by ideas, then we 
might expect that where ideas are shared through a common identity, preferences 
are also more likely to be shared. Where there is a strong regional identity, 
preferences are more likely to converge. Where a sense of shared identity is weaker, 
preferences are perhaps more likely to diverge. However, shared identities do not 
necessarily lead to shared preferences across the board. After all, states still care 
about their material interests, which are influenced by their structural position in 
the global economy and domestic interest groups and their ability to access and 
influence government. How states translate their material interests into national 
preferences depends on the identity and ideas of national decision-makers.  
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Member states material interests on trade policy are (partially) determined by 
their developmental status and position in the global economy. As a general 
principle of the multilateral trading system, Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are 
unilaterally granted non-reciprocal trade preferences by developed countries. In 
principle this means they should have little interest in signing free trade deals 
that open their markets to competition from more developed economies. In the 
context of interregional trade deals, LDCs are not necessarily disinterested parties 
to negotiations, since they care about preserving the unity of regional markets and 
preserving policy space for when they graduate from LDC status. Furthermore 
LDCs may be interested in the legal certainty offered by a reciprocal trade deal, as 
LDC’s special trade preferences are offered on a unilateral basis and in theory can 
be revoked at any time. Non-LDC developing countries are able to trade under 
various Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) schemes, which grant developing 
states asymmetric access to the markets of developed countries. In principle, these 
states will only have an interest in signing free trade agreements that are more 
attractive than the terms of GSP. Wealthier developing countries may not qualify 
for GSP schemes, in which case they fall back to the WTO-prescribed baseline of 
Most Favoured Nation (MFN). In principle these countries would have an interest 
in signing trade deals with their main trading partners in order to gain a 
competitive edge for their exports.  
The mobilization of domestic interest groups also plays a role in determining 
states’ interests. The most well-known theory of national interest formation via 
the domestic level is Andrew Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist approach. 
Liberal intergovernmentalism assumes that governments wish to retain power 
through the ballot box, which requires the support of a coalition of voters whose 
views are transmitted up to the highest national level through domestic 
institutions (Moravcsik 1993: 483). It is mobilization of domestic interest groups, 
mainly business groups, that determines state interests. Groups that stand to 
either gain or lose from liberalization are the most influential: they mobilize, 
articulate their interests in civil society forums, and governments aggregate the 
various competing interests to formulate a national position. When it comes to 
trade liberalization, Moravcsik assumes that mobilized interest groups are almost 
exclusively composed of domestic producers, drawn from labour and/or capital 
(Moravcsik 1993: 488). Exporters are likely to favour freer trade, while producers of 
goods that compete with imports in the domestic market are most likely to press 
for protection (Moravcsik, 1993: 489). Where domestic interests are strong, certain 
and unified, governments will conform to them, otherwise they are more likely to 
risk liberalization when faced with policy failure, low growth and/or unsustainable 
external disequilibria (Moravcsik 1993: 495). However, this theory of state interest 
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formation was developed in the laboratory of European integration. Many of the 
assumptions underlying liberal intergovernmentalism have been questioned even 
in the European context (cf. Smith and Ray 1993; Wincott 1995; Nugent 1999), and 
may not hold up well in an African context. 
Firstly, domestic interest groups in African states operate in a different 
environment than that assumed by Moravscik. Business groups and associations 
in the ‘typical’ Africa country operate in a context characterized by weak private 
sectors, due to colonial inheritance and postcolonial policies; factor endowments 
that favour an outsized role for the state (parastatals); weak and poorly organized 
private-sector associations; and neopatrimonialism, which facilitates an 
environment inhospitable to the concerns of business groups (Taylor 2007: 207). As 
a result many African countries simply do not have organized or influential 
business groups. Furthermore, liberal intergovernmentalism overlooks the role of 
non-profit organizations in national interest formation. In the context of EPAs 
there are many non-profit civil society groups (women’s groups, religious 
organizations, ethnic organizations, academe, NGOs), in both Europe and Africa, 
which have mobilized in opposition or support of EPAs. 
Secondly and relatedly, the assumption of a politically liberal environment in 
which domestic interest groups (business or non-profit) operate is problematic in 
the African context. Liberal intergovernmentalism considers society-state relations 
much like a principal-agent one, in which the state (the agent) is mandated to 
carry out foreign policy by the support of a majority of its citizens (the principals). 
It assumes that interest groups have the freedom to express their interests, and 
that governments aggregate competing interests fairly. But as many commentators 
point out, this link between government and citizens is broken in many African 
countries (cf. Moyo 2009). Holding power is not necessarily dependent on domestic 
support of a majority coalition, but may rather depend on external support, that 
of a rentier class, or other niche or unrepresentative interests. For that reason, one 
should take regime type into account. In theory, democratic states should be more 
open to the demands of both business interests and civil society groups, and likely 
to formulate a national position that fairly aggregates the competing interests of 
domestic groups. In anocratic states, where power is not vested in political 
institutions, but in various elite groups that compete with each other for power, 
governments are more susceptible to ‘state capture’ by private interests. Serving 
the niche interests of a rentier class of powerful private interests may help 
governments retain power, and indeed government officials may be part of the 
rentier class themselves, and use their political positions to pursue private 
interests. This can result in a form of ‘shadow governance’, in which government 
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officials exploit their positions to promote patronage networks and personal 
interests in the formal and informal markets (Söderbaum 2004). In such a context, 
government decision-makers may be open to the demands of (certain) business 
interests (not necessarily representative ones), but less so to the demands of 
non-profit civil society groups, which have less to offer in terms of patronage and 
rent-seeking opportunities. In autocratic states the executive has little incentive to 
carefully take into account the demands of domestic interest groups, and can 
make decisions on foreign economic policy unilaterally. In such cases it is likely 
that structural economic position in conjunction with government ideology is 
likely to play a significant role in determining state interests. Finally, the 
assumption that liberal democratic states have the capacity to collect and aggregate 
interests may also be problematic. Liberal democracies in the developing world 
may be willing to take the demands of domestic interest groups into account, but 
may not be able to do so, as many African states, particularly the smaller and less 
developed ones, are institutionally weak and lack the financial and human 
resources required for effective engagement with civil society. 
Finally, the role of government ideology in the formation of national interests is 
taken into account. This encompasses elite beliefs and expectations about the best 
way to utilize foreign economic policy in pursuit of the national interest. For 
example, a socialist executive is more likely to be in favour of protectionism, and 
more receptive to civil society groups and trade unions; while neoliberal-orientated 
governments are likely to favour deeper liberalization and be more receptive to 
business interests. At the regional level some states may have more of an ideological 
commitment to regionalism, in such cases they may be willing to subordinate 
short-term material self-interest in favour of long-term regional cooperation. 
At this point aspects of regional identity (i.e. pan-Africanism, post-colonialism etc.) 
influences how member states perceive and handle divergent preferences, and can 
contribute to whether solidarity is perceived as more important than national 
interest.  
Formal and informal institutions 
Regions consist of patterns of intra-regional decision-making that are both formal 
and informal. Formal institutions are codified in treaties and protocols, their 
strength dependent on the degree of delegation and sovereignty-pooling member 
states are willing to engage in. Informal institutions are exactly that: based on 
informal networks and emergent through practice over time (Lenz and Marks, 
2016). Informal institutions are included here as evidence from Comparative 
Regionalism studies suggests that even where the formal rules of regional 
organizations proscribe supranational or majority decision-making, the informal 
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rules continue to privilege consensual decision-making among member states 
(Lenz and Marks, 2016; cf. Hartmann 2013 on ECOWAS; Heisenberg 2005 on the EU; 
Middlebrook 1978 on the Andean Pact). As informal rules tend to favour powerful 
states that have the power to circumvent formally delegated authority  (Lenz and 
Marks, 2016), issue informal veto’s (Meunier and Nicolaidis 2005) or set the region’s 
agenda, informal institutions are analyzed in terms of the degree of regional 
leadership historically displayed by the regional power. Of course there may be 
many other types of practices that constitute the informal institutions of a region, 
but here the discussion is limited to the informal influence of the most powerful 
state, as IR theory frequently reiterates the importance of power and influence in 
international affairs.       
Formal decision-making procedures are an important contributory factor to high 
levels of actorness, so far as they contribute to the convergence of member states’ 
preferences. Supranationalism (exclusive competencies) and majority-voting are 
generally beneficial to actorness (Lenz and Marks, 2016), while unanimity and 
consensual procedures are generally less beneficial to actorness (Wunderlich 
2012). However, we should not be too quick to associate supranationalism with 
high levels of actorness, and intergovernmentalism with low actorness. In cases 
where enlargement of supranational organizations without corresponding 
amendments to treaty-based cooperation, actorness may actually be reduced, as 
decision-making becomes slow and unwieldy (Doidge 2011), while informal 
practices may also undermine the efficient functioning of supranational and 
majority-rules institutions. On the other hand, intergovernmental ROs may have 
high levels of actorness when ‘characterized by something resembling hegemonial 
leadership’ (Doidge 2011: 23).10 If one state is both overwhelmingly powerful, and 
able to influence other member states, high actorness can exist. Regional leadership 
is present when a single member state is both willing and able to take on the 
mantle of leadership, and persuades others to follow a given course of action they 
might otherwise not have pursued. This may involve a degree of arm-twisting or 
bribery (Kindleberger 1973), side-payments and issue-linkages (Mattli 1999), or 
even normative suasive strategies (Destradi 2010). Of course, for regional leadership 
to be an effective component of actorness, other member states must accept the 
leadership as legitimate. A regional power may be both willing and able to exert 
leadership, but its leadership is so contested by other member states that it is 
10 I prefer to use the term ‘regional leadership’ to ‘hegemonial leadership’, as hegemony implies great 
power or superpower status. Most ‘pivotal’ states within continental sub-regions are not global 
hegemons, but nevertheless important and influential actors within their regions.  
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unable to do so.11 On the other hand, regional leadership may be entirely absent, 
if there is no member state willing nor able to take on the role. 
Whether the presence or absence of regional leadership and its degree of 
contestation is beneficial or detrimental for actorness depends on the formal 
institutional context the regional leader finds itself in. In principle, supranational 
institutions and/or the presence of uncontested leadership from a powerful state is 
likely to result in higher levels of actorness; formal institutions that use major-
ity-voting procedures can be associated with higher or lower levels of actorness, 
depending on the presence or absence of regional leadership, and the degree to 
which it is contested; and purely intergovernmental institutions are likely to 
result in lower levels of actorness, but may be compensated for with uncontested 
regional leadership.   
A region’s formal and informal institutions are influenced by its identity 
(Wunderlich 2012). Certain shared values and culture in Southeast Asia have 
contributed to ASEAN institutions based on consultation, consensus and 
informality (Acharya 1997). Regions with democratic norms at the core of their 
identity are more likely to incorporate such features as regional parliaments with 
legislative or oversight powers, although such features may reduce actorness by 
slowing down the decision-making process. Postcolonial regions that value 
non-interference are more likely to prefer unanimous or consensus-based formal 
institutions (Barnett and Solingen 2007), while regional powers may be constrained 
or empowered in exercising leadership by the region’s history and identity. 
As illustrated above, formal and informal regional institutions are important for 
actorness as (functional) institutions aggregate member states preferences into a 
common position. However, high actorness can exist even when formal decision- 
making institutions are less efficient at producing common positions, if there is a 
high degree of convergence of member state’s initial preferences. Groenleer and 
van Schaik (2007) have shown how a high degree of initial preference convergence 
among EU member states contributed to a high level of EU actorness in establishing 
the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol, despite intergovern-
mental decision-making procedures in both cases. Interaction over time between 
member states led to socialization and a ‘Europeanization’ of policies on these 
issue areas as representatives came to increasingly identify with each other, 
leading to even greater convergence of preferences, even without an increase in 
11 See Destradi 2010 for an extensive discussion on the different strategies by which regional 
powers exert influence in their region, and how neighbouring states react to coercive, suasive and 
incentivization strategies.  
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formal institutionalization. On the other hand actorness is undermined where 
there is a lack of convergence of member states preferences, especially if the issue 
area is one governed by intergovernmental decision-making, or there is a lack of 
informal leadership. 
Capabilities
A region’s capabilities are its means to an end; the resources used to advance the 
region’s interests. Capabilities consist of the region’s operational budget and its 
diplomatic toolbox for transforming policy – formulated more or less coherently 
and efficiently through formal or informal institutions – into concrete, real world 
action on the international stage. Member states may pool their diplomatic 
resources to contribute towards regional capabilities, but the important part is 
that these resources should be deployed in a regional capacity, rather than a 
national one. 
First off, the operational budget is important, as it is an indirect measure of its 
institutional capacity and the resources available for putting policies into action. 
However this comes with the caveat that for many ROs, particularly in the 
developing world, the autonomy with which they can use their budgets is an issue. 
Many regions in the developing world receive a large portion of their budget from 
international donors. More often than not donor funds must be spent in a 
particular way on particular projects, placing constraints on financial resources.  
Secondly, similarly to those of states, ROs’ diplomatic toolbox for external action 
consists of the ability to make credible threats and bribes, and the ability to persuade 
or socialize external parties.  The issuing of threats and bribes are intended to 
manipulate the utility calculations of targeted actors by providing negative 
incentives (threats) or positive incentives (bribes) to induce behavioural change or 
extract concessions during negotiations. Threats can involve the imposition of 
legal or physical force through litigation or military intervention, or less forceful 
(although still coercive) measures such as economic sanctions or the withdrawal of 
unilateral trade preferences. As regards interregional trade negotiations, threats 
of military intervention are not a relevant tool deployed during trade negotiations. 
Threats of litigation are potentially relevant, as states and regions negotiate ‘under 
the shadow of international law’ (Poletti et al. 2013). However, only full members of 
the WTO can access its dispute settlement mechanism, and the EU is to date the 
only RO that enjoys full membership rights at the WTO. Other ROs would have to 
lodge or answer cases as individual states, and in the case of ACP states, most 
simply do not have the resources to participate in such expensive international 
dispute settlement (Shaffer 2010). The ability to make credible threats of litigation 
empowers the EU over just about any other region in interregional trade 
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negotiations, as credible threats of litigation can encourage otherwise obstinate 
negotiating partners to make concessions (Poletti et al. 2013). Yet at the same time, 
the rules-based system of the WTO provides a legal constraint on powerful actors 
issuing all-out trade sanctions on weaker actors. However, preferences that have 
been established outside of the WTO and which can be unilaterally withdrawn by 
one actor are an area where states/regions can and do make credible threats (Jones 
2014). Indeed, the EU issued several credible threats to withdraw the ACP’s existing 
trade preferences if agreement on the EPAs was not reached by a certain date, 
shaping the outcomes of the negotiations (Jones 2014).    
On the other hand, regions may get what they want through the carrot rather 
than the stick. Positive incentives, or ‘bribes’, towards negotiating partners can 
take the form of promises of financial, technical, or development assistance, and/
or membership accession. As in the case of relations between the EU and central 
and eastern European states, the possibility of accession to the EU is often used as 
an instrument of positive incentivisation to encourage behavioural change in 
neighbouring countries (Schimmelfennig 2001). Where accession is not an option, 
promises of financial and technical assistance from a stronger partner in exchange 
for concessions from a weaker partner are often made in negotiations between 
developed states and regions and developing ones (under the rubric of Trade for 
Aid), and can be an important factor in reaching agreement. For their part, 
developing states and regions are generally not in any position to offer such 
incentives to wealthier negotiating partners in exchange for concessions, so again 
the EU is empowered over any other RO in this respect. 
Finally, the actorness of ROs is influenced by their capacity to persuade and 
socialize others. Persuasion and socialization are instruments of moral suasion 
that draw on the logic of social action theorized by constructivism, and include 
socialization through complex learning and habituation, and persuasion via 
argumentation and reason-giving (Börzel and Risse 2009: 7-8; see also 
Schimmelfennig 2001 on rhetorical action). Suasive instruments focus on 
convincing one’s negotiating partner of the validity and legitimacy of a certain 
perspective, and includes diplomatic actions such as engaging in political dialogue 
between partners, the issuing of unilateral diplomatic statements, and lobbying 
targeted at external parties. Lobbying is probably the most used persuasive 
instrument in trade negotiations, and one that can be used even by relatively 
weaker states and regions. Lobbying capacity requires diplomatic representation 
abroad, either via a specially designated representative for the region as a whole, 
or coordinated committees of ambassadors. These representatives can lobby 
certain groups within their negotiating partner’s territory that may be sympathetic to 
Processed on: 19-7-2016
504439-L-bw-Hulse
72
CHAPTER THREE
the region’s interests and have influence over the relevant decision-making 
process.12 For example the EU has diplomatic delegations in most countries around 
the world, several of which are also accredited to key regional organizations, while 
many other ROs have regular representation at the WTO’s various sub-committees, 
and a few African ROs even have permanent designated representatives in 
Brussels.13  
Actorness in comparative perspective 
Taken together, regional identity, the degree of preference homogeneity among 
member states, formal and informal institutions, and regional capabilities for 
external action contribute to a region’s international actorness. The model’s 
elements interact to produce actorness in various ways. Although the model 
provides guidelines for assessing regional actorness (see Chapter Four for oper-
ationalization), how the elements interact with each other may be regionally 
specific, as well as issue-specific. For example, certain aspects of a region’s identity 
may lead to a particular combination of formal and informal institutions, which 
may or may not be conducive to greater preference convergence. Regions with 
inefficient institutions for decision-making may have high actorness due to having 
homogenous preferences in a given issue area. Then again, the same member 
states may have very heterogeneous preferences in a different issue area, and 
without institutions for aggregating divergent preferences, the result is low 
actorness in a different policy sector. Aspects of regional identity may also 
influence capabilities, by influencing decisions regarding what types of 
instruments are suitable to use in pursuit of its external policies, and how they are 
utilized.14 Some regions may have many diplomatic instruments for external 
action, but are unable to deploy them due to a lack of agreement among member 
states, thereby actorness is less than might be expected by looking at capabilities 
alone.
12 In the case of ACP regions engaging in interregional trade negotiations with the EU, these are the 
European Council; the European Parliament, and NGOs and other civil society groups potentially 
sympathetic to the developmental concerns of ACP states, which can put political pressure on 
decision-makers (e.g. the transnational Stop-EPA campaign which lobbied the European Parliament 
to extend the deadline to concluded EPAs).  
13 Namely, the African Union, which has a permanent mission accredited to the EU and the ACP, and 
ECOWAS and COMESA. 
14 For example, the EU generally rejects the use of military force as a foreign policy tool, however it 
does have several standing battle groups, but they can only be deployed on humanitarian grounds 
for peacekeeping and peacemaking activities, which fits with the EU’s self-identification as a ‘force 
for peace’ in the world (Erhardt 2011).  
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However, the components of actorness are not necessarily equally important in 
producing actorness. Although identity may go some way to explain institutional 
patterns within regions, it is primarily the efficacy of those institutions that 
contributes to high or low actorness. Furthermore the evidence that identity 
matters for regional cooperation is at best limited (Checkel, 2016). Thus we might 
reasonably expect identity to be the component that matters least for overall 
actorness, while convergent preferences and the presence of either a supranational 
regional authority or a regional leader matters most. An ‘old’ institutionalist 
approach would predict that it is formal institutions and their degree of autonomy 
and authority that matters most for producing regional actorness, yet as institu-
tionalist approaches broadened to include the ‘principles, norms, rules and deci-
sion-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given 
issues area’ (Krasner 1982: 185), the door opened to include the informal aspects of 
decision-making within institutions, allowing for the lack of a supranational 
agency to be compensated for by the informal leadership of a powerful state. 
Indeed, the presence of a regional leader is a well-established principle for 
successful regional cooperation in Hegemonic Stability Theory approaches to 
regionalism (Grieco 1997; Mattli 1999, Gilpin 2001), although such approaches 
would predict that regional powers only contribute to facilitating regional 
actorness so long as it serves their material self-interest.  Whether formal 
institutions or informal leadership matters more for actorness may be regionally 
specific, but nevertheless, based on the well-established principles of liberal insti-
tutionalism and Hegemonic Stability Theory, it is probably the formal and informal 
institutional components of actorness that are most important for producing 
higher degrees of actorness. 
Finally, regions can be thought of as having high, medium, or low levels of 
actorness, although it’s worth pointing out that actorness, like power, is a relational 
concept, in that it refers to actual or potential relationships in which actor A can 
cause a change in the behaviour of actor B (Baldwin 2013). The actorness of a 
region, in and of itself, is not meaningful. Actorness does not exist in a vacuum. It 
only becomes meaningful when viewed in relation to the actorness of other similar 
entities, and in similar policy domains. Yet actorness is not always sufficient to 
explain the outcomes of interregionalism. For this we must look at the causal 
relationship between actorness and effectiveness and factors in the external 
environment that constrain or empower regions to act. 
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3.3  Effectiveness in Interregional Relations 
From Actorness to Effectiveness 
To make meaningful claims about the relevance of regional organizations in the 
international system it is necessary to go beyond the concept of actorness to also 
consider their effectiveness as international actors (Groen and Niemann 2012). 
Actorness and effectiveness have often been confused with each other, but 
effectiveness is actually a separate and distinct variable (Carbone 2013). Most 
scholars in the small but growing literature linking (EU) actorness and effectiveness 
conceptualize effectiveness as ‘goal attainment within a given negotiating context’ 
(van Schaik 2013: 294). Similarly, effectiveness is here understood as goal 
attainment: the extent to which regions are able to shape outcomes in accordance 
with the objectives they adopt on particular issues (Groen and Niemann 2012; 
Thomas 2012). Like actorness, effectiveness is a spectrum variable that ranges on a 
continuum from high to low effectiveness (see Chapter Four for details on oper-
ationalization) 
As actorness relates to the region’s capacity to negotiate it also affects its bargaining 
power in international negotiations (van Schaik 2013: 293). The extent to which 
regions can obtain interregional outcomes in accordance with their objectives 
depends to a large extent on the degree of actorness they can deploy in the 
interregional negotiation process. Regions with more actorness are likely to be 
more effective actors than regions with less. In relation to interregionalism 
involving the EU, it has been suggested that the stronger the partner region in 
terms of actorness, ‘the more concessions are made by the EU’ (Rignér and 
Söderbaum, 2010: 51). This leads to the following simple hypothesis: 
H1: Regions with greater (trade) actorness are likely to be more effective negotiators in 
interregional negotiations than those with less.   
This however is merely a correlational hypothesis. To establish causality one must 
look to the causal pathway linking actorness and effectiveness, yet to date this has 
not been fully parsed out in the literature. Thinking logically, in the context of 
interregional negotiations, one should expect the following three stages in the 
causal process whereby actorness is translated into effectiveness (see Figure 3.2): 
1)  formulation of a common position by member states and/or regional institutions 
2) deployment of a negotiating strategy by the region as a whole
3) member states maintain unity until the conclusion of negotiations.
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Formulating a Common Position 
Regions with higher degrees of actorness, in that the member states of such regions 
have a shared affinity and sense of common destiny (identity), more homogenous 
preferences, functional formal and informal institutions and capabilities to hand, 
are better and more quickly able to formulate a common regional position on the 
shared goals of negotiations. The faster member states can agree on a common 
position, the more time can be spent on developing a negotiating strategy and 
substantial engagement with the negotiating partner. Regions with lower levels of 
actorness are more likely to spend a larger chuck of the available time settling 
their intra-regional differences, leaving less time for actual negotiation with the 
external partner. 
Deploying a Negotiating Strategy 
Formulating and deploying a coherent negotiating strategy is the next step in 
transforming actorness into effectiveness. While formulation of a common 
position represents agreement on the shared goals of the negotiations, formulation 
of a strategy signals agreement on the means of obtaining those goals, and involves 
the region making use of its diplomatic toolbox (threats, bribes, and persuasion). 
It is not my intention to give an overview of the full range of negotiating strategies 
that regions might opt for (divisive, integrative, resistance, delay, take-it-or-leave-it, 
rhetorical action, etc), but rather highlight the fact that having a coherent strategy 
and the tools to implement it are an important part of the causal process. However, 
one should point out the apparent paradox that, in international negotiations, 
disunity might sometimes be a source of strength (Schelling 1960; Putnam 1988). 
In regions with low actorness, regionally agreed positions may reflect lowest 
common dominator logic, meaning that the agreed position and the agents chosen 
to represent it have little room for manoeuvre (Doidge 2011). Depending on how 
badly the other partner wishes to reach agreement, this might actually increase 
the bargaining power of the low actorness region, if its representatives are able to 
successfully deploy a ‘hands-tied’ strategy (Meunier 2000).15 Regional negotiators 
can point to the lack of agreement among member states and their inflexible 
mandate to justify a low offer and avoid making substantial concessions. So under 
certain conditions, regions may be able to exploit their own weakness, although 
15 To give an example of a hand-tied strategy in the context of a region with high actorness: the EU Trade 
Commissioner has full competencies to negotiate on behalf of EU member states, and has a degree 
of flexibility so long as she remains in the remit of the mandate. However, if the Commissioner 
is considering a significant move, she may need to (informally) consult with member states. This 
makes it harder for the EU to make concessions, but to the extent to which bargaining partners are 
aware of this limitation, may increase its leverage and make for more effective outcomes (Meunier 
and Nicolaidis 2005). 
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they may struggle to formulate and execute such a strategy if actorness is very low. 
At the very least a common position and agreement about strategy among member 
states is a pre-requisite to execute a successful ‘power of the weak’ strategy (or any 
negotiating strategy for that matter). 
Maintaining Unity 
The final part of the causal mechanism linking actorness and effectiveness is the 
maintenance of regional unity. If individual member states break away from the 
rest of the group and articulate alternative positions – or worse – initial, sign, 
ratify, or implement bilateral agreements separately from the other members of 
the group, the common position and strategy is compromised, undermining 
effectiveness. Member state defections are more likely to occur in regions with 
lower levels of actorness, where regional identity is weak, preferences are more 
heterogeneous and the formal and informal institutions responsible for facilitating 
regional unity are relatively weak. On the other hand, regions that successfully 
transform actorness into effectiveness maintain the unity and cohesion of their 
member states, even in the face of external pressure and incentives in favour of 
individual defection. Member states may refrain from defection due to convincing 
arguments and/or side-payments from the regional secretariat or the regional 
power, or they may refrain from defection for normative, ideological reasons, in 
some cases even incurring material costs in order to maintain regional unity. 
If negotiating effectiveness is indeed the result of actorness then we should expect 
all parts of the casual mechanism to be present in the empirical case studies. 
Therefore the testable hypotheses concern the expected pattern of behaviour of 
relevant actors prior to the observed outcome. This generates the following 
hypotheses for each part of the causal mechanism: 
H2: A region with greater actorness will produce a common position faster than regions 
with less actorness. 
H3: A region with greater actorness will implement a more coherent negotiating strategy 
and better deploy diplomatic tools in pursuit of goals than regions with less actorness. 
H4: Member states of a region with greater actorness will resist defection better than 
regions with less actorness. 
Scope Condition: favourable opportunity structure 
As the literature on EU actorness and effectiveness has pointed out, actorness is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for effectiveness. Conditions in the external 
environment affect the relationship between actorness and effectiveness. A high 
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3degree of actorness is no guarantee that a region will attain its external policy 
goals. Just as the most powerful states can fail to achieve their foreign policy goals, 
so can the most capable regions. Ineffectiveness in interregional negotiations can 
occur for a number of reasons that have more to do with factors in the external 
environment than actorness. This leads to the supposition that actorness only 
leads to effectiveness if the opportunity structure in the external environment is 
favourable. The opportunity structure ‘denotes factors in the external environment 
of ideas and events which constrain or enable actorness… [it] signifies the structural 
context of action’ (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 24), and ‘entails the conduciveness 
of the overall constellation of actors and their goals (and also whether the [region] 
has devised a strategy that takes the external environment into account)’ (Groen 
and Niemann 2012: 14). The opportunity structure includes factors such as: 
•	 The degree of opposition from the bargaining partner(s): if opposition is very 
strong, it is harder for a region to achieve its goals. 
•	 The broader policy arena in which interregional negotiations take place. 
Interregional trade negotiations take place in the shadow of the multilateral 
trading system as governed by the WTO. A region may be able to argue a 
particular interpretation of WTO rules as part of its negotiation strategy, thereby 
gaining greater leverage. 
•	 The influence of powerful external third parties: if third parties can provide 
viable alternatives to the negotiations, the exit costs are reduced, making it 
easier for the region to ‘walk away’ from a less than desirable agreement, thereby 
granting them greater leverage in negotiations. Likewise, fear of losing markets 
or access to resources to a third party may incentivize a bargaining partner to 
make greater concessions than they otherwise would. 
Figure 3.2  Causal process linking actorness and effectiveness 
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The limited body of literature exploring the link between (EU) actorness and 
effectiveness would suggest that ROs are more effective when there is a favourable 
opportunity structure, and are less effective under unfavourable conditions. 
Studies on the EU have found that although the EU’s actorness has increased in 
various issue areas, in most cases it has not become a more effective actor, due to 
an increasingly unfavourable opportunity structure. The EU’s enhanced actorness 
in the field of development aid has not actually lead to greater effectiveness, as the 
EU’s increased actorness led to increased resistance to the enhancement of EU 
powers from recipient governments (Carbone 2013). Likewise, the EU’s trade 
actorness has also increased in recent years, yet its effectiveness has not, due to an 
increasingly unfavourable opportunity structure brought about by the rise of the 
BRICS, China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, and Africa’s increasingly close 
cooperation with China (Bretherton and Vogler 2013). 
The relative importance the opportunity structure varies according to whether 
actorness falls on the higher or lower end of the spectrum. Regions with low 
actorness require a favourable opportunity structure for their external action to be 
effective. Low actorness combined with an unfavourable opportunity structure 
means a region has little hope of being effective. Low actorness combined with a 
favourable opportunity structure means the region has a chance of being effective, 
if it has a sufficient level of actorness to adequately exploit a window of opportunity. 
This is where the actorness-effectiveness causal pathway interacts with the 
external environment: if a region can incorporate changes in the external 
environment into their negotiating strategy, they are more likely to be effective 
negotiators. This leaves us with the following hypotheses regarding weaker 
regions’ opportunity structures: 
H5: Lower actorness regions (i.e. ACP regions when negotiating with the EU) require a 
favourable opportunity structure in order to be effective
H6: Those ACP regions with higher levels of actorness will be better able to exploit 
favourable opportunities structures as part of their negotiating strategy, resulting in 
greater effectiveness. 
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3.4  The EU’s External Influence on ACP Regions  
Translating the actorness-effectiveness model from the European context to 
regionalism in the developing world presents a conceptual and methodological 
problem: accounting for external influence. External influence is an important 
contextual variable when analyzing regionalism and regional organizations in 
the developing world due to developing states’ structural weaknesses and 
dependence on trade and aid from the developed world. This means that regions in 
the developing world (e.g. SADC, ECOWAS, Mercosur) are much more susceptible to 
external influence than regions in more developed parts of the world (the EU, 
NAFTA and ASEAN), which has a direct effect on the evolution of actorness, and by 
extension, an impact on how effective they are in their interregional relations. 
Why regions in the developing world are susceptible to  
external influence16 
The dynamics of regionalism in the developing world, where states have low levels 
of interdependence, are different from those in industrialized regions where 
states tend to be highly interdependent (Krapohl and Fink 2013; Muntschick 2012). 
The more interdependent states are, the more they have an incentive to cooperate 
at the regional level. For example, even prior to the establishment of the common 
market in 1957, European states already traded mainly with each other. Asides 
from the ideological and normative arguments in favour of integration, there were 
significant material gains to be made from integration, so there were strong 
incentives for states, especially regional powers (France and Germany), to participate 
in providing the good of regional integration. On the other hand, regions in the 
developing world are typically characterized by much lower levels of intra-regional 
trade, typically less than 15 percent. Many states are economically underdeveloped 
and rely on the export of primary commodities and other low-value products to 
the developed world. For historic reasons rooted in colonialism, most developing 
countries trade more with the developed world than with each other, and are 
heavily invested in maintaining market access to more developed economies. Due 
to relatively low levels of intra-regional trade, the gains to be made from the 
liberalization of intra-regional trade are fairly limited (Burges 2005). Therefore 
regional cooperation in the developing world is motivated more by an extra-regional 
logic of integration, rather than the intra-regional logic that drove European 
regionalism (Krapohl et al. 2014). This particular form of outwardly- orientated 
‘new’ or ‘open’ regionalism, which co-evolved alongside theories of export-driven 
16 The Bamberg Cluster on Regional Integration has developed an extensive theory of external 
influence on regional integration in the developing world, from which much of the following 
section is drawn. 
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development, does aim to increase intra-regional trade among member states, but 
is primarily characterised by several strands of extra-regional logic: 
•	 to increase member states’ visibility and leverage in international negotiations 
(Hänggi 2006; Doctor 2007; Krapohl et al. 2014:), thereby maintaining and 
improving market access to developed economies (Krapohl and Fink 2013);
•	 to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from external investors into the region 
in order to encourage development (Büthe and Milner 2008; Jaumotte 2004).17
As Krapohl and Fink point out, one of the major problems for regional cooperation 
in the developing world is that those member states that benefit from the gains of 
outwardly-orientated regionalism without contributing to its costs cannot be 
punished by the other member states or regional institutions. Defectors  can only 
be punished with the help of the extra-regional actors that control the FDI flows 
and access to their markets (Krapohl and Fink 2013). The lack of an internal 
enforcement mechanism makes regional cooperation in developing regions much 
more difficult, and cooperation becomes dependent on the willingness of external 
partners to reward regional cooperation through gains (increased FDI, enhanced 
market access, access to financial and technical assistance) that are evenly 
distributed among member states, and punish defectors by excluding them from 
the gains of cooperation, as the region itself has limited capacity to do so. So to an 
extent the success of regional cooperation in such regions is dependent on the 
willingness of an external power to act as an external paymaster. 
Accordingly, regional cooperation in the developing world is much more prone to 
the defection of member states, especially regional powers. This occurs when 
member states 1) have the option of differentiated trading options with 
extra-regional actors that are incompatible with the local regional integration 
agenda; and 2) the benefits of availing of these differentiated options outweighs 
the benefits of regional integration, causing member states to defect from regional 
cooperation altogether, thereby becoming ‘regional Rambos’ (Krapohl et al. 2014).18 
17 Regionalism provides size and stability effects that can attract FDI flows, as firstly, abolition of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers to trade expands the size of the market, increases intra-regional trade and 
improves stability; secondly, regional cooperation on infrastructure projects can reduce non-tariff 
barriers to trade and improve market access; third, monetary integration leads to the stabilization 
of exchange rates, improving macro-economic stability; and finally, the establishment of regional 
security communities improves political stability. These factors improve economic and political 
stability, reduce risk, and make a region a more attractive prospect for investment (Jaumotte 2004; 
Krapohl and Fink 2013). 
18 Typically, intra-regional liberalization and regulation of trade and investment can be modelled as 
a prisoner’s dilemma and a battle of the sexes cooperation game between member states (Krapohl 
et al. 2014). First member states must choose between protectionism and liberalization (Prisoner’s 
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Small states can be Rambos, but the attraction of defection is greater for regional 
powers, since the benefits of availing of a bilateral deal with a powerful external 
actor typically outweighs the benefits of integration with economically small and 
weak neighbouring states (Krapohl and Fink 2013; Krapohl et al. 2014). The impact 
on regionalism is also greater when the defecting state is the regional power. 
When regional powers become Rambos, the region is left without an internal 
engine to drive the agenda. 
Regional institutions and smaller member states are usually unable to solve this 
problem as they cannot punish defectors, nor can they offer sufficient side-payments 
to the regional power to buy their cooperation, without the help of extra-regional 
actors. So, to the extent that external actors supply differentiated trading options 
to the member states of developing regions, and fail to act as an external paymaster, 
they fuel the existing difficulties with regional cooperation in the developing 
world, and incentivise member states to become Rambos. 
Of course, ACP regions are structurally weak and susceptible to the influence of 
powerful external actors other than the EU. The USA, China, and other powerful 
and emerging states are important providers of trade and aid opportunities for 
ACP states, and they do periodically interact with ACP regional organizations and 
fund regional projects as part of their development policies. However Chinese and 
American interest in regionalism in the ACP is fairly limited. China prefers 
bilateral cooperation to cooperation with regions (Shinn and Eisenman 2012), 
while the USA takes a blanket approach to its trade relations with Africa under the 
Dilemma), and secondly they must choose a distributive point (adopt standard A or standard B) at 
which to coordinate liberalization (Battle of the Sexes). Iteration and strong regional institutions 
play an important role in solving these cooperation problems. Regionalism in the developing world 
is afflicted with the same set of cooperation problems, but they have an additional game theoretic 
cooperation problem that does not affect regionalism in the industrialized world: the Rambo 
game. A Rambo game refers to an asymmetrical situation between two (or more) players, in which 
one player’s dominant strategy is to co-operate, whereas the other player’s (the Rambo) dominant 
strategy is defection. Rambos do not defect so much to free ride on the efforts of others, but because 
they have little interest in cooperation in the first place (Krapohl et al. 2014). Rather, their attention 
is diverted towards playing an entirely different game with other players. This situation arises 
when the extra-regional privileges of unilateral action outweigh the benefits of intra-regional 
cooperation. The Rambo game can be illustrated with the following example: two friends, Sara and 
Jane, are invited to a party. They can only go if they go together. However, Sara has an invitation to 
a more desirable party the same evening. Only she is invited, and she cannot bring Jane with her. 
If Sara follows her dominant strategy of attending the more desirable party, Jane stays home alone. 
Of course this is a simple illustration and, as a real world situation between two friends, probably 
easily solvable. However when applied to inter-state relations Rambo games are extremely difficult 
to overcome. Regional institutions are usually not sufficient to induce cooperation (Krapohl et al. 
2014), and the states whose dominant strategy is cooperation are usually unable to offer sufficient 
incentives to the Rambo for it to forgo its dominant strategy of defection.  
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continent-wide AGOA scheme, while development is targeted at the national level. 
If these actors were to start pursuing strategies or policies that focus specifically 
on regional cooperation in the ACP, it might be possible to apply the framework on 
how their external influence affects the actorness of ACP regions. Here I focus on 
the EU’s influence on ACP regions as to date it is the only powerful external actor 
that explicitly and systematically pursues a policy of ‘regionalism through inter-
regionalism’ in its external relations towards the ACP. Not only does the EU 
position itself as an external paymaster to regionalism in the ACP and other 
developing regions, providing incentives to promote regional cooperation and 
integration, it is also, in most cases, their number one trading partner. Indeed, the 
prospect of region-to-region trade deals with their number one trading partner 
was intended to encourage the emergence and/or strengthening of regional 
institutions in ACP regions, as such a level of interregional cooperation demands 
greater intra-regional coordination, which is linked directly to the evolution of 
regional actorness (Doidge 2011: 52). 
The literature on EU diffusion deals extensively with the means by which the 
EU-model of regional integration and cooperation diffuses to other regions (Börzel 
and Risse 2011; Jetschke and Murray 2011; Lenz 2013). They identify mechanisms 
such as coercion, the provision of material rewards, socialization, persuasion, the 
search for international legitimacy, lesson-drawing and emulation as the various 
ways in which the EU can influence other regions and directly or indirectly 
encourage greater integration and cooperation, thereby increasing regional 
actorness. In short they look at the integrative influence of the EU on other regions. 
However the EU’s influence may actually have the opposite effect, and promote 
disintegrative tendencies within regions already characterized by cooperation 
problems. This can occur via the provision of differentiated trading options that 
incentivize member states to defect from regional cooperation. As outlined above, 
the Bamberg Cluster scholars have pointed out how the EU’s tendency to offer 
bilateral free trade deals to emerging powers reduces their incentive to participate 
in their local regional integration initiatives, thereby depriving effected regions of 
much-needed internal leadership (Krapohl et al. 2014), while other scholars have 
suggested that EPAs have inflamed existing intra-regional tensions (Hurt et al. 
2012). Secondly, the EU can exert a much more overt disintegrative influence on 
ACP regions through the use of divide-and-rule tactics (Elgström 2009), which tend 
to undermine the causal relationship between actorness and effectiveness. 
I explore the EU’s integrative and disintegrative influences in turn. 
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The EU’s Integrative Influence 
The EU exerts an integrative influence and promotes the evolution of actorness in 
ACP regions in two main ways. First it positions itself as an external paymaster 
and provides material incentives (increased FDI, financial and technical assistance) 
intended to encourage further regional cooperation. Second, it promotes regional 
integration and capacity-building via the prospect of interregional trade deals, 
introduced with the intention to encourage greater intra-regional coordination, 
deeper integration and capacity-building as a precondition for embarking on 
interregional trade negotiations (Doctor 2015). 
The EU as External Paymaster: A paymaster encourages regionalism by shouldering 
the costs of integration and preventing others from free-riding on the cooperation 
of others. The presence of an internal or external paymaster is considered by many 
to be one of the conditions associated with successful regionalism (Mattli 1999; 
Gilpin 2001). Paymasters can be external: an actor beyond the borders of the region 
that bears the costs of cooperation in another region as part of its foreign policy. 
External actors may ‘become conducive to the formation of regional cooperation 
projects if third parties act altruistically and assist in overcoming collective action 
problems by providing side payments, increasing cooperative payoff, reducing 
the costs of implementation and compliance, and improving institutional 
functionality’ (Muntschick 2012: 8). In such a way an external paymaster helps to 
alter the preferences of member states in favour of regional cooperation, which is 
important in developing regions where the gains of intra-regional liberalization 
are relatively low. External paymasters can also prevent member states from 
becoming Rambos, first by refraining from offering extra-regional privileges that 
encourage defection in the first place, and second by punishing states that do 
defect from regional cooperation, by withholding FDI or market access. Indeed, 
the EU positions itself as an external paymaster via the provision of development 
funding to regional organizations in the ACP, providing material incentives 
intended to encourage further integration and institution-building. The EU’s 
funding to ACP regions is primarily focused on promoting regional economic 
integration, in the form of trade integration, infrastructure and building the 
capacity of regional institutions.19 A smaller percentage is directed towards 
regional political cooperation, which involves the promotion of democratic 
governance, peace and security architecture, and disaster management. At the 
extreme, member states may be motivated to engage in regional cooperation solely 
because of the incentives provided by outsiders, with the result that when 
19 Focal areas and the amount of funding devoted to particular programmes vary according to the 
identified needs of each region. See empirical chapters for a detailed breakdown of programming 
in southern and Western Africa. 
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incentives are withdrawn or reduced, regional cooperation grinds to a halt. This 
may explain why regionalism in the developing world often proceeds in fits and 
starts, and once promising initiatives often fail to deliver (Muntschick 2012). 
Interregional trade deals: Asymmetric interregionalism, such as that between the EU 
and ACP regions, can strengthen regional actorness in the weaker region, due to 
‘the building of intra-regional institutions within the less integrated regional 
grouping as a function of interregionalism’s demand for greater intra-regional 
coordination. This may involve the emergence of new structures of cooperation, or 
the strengthening of existing structures’ (Doidge 2011: 52). The mere prospect of 
having to engage with an external actor such as the EU on an interregional basis 
encourages the evolution of regional actorness. The EU introduced the EPAs in 
order to accelerate the integration agenda in ACP regions (Bilal 2013). It was hoped 
that their introduction would force ACP states that belonged to multiple regional 
organizations to make difficult but decisive choices about their memberships and 
reduce the prevalence of overlap, thereby contributing to more coherent regional 
integration (International Food and Agricultural Trade Policy Council 2011). 
Unfortunately this was not always the case. According to the Cotonou Agreement, 
EPAs were designed to be WTO-compatible, reciprocal trade agreements aiming to 
encourage regional integration and regional trade capacity in ACP regions. 
However, the Agreement did not contain any prescription regarding the degree of 
integration required for ACP regions to enter into EPA negotiations, or what level 
of integration should be obtained at the end of the EPA process (International Food 
and Agricultural Trade Policy Council 2011). Many observers noted that a Common 
External Tariff should be a minimum requirement to enter into coherent trade 
negotiations with external partners (InBrief 2006; Jessen 2004). 
Participating in interregional trade negotiations such as the EPAs can stimulate 
actorness in ACP regions through several mechanisms. First, participating in an 
intensive negotiation processes stimulates ‘the internal procedures for 
coordinating and establishing common positions…[and] helps to develop a culture 
of mutual and balanced compromises’ within regions (International Food and 
Agricultural Trade Policy Council 2011). Second, pressure from the negotiating 
partner to take decisions on issues on which there is no regional position can 
advance the regional agenda and contribute to the formulation of a common 
regional position where previously there was none (Bilal 2013). For example, 
making technical decisions about liberalization policy towards European goods 
can facilitate the technical internal negotiations towards a Common External 
Tariff (International Food and Agricultural Trade Policy Council 2011). Third, 
engaging with a more coherent ‘Other’ can contribute to the evolution of a regional 
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identity. Greater interaction between member states as they try to establish a 
common position may remind states that they share a common fate, shared values, 
norms and characteristics vis-à-vis the ‘Other’, which in turn could lead to more 
established institutions for intra-regional cooperation (Doctor 2015). However, for 
interregional trade agreements to be effective ‘mid-wives’ to greater coordination, 
institutionalization and identity formation, they should cohere with pre-existing 
regional initiatives, otherwise they contribute to the ‘lock-in’ of overlap and 
fragmentation, making future integration difficult to achieve, and inhibiting the 
emergence of regional actorness.  
 
The EU’s Disintegrative Influence 
The EU can exert a disintegrative influence on ACP regions, also in two ways. 
Indirectly, through the provision of differentiated trading options which 
incentivize member states to become regional Rambos; and more directly, the EU 
may purposively undermine the actorness of ACP regions by employing divide-
and-rule tactics. 
Incentivizing member states to become Rambos: The paragraphs above outlined how 
regions in the developing world are more prone to the defection of member states 
from regional cooperation. This occurs when there are differentiated trading 
options with external actors that are both incompatible with regional integration, 
and more attractive than regional cooperation with neighbouring states. The EU 
promotes regionalism in the ACP, but it also employs the principle of differentia-
tion, based on individual states’ level of development. The principle of differentia-
tion is most frequently used in relation to the allocation of the EU’s development 
funding, and is intended to prioritize the needs of Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) and Low Income Countries over those of the middle-income countries. 
However, the differentiation principle also has a trade component, as the EU 
unilaterally offers several different trading regimes, in addition to the EPAs, that 
developing states may choose to trade under. Eligibility for these preferential and 
in some cases non-reciprocal regimes is determined by states’ level of development. 
The EU also negotiates and signs bilateral FTAs, on an ad hoc basis, with emerging 
economies in the developing world (e.g. Mexico, Brazil, South Africa), granting 
them extra-regional privileges which can cause them to favour orientating their 
trade policy towards the EU over their local regional integration efforts. They then 
become regional Rambos. When regional powers become Rambos, integration 
stalls, institution-building grinds to halt (Muntschick 2012), and the regional 
power abdicates its leadership role, thereby undermining actorness. These bilateral 
deals with regional powers, nested in a broader framework of interregional 
cooperation, not only complicate interregional negotiations, but also have the 
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potential to foster mistrust within the region (Doctor 2015). These differentiated 
trading options represent extra-regional privileges for certain states. States that 
would incur a loss by giving up their extra-regional privileges in favour of a 
regional position are likely to be reluctant to do so, and to the extent that 
developing regions are composed of states at different levels of development, the 
differentiated trading options contribute to divergent external trade policy 
preferences, making it difficult to formulate common positions. 
Divide-and-rule tactics: Divide-and-rule tactics involves an actor exploiting coordination 
problems within a group by making discriminatory offers or threats, and are a 
well-known and frequently deployed tool in international diplomacy and trade 
negotiations (Posner et al. 2009; Meunier 2000). The shift in the EU’s relations with 
the ACP, from being conducted on an all-ACP – EU basis, to a scenario in which the 
ACP is split into seven regional groups could be considered a divide-and-rule tactic 
in itself. So too could the option of pursuing interregional trade agreements 
instead of multilateral negotiations at the WTO, where developing states lose the 
advantage of numerical supremacy, making it easier for the EU to push a WTO+ 
agenda that was previously rejected by developing states. It may be controversial to 
suggest that the EU deliberately employs divide-and-rule and rule strategies 
vis-à-vis developing countries, especially in light of its normative promotion of 
regionalism. However several authors note that the changing global economy, and 
ongoing Euro-crisis have resulted in the EU subordinating its normative goal of 
promoting regionalism in the developing world to more mercantile interests, and 
that ‘regionalism through interregionalism’ is no longer a priority for the EU 
(Hardacre 2009; Doctor 2015). There may also be bureaucratic explanations for the 
prevalence of negotiating tactics that run counter to the stated aims of regional 
development (see Section 1.4). In the context of interregional trade negotiations, 
one partner may take advantage of known divisions in the other in order to extract 
concessions, while increasing pressure via external constraints. For example, the 
imposition of unilateral deadlines serves to increase intra-regional tensions and 
makes individual states more susceptible to defection from the regional position. 
One partner may circumvent the regional level in order to lobby individual 
member states, using threats of loss of market access or bribes (more preferential 
treatment) to encourage the signing of bilateral deals and/or concessions on 
contentious issues. Increases or decreases in development funding may also be 
used as carrots and sticks in negotiations (Tandon 2010).  
In summary, the EU exerts a powerful influence on ACP regions (see Figure 3.3), 
which may be beneficial or harmful to their actorness. The EU’s influence has 
an integrative effect that boosts actorness if it acts as an external paymaster: i.e. 
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it provides sufficient material incentives to encourage regional cooperation 
and institutional capacity building. Indirectly, the EU can also have a positive 
effect on the actorness of ACP regions with the prospect of interregional trade 
deals (the EPAs themselves), which ‘forces’ the consolidation of regional positions, 
strengthening of regional institutions, and even regional identities as weaker 
ACP regions prepare to engage with a more powerful actor. However negotiating 
configurations must cohere with the borders of existing regional organizations to 
be effective in facilitating deeper integration and regional actorness. On the other 
hand, the EU may exert a disintegrative influence on ACP regions that undermines 
actorness, either by employing divisive negotiating tactics, or by the indirect 
supply of differentiated trading option to individual states within a region. 
Bilateral FTAs with regional powers are especially harmful for regional actorness 
if they cause the region’s most powerful state to defect from actively participating 
in regional cooperation. The EU’s integrative and disintegrative influences co-exist 
simultaneously and act at cross-purposes to each other. Whether EU influence 
boosts or undermines actorness depends on whether an overall integrative or 
disintegrative influence prevails. This leads to the following final hypothesis: 
H7: Where an integrative influence prevails (material incentives are sufficient to promote 
regional cooperation, no bilateral FTAs, EPAs cohere with boundaries of regional 
organization, lower prevalence of divide and rule tactics), regional actorness is likely to 
be greater. Where a disintegrative influence prevails (material incentives are insufficient 
to promote intra-regional cooperation, there are bilateral FTAs with the regional power 
or other differentiated trade regimes that prevent the emergences of a common regional 
position, EPAs do not cohere with pre-existing regional organizations, high prevalence of 
divide and rule tactics), regional actorness is likely to be lower.  
Figure 3.3  The EU’s influence on the actorness of ACP regions
Integrative Disintegrative
Direct 
Paymaster  
(funding of regionalism)
Divide-and-rule
Indirect
Coherent interregional trade 
negotiations (EPAs)
Differentiated trading options  
at odds with EPAs (esp. bilateral FTAs 
with regional powers)
Source: Author’s illustration
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3.5  Conclusion
The framework presented here argues that actorness – a composite variable 
consisting of regional identity, formal and informal institutions for decision -
making, the homogeneity of member state preferences, and regional capabilities 
– is an important variable in determining whether regions are more or less 
effective in the their interregional relations. But the relationship between 
actorness and interregional effectiveness is more nuanced than simply higher 
actorness equating to greater effectiveness Conditions in the external environment 
(the opportunity structure regions find themselves in) also affects the relationship 
between actorness and effectiveness. Opportunity structure consists of the degree 
of asymmetry between bargaining partners, the degree of opposition from the 
bargaining partner; the broader policy arena in which negotiations take place; 
and the influence of powerful, external third parties. Favourable opportunity 
structures are likely to lead to regions being more effective. 
When translating the actorness-effectiveness argument from EU foreign policy 
studies to the context of other world regions, we should keep in mind that 
structural asymmetries in the global economy mean that regions in the developing 
world, especially the ACP, are particularly susceptible to the influence of external 
powers. They are especially susceptible to the EU’s influence, which is not only 
their most important trade partner, but also actively promotes regionalism in the 
Figure 3.4  Full theoretical model 
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ACP. The EU can exert either an integrative or disintegrative influence on ACP 
regions, contributing to higher or lower levels of actorness. To the extent that the 
EU’s influence is beneficial for intra-regional cooperation in ACP regions, the EU is 
empowering these regions to become stronger and more cohesive bargaining 
partners. If successful, this policy has the potential to undermine the EU’s own 
negotiating effectiveness and force them to grant greater concessions to ACP 
regions as they become stronger negotiating partners. As such it represents an 
interesting yardstick for evaluating claims that the EU is a normative power. Is the 
EU genuinely willing to promote regional cooperation in ACP regions, even if 
doing so ultimately undermines its own bargaining power?      
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4.1  Introduction 
Previous research on interregionalism left much to be desired in terms of research 
design and methodological rigor. As is common with nascent research agendas, 
early studies tended to be explorative and descriptive (Hänggi 2006). As the field 
progressed, studies became more sophisticated, but nevertheless there are still few 
studies that are comparative (with the exception of Maull and Ofken 2003 and 
Söderbaum et al. 2005), and even fewer causal or theoretically rigorous explanations 
of interregionalism (the exception being Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004). This 
manuscript departs from previous studies in that it seeks a theoretically informed 
causal explanation of the outcomes of asymmetric interregionalism involving the 
EU and ACP regions, and utilizes a comparative case study research design in order 
to do so. 
This chapter lays out the key considerations of the research project. Section 4.2 
situates the research project within the broader ontological and methodological 
debates with the discipline of International Relations. The various choices 
associated with the comparative case research design are explained in Section 4.3. 
The project uses a most-similar systems research design to explain the puzzle of 
why West Africa has managed to be more effective in its interregional negotiations 
with the EU than the SADC Group. Process-tracing is used to strengthen the 
‘correlational’ method of most-similar systems research designs. Section 4.4 
describes the operationalization and measurement of the independent and 
dependent variables, as well as the expected observable manifestations of the 
causal pathway linking actorness and effectiveness in the context of highly 
asymmetric interregional trade negotiations. Section 4.5 discusses data collection 
and the various difficulties, limitations and constraints encountered when doing 
research on trade negotiations and African regional organizations, while Section 
4.6 concludes the chapter.
4.2  Ontological and methodological considerations
The so-called ‘Great Debates’ that have characterized International Relations all 
concerned themselves in some way, either tangentially or directly, with questions 
of ontology, epistemology and methodology. What is this world really like and how 
can we claim to ‘know’ things about it? It is perhaps most useful to think of the 
various ontological and epistemological positions espoused by the different 
schools of thought in terms of the reflectivist-rationalist-constructivist ‘semi-circle’ 
put forward by Christiansen, Jorgensen and Wiener (see Figure 4.1). 
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Briefly put, the rationalist pole represents deductive, materialist approaches 
associated with methodological individualism. Rationalists consider actors to be 
utility-maximizing and their interests as exogenously given. Here one would find 
(neo)realism, (neo)liberalism, rational choice theories and game theory, amongst 
others. Rationalism certainly has the advantage of parsimony, ‘underpinned by a 
familiar positivist epistemology’, but it is neglectful of ‘irrational’ concerns such 
as identities, culture and community (Christiansen, Jorgensen and Wiener 2011: 
533). On the other hand, the reflectivist pole is best described as the ‘antithesis’ of 
rationalism. Reflectivist positions are associated with post-modernism, feminist 
theory, critical theory and historical sociology. Reflectivists reject the notion that 
an objective social science and causal explanations about the social world are 
possible. The world is mediated through language and thus our social world and 
our understanding of it is inherently subjective. Actor’s interests are intersubject-
ive, endogenously generated and subject to change. In acknowledgement of this, 
reflectivist researchers tend to rely on interpretivist methodologies. Rationalism 
and reflectivism represent inherently incompatible ontologies. However 
constructivism offers a middle ground and the potential for bridging the gap 
between rationalism and reflectivism, in which researchers may take into account 
the importance of identities, norms, and culture without necessarily sacrificing 
positivist epistemologies. As constructivist approaches may be positioned 
anywhere along the spectrum between reflectivism and rationalism (see Figure 
4.1) it can produce ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ variants, with thick variations being closer to 
reflectivism (with interpretivist epistemologies) and thin variants being closer to 
rationalism (with positivist epistemologies). 
As for the implication regarding my own research, rather than engaging in an 
extensive debate about the philosophy of science in IR and Comparative Politics, (cf. 
Wendt 1999; Wæver 1996; Lichback 1997), it seems more useful to me to engage 
Figure 4.1  Constructivism as a middle ground
Reflectivism Rationalism 
Constructivist positions 
Source: Christiansen, Jorgensen and Wiener 2011
Processed on: 19-7-2016
504439-L-bw-Hulse
95
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
4
with ontological and epistemological considerations via my own sub-field of 
Comparative Regionalism and the topic of interregionalism by asking questions 
directly relevant to my research, such as what is a region, how do we know one when we 
see one, and can regions interact meaningfully with each other? 
As noted in Chapter One, this manuscript is situated in the relatively newish field 
of Comparative Regionalism, which finds itself somewhere in between the more 
traditional fields of International Relations and Comparative Politics. Regionalism 
is by no means a new phenomenon: social scientists have been studying the process 
of European integration for nearly 60 years. What is new are the increasing efforts 
to move away from the n=1 teleology of traditional EU Studies, and consider 
different forms of regional integration around the world, including the EU, in 
comparative perspective. 
Inevitably any scholarly investigation of regionalism and interregionalism runs 
into a consideration of what exactly we mean when we refer to a ‘region’. There is 
no obvious, physical demarcation of where a transnational region should begin 
and end, but nevertheless regions and regional organizations do define themselves 
with boundaries marking insiders from outsiders. These boundaries are not 
necessarily marked by brute material facts: regions can span vertiginous mountain 
ranges, wide rivers, even seas; while ending abruptly on an easily traversable 
steppe. The reason regions can accommodate geography is that they are social 
constructions, in which regions are an imagined community of states, bound 
together and separated from others through something more than brute material 
fact. For that reason it seems obvious to me that any consideration of regionalism 
and regions’ relations with other regions requires an ontology that takes into 
account the relevance of intersubjective meaning and the role that identities and 
norms play in international affairs. Even the earliest theories of integration 
acknowledged the importance of ideational factors such as identity and community 
within regional integration, even if they were not explicitly ‘constructivist’ (cf. 
neofunctionalist studies of EU integration). 
As such, this project adopts a ‘thin’ constructivist approach: what has been termed 
‘constructive realism’ (Ben Ze’ev 1995), sociological constructivism (Katzenstein 
1996), naturalistic constructivism, (Ruggie 1998) or modern (as opposed to 
postmodern) constructivism (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001). In practise this means 
that the manuscript’s approach is situated closer towards the rationalist pole of 
the reflectivist-rationalist-constructivist semi-circle. It assumes an intersubjective 
ontology, in which actors engage in mutually constitutive interaction from which 
they derive meaning and interests, but they are nevertheless rooted in an 
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independently existing social reality. Interests are not exogenously given and 
fixed, as assumed in rationalist approaches, but rather endogenously generated 
and changeable. I consider this a preferable position as, firstly, rationalism 
‘provides no answer to the core foundational question: how the constituent actors 
– in international relations, territorial states [or regions, in this case] – came to 
acquire their current identity and the interests that are assumed to go with it’ 
(Ruggie 1998: 863). It also makes little (theoretical) allowance for transformations 
in (state) interests and identity over time, when (empirically) we know that state 
interests must and do change over time. Secondly, as research into decision- 
making at the individual level has shown, humans frequently do not behave as 
the rational, utility-optimising individuals that a rationalist ontology assumes 
(cf. Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow). As various iterations of the Ultimatum 
Game have shown, decisions about behaviour are made within an intersubjective 
framework in which considerations of fairness, reputation and justice are 
considered relevant to the actors involved, oftentimes more so than mere utility 
maximisation.20 A purely rational approach to the study of the social world does not 
take into account such normative concerns and is an inaccurate, if parsimonious, 
view of human behaviour. A constructive ontology of International Relations 
recognises the role of human perception in international affairs; that the building 
blocks of international reality are ideational as well as material; and ‘that the 
meaning and significance of ideational factors are not independent of time and 
place’ (Ruggie 1998: 879). In this it departs from more ‘traditional’ approaches to 
IR that aspire to make the social sciences as much like the natural sciences as 
possible. However, I also assume that social interaction is nevertheless rooted in an 
independently existing empirical reality, in which even ‘the intersubjective 
aspects of social life exist independently of the mental states of most individuals 
that constitute it’ (Ruggie 1998: 880). In this respect the strand of constructivism 
employed in this manuscript is rooted in scientific realism, and I see no inherent 
conflict between a constructivist ontology and positivist epistemology. Finally, 
a note on constructive ontology and causality: ideational factors do not ‘cause’ 
action in the same way as material facts. Rather they provide ‘reasons for action, 
which is not the same as causes for actions’ and play a role in explaining why an 
20 The Ultimatum Game involves two players, in which player A receives a sum of money, and 
must then propose a division of the money between the two players. If player B accepts player A’s 
proposal, both players get to keep the money. If play B rejects the proposal, neither of them are 
allowed to keep anything. A purely rational, utility-maximizing interpretation of this game would 
predict that player A allocates 99 percent (or a similarly large portion) of the money to herself, and 
offers player B one percent of the total amount. Player B should accept this, as a small sum is better 
than nothing, and even though he does not receive as much as player A, he is still better off than 
before. However, when the game is played between real people, offers that are perceived by player 
B as ‘unfair’ are most often rejected, leaving both players with nothing.
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outcome is historically so and not otherwise (Ruggie 1998: 869). Ergo causality 
within constructivist ontologies can only ever be probabilistic, not deterministic. 
4.3   Research design: Most-similar cases  
with process-tracing  
Main research puzzle and research questions
The puzzle guiding the research is how has West Africa managed to be more effective in 
its interregional trade negotiations with the EU than its more-or-less similar counterpart in 
southern Africa, SADC? The outcome on effectiveness is surprising as West Africa is 
economically and politically less influential than Southern Africa, so the region’s 
relative success in EPA negotiations is somewhat unexpected. Broken down into its 
constituent parts the main research question reveals several sub-questions guiding 
the research, including: 
•	 How to conceptualize, operationalize and assess the respective levels of actorness 
of West Africa and SADC? 
•	 To what extent is West Africa or SADC’s effectiveness in the negotiations 
attributable to their degree of regional actorness, as opposed to external factors 
unrelated to actorness? 
•	 How does actorness translate into greater effectiveness?
•	 To what extent do ECOWAS and SADC experience the EU’s external influence as 
beneficial (or detrimental) to their development of regional actorness? 
Principles of comparative case study research designs 
With small-N case study design, one should give due consideration to the selection 
of cases, which should aim to provide the element of control and variation required 
by the research puzzle (George and Bennett 2005). The logic of the case selection in 
this project is based on a most-similar research design, in which the researcher 
selects cases that are similar in all of their independent variables except one (in 
this case, actorness), and which differ on the dependent variable of interest 
(effectiveness). Most-similar research designs and their close cousin, least-similar 
designs (cases which are dissimilar in all independent variables except one, and 
share a value on the dependent variable), allow for controlled comparison across 
two or more cases. In the case of most-similar cases, ‘if exogenous variables can be 
ruled out as a source of variation in the outcome [through case selection]…then 
there is some basis for inferring that differences in the outcome can be attributed 
to the one variable… on which the cases differ’ (George and Bennet 2005: 252). 
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The main advantage of most- and least- similar systems research designs is that 
they can provide an element of control and variation for social phenomena where 
experimental research designs would be either impossible or unethical (Peters 
1998), which makes it a particularly useful research design for International 
Relations and Comparative Politics. Most-similar systems designs are also 
considered somewhat stronger than least similar systems designs as the danger of 
producing false positives is reduced (George and Bennet 2005). However there are 
also a number of disadvantages to most-similar research designs. The logic of most 
similar systems designs is based on John Stuart Mill’s Method of Difference. Mill 
himself was well aware of the difficulties and limitations in making effective use 
of this method in explaining social phenomena, namely the possibility that the 
accidental ‘omission of relevant variables can invalidate the results of cross-case 
comparison’ in both most-similar or most-different research designs (George and 
Bennett 2005: 51). Given that the social world is a complex and multi-causal place, 
it is unlikely that the researcher can entirely control for extraneous variables 
purely through case selection. The risk with most-similar research designs is that 
findings may be over-determined, as there may be multiple possible and plausible 
alternative explanations for the outcome, which have not been controlled for in 
the selection of cases (Peters 1998). However there are safeguards against this, in 
the form of testing rival hypotheses to ensure no relevant variables or alternative 
explanations are left out, and careful with-in case analysis in the form of process 
tracing, which can compensate for the limitations of the comparative method. 
Critics may question whether a small or medium N study is sufficient to test a theory. 
This is based on the assumption that increasing the N by adding more cases, and 
thus more data-set observations, will increase the validity of one’s research (cf. King, 
Keohane and Verba 1994). However more recent approaches to qualitative research 
reject this ‘statistical worldview’ of qualitative research  (McKeown 1999; Mahoney 
and Goertz 2006) and affirm the value of small-N research through the accumulation 
of causal-process observations from within-case analysis. Causal-process observations 
provide leverage not by increasing the size of the N, but by ‘the ability of individual 
observations to confirm or challenge a researcher’s prior expectations about what 
should occur’ (Mahoney 2010: 128). Using this approach to qualitative methodology, 
small or medium N research characterised by well-chosen cases can provide 
compelling evidence that a particular theory has weak or strong explanatory power. 
Provided the cases are carefully handled and sufficient causal-process observations 
are collected via process-tracing, there is no reason that a two-case study should not 
be able to lend convincing weight to a particular argument, which can – in future 
research – be reasonably expected to be applicable to other cases, so long as they fall 
within the specified scope conditions of the theory. 
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Process tracing
Process tracing can greatly strengthen the causal inference of comparative case 
studies by uncovering the causal mechanisms that underlie the correlation 
between the observed variables, and determining that the outcome of interest was 
indeed due to the variance on the independent variable between the two cases 
(George and Bennet 2005; Tarrow 2010). Process tracing is particularly useful for 
theory testing and development as it generates multiple observations within a case 
(casual-process observations) and aims to clarify the precise manner in which 
those observations are linked so that they result in a particular outcome. It involves 
the examination of diagnostic pieces of evidence, usually evaluated in a 
chronological or explanatory sequence with the aim of supporting or negating 
causal hypotheses (Collier et al. 2011). It is a valuable supplement to the ‘correlational’ 
methods of agreement and difference represented by least-similar and most-similar 
cases research designs. 
This project adopts the theory-testing variant of process tracing in order to 
empirically test whether the hypothesised causal mechanism linking actorness and 
effectiveness is actually present. The causal mechanism is akin to a mid-range 
theory and can be expected to be present in the wider population of cases in which 
the necessary scope conditions are present (Beach and Pederson 2013). To test the 
causal mechanism, the researcher generates a set of observable manifestations for 
each part of the mechanism (see Section 4.4), and if evidence in favour of these 
expected manifestations is found, the researcher can infer whether the causal 
mechanism was present, and whether the causal mechanism functioned as 
predicted (Beach and Pederson 2013). Researchers engaging in process tracing 
should remember that the quality or strength of evidence is more important than 
its quantity: one piece of ‘smoking gun’ evidence is more relevant in corroborating 
an explanation than ten pieces of circumstantial evidence. The proverbial ‘smoking 
gun’ describes a piece of evidence that can strongly support a given hypothesis, but 
if such a piece of evidence is absent it does not necessarily mean the hypothesis is 
invalid. There are three other types of evidence in process tracing: straw-in-the-wind 
(circumstantial evidence that affirms the relevance of a hypothesis, but does not 
confirm it), hoop (establishes necessary conditions; although it does not provide 
direct support for a hypothesis, it can eliminate rival explanations), and doubly- 
decisive (the strongest type of evidence; it supports a hypothesis while eliminating 
rival explanations) (George and Bennet 2005; Bennet 2010). 
Case selection of West Africa/ECOWAS and SADC 
Interregionalism involves institutionalized relations between groups of states 
from different regions, each coordinated to a greater or lesser degree. Ideally inter-
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regionalism takes place between two or more regional organizations, with clearly 
defined borders and a minimal level of integration. There are approximately 30 
cases of interregionalism between regions represented by regional organizations 
(see Table 4.1), and more if relations between more diffuse groups are included. 
ECOWAS and SADC: Similarity in key background variables
Of these existing cases, the selected cases of EU-SADC and EU-ECOWAS show 
similarity in key background variables, or as much similarity as might reasonably 
be expected when it comes to large scale phenomena such as regionalism (see 
Table 4.2). Both regions are located on the African continent and share a history of 
colonial occupation by European powers.21 Both are recognised Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) of the African Union, receiving support from the AU with the 
long-term goal of eventual continental union. Both have 15 member states, without 
21 With the notable exception of Liberia. 
Table 4.1   Existing cases of interregional cooperation between regional 
organizations 
Regional organizations Date Regional organizations Date
EU – ASEAN 1972 EU – IGAD 2003
EU – CARICOM/CARIFORUM 1975/1992 Mercosur - CARICOM 2004
EU – GCC 1988 Mercosur – SACU 2004
ASEAN – GCC 1990 ASEAN – SCO 2005
EU – Mercosur 1992 Mercosur – GCC 2005
EU – CACM/SICA 1993 AU – CEN-SAD 2007
Mercosur – CAN 1993 AU – COMESA 2007
EU – SAARC 1994 AU – ECCAS 2007
EU – SADC 1994 AU – ECOWAS 2007
ASEAN – ANZCERTA 1996 AU – IGAD 2007
ASEAN – SADC 1996 AU – LAS 2007
ASEAN – Mercosur 1996 AU – AMU 2007
EU – CAN 1996 AU – SADC 2007
ASEAN – CAN 1997 EU – EAC 2007
IOR – ARC 1997 COMESA – EAC – SADC 2008
EU – ECOWAS 2000
Source: van der Vleuten and Ribeiro Hoffmann 2013, updated by author
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any overlap with each other. Both regions are characterised by a similar 
distribution of power across member states, with one undisputed military and 
economic power – Nigeria in ECOWAS and South Africa in SADC – and a 
surrounding system of smaller and less developed states. Politically, both regions 
are characterised by a mix of democratic and undemocratic regimes. Economically, 
both regions are still characterised by poorly integrated regional markets despite 
30 odd years of regional cooperation, with many remaining tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to integration remaining. Both regions are, on aggregate, producers of 
primary products that are exported to various extra-regional partners, especially 
the European Union, which makes them susceptible to outside influence. Finally, 
both regions are working towards similar long-term goals: to establish economic 
and monetary unions, accompanied by political cooperation, in order to promote 
economic growth and development and eradicate poverty. However ECOWAS has a 
more ambitious agenda due to its acknowledgement that the achievement of their 
goals may require the pooling of sovereignty, a principle that SADC’s Treaty rejects.
Similarity in opportunity structure (scope condition are present) 
As explained in Chapter Three, opportunity structure is a scope condition for the 
causal relationship between actorness and effectiveness in interregional outcomes. 
This project focuses on ACP regions in highly asymmetric interregional relations 
with the EU, meaning they require at least a somewhat favourable opportunity 
structure in order to be effective. Luckily for both SADC and ECOWAS, global 
conditions over the past decade have shifted in their favour, thanks to economic 
crisis in Europe, the rise of the BRICS, and increased Chinese influence in Africa 
(Jones 2014; Bretherton and Vogler 2013). Both regions negotiated with the EU, a 
vastly more powerful region in terms of both actorness and market size (see Figure 
4.3), on a similar set of trade policy issues, over the same time period (2002-2014), 
under the umbrella grouping of the ACP. Both sets of negotiations were nested in 
the same multilateral policy arena. West Africa/ECOWAS and SADC EPA 
negotiations are nested in the broader Cotonou Agreement governing relations 
between the EU and the ACP. More broadly, the negotiations are also nested in the 
multilateral WTO framework. EPAs were negotiated on the understanding that 
they must be ‘WTO compatible’, which can provide both sides leverage in arguing 
their understandings of WTO compatibility.
There may be some variance on the degree of EU opposition to an ACP region’s 
position on a given issue, but for the most part the EU’s position on the various EPA 
issues is the same or very similar across all ACP regions, and EU negotiators employ 
similar bargaining tactics across different EPA negotiations. The EU does not 
display greater altruism to weaker regions because it can ‘afford’ to, as some might 
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Table 4.2   Comparison of ECOWAS and SADC key background variables 
ECOWAS SADC
No. member states 15 15
Year founded 1975 SADCC: 1980
SADC: 1992
Population 339 million 277 million
Regional GDP US$ 316 billion US$ 572 billion
Regional power’s 
share of GDP
64% (Nigeria) 64% (South Africa)
Intra-regional  
trade as % of total 
(exports only)
9% 8% 
Level  
of integration
Customs and monetary union 
between 8 MS (UEMOA), common 
external tariff for all 15 MS  
since 2015
Customs union between 5 MS 
(SACU); FTA between 11 MS  
since 2008 
Objectives Promote economic and 
social development through 
integration and pooling of 
sovereignty, leading to a 
common market; achieve 
complementarity of regional 
and national policies; promote 
private-sector joint ventures; 
establish enabling legal 
environment; promote balanced 
development of the region; 
improve information flows 
among population (ECOWAS 
Treaty 1993)
Poverty eradication; promote 
common political values; 
promote democracy, peace 
and stability; achieve 
complementarity between 
national and regional 
programmes; mobilization of 
resources; promote cultural 
affinity between people; combat 
HIV/AIDS; mainstream gender 
(SADC Amended Treaty 2001)
Former colonial 
powers
France – 9 MS
UK – 3 MS 
Portugal – 2 MS
UK – 10 MS
Portugal – 2 MS
France – 1 MS
Germany – 1 MS
Belgium – 1 MS 
Regime mix  
(Polity IV)
Democracies: 7
Open anocracies: 5
Closed anocracies: 3
Autocracies: 0
Democracies: 7
Open anocracies: 4
Closed anocracies: 2
Autocracies: 1  
Sources: IMF, Polity IV
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expect, as this would set an undesirable precedent for more powerful states and 
regions, and undermine the EU’s bargaining power in future negotiations. Finally, 
the influence of powerful external third parties such as the USA and China can 
alter the opportunity structure. If a region has potentially attractive trading 
options with a powerful actor other than the EU it has less incentive to make 
concessions in order to reach agreement. In the African context, increased trade 
and investment with China may make states and regions less interested in making 
concessions to the EU, and as the EU faces increasing competition for Africa’s raw 
materials it may be more willing to grant trade concessions, thereby making 
regions more effective than their degree of actorness would otherwise suggest. 
Indeed many observers suggest that China’s increasing engagement with Africa 
has almost certainly reduced the EU’s bargaining power over the decade-long 
course of EPA negotiations (Bretherton and Vogler 2013; Draper and Freytag 2014), 
and to a certain extent the EPAs are motivated by a desire to ‘lock-in’ access to 
African markets and resources and gain an advantage over these emerging 
competitors to European trade. Chinese trade with Africa has grown exponentially, 
from US$10 billion in 2000, to US$210 billion in 2013 (Patey and Chung 2014). 
Chinese trade and investment is largely focused around the larger African 
economies, including South Africa and Nigeria (Sautman and Hairong 2009), 
however the EU remains the most important trading partner for most African 
states.22 
22 The USA’s economic influence in Africa has remained steady throughout the 2000s with the 
American Growth and Opportunity Act. 
Table 4.3   Power Asymmetry between the EU and ECOWAS/SADC
Population GDP US$ 
EU 28 500 million 14 trillion 
ECOWAS 15 339 million 316 billion 
West Africa 16* (EPA configuration) 343 million 320 billion
SADC 15 277 million 572 billion
SADC 7** (EPA configuration) 110 million 524 billion
* inc. Mauritania
 ** ex. DRC, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe
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4.4  Operationalization of variables
As outlined in Chapter Three, regional actorness consists of identity, formal 
institutions and informal leadership, the homogeneity of member state preferences, 
and capabilities. Actorness is issue specific and varies across different aspects of a 
region’s external relations. Since this project’s focus of is outcomes in interregional 
trade negotiations, it operationalizes actorness in trade terms.  
Regional identity  
Identity is perhaps the trickiest element of actorness to operationalize. How does 
one distil the complex subjective understandings of social groups into a value 
indicating whether said group has a collectively ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ identity? In the 
context of this project I assess the strength of political community among member 
states by analysing speeches given by Heads of State and the RO’s chief representa-
tive(s) at meetings of the regional executive. These are chosen because it is in this 
context that leaders explore and re-affirm ideas of ‘who we are’ via rhetorical 
performance. Repeated references to certain frames or motifs concerning the 
political culture of the region give an idea of how the member states of the region 
view themselves (in relation to the outside world), and how salient that perception 
is to the organizational identity of the region. There are certainly some limitations 
to this method. Firstly, it may be considered a rather crude measure of political 
culture. Secondly, a suitable sample size of speeches simply may not be available. 
Indeed, sourcing ECOWAS speeches proved difficult. The speeches made at SADC 
summits are published in SADC’s annual records, which are publicly available 
after two years. On the other hand, while ECOWAS does publish an annual Official 
Journal, which outlines the points of discussion and main decisions taken at 
meetings of the executive, they do not include the speeches. As an alternative I 
searched for speeches via ECOWAS’ online archive of press releases and the region’s 
various news publications, although this approach yielded a lower number of 
speeches than that available for SADC. For that reason I supplement the analysis 
with reference to the historical experience of the region, relevant official documents 
(for example treaties and protocols that make reference to organizational 
principles of the region) and secondary literature. 
Institutions, formal and informal
An analysis of a region’s institutions – its rules and procedures for making 
decisions – is central to any understanding of its actorness. The formal institutions 
of a region consist of the rules and procedures legally codified through its 
institutional design. In principle, the more autonomous regional institutions are 
from their member states, the greater their actorness (Cosgrove and Twitchett 
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1970; Sjosted 1977; Jupille and Caporaso 1998). Therefore we might expect regions 
with formalized supranational or majority-voting rules and procedures to be 
characterized by greater degree of actorness.23 In order to assess the role of role of 
formal institutions in regional actorness, I first look at the overall institutional 
design of the region as codified in founding treaties and the general level of 
autonomy and authority of the region’s primary institutions. Next the institutional 
structures specifically set up to deal with the EPA negotiations are examined, as is 
the negotiating team, to determine whether it is made up of national or regional 
representatives. As Chapter Three mentioned, informal institutions, especially 
leadership from a powerful state, can also be important for actorness. To assess the 
absence or presence of regional leadership I examine the historic role that the 
regional power has played in the region, both on a general level, and with specific 
reference to the EPA negotiations. Finally I look at the extent to which regional 
leadership is contested by other member states, with reference to interviews and 
secondary literature. 
Member state preferences 
As outlined in the previous chapter, the homogeneity of member states preferences 
is important for actorness. Member state preferences are deduced from their 
position in the global economy, domestic interest groups and state-society 
relations, and government ideology. A state’s position in the global economy is 
assessed according to its developmental status: LDC or non-LDC, which determines 
which best alternatives to a negotiated agreement (BATNAs) are available to an 
individual country. Its main exports and export markets are also taken into 
account as they influence how keen states are to reach an agreement on EPAs. 
Information on country exports came from the Observatory of Economic 
Complexity and the CIA World Factbook. Data on the role of domestic interest 
groups in EPA negotiations came from local news reports via allAfrica.com, press 
releases, and secondary literature. Data on state-society relations came from the 
Polity IV project (for regime type) and secondary literature. Data on government 
(economic) ideology came from party websites, news reports, and the Heritage 
Foundation’s Trade Freedom Index, which indicates a country’s preference for 
protectionism or liberalization.   
23 Supranationalism: Authority is delegated to regional institution(s), member states must abide 
by the institution’s decisions. Majority voting: Majority of state representatives must vote for a 
decision before it becomes binding on all members. Consensus: Collaborative decision-making, 
seeks consent (lack of objections) rather than active agreement, members may abstain from voting. 
Unanimity: All members must agree and vote in favour, each has veto power. 
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Capabilities 
Capabilities are determined by looking at a regional organization’s budget and the 
diplomatic instruments it makes use of in pursuing its objectives in relation to 
trade policy and the EPAs. First, the budget of the organization is included as it 
gives a good indication of the overall institutional capacity of the region. 
Organizations with larger budgets are more likely to be adequately staffed, and 
have the financial and human resources to put policies into action. The percentage 
of the budget that comes from development partners is included as it gives an 
indication of the autonomy of the regional organization, since development 
funding is often earmarked for particular projects. Having surveyed the 
operational budgets of 20+ regional organizations of varying prominence around 
the world, I’ve developed guidelines on what constitutes a large, moderate or small 
budget for a regional organization. At the lower end of the budgetary scale we have 
organizations such as the moribund Arab Maghreb Union, with an annual 
operating budget of US$ 1.7 million (Institute for Security Studies, no date). At the 
opposite extreme lays the EU with an operational budget of ă150.9 billion in 2013 
(European Commission). 
Second, the region’s diplomatic instruments are examined. In theory there are a 
number of diplomatic instruments regions could make use of, ranging from 
diplomatic representation abroad, the issuing of official statements, lobbying, 
financial and technical assistance, conditionalities, and legal and physical 
coercion. In practice however few regions make use of the full range of diplomatic 
instruments, with ACP regions only capable of activities such as representation, 
issuing of statements, and lobbying in order to achieve their EPA related objectives. 
Diplomatic capabilities are assessed in terms of whether the region has permanent 
or ad hoc observer status at the WTO; whether it has specific diplomatic representation 
and/or coordinated Committees of Ambassadors in strategic cities or countries 
beyond the borders of the region, such as Brussels, Geneva or New York; and 
whether these diplomatic representatives engage in lobbying activities on behalf 
of the region as a whole, as opposed to representing national interests. Information 
on diplomatic representation and lobbying activities came from the websites and 
internal documents of international organizations (the WTO, the EU, SADC and 
ECOWAS), press releases, news reports and interviews. 
In a final step, the various aspects of actorness are cumulatively assessed. Indicators 
for each aspect are assigned a numerical value and these are added up to arrive at 
a final cumulative ‘actorness score’ which ranges on a spectrum from 4 (low 
actorness) to 17 (high actorness). 
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Effectiveness of ACP regions in EPA negotiations 
Effectiveness is defined as ‘goal attainment within a given negotiating context’ 
(van Schaik 2013: 294): the extent to which regions are able to shape outcomes in 
accordance with the objectives they adopt on particular issues (Groen and Niemann 
2012; Thomas 2012). Since effectiveness is conceptualized as alignment between 
initial objectives and actual outcomes, as a first step it was necessary to determine 
the region’s actual objectives regarding the various EPA issues. However there are 
a number of methodological problems in establishing regions’ ‘true’ objectives. 
First, negotiators may have an incentive to misrepresent their true objectives, in 
order to include a strategic margin as a basic negotiation strategy. I deal with this 
by assuming that both sides include a strategic margin in their starting positions, 
thereby effectively cancelling each other out. Second, trade negotiations tend to be 
secretive (Dür and Zimmerman 2007). Negotiators typically do not reveal their 
hand prior to the commencement of negotiations, as this would give the bargaining 
partner an informational advantage. Even after the conclusion of negotiations, the 
minutes of bargaining sessions or internal position papers and memos are not 
made public. Finally, negotiating objectives are something of a shifting goal post. 
As the process continues, new and unforeseen issues can arise and new objectives 
have to be developed (Larsén 2007).
One solution to this is to look at news reports of the early rounds of negotiation 
between the EU and ACP regions. This approach works on the assumption that 
both sides articulate what they want from the negotiations, giving an empirical 
indication of their objectives. However both sides may open the negotiations with 
inconsequential matters, in order to build trust and reciprocity before moving on 
to the more important and contentious issues. Thus relying on this method may 
overstate the importance of relatively minor issues and misrepresent the regions’ 
main objectives. Additionally it would eliminate the inclusion of new and 
unforeseen issues that arise during the course of the negotiations. I worked around 
this by reading the monthly EPA Updates produced by the International Centre for 
Trade and Sustainable Development (February 2002 to September 2007) and the 
European Centre for Development Management Policy (November 2006 to 
December 2014). From this I gathered information on the objectives articulated by 
ECOWAS and SADC on the main issues of the negotiations. EPA updates however 
did not always clearly articulate objectives on every issue. For example, updates 
would frequently mention that export taxes were a contentious issue in the SADC 
negotiations, without clearly stating exactly what SADC’s exact position on export 
taxes actually was. In instances such as this, where information is unclear or 
uncertain, I resort to the all-ACP position, which is articulated through periodical 
declarations. Although these declarations are not regionally specific, they do give 
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an estimate of what their objectives might have been. In order to take into account 
the ‘shifting goalposts’ of the negotiations I look especially at regional positions at 
critical junctures in the negotiations, where the regions are most likely to 
explicitly articulate their objectives on particular contentious issues through 
unilateral demarches, declarations, or public statements. After identifying the 
objectives of ECOWAS and SADC in the various issue areas, it was necessary to 
identify the agreed outcome on each issue and categorize it as effective, moderately 
effective, or not effective, according to how close the outcome is to the originally 
stated objectives of the region (see Table 4.6).  
The problem of comparing effectiveness across regions 
Comparing initial objectives to the final outcome takes us a step closer to 
determining how effective a region has been in the negotiations. However a 
problem arises in the difficulty of comparing issues like-for-like across different 
regions, as different issues have varying degrees of contentiousness in different 
regions. Community levies may have been a contentious issue for ECOWAS and the 
EAC, but it was an entirely irrelevant issue for the SADC Group. In principle regions 
will be unwilling to compromise on issues that are important to them, and more 
willing to compromise on issues identified as less important. So two regions may 
make a seemingly similar compromise on a particular issue, but for region A that 
compromise represents a far greater gain (or loss) than it does for region B because 
the issue is more (or less) contentious. The difficulty in comparing across cases is 
solved by ranking the relative importance of negotiating issues in each region. 
This is done by first determining the interests of the non-LDC states in each region, 
through an analysis of structural economic factors, domestic interest groups and 
institutions and government ideology. In a second step the intra-regional 
bargaining power of member states is assessed. States with greater bargaining 
power are likely to set the regional agenda and push their particular interests to 
Table 4.5   Negotiating outcomes on EPA issues 
Effective The agreed outcome is close to the original objective.  
May include some face-saving but essentially meaningless 
aspects for the negotiating partner 
Moderately effective The agreed outcome represents a more-or-less 50/50 
compromise between negotiating partners 
Not effective The agreed outcome is far from the region’s original objective 
and closer to the negotiating partners demands. May include 
some face-saving but essentially meaningless concessions. 
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the forefront of the regional position. Finally, the interests of the regional 
bureaucracy itself and its role in amalgamating a more-or-less coherent regional 
position from member state preferences are taken into account. Taken together, 
the various interests and degrees of power determine which issues are most salient 
in each region, making a like-for-like comparison of effectiveness possible. In total 
EPA negotiations cover approximately 16 trade policy issues, plus four definitional 
or conceptual issues, where negotiating sides disagreed about the ‘rules of the 
game’ (see Table 4.7). As covering all issues would double the length of the empirical 
chapters without leading to a different conclusion, the empirical analysis is 
limited to the eight most contentious issues in each region.
Operationalization of the causal mechanism linking actorness  
and effectiveness
Operationalization of a causal mechanism demands the question: if the theory is 
true, what else would we expect to observe happening? (Beach and Pederson 2013) 
At the theoretical level, part one of the proposed three-part mechanism expects 
effective regions to produce a common regional position regarding the EPAs 
relatively early on in the negotiating process, either due to a high degree of initial 
preference homogeneity between member states, the strong role of regional 
institutions, or the leadership of a regional power. Empirical manifestations of 
this include: 
Table 4.6   Issue areas in EPA negotiations
 
Substantive issues 
Agricultural/bilateral safeguards New Generation issues
Agricultural subsidies Non-execution clause
Community levies Quantitative restrictions
Development funding Rules of origin
Export taxes SPS standards
Infant industry protection Status quo/standstill clause
Market access Sustainable development
Most Favoured Nation clause Timetable for liberalization
Definitional issues
The ‘development’ aspect of the EPAs ‘partnership of equals’
‘parties’ to the agreement ‘substantially all trade’
Source: own compilation
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•	 The region acting as a coherent block during the all-ACP – EU consultative phase 
of the negotiations, before the EPA configurations were formalized;
•	 The speed at which the region produced an official roadmap, position paper 
or strategic framework from the commencement of the region-to-region 
negotiations;
•	 The speed at which the region officially responds to any ‘new’ issues introduced 
into the negotiations  
Part two of the mechanism predicts that effective regions will implement a 
coherent negotiation strategy and utilize the capabilities at its disposal as part of 
its strategy. As Chapter Three explained, ACP regions do not have the capabilities 
to make credible threats or bribes when negotiating with a much stronger partner 
such as the EU. Rather I expect their capabilities to be limited to the use of 
persuasive diplomatic instruments. Empirical manifestations of these are:  
•	 The use of norm-based arguments as part of the negotiating strategy
•	 The frequency and intensity of lobbying activities directed at European actors 
that hold sway over the EPA decision-making process, such as the European 
Parliament, sympathetic EU member states, and even the European public via 
transnational civil society campaigns.   
•	 Capitalizing on the external opportunity structure in order to increase their 
leverage vis-à-vis the EU.  
Part three of the mechanism predicts that the member states of effective regions 
will better resist external pressures and incentives to defect from the regional 
position. Defection is considered to be any action that threatens regional unity 
and the future of regional cooperation. In the context of EPA negotiations there 
are several degrees of defection. Empirical manifestations of defection, in order of 
severity, include: 
•	 The number of member states that publicly articulate a position deviating from 
the majority regional position
•	 The number of member states that initial a bilateral interim EPA 
•	 The number of member states that sign a bilateral interim EPA 
•	 The number of member states that ratify a bilateral interim EPA 
•	 The number of member states that implement a bilateral interim EPA
Operationalization of EU Influence on ACP Regions 
The EU’s integrative influence is assessed by looking at the amount of European 
Development Funding earmarked for West Africa and SADC’s respective Regional 
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Indicative Programmes over the last four funding cycles (covering the period from 
1996-2020).24 The extent to which EPAs have contributed to the solidification of 
intra-regional processes is assessed via secondary literature and interviews. The 
disintegrative influence of the EU is assessed in terms of whether the EU offers 
extra-regional privileges to individual member states that incentivizes them to 
become regional Rambos, particularly the presence/absence of pre-existing FTAs 
with regional powers. Secondly, the use of divide and rule tactics on the EU’s 
behalf is assessed via interviews, news reports, and secondary literature. 
4.5   Data collection, difficulties, limitations  
and constraints 
The seas of social science research are rarely plain sailing. Every researcher can 
expect to encounter at some point difficulties and constraints in her research, 
some being more surmountable than others. Probably the greatest difficulties 
during the course of this research project were associated with access to 
information. This boiled down to two main issues: 1) that trade negotiations are by 
nature a secretive affair, and 2) a lack of transparency and accessibility within 
SADC and ECOWAS. 
Trade negotiations tend to be a secretive and exclusive form of policy-making 
(Maes 2012). Even in the case of the EU, which produces millions of pages of 
documentation every year, gaining access to detailed information about the 
internal processes underlying its behaviour in international trade negotiations 
can be very difficult, as policy documents do little to highlight processes of 
internal decision-making and the proceedings of Council and Committee sessions 
are not in the public domain, nor are the details of the negotiation sessions 
themselves, forcing researchers to rely on interviews, evaluations of official 
documents, and the press (Dür and Zimmerman 2007). These difficulties in 
studying EU behaviour in trade negotiations are magnified when studying ACP 
regional organizations, which in comparison to the EU are under-staffed and 
under-resourced, and don’t have the same capacity for archiving, and making 
information publically accessible. This was compounded by a more general 
difficulty in gaining access to archives and inside information when studying 
African regional organizations (see also difficulties associated with elite 
24 It is too early for the most recent 11th EDF cycle, which covers the 2014-2020 period, to have had 
much effect on ACP regions. However the amount earmarked for the 11th EDF in each region gives 
a good indication of the region’s prior performance in absorbing earlier funding, and is a good 
indication of the ‘health’ of interregional cooperation.  
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interviewing below). Despite these difficulties, during the course of the project I 
visited South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia to speak with trade officials and EPA 
negotiators from SADC and the national ministries. As cost constraints ruled out 
a trip to West Africa I settled for phone interviews with West African negotiators 
and analysts. In total 18 interviews were conducted, while many more requests for 
interviews were ignored or declined.  
There are several caveats to elite interviewing as a research method. First of all, 
interviewees may be unreliable. They may remember events inaccurately, 
exaggerate their role or downplay it in order to minimize their accountability for 
a poor decision. For example South African negotiators tended to blame the 
European Commission for the sour turn of events in 2009, whereas negotiators 
from the BLNS countries tended to blame South Africa. A second problem concerns 
those specific to elite interviewing. Getting your foot in the door and obtaining an 
elite’s account of events can be challenging as in most instances elites are extremely 
busy, with tight schedules, and they may perceive that they have little to gain from 
the interaction. Elite interviewing entails ‘studying up’, in the sense that it is not 
the researcher that is the expert, but the interviewee, which creates something of 
a power imbalance between the researcher and the interviewee (Mikecz 2012). 
Interviewees may be constrained in what they say for political or bureaucratic 
reasons, which the presence of tape recorders may exacerbate. Although I did 
choose to use a tape recorder there were a few occasions where interviewees asked 
me to switch it off. Finally, one might consider whether there is something of a 
self-selection bias regarding those who respond positively to requests for an 
interview. Those that are already outspoken or heavily invested in a particular 
outcome may be more willing to grant requests for interviews, and therefore be 
over-represented. For example Namibian negotiators almost always responded 
positively to requests. At the time they were at a very difficult point in the 
negotiations and probably keener to make their viewpoint clear. At the other 
extreme it was impossible to secure an interview with a Motswana Trade Official, 
due to political sensitivities concerning Botswana’s role as chief coordinator of the 
SADC Group and it handling of the negotiations.  
4.6  Conclusion 
The puzzle guiding this research project concerns West Africa’s surprising level of 
effectiveness in its interregional trade negotiations with the EU compared to its 
southern African counterpart. The theoretical framework of Chapter Three 
generates several hypotheses about why some ACP regions are likely to be more 
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effective than others when engaging in asymmetric interregionalism with the EU, 
as well as several hypotheses concerning the causal pathway linking actorness to 
effectiveness. These are tested in Chapters Five and Six using a most-similar 
systems research design, supplemented with process-tracing. West Africa/ECOWAS 
and SADC are selected as similar cases due to their similarity on a number of key 
background variables and their similarity in the external opportunity structure. 
This introduces an element of control for certain rival explanations, such as the 
degree of asymmetry between interregional partners, the broader policy arena, 
and the influence of third actors. Actorness is operationalized and assessed by 
looking at the history of the region, the speeches of heads of state, and the 
institutional make-up of the region, both formal and informal, member state 
preferences, and regional capabilities.  Effectiveness is operationalized and 
assessed as the alignment between the regions’ objectives and the final outcome as 
expressed in the final agreement, identified via EPA Updates, news reports, 
interviews and secondary literature. EU influence is operationalized and assessed 
in terms of the amount of European Development Funding supplied to regions, the 
degree of coherence between EPA configurations and the boundaries of existing 
regional organizations, the prevalence of divide and rule tactics on the EU’s behalf, 
and the presence of differentiated trading options for individual member states, 
especially the regional power. Data was collected from European and African 
programming documents, interviews with African negotiators, policy-makers and 
researchers, monthly EPA Updates, and secondary literature. 
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5.1  Introduction 
West Africa represents one of the EU’s most important interregional relationships. 
It is the EU’s most important trade partner in the ACP and accounts for 40 per cent 
of EU-ACP trade (European Commission 2015). It also receives the largest allocation 
of European Development Funding, 70 per cent of which is dedicated to promoting 
regional integration. The region includes two key regional organizations: the 
Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA), a monetary and customs 
union consisting of eight primarily Francophone states; and the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a broader organization of 15 states 
with a broad mandate that includes peace and security, democracy, rule of law and 
good governance, as well as economic integration.    
UEMOA focuses primarily on operating their customs and monetary union and 
macroeconomic convergence. Its membership is entirely nested within ECOWAS 
(see Figure 5.2). Despite some earlier competitive tendencies between the two 
organizations (Piccoloino and Minou 2014), since the year 2000 there have been 
plans for the long-term harmonization and convergence of the two organizations 
so that ECOWAS will emerge as the sole regional organization in West Africa 
(InBrief 2006). As the broader encompassing organization and a recognized 
Regional Economic Community (REC) of the African Union, ECOWAS is considered 
Figure 5.1  Map of ECOWAS Region
Source: Ferris and Stark 2012
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the lead organization in EPA negotiations with the EU. 25 In addition to UEMOA, 
Mauritania is also included in the West African EPA configuration, even though it 
is not a member of either ECOWAS or UEMOA. The country was a member of 
ECOWAS until 2000, when it left the organization in favour of closer cooperation 
with the Arab League and Arab Maghreb Union (Hartmann 2013). However as 
neither of these organizations contains other ACP countries, and are not covered 
by the Cotonou Agreement, for the purposes of EPA negotiations Mauritania has 
re-joined the West Africa grouping on an ad hoc basis. 
As outlined in Chapter Three, higher degrees of regional actorness should result in 
greater effectiveness in interregional negotiations. The EU is likely to make greater 
concessions to ACP regions with greater actorness, while imposing more conditions 
25 Although UEMOA has a higher level of integration than ECOWAS, it was not chosen as one of the 
AU’s recognized RECs due to its colonial heritage. 
Figure 5.2  Overlapping Regionalism in West Africa
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on those with less (Rignér and Söderbaum 2010). Indeed this is the case for 
ECOWAS’ engagement in the EPA negotiations. As Section 5.2 illustrates, West 
Africa was one of the few ACP regions to sort its internal processes relatively well. 
A strong commitment to regional cooperation from all member states resulted in 
the ECOWAS Commission taking the lead in the negotiations, which was key in 
facilitating negotiating effectiveness, despite the apparent lack of leadership from 
Nigeria and the sometimes divergent preferences of member states. Despite the 
region being composed of structurally weak, underdeveloped states, ECOWAS was 
(partially) effective in obtaining concessions on six out of eight key negotiation 
issues, and effective on its two most important issues: market access and 
development funding, despite strong opposition from the EU. 
But where does ECOWAS’ higher degree of actorness come from? Asides from a 
stronger commitment to regional cooperation, acceptance of the principle of 
pooling sovereignty and willingness to delegate authority to the regional level, the 
external influence of the European Union is a major factor in accounting for 
ECOWAS’ actorness. The region is a major recipient of European Development 
Funding to promote regional cooperation and integration. Access to EDF resources 
together with the prospect of interregional EPAs created a major incentive for 
West African states to cooperate on the regional level, and build stronger and more 
autonomous regional institutions that contribute to regional actorness. At the 
same time, the disintegrative influences exerted by the EU are not particularly 
strong in West Africa, allowing ECOWAS to develop its actorness relatively 
unimpeded. The final outcome is an EPA that reflects the region’s objectives 
relatively well, and should be conducive to the future of regional integration in 
West Africa.   
5.2  ECOWAS actorness
As Chapter Three outlined, actorness consists of regional identity; institutions for 
decision-making, both formal and informal (particularly regional leadership); the 
degree of preference convergence between member states; and capabilities – the 
organization’s budget and diplomatic instruments for putting objectives into 
action. In this section I explore ECOWAS’ actorness in international trade by 
looking at the individual components of actorness. I first examine each component 
at a general level before focusing on how the component specifically matters for 
trade actorness (as actorness tends to vary by issue area). The analysis shows that 
although ECOWAS lacks a common regional identity and leadership from Nigeria, 
nevertheless its member states have a fairly homogenous set of preferences 
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regarding the EPAs, robust and autonomous regional institutions funded by a 
large budget, as well as the capacity to conduct lobbying activities in Europe. 
ECOWAS Identity 
Historically, West Africa is characterized by a great deal of cultural diversity. The 
pre-colonial period was characterized by a great diversity of political units 
organized on an ethnic basis (Smith 1976). European colonization consolidated 
these diverse political units into the contemporary states that today make up West 
African.  The British claimed the area now covered by the Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, 
and Sierra Leone, while the Portuguese colonized Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau. 
France consolidated what is now Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, 
Niger, Senegal and Togo into the colonial unit of French West Africa, which 
persisted until 1960. Most states in the region achieved independence relatively 
peacefully (with the exception of the Portuguese colonies) in the 1950s and 1960s. 
After independence, Francophone West African states opted to maintain close 
links with France, including the use of a common currency pegged to the franc 
and guaranteed by the French Central Bank. On the other hand, the Lusophone 
and Anglophone states, including Nigeria, opted for a relatively clean break from 
their former colonizers. The first decade after independence was marked by strong 
rivalry between Francophone and Anglophone states, and exacerbated by 
competing economic ideologies (with Francophone states – led by Côte d’Ivoire - 
generally having a capitalist orientation, while Anglophone states opted for more 
socialist-style policies), and conflicting ideas of how to engage with former colonial 
powers, which taken together made the prospect of regional cooperation 
unattractive at the time (Hartmann 2013). However the aftermath of the Biafran 
War (1967-1970), saw a previously-inward looking Nigeria realising that it needed 
a formal framework for cooperation with its neighbours and a counter-balance to 
French influence in the region.26 
The ECOWAS project was championed by Nigeria and Togo, while France opposed 
the project. However the discovery of oil in Nigeria contributed to the Francophone 
states accepting the initiative, as Nigeria used its newfound oil wealth to provide 
assistance to the drought-ravaged states to the north, and sold crude oil at 
concessionary prices to other West African states (Soremekun, 2010; Akinyeye, 
2010). Parallel to these regional developments, in February 1975 the EU and ACP 
states signed the first Lomé Convention, which promised a new framework for 
governing trade and aid between Europe and its former colonies. The prospect of 
improved access to Nigerian resources, a counter-balance to French influence and 
26 The Côte d’Ivoire, along with France, provided support to the Biafran rebels. 
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a better international bargaining position in the international arena led to the 
formal establishment of ECOWAS in May 1975 (Hartmann 2013: 8). However the 
linguistic and cultural divide between Anglophone and Francophone states 
persists. Thanks to the long running monetary and customs cooperation between 
the Francophone states, they enjoy a degree of harmonization and socialization 
not found among the other states (Hartmann 2013). The elites of the region do not 
share a common language and despite an on-going debate about the introduction 
of a common tongue, there appears no realistic way to resolve the issue.  
ECOWAS was initially intended as a purely economic organization. However the 
economic agenda faced many obstacles and did not really get off the ground in the 
1980s and 1990s (Hartmann 2013). Post-independence the region – more so than 
any other region in Africa – was plagued by war, coups d’état, and internal instability. 
Recognizing that economic development cannot take place in an unstable 
environment, and in combination with the changing geopolitical environment, in 
the early 1990s ECOWAS expanded its mandate into political and security affairs, 
and became the first African region to abandon the norm of non-interference in 
the domestic affairs of member states. Despite (or perhaps because of) having 
many unconsolidated democracies as member states, as an organization ECOWAS 
is committed to the promotion of democratic constitutionalism (Börzel, van 
Hüllen and Lohaus 2013: 12; Hartmann 2013), seeing it as a ‘necessary precondition 
for successful integration and economic development’ (Gbeho 2011). ECOWAS 
expresses ‘zero tolerance’ for power obtained or maintained through unconstitu-
tional means (ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance 2001), and 
has institutionalized highly legalized pro-intervention norms since 2008 
(Striebinger 2012: 184). Through its 2020 Framework, ECOWAS is also committed 
‘from the highest level’ to a participatory approach to regional integration, 
intending to transform the region from ‘an ECOWAS of states to an ECOWAS of 
peoples’ (ECOWAS Official, Skype interview, 13th August 2014; ECOWAS 2020). 
Observers note that ECOWAS identity is geographic and technocratic/pragmatic; 
that it is more a recognition of common problems that cannot be individually 
tackled that binds states together (International Trade Expert and EPA negotiator, 
Skype interview, 13th June 2014). ECOWAS comes across as a highly technocratic 
organization that ‘thinks they are better than the other RECs’ (SADC Official, Cape 
Town, 16th May 2013). The small number of speeches in the public domain confirms 
this view: there is little rhetorical flourish or reference to shared values. The only 
self-identification frame that appears more than once is the idea that ECOWAS is a 
‘model of Africa integration’ (Gbeho 2011; Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan 
2012). ECOWAS does not tend towards defining itself in opposition to outsiders, 
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and appears to have a favourable perception of the international community and 
the EU/Europe. In summary, ECOWAS is not a region characterized by a strong 
sense of political community or identity. The linguistic and cultural divide 
between Anglophone and Francophone states continues to hamper cooperation. At 
the organizational level, ECOWAS’ normative foundation includes a commitment 
to democratic constitutionalism and participatory engagement, which is certainly 
admirable, but one might question the extent to which Heads of State are genuinely 
committed to these norms (Hartmann 2013). Arguably, because sovereignty was 
not as ‘hard-won’ as it was in southern Africa, and because the region has 
experienced 60 plus years of independence, West African states are no longer as 
attached to the principle of sovereignty as more recently independent states, 
paving the way for stronger regional institutions and the introduction of 
supranational principles.  
Member states initial preferences on EPAs
The initial preferences of West African states regarding the EPAs were fairly 
homogenous. Three-quarters of ECOWAS’ membership are LDCs, meaning that 
they are able to maintain preferential access to EU markets without an EPA under 
the ‘Everything But Arms’ regime. Thus they were not under undue pressure to 
sign the EPA. The situation was a bit different for the non-LDCs – Nigeria, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Ghana and Cape Verde – which did not have attractive BATNAs and 
therefore a stronger preference to conclude an EPA before losing market access.27 
From the very beginning Nigeria was not enthusiastic about the EPA. Firstly, its 
main export market is the USA rather than Europe, and most of what is does 
export (oil) does not attract tariffs. The majority of Nigeria’s domestic interest 
groups, with the notable exception of some cocoa producers, were extremely 
opposed to the EPA. The National Association of Nigerian Traders (NANTS) and 
National Focal Point Committee, as major campaigners against the EPA, claimed 
that the private sector is ‘completely opposed to signing the agreement’ (Agritrade, 
15 June 2014). NANTS conducted a long-running and highly visible public campaign 
against the EPA (Trommer 2014), while the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria, 
the Nigerian Chamber of Commerce, and various government officials also 
expressed their opposition to the EPA (Ukaoha 2014). Although previous research 
suggests that business groups and other domestic interest groups have a limited 
27 Cape Verde graduated from LDC status in 2008. After a three-year transition period it became 
the first ACP state to be granted trade preferences under the GSP+ regime, which offers enhanced 
preferences over those of the standard GSP, based on the country’s commitment to 27 core 
conventions on human and labour rights, environmental standards, and good governance. So the 
state has had an attractive BATNA since 2011, but even before this time it was not very involved 
in the negotiations, mostly due to its small size and economy dependent on tourism (rather than 
export-orientated). For this reason I leave it out of the analysis.  
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ability to affect Nigeria’s national policies (Taylor 2007: 210), in this case it seems 
that the intense public opposition contributed to government opposition to the 
EPA, despite the dominant People’s Democratic Party generally pro-free-market 
approach. On the other hand, the other non-LDCs in the group, Côte d’Ivoire and 
Ghana, both export primarily to the European Union and stood to incur serious 
losses to their cocoa producing industries if they did not sign EPAs. Domestic 
interest groups in both countries were divided on the issue, with exporters to 
Europe favouring an EPA (even favouring bilateral interim EPAs if necessary), 
while exporters to regional markets and civil society groups opposed it (Agritrade 
15 June 2014; GhanaWeb 11 June 2014; Czapnik 2014). States tend to favour 
liberalization under conditions of uncertainty (Moravcsik 1993), and as both the 
Ivorian and Ghanaian governments are more inclined toward liberal economic 
policies (Taylor 2007: 212; The Heritage Foundation 2015), it is not surprising that 
these two states main preferences were to sign an EPA sooner rather than later. 
However local West African markets are quite important for both Nigerian and 
Ivoirian exports, and in principle all ECOWAS member states are invested in 
maintaining regional integration in the interests of long-term development and 
increased self-reliance. In practice this means that if ECOWAS’ regional integration 
is to be protected, either all states sign the EPA, or none do. At the regional level, 
the signing of bilateral EPAs between the EU and individual member states would 
have been a sub-optimal outcome, even if 14 out the 16 countries within the EPA 
configuration would prefer not to sign an EPA. 
ECOWAS formal and informal institutions 
The 1975 Treaty of Lagos that formed ECOWAS only allowed for an intergovern-
mental institutional arrangement. The 1993 Revised Treaty introduced a stronger 
institutional structure (Hartmann 2013), noting that ‘the integration of the 
Member States into a viable regional Community may demand the partial and gradual 
pooling of national sovereignties’ (ECOWAS Revised Treaty, 1993, Preamble, emphasis 
added). The adoption of this principle has led to the development of some 
supranational and majority voting procedures in ECOWAS institutions. At 
Authority and Council level, decisions are made by unanimity, consensus or 
two-thirds majority, depending on the subject matter (ECOWAS Revised Treaty, 
1993, Article 9.2). In the area of peace and security, the Mediation and Security 
Council is composed of Ministers of Foreign Affairs from nine member states and 
may authorise military interventions in ECOWAS states. Decisions are taken by 
two-thirds majority, and are binding on all member states, even those not 
represented on the Council; an extremely far-reaching competency for any 
regional organization. The introduction of self-financing levy in the 1990s gave 
the ECOWAS Secretariat greater autonomy vis-à-vis member states, and in 2005 
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the Secretariat was transformed into a Commission, giving it greater decision- 
making and implementation powers (Zounmenou and Loua 2011: 4). However at a 
general level the organization still faces a number of institutional constraints, 
including weak administration and limited capacity to implement ECOWAS’ full 
mandate, while some key positions at the Commission remain unfilled (Hartmann 
2013). 
Despite the Commission’s limitations, the commitment to an enhanced role for 
regional institutions is evident in the formal negotiating structures present in 
Table 5.1   West Africa/ECOWAS Member States
 
Country Developmental Status 
(UN)
Regime Type 
(Polity IV)
GDP, PPP per capita  
(IMF)
Main exports  
(CIA Factbook) 
Top 3 Export Partners, 2013  
(Observatory of Economic Complexity) 
Benin LDC Democracy $1,666 cotton, cashews, shea butter, textiles, palm 
products, seafood
China, India, Nigeria
Burkina Faso LDC Closed anocracy $1,666 gold, cotton, livestock Switzerland, China, Mali
Cape Verde LDC Democracy $6,570 fuel (re-exports), shoes, garments, fish, hides Republic of Congo, Spain, Portugal 
Gambia LDC Autocracy $1,864 peanut products, fish, cotton lint, palm kernels China, Mali, Guinea
Ghana Developing country Democracy $5,124 oil, gold, cocoa, timber, tuna, bauxite, 
aluminum, manganese ore, diamonds, 
horticultural products
South Africa, Iran, UAE
Guinea LDC Closed anocracy $1,082 bauxite, gold, diamonds, coffee, fish, 
agricultural product
India, South Korea, Spain 
Guinea-Bissau LDC Closed anocracy $1,439 fish, shrimp; cashews, peanuts, palm kernels, 
raw and sawn lumber
India, Vietnam, Ghana
Côte d’Ivoire  Developing country Open anocracy $1,938 cocoa, coffee, timber, petroleum, cotton, 
bananas, pineapples, palm oil, fish
Ghana, Germany, France
Liberia LDC democracy $2,000 rubber, timber, iron, diamonds, cocoa, coffee Poland, China, USA 
Mali LDC Open anocracy $1,100 cotton, gold, livestock China, Burkina Faso, India
Mauritania* LDC Closed anocracy $2,230 iron ore, fish and fish products, gold, copper, 
petroleum
China, Italy, Switzerland
Niger LDC Democracy $771 uranium ore, livestock, cowpeas, onions Nigeria, France, USA
Nigeria Developing Country Open anocracy $6,184 petroleum and petroleum products, cocoa, 
rubber
India, USA, Brazil
Senegal LDC Democracy $2,026 fish, groundnuts (peanuts), petroleum products, 
phosphates, cotton
India, France, Côte d’Ivoire  
Sierra Leone LDC Democracy $1,344 diamonds, rutile, cocoa, coffee, fish China, Belgium-Luxembourg, USA 
Togo LDC Closed anocracy $1,096 reexports, cotton, phosphates, coffee, cocoa Ghana, Lebanon, Burkina Faso 
* Not a member of ECOWAS, but part of the EPA Group
Processed on: 19-7-2016
504439-L-bw-Hulse
129
WEST AFRICA
5
West Africa, in which the ECOWAS Commission took the lead role (International 
Trade Expert and EPA negotiator, Skype interview, 13th June 2014). EPA negotiations 
took place on three levels – chief negotiators, senior officials, and technical experts 
(see Figure 5.3). Each level was led by an official from ECOWAS and assisted by a 
UEMOA official. Anecdotally there was some tension between the ECOWAS and 
UEMOA Commissions, stemming from the fact that UEMOA has a higher level of 
integration and a more liberal economic orientation than the Anglophone states. 
However in the EPA negotiations the tensions between ECOWAS and UEMOA were 
not obvious and the two organizations worked together to ensure a unified 
Table 5.1   West Africa/ECOWAS Member States
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(UN)
Regime Type 
(Polity IV)
GDP, PPP per capita  
(IMF)
Main exports  
(CIA Factbook) 
Top 3 Export Partners, 2013  
(Observatory of Economic Complexity) 
Benin LDC Democracy $1,666 cotton, cashews, shea butter, textiles, palm 
products, seafood
China, India, Nigeria
Burkina Faso LDC Closed anocracy $1,666 gold, cotton, livestock Switzerland, China, Mali
Cape Verde LDC Democracy $6,570 fuel (re-exports), shoes, garments, fish, hides Republic of Congo, Spain, Portugal 
Gambia LDC Autocracy $1,864 peanut products, fish, cotton lint, palm kernels China, Mali, Guinea
Ghana Developing country Democracy $5,124 oil, gold, cocoa, timber, tuna, bauxite, 
aluminum, manganese ore, diamonds, 
horticultural products
South Africa, Iran, UAE
Guinea LDC Closed anocracy $1,082 bauxite, gold, diamonds, coffee, fish, 
agricultural product
India, South Korea, Spain 
Guinea-Bissau LDC Closed anocracy $1,439 fish, shrimp; cashews, peanuts, palm kernels, 
raw and sawn lumber
India, Vietnam, Ghana
Côte d’Ivoire  Developing country Open anocracy $1,938 cocoa, coffee, timber, petroleum, cotton, 
bananas, pineapples, palm oil, fish
Ghana, Germany, France
Liberia LDC democracy $2,000 rubber, timber, iron, diamonds, cocoa, coffee Poland, China, USA 
Mali LDC Open anocracy $1,100 cotton, gold, livestock China, Burkina Faso, India
Mauritania* LDC Closed anocracy $2,230 iron ore, fish and fish products, gold, copper, 
petroleum
China, Italy, Switzerland
Niger LDC Democracy $771 uranium ore, livestock, cowpeas, onions Nigeria, France, USA
Nigeria Developing Country Open anocracy $6,184 petroleum and petroleum products, cocoa, 
rubber
India, USA, Brazil
Senegal LDC Democracy $2,026 fish, groundnuts (peanuts), petroleum products, 
phosphates, cotton
India, France, Côte d’Ivoire  
Sierra Leone LDC Democracy $1,344 diamonds, rutile, cocoa, coffee, fish China, Belgium-Luxembourg, USA 
Togo LDC Closed anocracy $1,096 reexports, cotton, phosphates, coffee, cocoa Ghana, Lebanon, Burkina Faso 
* Not a member of ECOWAS, but part of the EPA Group
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position prior to engagement with the EU (International Trade Expert and EPA 
negotiator, Skype interview, 13th June 2014). The negotiating team reported back to 
the EPA Ministerial Monitoring Committee, which was made up of Ministers 
responsible for trade, regional integration and finance, and met at expert and 
ministerial level, their role being to approve the decisions made by negotiators. 
A unique feature of the West African EPA was the direct representation of private 
sector and civil society groups in the negotiations, fitting with ECOWAS’ 
organizational identity as a more participatory organization. It was perhaps the 
only EPA configuration where civil society representatives had a seat at the 
negotiating table, where even member states did not (ECOWAS Official, Skype 
interview, 13th August 2014). As in SADC, a Regional Preparatory Taskforce was 
created to promote and facilitate the link between the EPA and development 
funding, especially in terms of identifying projects designed to address supply-side 
constraints. Observers noted that ‘ECOWAS has been sorting its internal processes 
rather well and acting as a block, compared to places like Central African or SADC’ 
(International Trade Expert, Skype interview, 13th June 2014 ).  
Informally, Nigerian influence has an important role in the functioning of 
ECOWAS institutions. Two-thirds of ECOWAS’ budget comes from revenue collected 
on goods imported into Nigeria. Its headquarters are located in Abuja, and the 
Commission is heavily staffed by Nigerian nationals. Nigerian leadership has been 
influential in the evolution of ECOWAS’s mandate, especially in the realm of peace 
and security (Hartmann 2013). Without Nigerian troops and hardware the regional 
peace-keeping force would never have gotten off the ground (Bach, 2010), and it 
has continued to play ‘an active and constructive role’ during political crises in 
Niger, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire (Sperling 2011: 1). However Nigerian leadership 
does not go uncontested. The Francophone states have a numerical supremacy and 
often out-vote Nigeria on various issues (Chafer and Stoddard 2014; Udo and Ekott 
2013).  
Nigeria’s constructive leadership in the realm of peace and security is not matched 
in the realm of trade. Those directly involved with the EPAs did not view Nigeria 
as a benevolent or capable regional leader. Nigeria’s approach to trade policy-making 
and implementation has been described as ad hoc, opaque and inconsistent 
(Ugbajah 2010). It is the region’s largest economy and accounts for approximately 
two-thirds of the region’s GDP, ‘so when Nigeria says no, it means no, everything is 
blocked’ (International Trade Expert, Skype interview, 13th June 2014). At times 
Nigeria (mis-)used its veto power to weigh in at the last moment, with the rationale 
for their actions not being entirely clear to observers (an unorthodox negotiating 
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strategy to obtain last-minute concessions, or the result of internal dysfunction?). 
This happened both during intra-regional negotiations to finalize the ECOWAS 
Common External Tariff, in which Nigeria in theory signed off on the agreement, 
only to dispute it after the close of the negotiations. A similar situation happened 
towards the end of EPA negotiations, when Nigeria raised a list of concerns after 
the negotiations were concluded.  Observers noted that ‘Nigeria has always been 
against the EPA, either in a passive-aggressive mode of not taking initiative, and 
being a bit seat-dragging’, which annoyed the ECOWAS Commission and other 
member states, especially the UEMOA states (International Trade Expert, Skype 
interview, 13th June 2014). Such erratic behaviour from the regional power makes 
it difficult for ECOWAS to implement an effective regional trade policy 
(International Trade Expert, Skype interview, 13th June 2014). The picture of 
Nigerian leadership in ECOWAS is not straightforward. It has demonstrated 
Figure 5.3  EPA Negotiating Structure for West Africa
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leadership in some sectors, particularly peace and security, but not in relation to 
the EPA, due to a lack of enthusiasm for the whole concept. Commentators agree 
that although Nigeria does in theory have the capacity to drive forward the 
negotiations, in practice it didn’t have the willingness to do so (International Trade 
Expert, Skype interview, 13th June 2014; ECOWAS Official, Skype interview, 13th 
August 2014). 
Capabilities 
From the limited information available, ECOWAS has a substantial operating 
budget (as much, if not more than the African Union) due to its self-financing 
mechanism. The region also receives substantial amounts of donor funding from 
the EU and other development partners, but this is spent on particular projects 
and not financing the day-to-day operations of the Commission. Details of the 
ECOWAS budget seem to be ‘largely a matter of secrecy’ (Sperling 2011), but from 
the limited data found for the 2007 to 2009 period, it would appear that ECOWAS 
accrued a surplus of approximately US$ 252 million, a veritable ‘war chest’ giving 
ECOWAS ‘considerable leeway in implementing its mandate’ (Bensah 2012).
In terms of coercive instruments, ECOWAS has had the capacity for military 
intervention since 1990, but this is not relevant beyond the realm of peace and 
security, nor in engaging third parties in trade agreements. As for litigation via 
international dispute settlement mechanism, ECOWAS is not a member of the 
WTO in its own right and therefore could not bring a case. However in theory 
individual member states could bring a case, although this is quite unlikely. With 
the exception of South Africa, African states do not make use of the WTO’s dispute 
settlement mechanism. The entry barriers in terms of financial, institutional and 
human resources are prohibitively high, they are unlikely to be able to enforce 
compliance of their more powerful trade partners with any favourable ruling, and 
they may risk retaliatory action from countries whose trade policies are challenged 
(Cheng 2007; Chaffer 2010). 
In practice, ECOWAS’ diplomatic instruments relevant to trade diplomacy are 
largely confined to the category of moral suasion. The Commission President 
represents ECOWAS abroad, as do coordinated ambassadorial committees in 
strategic countries such as Belgium, Switzerland, Japan and China. ECOWAS 
ambassadors sometimes engage in economic diplomacy and lobbying: in Japan, a 
regular forum aims to raise awareness of investment opportunities in West Africa, 
while two ECOWAS–China Business Forums have led to a memorandum of 
understanding between ECOWAS and the state-owned Chinese Council for the 
Promotion of International Trade, aiming to increase Chinese investment in the 
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ECOWAS region. In Brussels there is a forum of ECOWAS Ambassadors and an 
ECOWAS Permanent Representative, both of which engage in economic diplomacy 
and lobbying of the European Union. The ECOWAS Commission itself does not 
engage directly with EU institutions or member states, but ECOWAS Parliamentar-
ians will engage with EU Parliamentarians and engage in parliamentary lobbying 
(ECOWAS Official, Skype interview, 13th August 2014).   
Conclusion on ECOWAS trade actorness 
With an overall actorness score of 10, ECOWAS has a moderate degree of actorness 
in relation to the EPAs (see Table 5.2 here and Table 4.4 on page 92). Although West 
African states do not have a particularly strong sense of political community due 
to the linguistic and cultural division between Francophone and Anglophone 
states, this is not necessarily a hindrance as the regional culture and identity does 
not preclude delegation to the regional level, as it does in some other post-colonial 
regions. ECOWAS’ organizational identity is technocratic and built on the 
foundational norms of pooling sovereignty, promoting democratic constitutional-
ism, and a participatory approach to regional integration. As a result the mandate 
for conducting the negotiations was granted to the ECOWAS Commission, giving 
it a significant degree of autonomy and influence compared to other ACP regions, 
Table 5.2   ECOWAS trade actorness in relation to EPA negotiations
Aspect of actorness Qualitative 
assessment
Numerical score
Identity Weak, but does inhibit 
pooling of sovereignty
1
Member state preferences Fairly homogenous 2
Institutions Formal 
institutions
Robust and 
autonomous 
Commission, 
supranational 
negotiating machinery 
4
Informal 
leadership 
Absent 0
Capabilities Budget High 2
Diplomatic 
instruments
Diplomatic 
representation 
1
Cumulative score 10 
Source: own compilation
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which has been key to ECOWAS’ actorness in the EPAs, even despite the lack of 
leadership from the regional power and the differing interests of the LDC and 
non-LDC members. In terms of capabilities, ECOWAS enjoys permanent diplomatic 
representation in the EU capital of Brussels, giving it the capacity to lobby EU 
institutions on matters relevant to the EPAs. 
5.3  From Actorness to Effectiveness
Main issues in the West Africa EPA
In Chapter Four, I identified 16 substantive issues in EPA negotiations, relevant to 
all ACP regions. However in the service of brevity and analytic simplicity I limit 
the analysis to the eight most important issues for each region, and focus the 
analysis on the most contentious and important issues, for which there is relatively 
more information available. For the West Africa EPA configuration the most 
important issues were the market access offer and the financing of the PAPED, a 
development tool connected to the EPA. Also important, but to a lesser degree, 
were community levies, the non-execution clause, agricultural subsidies, 
agricultural safeguards, the most-favoured nation clause, and the rules of origin. 
These are explained in greater detail below.  
During the all-ACP – EU phase of the EPA negotiations, both ECOWAS and UEMOA 
were enthusiastic about the idea of interregional EPAs, even while other ACP 
regions were skeptical and preferred to continue on an all-ACP basis (Bilal 2002). 
West Africa was the first region to indicate its readiness to begin interregional 
negotiations with the EU by the envisaged start date of September 2003, even 
while other ACP regions were signalling the need for more time for Phase I (Mballa 
2003). Phase II of West Africa’s negotiations began on 6th October 2003. The region 
produced a Roadmap to guide the negotiations relatively quickly, eight months 
into Phase II. Although it does not contain any specific objectives on market access 
opening or any of the other EPA issues, the speed at which the region was ready to 
commence Phase II, and the speed at which it produced the Roadmap, suggest the 
region had already internally formulated objectives on the key issues. 
Nevertheless, Phase II ended with Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana defecting from the 
regional position and initialling interim EPAs in December 2007. Negotiations on 
a regional EPA continued into 2008, and Phase III saw the bulk of the substantive 
progress on the various issues. However this did not prevent Côte d’Ivoire from 
adding its signature to the interim EPA on 28 November 2008. Ghana resisted the 
pressure to sign, and Côte d’Ivoire did refrain from ratifying or implementing its 
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agreement until the conclusion of a regional deal. Finally, six years later, West 
Africa was the first region to successfully conclude an EPA, reaching agreement at 
the level of Senior Officials in February 2014. The deal was formally endorsed for 
signature by the ECOWAS Heads of State on 10 July 2014. At the time of writing 
[July 2015] the signatory process is still on-going, with the ratification phase yet to 
commence.28 
Market Access
The degree of market access opening was the most important issue for West Africa. 
The market access issue consisted of three dimensions: the degree of liberalization 
on the West African side (what percentage of goods will have tariffs removed), the 
timetable over which liberalization should take place, and whether the schedule 
should be linked to development benchmarks. ECOWAS’ initial objective on 
market access was to obtain an opening as low as possible, and the region’s 
negotiators opened with an offer of 60 percent opening over 25 years, even though 
the negotiators ‘knew that would not fly’ (EPA Negotiator, Skype interview, 20th 
August 2014). ECOWAS also wanted developmental benchmarks built into the 
liberalization schedule in order to have a ‘pro-development’ EPA, meaning that the 
liberalization schedule would be dependent on the level of development obtained 
within the region. As for its part, the European Commission was insistent 
throughout the course of negotiations, and across all ACP regions, that ACP states 
should open their markets to the EU by at least 80 percent over 15 years, in exchange 
for the EU’s offer of 100 percent duty free quota free access (DFQF) to European 
markets. The EU was also opposed to the inclusion of development benchmarks in 
the agreement. After long and protracted negotiations on the issue, negotiators for 
the two sides finally agreed on an opening of the West African market of 75 percent 
over 20 years. Development benchmarking was not included in the final agreement. 
The agreement on 75 percent opening was a surprising outcome given the EU’s 
hardline position on a minimum of 80 percent opening for all ACP regions. It is 
the lowest market access opening of any EPA, and even though the final outcome 
is quite far away from the original (but probably unrealistic) objective of 60 percent 
over 25 years, the fact that ECOWAS managed to extract such a concession from 
the EU especially when the EU was so insistent that nothing less than 80 percent 
would do, is fairly impressive. Therefore I consider ECOWAS to have been an 
effective negotiator on market access.  
28 Update January 2016: EPA has not been signed by Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Gambia. 
Signatures by the remaining 12 members remain outstanding. 
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How did West Africa manage to win this precedent-setting concession from the 
EU? Differing interpretations of the Article XXIV of the GATT Agreement lay at the 
heart of this extremely contentious issue. The EU quoted Article XXIV, which 
specifies that regional trade agreements should liberalize ‘substantially all trade’ 
in order to be WTO compliant, and argued that this definition is met when 90 
percent of trade in goods between two partners is liberalized (OPPD 2012). As the 
EU already offers 100 percent DFQF market access to ACP regions, they should 
liberalize 80 percent on their side to meet the minimal definition of ‘substantially 
all trade’. Anything less, the EU argued, would constitute a contravention of Article 
XXIV, and therefore it would not accept any offer below 80 percent over 15 years, 
citing fears of challenges by others at the WTO and ‘precedent setting’ in future 
negotiations (EPA Update, November 2013). The West Africans argued that the 
term ‘substantially all trade’ has never actually been defined in quantitative terms 
by the WTO, and there are existing examples of trade agreements between 
developed and developing countries that liberalize much less than 90 percent of 
trade.29   
Both Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire initialled individual interim EPAS in December 2007 
in order to avoid losing access to EU markets, with the ‘authorization’ of the 
UEMOA and ECOWAS Commissions (EPA Update March 2008). The ECOWAS 
Commission stated that it supported interim arrangements to allow trade in goods 
to continue uninterrupted, so long as they leave continued negotiations for a 
regional EPA to the ECOWAS Commission in order to maintain regional solidarity 
(Public Agenda, 17 December 2007). Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire had minimal input 
into the interim EPAs they initialled, and were pressured into accepting what was 
essentially an EU-drafted template presented to them only a few days before the 
deadline (Bloomer 2007; Meyn 2008). As the ECOWAS member state most invested 
in maintaining access to European markets, Côte d’Ivoire initialled first, agreeing 
to liberalize 81 percent of EU imports over 15 years. Ghana held out a few weeks 
longer, but eventually behind-the-scenes pressure on the Ghanaian Presidency 
(Bloomer 2007) lead to it initialling an EPA agreement committing to liberalize 80 
29 The EU’s interpretation of ‘substantially all trade’ has been criticized by the ACP as being arbitrary 
and ‘unsuitable for pro-development EPAs’ (ACP Addis Ababa Declaration 2007). Trade experts 
note that the WTO would in all likelihood accept any FTA that covers 70 percent of goods over 
15-20 years, especially if the agreement involves developing countries or LDCs (Bilal and Ramdoo 
2010). The WTO’s acceptance of regional FTAs is based on a lack of objections from other WTO 
members and previous FTAs that have been notified and went uncontested. Given that in 1997 the 
EU signed an FTA with Mexico that entailed 54.1 percent opening over ten years, and which went 
uncontested, it would appear that the EU’s insistence that EPAs should liberalize 80 percent over 15 
years to achieve WTO compliance doesn’t hold much water. 
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percent of imports over 15 years. A year later, in November 2008, Côte d’Ivoire’s 
signed its interim EPA, while Ghana resisted pressure to do so. Both countries 
restated their commitment to working towards a full regional EPA to replace their 
bilateral interim arrangements. Nevertheless, at the time observers noted that 
interim EPAs and their differing commitments on market access could contribute 
to regional disintegration in West Africa (EPA Update December 2008). However 
European negotiators informally indicated that a re-negotiation of Ghana and 
Côte d’Ivoire’s accords could be possible within the broader context of a full 
regional EPA (Bilal and Braun-Munzinger 2008), presumably in order to preserve 
West Africa’s integration process and avoid allegations of deliberately undermining 
it. Having secured an informal indication that re-negotiation on the interim EPAs 
was possible, ECOWAS negotiators dug their heels in on the market access issue 
and stalled for as long as possible. According to Silke Trommer’s (2014) analysis of 
the negotiations, a turning point on the market access issue came in early-2009; 
just over a year since Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana had initialled their interim EPAs. 
Concerned about the vagueness of the wording of GATT Article XXIV, a coalition of 
West African civil society groups commissioned an independent trade expert to 
carry out a legal analysis. His report highlighted that nothing in the wording of 
Article XXIV leads to the conclusion that WTO compatibility requires an 80 
percent liberalization over 15 years, as the EU claimed (Trommer 2014: 13). The 
civil society coalition presented the report to the ECOWAS Commission, and at the 
next meeting of EU and ECOWAS negotiators, the region again tabled its 60 percent 
offer, but this time justified in terms of the legal interpretation of Article XXIV, 
instead of the development-based arguments previously deployed. This led to a 
radical change in the dynamics of the negotiations, and from here on ECOWAS 
negotiators started to use their low market access offer as a bargaining chip in 
order to obtain concessions on their other EPA objectives (Trommer 2014). This 
episode illustrates how ECOWAS was able to exploit part of the opportunity 
structure, in this case the shadow of WTO law, as part of its negotiation strategy. 
However the negotiations remained deadlocked, as the EU was unwilling to accept 
an offer of 60 percent. Eventually ECOWAS shifted its offer to 70 percent over 25 
years in 2010, an offer the EU again rejected. The impasse was such that negotiations 
between the two sides broke down and were put on hold for almost two years 
(April 2012 – February 2014), during which time ECOWAS indicated it was working 
on the technical details of a revised market access offer, thereby signaling that it 
was prepared to shift its position. During this time the European Commission also 
indicated a willingness to compromise on its position and offer a liberalization 
timetable over 15 years instead of 25, which it framed as ‘a very generous’ offer to 
ECOWAS (EPA Update, July 2013), but still not budging on 80 percent opening. In 
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October 2013, an Extraordinary Summit of ECOWAS Heads of State was called to 
‘reflect’ on the state of EPA negotiations. Amidst the Ivorian President’s pleas for a 
swift conclusion to negotiations, and the Senegalese President’s efforts at 
mediating between those states wishing to sign EPAs as soon as possible (Côte 
d’Ivoire and Ghana) and those reluctant to do so (Nigeria), the Heads of State 
authorized a new market access offer of 75 percent, an offer civil society groups in 
the region condemned as ‘economically catastrophic for West Africa’ (EPA Update 
November 2013). West African and European negotiators were finally scheduled to 
meet again in February 2014 for a decisive round of negotiations on market access. 
But before this could happen, on December 4th, a Franco-African Economic 
Conference took place in Paris, at which 52 African Heads of State met with the 
French President Francoise Hollande. Responding to Hollande’s stated ambition to 
double trade between France and Africa over the next five years, Nigerian Finance 
Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala warned France of ‘missing the boat’ in Africa:
It is true that Africa has many suitors now. And it is true that our traditional partners 
like France…may have to work a little harder to persuade us to work with them on 
investments on the African continent (quoted in France24, 4 December 2013) 
The Final Declaration of the conference confirmed France’s preference for an EPA 
‘with scheduling and content that better suits African countries’ (Elysée Summit 
for Peace and Security in Africa 2013), and the very next day, December 5th, the 
French Ministers for Trade and Development, along with the Trade and 
Development Ministers of four other EU member states (the UK, Ireland, the 
Netherlands and Denmark), issued a public letter addressed to the European 
Commission expressing their concern that failure to reach an agreement on EPAs 
could lead to wider political fallout in EU-Africa relations. The letter asked the 
Commission to ‘adopt a more accommodating approach to ACP concerns in the 
final stages of the negotiations’, and should consider accepting a lower level of 
liberalization from some ACP regions, and transition periods longer than 15 years 
(Joint letter to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, and Vice President of the European Commission and the European 
Commissioners for Development and Trade, 5th December 2013). 
Observers have suggested that the French government knew ECOWAS was shortly 
to table its revised market access offer, and coordinated the release of the letter in 
such a way to ‘force’ the Commission to accept ECOWAS’ revised market access 
offer (International Trade Expert, Skype interview, 13th June 2014). In such a 
context, where European member states had publicly expressed their displeasure 
with the Commission’s approach, and ECOWAS was about to table an upwards 
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revised offer, the Commission was rhetorically entrapped. It would have further 
hurt the Commission’s already-damaged reputation and legitimacy, both inter-
nationally and with its own member states, to refuse to meet West Africa halfway 
on market access (EPA Negotiator, Skype interview, 20th August 2014). Compounding 
the issue was the looming deadline and the fact that, at the time, the EU had not 
concluded a final EPA text with any region. Market access was the last hurdle in 
the conclusion of the West African negotiations, and a sense of urgency to meet 
the deadline, fatigue with the drawn-out nature of the market access issue and the 
rhetorical entrapment of the European Commission, lead to its acceptance of 
ECOWAS’ offer of 75 percent over 20 years, 5 percent and 5 years below its 
previously stated minimally acceptable offer. 
Development funding
The second most contentious issue in the negotiations concerned the amount of 
development funding that would accompany the EPA, and whether there would be 
any funding additional to existing development programmes, in order to 
compensate West Africa for the adjustment costs of liberalization. West Africa/
ECOWAS wanted to secure additional funding from the EU, to be distributed 
through a financing instrument it designed to accompany the EPA, the ‘Programme 
de l’APE pour le Développement’ (PAPED). West African negotiators argued that 
funding should be additional to that available under the terms of the Cotonou 
Agreement and European Development Funding programmes, so as to avoid 
diverting resources away from other important development programmes. Given 
that West Africa will face significant adjustment costs in implementing the EPA, 
the region also maintained that signature of the EPA was conditional on 
‘appropriate financing’ of the PAPED by the EU (EPA Update, May/June 2013), a 
figure which ECOWAS initially put at 16 billion euros of funding additional to that 
available under the EDF.  
The EU was opposed to making any additional commitments on development 
financing, or indeed even introducing any developmental dimension at all into 
the EPA framework. They argued that the EPAs are an adequate developmental tool 
in and of themselves, and that liberalization of trade in goods, services and 
investment will attract foreign investment; create jobs; and lower prices for 
consumers, thereby leading to development. Furthermore, resources available for 
development cooperation are adequately covered within the framework of the 
Cotonou Agreement, and ‘the question is not open for renegotiation under the EPA 
framework’ (Joint Report on the all-ACP – EU Phase of EPA Negotiations, 2003). 
Accordingly, from the start of EPA negotiations until late-2006, the EU resisted 
West African requests to include developmental provisions in the EPAs. However 
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the EU’s position shifted in October 2006, when the General Affairs and External 
Relations Council (GAERC) issued a declaration stating that although there would 
be no additional finances specific to the EPA, EU member states agreed to provide 
bilateral funds on top of the EU’s EDF programming in order to support Aid for 
Trade programmes in West Africa that support the EPA (Trade Negotiation Insights, 
Nov/Dec 2006). The change of heart on the EU’s behalf was apparently motivated 
by the increased traction of Aid for Trade debates at the WTO level, and although 
the GAERC declaration avoided making any explicit or binding commitments, 
nevertheless the principle that the agreement should include a development 
financing component connected to the EPA had been introduced into the 
negotiations. The amount of funding and its ‘additionality’ remained as the main 
points of contention. 
The EU was reluctant to designate additional development funding as they argued 
this would encourage an illegitimate cash-for-signature, transactional approach 
to EPA negotiations. The EU argued that ‘the ACP should not view EPAs as an ATM’ 
(International Trade Expert, Skype interview, 13th June 2014), and they did not 
wish to be seen to be ‘buying’ the region (ECOWAS Official, Skype interview, 13th 
August 2014). After much lobbying from West African negotiators, civil society 
groups, and ECOWAS parliamentarians, in May 2010 a declaration by the Council 
of European Development Ministers conceded that the PAPED was now ‘an 
essential element of the future EPA with West Africa’ and noted that support of the 
PAPED by the EU, EU Member States, and the European Investment Bank ‘already 
exceeded the Council’s commitment of 6.5 billion euros to reach more than 8.2 
billion euros’ (European Commission 2010). The declaration also committed a 
further 6.5 billion euros for the 2015-2020 period. The ECOWAS Trade Commissioner 
responded that this commitment did not match PAPED’s requirement of 9.5 billion 
euros (downgraded from the previous objective of 16 billion), the programming 
did not match needs identified as priorities for West Africa, and suggested that 
West Africa would look to other actors such as China and the African Development 
Bank to make up the shortfall. He also implied that signature of the EPA depended 
on ‘sufficient’ funding of the PAPED in the 2010-2014 period (Trade Negotiations 
Insights, June 2010). 
The EU became increasingly annoyed by the region’s attempt to bargain for more 
aid under the EPA (Weinhardt 2014), and as with market access, the issue became 
so contentious that it contributed to the April 2012 – February 2014 breakdown of 
negotiations. As with the market access issue, the impasse was fuelled by 
fundamentally different conceptions of the ‘rules of the game’, and divergent 
beliefs about the overall aim of the EPAs (Weinhardt 2014). Despite its normative 
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statements, for the EU the EPA was primarily a trade agreement, whereas for 
ECOWAS the EPA was perceived as a trade and development agreement (ECOWAS 
Official, Skype interview, 13th August 2014). The EU had a fundamentally different 
conception or understanding of what constitutes development within the context 
of the EPAs. The EU’s understanding is based on a neoliberal approach, equating 
freer trade, investment liberalization and competition with development (Vickers 
2011: 187). For the EU, liberalization leads to more trade, which leads to development 
(Weinhardt, 2014). Essentially, trade is development. For West African negotiators, 
the development aspect and the trade aspect were separate dimensions. Trade 
liberalization and development are not necessarily synonymous, although 
strategic liberalization and protectionism can be used as a developmental tool. 
They were willing to make concessions on the trade dimension in exchange for 
additional development funding (Weinhardt, 2014), an approach the EU perceived 
as illegitimate.  
The EU continued to insist that there would be no ‘additional’ funds for West 
Africa, while ECOWAS continued to hint it would not sign in the absence of 
sufficient funding. As with the market access offer, the events of December 2013 
appear to be key to unblocking the impasse. The December 5th letter from the five 
EU member states also asked the EU that programming of the 11th EDF, underway 
at the time, ‘take into account the need for EPA accompanying measures, particularly 
in regions where EPA development programs have been designed’ (Joint letter… 5th 
December 2013, emphasis added). Two months later, the EU agreed to provide the 
PAPED with 6.5 billion euros over the 2015 to 2020 period. ECOWAS backed down 
from insisting the text spell out that resources would be ‘additional’ (EPA Update, 
Feb 2014), and in exchange the EU, its member states, and the European Investment 
Bank agreed to find a way to match West Africa’s expressed development needs 
with funding (Bridges Africa, 6 Feb 2014; ECOWAS Press Release, 17 Feb 2014). They 
agreed that funding will be delivered and implemented in the framework of the 
Cotonou Agreement, the 11th EDF, relevant instruments of the EU general budget, 
and aid mechanisms of EU Member states willing to support the PAPED’ (Council 
Conclusion on West Africa’s EPA Development Programme 2014). Note that there is 
not explicitly any new funding for the region under the terms of the EPA. Instead 
there was a repackaging of commitments under EDF, in line with the EU’s 
preferences. However its notable that the 11th EDF envelope for West Africa – which 
coincidentally was announced at the end of 2013, prior to the make-or-break 
round of negotiations between ECOWAS and the EU in early 2014 – more than 
doubled the amount of funding available to West Africa, bringing development 
funding for West Africa to a total of 1.15 billion euros over the 2014-2020 period, 
significantly more than any other region. West African policy-makers were keen to 
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point out that this jump in EDF resources was not necessarily connected to the 
EPA, but was rather the ‘result of our deepening cooperation’ (ECOWAS Official, 
Skype interview, 13th August 2014). Although negotiators do not draw an explicit 
link between the EDF and the EPA, circumstantial evidence suggests that the 
announcement of an extremely generous EDF envelope just prior to the meeting of 
negotiators may have soothed West African sentiment on the development funding 
issue, while avoiding the appearance of the EU ‘buying’ the region’s signature. 
Other analyses of the development financing issue conclude that West Africa was 
not particularly successful in obtaining its objectives due to the fact that the final 
text does not specify that resources for PAPED should be additional (Ramdoo 2014). 
However this perspective overlooks the fact that a developmental aspect was 
introduced into the EPA against the EU’s wishes, the very substantial increase in 
the 11th EDF, the commitment from the EU to assist in mobilizing new resources, 
and the agreement that regional development funding will be based on priorities 
identified by the region, instead of development partners’ pet projects, leading to 
greater coherence between development needs and existing pots of money, and as 
such West African negotiators themselves consider the agreed outcome a moderate 
success for the region (EPA Negotiator, Skype interview, 20th August 2014). 
Community levies
The UN Economic Commission for Africa notes that lack of funding is a chronic 
problem for regional organizations in Africa, with member state contributions 
barely covering operating costs and forcing some RECs into an overreliance on 
external assistance. Community levies can overcome financing gaps and ensure a 
reliable and predictable source of funding while having minimal impact on 
taxation (UN-ECA 2004). Some ACP regions, including ECOWAS, UEMOA and 
CEMAC, already finance their operations through the application of a small levy 
on imports into the region. This became an issue in West Africa during EPA 
negotiations as the EU insisted that where community levies exist they should be 
phased out as they are a form of tariff on goods, which the EPA aims to eliminate 
(Third World Network, 8 July 2011). This represented a substantial threat to both 
the ECOWAS and UEMOA Commissions. ECOWAS considered it a red-line, 
non-negotiable issue, arguing that the removal of the community levy would 
undermine the financing of the day-to-day operations of the Commission and 
existing regional integration initiatives (Third World Network, 8 July 2011). The 
ECOWAS Trade Commissioner argued that the EU would have to (temporarily) 
accept a definition of ‘customs duties’ that excludes community levies, and a five 
year transition period after the signature of the EPA, during which time ECOWAS 
will put in place an indirect taxation system to finance community activities 
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(Trade Negotiations Insights, June 2010). In the interim, ECOWAS and UEMOA 
devised a plan to merge their respective levies under the ECOWAS Common 
External Tariff. The harmonized ‘Community Integration Levy’ of 1.5 percent will 
be revisited after a period of five years (EPA Update, May/June 2013). The final text 
of the EPA allowed the region to retain the harmonized community levy until 
such time as alternative financing can be secured, and as the outcome is in line 
with the ECOWAS Trade Commissioner’s views, I consider the region to have been 
effective on community levies.  
Non-execution clause
The non-execution clause is a political clause proposed by the EU that, if included 
in the EPA, would allow parties to impose trade sanctions in the case of failure to 
implement the provisions of the EPA, and/or violations of human rights, the rule 
of law, democracy and good governance. A non-execution clause is already present 
in Articles 96 and 97 of the Cotonou Agreement, and allows for the suspension of 
development aid should ACP states violate the ‘essential elements’ of the Agreement. 
Political conditionality was introduced into EU-ACP relations in 1989 with the 
Lomé IV Convention. Under Lomé IV, several ACP states were sanctioned via the 
denial of trade benefits and access to EDF funds due to breaches of the Convention 
that were largely political in nature, while no European countries were ever 
sanctioned for breaches of the Convention (Hylton 2003). ACP states were unhappy 
with what they perceived as an inequitable arrangement, and have long been 
opposed to the inclusion of political conditionalities in their relations with the EU, 
although the EU’s superior bargaining power during the 1980s and 1990s saw 
them included in both the Lomé and Cotonou Agreements (Jones 2014). Given that 
the Cotonou Agreement, the overarching framework in which EPAs are nested, 
already contains a non-execution clause, one might wonder why either side cared 
so much about the issue. For its part, the EU argued for the inclusion of a 
non-execution clause in order to maintain the status quo of what was agreed under 
Cotonou (Lui and Bilal 2009). The EU also includes political conditionalities related to 
human rights, sustainable development, and good governance in trade agreements 
with third parties as a matter of principle since 1995, although the strength of 
such clauses varies from agreement to agreement (Bartels 2013). Furthermore, 
including the clause in the EPA would allow the suspension of trade preferences in 
addition to the possibility of suspending development aid under the provisions of 
Cotonou, giving the EU more options for effecting change in wayward ACP states. 
The all-ACP – EU phase of EPA negotiations ended with the EU signalling its 
intention to have the non-execution clauses of the Cotonou Agreement included in 
the EPAs, while the ACP position was that the clause should be confined to political 
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cooperation (ACP-EC 2003). ACP ministers ‘totally rejected’ the proposal to include 
non-execution clauses in EPA texts (ACP Communiqué, Nov 2007). They argued 
that political conditionality had already been adequately addressed in the Cotonou 
Agreement and that there was no need to carry it over to the EPAs (Third World 
Network, 8 July 2011). In line with the ACP position, ECOWAS opposed the inclusion 
of a political clause in a trade agreement (Bridges Africa, 6 Feb 2014). Interestingly, 
West African civil society and human rights groups, as well as the regional civil 
society representative on the ECOWAS negotiating team, opposed the inclusion of 
the clause in the EPA. They argued that it is unequal, as in practice it is only the EU 
that punishes the ACP, and never vice versa; that it puts the EU in an old-fashioned 
paternalistic role vis-à-vis the ACP; and that it is inconsistently applied by the EU 
according to whether or not it suits their geopolitical interests.30 They argue that 
African governments should be held to account for their compliance with 
governance standards by the citizens of their respective countries, not external 
powers (Mabanza 2011). The West African Civil Society Platform (2011) called on 
the ECOWAS Commission to reject the clause, and accordingly the region’s 
negotiators argued against the clause, claiming that it was not reciprocal (and 
therefore not in the spirit of a reciprocal agreement) and did not allow ECOWAS 
the power to impose trade sanctions on the EU in case of human rights violations 
in Europe, for example if France were to violate the rights of Senegalese immigrants 
(Agazzi 2011; Trommer 2014).  There were also concerns that the EU’s ability to 
impose trade sanctions under the EPA framework would amount to unfair 
collective punishment, as trade sanctions imposed on one country might have 
adverse effects on regional trade and integration, especially if the sanctioned 
country is a key trading partner or outlet for landlocked countries (Lui and Bilal 
2009). The final text of the ECOWAS EPA did not include the non-execution clause 
(Bridges Africa, 6 Feb 2014), but does include a brief reference to the provisions of 
the Cotonou Agreement that deals with non-execution of commitments on human 
rights, democracy, and the rule of law (Agritrade, 24 Feb 2014). This means that the 
EU retains the option of suspending development assistance under the Cotonou 
provisions, but cannot impose a trade embargo or suspend trade commitments 
made under the EPA. Given that this fits with West Africa’s initial objectives and 
avoids the potential for disrupting regional trade we can consider the region 
effective on this issue.  
30 Civil society representatives cite the cases of Zimbabwe and Angola as evidence of the EU’s 
inconsistency in applying sanctions. Zimbabwe has been subject to long-running political dialogue 
and economic sanctions for its poor governance record, whereas Angola, with a similarly poor 
record, has not been subject to any sanctions, as Europe wants access to its valuable raw materials 
(Mabaza 2011).   
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Agricultural subsidies 
EU agricultural subsidies involve direct or indirect payments made to farmers in 
order to manage the supply and regulate the cost of agricultural produce. These 
kinds of subsidies play an important role in food security and food sovereignty, but 
– when applied to produce intended for export to developing countries – can 
undermine development by artificially driving down commodity prices and 
encouraging the ‘dumping’ of subsidized goods in countries and regions that 
cannot afford to provide subsidies to their own producers. EU subsidies are a 
contentious issue for all ACP regions as they are heavily reliant on their agricultural 
sectors for growth and employment. Most ACP regions used the opportunity of the 
EPA negotiations to push the EU for greater transparency of its Common 
Agricultural Policy and a reduction in subsidies. The EU – which traditionally 
maintains a defensive position on agricultural issues due to a powerful agricultural 
lobby – maintains that the WTO is the appropriate forum for discussing agricultural 
subsidies, not the EPAs. The EU has a protectionist stance when it comes to 
agricultural issues, wants to maintain the status quo as much as possible and is 
only willing to make symbolic concessions on domestic agricultural subsidies 
(Conceição-Heldt 2014). Throughout the negotiations, ECOWAS demanded that the 
EU make binding commitments regarding export subsidies and internal EU 
support to agriculture (de Roquefeuil, Plunkett and Ofei 2014), such as removing 
subsidies from food items destined for export to West Africa, and greater 
transparency in agricultural policy. 
In January 2014, Dacian Cioloă, the European Commissioner for Agriculture and 
Rural Development, announced that the EU would end the export of subsidized 
agricultural products to developing countries, bringing EU agricultural policy 
more in line with its development policy. In the final text, the EU agreed to refrain 
from using export subsidies on agricultural goods exported to West Africa, and 
also agreed to provide the region with information regarding the nature and 
amount of support it provides to its farmers (EPA Update, February 2014). The EPA 
text states that each party is to ensure the transparency of its domestic agricultural 
policies (Bridges Africa, 6 Feb 2014). At first glance this may look like a win for West 
Africa. Certainly the EU framed it as a major concession on its behalf (International 
Trade Expert, Skype interview, 13th June 2014). Yet all ACP regions received the 
same concession, as pointed out by Commissioner Cioloă, as the EU’s internal 
reforms of the CAP have in any case been gradually phasing out subsidies on 
exported products since the 1990s (International Trade Expert, Skype interview, 
13th June 2014). So even if the inclusion of the clause was a win for the region, it 
has relatively little to do with ECOWAS’ actorness, and more to do with internal 
developments in the EU. 
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Agricultural Safeguards 
Agricultural safeguards can be used to shield agricultural sectors from cheaper 
imports from outside the region, and are an important tool in preserving food 
security. Given the importance of agriculture to their economies, West African 
countries wanted to see a separate clause on agricultural safeguards in the EPA, as 
opposed to a general bilateral safeguard. Given its defensive position on agricultural 
issues, the EU was opposed to the inclusion of safeguards specifically relating to 
agriculture, and argued that the general bilateral safeguard clause would sufficiently 
allow for temporary protection of the agricultural sector, if and when needed by 
West Africa (Bilal and Ramdoo, 2010). Indeed, the agreed text of the West African 
EPA includes only a general bilateral safeguard clause, and no clause specific to 
agriculture. The general clause allows for safeguard measures to be applied for 
four years, renewable once. In contrast to safeguard clauses found in other EPAs, 
the clause is reciprocal, meaning that the EU can impose safeguards on West 
African products if they threaten to damage local industries or agricultural 
markets in the ‘outermost regions of the EU’, with the measures limited to those 
regions only (Ramdoo 2014). The general safeguard clause does allow the ECOWAS 
region some flexibility and policy space to (temporarily) shield local industries 
from European competition, however African commentators have criticized the 
‘weak safeguard provisions that West African countries will find difficult to invoke 
in case of import surges’ (Bagooro 2014). Clearly the failure to secure a specific 
agricultural clause is a disappointment for the region. The general safeguard 
clause does not represent any win on ECOWAS’s behalf, since all EPAs contain the 
same provision (Meyn and Stevens 2007), and the fact that Europe can place 
safeguards on West African products must surely be disappointing to the region. 
The region was therefore not an effective negotiator on this issue. 
Most Favoured Nation
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) refers to the level of treatment granted by one state or 
region to another. It means that the recipient of MFN must receive preferences 
equal to those of the granting state’s ‘most favoured nation’. It is founding principle 
of the WTO, as all members agree to grant MFN to each other. However, there are 
exceptions allowed for developing countries, regional FTAs, and customs unions, 
which is where the debate for the ACP comes in. Since West Africa’s exact position 
on MFN was not apparent, I fall back to the all-ACP position as a proxy. In principle, 
if ACP regions were to concede MFN to the EU, they would agree not to grant any 
other country/region better preferences. They argued that MFN should be excluded 
from the EPA as it contravenes the WTO’s Enabling Clause, which allows for 
South-South cooperation, and would limit their future options for signing trade 
agreements with states such as India, China, and Brazil. Few of these countries 
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would be interested in deals with ACP regions in the first place if they knew the EU 
would be given the same treatment, thereby eroding their margin of preference in 
ACP markets (Third World Network, 8 July 2011). Therefore it lowers ACP states’ 
bargaining power in future negotiations with emerging economies. For their part, 
the EU argued that inclusion of an automatic MFN clause was a matter of ‘fairness’ 
given their generous concessions on other EPA issues (Bilal and Ramdoo 2010: 3). 
The lack of flexibility on the issue from the EU had the potential to have serious 
negative consequences for the economic and political relationship between the EU 
and the ACP (Bilal and Ramdoo 2010).
 
In line with EU preferences, the interim EPAs with Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire 
contained a clause requiring MFN treatment should either party conclude an FTA 
with any other developed or ‘major trading economy’ (ActionAid 2013), and the 
clause in the final EPA text is very similar to that found in the interim agreements. 
It states that the EU will be granted equal terms to any bilateral trade deals 
ECOWAS may negotiate with ‘major trade partners’ in the future. ‘Major trade 
partner’ is defined as any country with a share of world trade higher than 1.5 
percent, or two percent for a group of countries; or any country with more than 10 
percent of GDP composed of value in manufacturing (Ramdoo 2014). This is a more 
generous interpretation of the term ‘major trade partner’ than appears in the 
SADC agreement however it would appear that ECOWAS is subject to an automatic 
extension of the clause, whereas SADC is not (see pages 172-173). As was the case 
with the SADC EPA, the MFN clause will not apply to trade deals signed with other 
African countries/regions and other ACP states. The outcome means that ECOWAS 
will not be able to offer better preferences to other major or emerging economic 
powers, thereby undermining their bargaining power in future trade negotiations. 
The text also states that the EU will grant ECOWAS any additional market access it 
may grant to other parties in the future, although this is fairly meaningless, 
face-saving concession, as under the EPA the EU will grant ECOWAS 100 percent 
DFQF access, which cannot really be improved upon. In conclusion, the outcome 
on MFN was a failure for ECOWAS as it undermines their future bargaining power 
vis-à-vis major trading partners.  
Rules of origin 
Rules of origin (RoO) are the criteria used to determine the ‘nationality’ of a 
product. Identifying the origins of raw materials and commodities is fairly simple 
as these products are generally wholly obtained in one state, but is more 
complicated in the case of products manufactured using inputs from multiple 
countries (Lui and Bilal 2009). The ACP’s main request on rules of origin was that 
they be simplified so that all ACP regions should be subject to the same rules in 
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order to encourage cumulation and value-addition between them (ACP Guidelines 
for the Negotiations of EPAs 2002; ACP 2011). It is difficult to pinpoint the EU’s 
precise position on rules of origin. Although the Cotonou Agreement promised to 
simplify rules of origin, the EU appeared unwilling to make commitments on the 
issue during Phase II of the negotiations (Lui and Bilal 2009). The European 
Commission failed to present a simplified RoO regime as planned in 2006 (Meyn 
2008), and as the various EPA negotiations progressed, different and discriminatory 
rules of origin regimes emerged across the configurations. In mid-2007, as the 
initial deadline for the conclusion of negotiations loomed, the EU stated that it 
was too late to reform the entire rules of origin regime and therefore reforms 
should be limited to the rules concerning textiles and agricultural sectors as these 
were of most concern to ACP states (Lui and Bilal 2009: 34). 
The interim EPAs initialled by Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire contained very restrictive 
clauses on the rules of origin. In Ghana’s case, goods could only be defined as 
originating in Ghana if the inputs originated from another iEPA signatory, which 
limited regional inputs to those originating in Côte d’Ivoire. Products with inputs 
from other West African states could not access the EU market as Ghanaian goods, 
placing constraints on its nascent agro-industrial export sector (ActionAid 2013). 
The wording of the clause seems intended to put pressure on the signatories of 
interim EPAs to pressurize their neighbours into also signing interim agreements. 
The region-wide EPA contained far more favourable rules of origin, and similar to 
those found in other EPAs. Cumulation between EU and ECOWAS countries is 
allowed, as is cumulation with other ACP states, states that have an FTA with the 
EU or benefit from EBA or GSP (with some exceptions, for example fish products 
originating in the Pacific). This represents greater flexibility and potential for 
cumulation among developing states, which is advantageous for value-addition 
processing and manufacturing, as it allows states to source cheap inputs from 
other developing states (Ramdoo 2014). This outcome can be considered a win for 
ECOWAS, but most likely not due to actorness, as other ACP regions obtained a 
similar outcome. More likely the concession is due to the strength of the all-ACP 
argument. As they pointed out, having different and/or conflicting regimes across 
different EPA configurations would undermine the potential for future regional 
and continental integration, especially where EPA configurations do not cohere 
with existing integration initiatives, and the EU did not want to be seen to be 
purposively undermining or obstructing the development and integration of the 
ACP. 
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Conclusion 
In all, West Africa was fairly effective in obtaining its objectives (see Table 5.2). 
ECOWAS was effective or moderately effective on six of its eight key issues, and 
effective on its most important objective, market access. The region’s ‘win’ on 
market access (75 percent opening over 20 years) is especially remarkable given the 
EU’s prior firm insistence on a minimum of 80 percent opening. A difference of 
five percent and five years – on the face of it – may not seem like a major concession 
on the EU’s behalf, especially to a minor trading partner such as West Africa. But 
given the relevance of EPAs for precedent setting in the EU’s future preferential 
trade agreements (Sauvé and Ward 2009), in actuality this is a major concession 
and one of the biggest successes in any ACP region. 
West Africa’s relative success in the EPA could be interpreted as a somewhat 
surprising outcome, given that the region is composed of structurally weak states. 
But this success is less surprising when we look at the role of actorness in obtaining 
effective negotiating outcomes. The region was able to obtain its relatively 
impressive outcome due to its higher degree of actorness. Granting the formal 
negotiating mandate to the ECOWAS Commission allowed the formation of a 
regional position early on in the negotiations. This was manifest in the region’s 
readiness to embark on Phase II of negotiations before any other ACP region, and 
the relative speed at which it produced a Roadmap to guide Phase II. The region 
tabled clear and coherent positions on its most important issues, the market access 
offer and the financing of the PAPED, and although the region did shift its position 
on these issues during the course of the negotiations, there was never any 
indication that the tabled position was not representative of the region as a whole. 
The region deployed a consistent and effective negotiation strategy. ECOWAS’ 
main strategy was to table an offer significantly far apart from EU preferences, 
then delay and stall for as long as possible, all the while making normative, de-
velopmental-based arguments intended to appeal to the EC’s self-image as a force 
for good. At the same time the region allowed civil society a strong role in the EPA 
process, even having a civil society representative on its negotiating team. This 
would have given West African negotiators the opportunity to deploy a ‘hands-tied’ 
strategy, refraining from offering too many concessions to the EU as it could point 
to the strength of domestic opposition. 
At several junctures the region exploited favourable factors in the external 
opportunity structure to its advantage. The region exploited the shadow of WTO 
law when it argued an alternative legal interpretation of the GATT Article XXIV 
regarding market access Reframing the argument in the same terms used by the 
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Table 5.3   Initial preferences versus final outcomes, EU-ECOWAS 
EU initial  
preference
West Africa initial 
preference
Opportunity structure Final outcome Analysis
Market access Minimum of 80% 
over 15 years 
60% over 25 years Degree of opposition from EU: 
Very high (unfavourable) 
Interpretation of WTO law 
supports WA position:  
Yes (favourable) 
Influence of other parties*:  
EU member states intervention 
(favourable) 
75% over 20 years WA obtained concessions from the EU 
on its most hardline issue through its 
negotiation strategy: Effective
Development 
financing
No additional 
funding, and 
funding should 
be mobilized 
via existing 
mechanisms 
18 billion euros 
to fund PAPED, in 
addition to existing 
funding levels 
Degree of opposition from EU: 
very high (unfavourable)
Interpretation of WTO law 
supports WA position: Sort-of 
(neutral)  
Influence of other parties: 
lobbying from civil society in 
support of WA position;   
EU member states intervention 
(favourable) 
6.5 billion euros for 2015-2020 period, not 
necessarily new funding, but repackaging 
of existing funds 
More-or-less equitable compromise: 
Moderately effective
Community 
levies
Community levy 
should be phased 
out
Community levy 
should be retained 
Degree of opposition from EU: 
moderate  (neutral) 
Interpretation of WTO law 
supports WA position: n/a
Influence of other parties: n/a
Community levy retained Outcome mostly reflects WA preferences: 
Effective 
Non-execution 
clause
EPA text should 
allow for trade 
sanctions in cases of 
violations of human 
rights, rule of law, 
or democracy. 
No political 
conditionality 
clauses in trade 
agreements 
Degree of opposition from EU: 
high (unfavourable) 
Interpretation of WTO law 
supports WA position: n/a 
(neutral) 
Influence of other parties: 
lobbying by WA civil society 
(favourable) 
Non-execution clause excluded, but 
reference to provisions in Cotonou 
Agreement
Outcome mostly reflects WA preferences:
Effective
Agricultural 
subsidies 
WTO, not EPA, is 
appropriate forum 
for discussion 
of agricultural 
subsidies. 
EU to make binding 
commitments 
on subsidies on 
agricultural goods 
exported to West 
Africa and internal 
subsidies to EU 
agriculture 
Degree of opposition from EU:  
low (favourable) 
Interpretation of WTO law 
supports WA position: n/a 
Influence of other parties: n/a
EU will no longer export subsidized 
agricultural goods to West Africa. Both 
sides to be more transparent regarding 
policies on domestic subsidies
Effective, but not due to actorness
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EU proved a more successful strategy than its previous justification of the market 
access offer on developmental grounds. The region leveraged developments at the 
multilateral level a second time when the introduction of the global Aid for Trade 
Agenda caused the EU to change its opposition to the inclusion of developmental 
provisions in EPAs. From this point on, ECOWAS was able to argue more 
convincingly about the merits of financing the PAPED under the rubric of Trade 
for Aid.
Finally, the region was able to capitalize on the window of opportunity created by 
EU member states issuing of the December 2013 letter admonishing the European 
Commission and unblock the negotiations and corner European negotiators into 
accepting a market access offer below 80 percent over 15 years. Some diplomatic 
coordination with France (most likely at the Franco-African Economic Conference) 
and other EU member states sympathetic to ACP concerns timed the release of the 
letter admonishing the Commission just prior to a crucial meeting of European 
Table 5.3  Continued 
EU initial  
preference
West Africa initial 
preference
Opportunity structure Final outcome Analysis
Agricultural 
safeguards
Agricultural 
safeguards are 
adequately covered 
by the general 
bilateral safeguard 
clause
Separate, specific 
clause to cover 
agricultural 
safeguards
Degree of opposition from EU: 
moderate (neutral) 
Interpretation of WTO law 
supports WA position: n/a
Influence of other parties: n/a
No specific clause for agricultural goods, 
and EU can apply safeguards on WA 
products 
Outcome closer to EU preferences: Not 
effective
Most favoured 
nation
MFN clauses should 
be included in text 
MFN should be 
excluded as it 
contravenes WTO’s 
Enabling Clause 
for South-South 
cooperation 
Degree of opposition from EU: 
very high (unfavourable) 
Interpretation of WTO law 
supports WA position: yes 
(favourable) 
Influence of other parties: n/a
EU to be granted MFN when WA signs trade 
agreements with any major trade partner 
Outcome reflects EU preferences: Not 
effective
Rules of origin Simplified rules 
in textiles and 
agriculture 
RoO to be simplified 
and harmonized 
across regions and 
all sectors, allowing 
full cumulation 
between African 
countries 
Degree of opposition from EU: low 
(favourable) 
Interpretation of WTO law 
supports WA position: n/a
Influence of other parties: ACP 
Group (favourable) 
WA can cumulate amongst themselves 
as well as with other EPA signatories and 
states that benefit from EBA, GSP or other 
FTA with the EU 
Effective, but not due to ECOWAS actorness 
*Growing Chinese influence in the region is a constant across all issues, so not included in the table 
Source: own compilation
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ECOWAS negotiators to table a strategically revised offer they had good reason to 
believe the European negotiators would have little choice but to accept. Such 
strategic action would not have possible without a sufficient degree of regional 
actorness. The ECOWAS region may well have benefited from a greater degree of 
coordination with France than other African regions, but the letter was publicly 
issued and there was nothing to preclude other ACP regions from similarly 
capitalizing on the opportunity offered by the letter. 
Even though Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire both initialed interim EPAs at the end of 
2007, the scale of defection was not that severe. Ghana never actually signed its 
interim agreement, although it did several times threaten to ‘take steps to protect 
its economic interest’ (EPA Update, July 2012), and Côte d’Ivoire refrained from 
ratification of its agreement. They initialed the agreements, with the permission 
of the ECOWAS Commission, in order to maintain market access, but never took 
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steps to legalize the commitments in the interim agreements, allowing them to 
renegotiate the commitments under a regional framework. These temporary 
defections were evidently not that problematic for the region’s effectiveness, as the 
commitments of the regional EPA are a far better deal that those of the interim 
EPAs, but perhaps the region could have obtained an even better deal if Ghana and 
Côte d’Ivoire had refrained from initialing interim EPAs. 
A more problematic, albeit temporary, defection came after the close of negotiations. 
In March 2014, Nigeria raised a last-minute list of ‘objections’ to the deal reached 
at the level of Senior Officials the previous month. Fearful that this would led to 
the agreement falling apart, the ECOWAS Commission convened a special panel of 
Nigerian, Ghanaian and Ivorian officials, with Senegal tasked with mediating and 
finding a solution to Nigeria’s objections without having to re-open negotiations 
(which the EU insisted was in any case not possible) (EPA Updates, March/April 
2014). The panel was able to assuage Nigerian concerns, and Nigerian President 
Goodluck Jonathan endorsed the deal along with the other Heads of State in July 
2014.  It should be stressed that such actions are highly unusual in international 
negotiations. Its neighbours viewed this as highly obstructionist and infuriating 
behaviour, and observers could not identify whether this behaviour was an 
unorthodox move to obtain further concessions at the last minute, or simply the 
result of internal dysfunction and a lack of attention to the EPA process 
(International Trade Expert, Skype interview, 13th June 2014; ECOWAS Official, 
Skype interview, 13th August 2014). Ultimately though, the Nigerian government 
opted to sign the agreement, essentially to maintain Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire’s 
market access for their cocoa products, ‘which in the end is a pretty big show of 
regional unity’ (International Trade Expert, Skype interview, 13th June 2014). 
Nigeria opted to stand by neighbours rather than reject an agreement it had deep 
reservations about, and most likely would have preferred not to sign at all (EPA 
Update, July/August 2014). While there was no active leadership from Nigeria on 
the EPA issue, it is remarkable that Nigeria subordinated its national interest to 
the regional interest, when it could easily have opted for a unilateral strategy. The 
overall outcome of the negotiations is an agreement that not only preserves the 
integrity of ECOWAS’ integration, but has actually strengthened it. As one 
interviewee pointed out, the ECOWAS Commission not only played a strong role 
throughout the process, but also consolidated and strengthened its role vis-à-vis its 
member states and the international community (International Trade Expert, 
Skype interview, 13th June 2014). As a result he final agreement reflects regional 
objectives and is generally conducive to the future of regional cooperation in West 
Africa. 
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5.4  EU influence in West Africa 
This section explores to what extent the external influence of the European Union 
promotes or undermines regional cooperation and integration in West Africa. As 
pointed out in Chapter Three, the actorness and effectiveness of ACP regions is 
conditioned by the influence of powerful external actors, especially the EU. This is 
in part due to their member states’ structural weakness in the global economy, but 
also their dependence on donor funding, much of which originates from the 
European Union. The (effective) promotion of regional cooperation and integration 
in West Africa – most obviously via financial incentives, but also socialization and 
emulation of the EU model of regionalism – increases actorness by strengthening 
regional institutions and member states’ preferences for cooperating on the 
regional level. On the other hand, the EU’s influence may have the opposite effect 
of promoting disintegrative tendencies within the region, either indirectly 
through the provision of differentiated trading options which reduces member 
states’ preferences for regional cooperation; or directly, through employing div-
ide-and-rule strategies in the negotiations themselves. The EU’s integrative and 
disintegrative influence on target regions co-exist, often simultaneously and 
working at cross-purposes to each other. Whether an integrative or disintegrative 
influence prevails within a given ACP region depends whether the incentives in 
favour of cooperation and integration outweigh those for defection from the 
regional project. In the case of West Africa, the EU’s influence generally has a 
positive effect on regional integration and cooperation. The large amount of 
funding provided via the EDF mechanism, in combination with an EPA that 
coheres with the borders of a pre-existing regional organization, creates strong 
incentives for West African states to cooperate at the regional level under the 
auspices of ECOWAS. At the same time, the disintegrative influence of the EU is 
relatively low. There are no preexisting bilateral trade deals with the regional 
power or other member states to undermine cooperation at the regional level, and 
the more unified front of West African states in the EPA negotiations made it 
harder for the EU to deploy divide-and-rule strategies. EU influence has been 
generally beneficial to ECOWAS actorness, thereby indirectly contributing to 
ECOWAS’ greater effectiveness in EPA negotiations.  
The EU’s Integrative Influence on Regionalism in West Africa 
The EU’s promotion of regional cooperation and integration in West Africa has a 
long and complicated history rooted in the region’s colonial past and Anglo-
phone-Francophone rivalry. France has acted as an external paymaster to regional 
integration between the Francophone states since 1945, when it introduced and 
guaranteed the CFA Franc. This arrangement has continued to the present day and 
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accounts for the successful continuation of UEMOA’s monetary union under 
otherwise unfavourable conditions (Idrissa 2013). UEMOA and its predecessor 
organizations maintained close contact with France throughout the post-In-
dependence period, and given France’s position as a key power in the EU, it is 
hardly surprising that the EU and France together played a direct role in shaping 
regionalism in Francophone West Africa (Piccolino and Minou, 2014). The UEMOA 
Treaty mimics the EEC’s, and was written by consultants from the European 
Economic Community  (Asante 1985: 83), and the sub-region’s macroeconomic 
polices encourage the reproduction of the Maastricht convergence criteria albeit 
without much regard for their applicability to developing states (Idrissa 2013). Due 
to France’s support of UEMOA and (latent) opposition to the Nigerian-led ECOWAS, 
ECOWAS did not have the same level of involvement with the EEC at the time of its 
establishment in 1975, but was rather indirectly influenced by the relevance of the 
EU as a reference point, something explicitly acknowledged by the founders of the 
organization (Asante 1986). As in the EU, West African states figured that 
regionalism starts with trade and economic integration (Piccolino and Minou 
2014: 20), as opposed to the political coordination that SADC is rooted in. Despite 
using the EU as a reference point for its own integration, ECOWAS was relatively 
neglected by the EU and its member states until the late 1990s (Chaffer and 
Stoddard 2014; Piccolino and Minou 2014: 12). However this changed with the 
adoption of the Cotonou Agreement in 2000 and the subsequent 9th and 10th EDF 
cycles, when the EU began to encourage ECOWAS and UEMOA to harmonize their 
policies, and aimed to support ECOWAS and UEMOA’s regional agenda as a whole, 
as opposed to specific regional projects (Piccolino and Minou 2014: 13). An 
EDF-funded project to coordinate ECOWAS and UEMOA policies was set-up in 2004 
(European Court of Auditors 2009: 24), and from the 10th EDF cycle onwards there 
is no distinction between the financial allocations to ECOWAS and UEMOA, with 
the eventual goal of ECOWAS to emerge as the sole regional organization in West 
Africa.31
As is the case in other ACP regions, the EDF mechanism is the primary instrument 
of the EU’s influence in promoting regionalism in West Africa. The region has 
consistently received more funding for regional cooperation and integration from 
the European Development Fund than any other region in the ACP. As in other 
31 This re-orientation of European development funding towards ECOWAS was motivated by peace 
and security concerns. UEMOA primarily focuses on economic convergence and has limited 
capacity in peace and security affairs, not least due to the fact that it excludes the regional power. 
The landmark declaration of Anglo-Franco cooperation in defense matters at Saint-Malo in 1998 
encouraged a convergence of UK and French attitudes towards West Africa, and greater recognition 
of ECOWAS (Chafer and Stoddard 2014).  
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regions, approximately 70 percent of EDF money is earmarked for the promotion 
of regional economic integration, with the rest dedicated to political cooperation 
and other focal areas (see Table 5.4). Financial support for regionalism doubled in 
the 11th EDF to an enormous 1.2 billion euros, despite an assessment by the 
European Court of Auditors that previous EDF support to regional integration in 
West Africa had been only ‘partially effective’, and that ECOWAS and UEMOA ‘fail 
to overcome basic constraints’ in human and institutional capacity, in light of 
which the European Commission should consider whether its financial allocation 
to regional programmes in West Africa is ‘too high’ (European Court of Auditors 
2009). This might suggest that the amount of funding that directly benefits 
ECOWAS is in reality lower than it appears from the EU’s programming documents 
(Piccolino and Minou 2014: 23). However other observers and ECOWAS itself 
conclude that donor support in the ‘areas of technical assistance, staff recruitment 
and training, review of administrative and financial rules and regulation, 
modernization of procedures and systems…and improved inter-institutional 
collaboration’ has succeeded in building ‘enduring’ institutional capacities (Essien 
2014: 26), at least in comparison to other African regional organizations. Indeed, 
ECOWAS has strengthened its institutions in the recent past. In 2005 ECOWAS 
transformed its secretariat into a Commission, explicitly modeled on the European 
Commission, and giving it greater autonomy and implementation powers 
(Zounmenou and Loua 2011). Institutionally, ECOWAS resembles the EU much 
more closely than SADC, and acknowledges that successful regional cooperation 
may require an element of supranationalism, which lends credence to Piccolino 
and Minou’s (2014) claim that that the EU’s influence ‘deeply shaped’ regional 
cooperation in ECOWAS, primarily by providing a normative template of 
Table 5.4   European Development Funding to West Africa, 1996-2020
Framework Funding period ECOWAS/UEMOA 
Lomé IV 1996-2001 Regional Indicative Programme 
(8th EDF)
226 million
Cotonou Agreement 2002-2007 Regional Indicative Programme 
(9th EDF)
253 million
Cotonou Agreement 2008-2013 Regional Indicative Programme 
(10th EDF) 
597 million
Cotonou Agreement 2014- 2020 Regional Indicative Programme* 
(11th EDF) 
Approx. 1.2 billion
*Final amounts not confirmed at time of writing (January 2015) 
Source: EuropeAid
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‘successful’ regionalism to be copied by West Africa. West African policy-makers 
acknowledge that the EU is ‘a very good example for us’, but with the caveat that 
the economic situation and culture of West Africa is different from that of Europe, 
so the EU model cannot be ‘planted’ wholesale in the region (ECOWAS Official, 
Skype Interview, 12th June 2014). 
The introduction of the EPA has also successfully encouraged integration within 
ECOWAS. EPAs were introduced by the EU as a means to speed up the regional 
agenda in ACP regions. However this was really only effective in regions in which 
negotiating configurations aligned with existing regional integration projects. In 
regions with a high degree of overlap and split memberships (SADC, Central 
Africa), EPAs have contributed to increased fragmentation and are likely to inhibit 
moves towards deeper integration (Jakobeit et al. 2005). However, in regions where 
EPA configurations cohere with pre-existing integration initiatives, EPAs have 
acted as a mid-wife to deeper integration and cooperation. This has been the case 
in West Africa, where the EPA configuration coheres with the membership of 
ECOWAS. Engaging with the EU on the EPA has pressured ECOWAS into prioritizing 
its regional agenda. ECOWAS negotiators took an almost two year break from the 
EPA (April 2012 – February 2014) in order to finalize the ECOWAS Common 
External Tariff so they could move ahead as a unified block in the negotiations. 
The new CET is built on UEMOA’s pre-existing CET, with a higher tariff band of 35 
percent added to satisfy Nigeria’s protectionist leanings. Plans for a CET and 
customs union had been on the ECOWAS agenda since the signing of the Revised 
Treaty in 1993, without much progress until 2012, when it became apparent that 
the region needed a CET in order to successfully implement a region-wide EPA. 
Furthermore, the pressure to formulate regional positions on several issues 
Table 5.5   2008-2013 Regional Indicative Programme for West Africa 
Type of Support Amount  
earmarked
Percentage  
of total 
Focal Sector I: deepening of regional integration, 
strengthening of competiveness and implementation  
of the EPA
 418 million 70%
Focal sector II: Good governance and regional stability 119 million 20%
Other Programmes, including support of Non State Actors 60 million 10%
Total 597 million 100% 
Source: European Commission
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previously neglected by ECOWAS (such as service liberalization and other 
trade-related issues) has served to sharpen the regional agenda within West Africa 
(Bilal 2013: International Trade Expert, Skype interview, 13th June 2014). 
The EU’s Disintegrative Influence on Regionalism in West Africa
The disintegrative influence of the EU is relatively low is West Africa. As outlined 
in Chapter Three, the EU may have a disintegrative influence on ACP regions 
through the provision of differentiated trading options to member states. Where 
these options are more attractive than regional options, states are likely to become 
regional Rambos who choose to defect from regional cooperation in favour of 
extra-regional privileges. This is especially deleterious when regional powers are 
offered bilateral free trade deals and subsequently lose interest in regional 
cooperation and integration. This dynamic is not present in West Africa, where 
there were no pre-existing FTAs between the EU and Nigeria, or any other member 
state. However, Nigeria could have opted for a bilateral interim deal at the end of 
2007 in order to preserve its market access but instead choose to incur short-term 
losses in favour of pursuing a regional EPA. As in all other ACP regions, LDCs had 
the option to avail of the non-reciprocal Everything But Arms regime instead of 
the EPA, thereby becoming Rambos, but like Nigeria they instead opted for the 
region-wide EPA. 
While West African negotiators prefer ‘to avoid the phrase divide-and-conquer, 
because it has a bit of a colonial mindset’ (ECOWAS Official, Skype interview, 13th 
August 2014), they do note instances of what could be considered divide-and-rule 
tactics from the EC. The EU inflamed tensions between UEMOA and the ECOWAS 
Commission at the start of negotiations, when UEMOA representatives were 
invited to informal talks with the EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy (Bilal 
2013), bypassing the ECOWAS Commission as the primary representative of the 
region. Divide-and-rule tactics were most apparent under the leadership of Peter 
Mandelson (November 2004 - October 2008), especially in the lead up to the initial 
deadline for the conclusion of negotiations at the end of 2007. In November 2007 
Mandelson strongly criticized the position of the larger African countries, 
specifically Nigeria and South Africa. He described Nigeria as ‘sitting like an 
elephant in the middle of the road’ and blocking the EPA to the detriment of other 
states in the region:
If you go to West Africa, the regional group is dominated by Nigeria, which wouldn’t touch 
an EPA with a barge pole. That’s okay for West Africa if you are relatively rich like Nigeria. 
But what about Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana? They are not rich, nor are they LDCs. They need 
an EPA to avoid disruption to trade at the end of the year (quoted in Cronin 2007)
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West African negotiators also noted instances of the EU lobbying individual 
ECOWAS member states outside of the agreed framework for the negotiations, 
‘which did appear to be trying to divide the ranks amongst the regional body’ 
(ECOWAS Official, Skype interview, 13th August 2014). Although this was most 
prevalent in the run-up to the 2007 deadline, it happened throughout the 
negotiation process. Such divide and rule type tactics contributed to a perception 
among some West African negotiators that the EU was behaving in a fashion 
reminiscent of the colonial period, eroding relational trust between the two sides 
(Weinhard 2015) and inflaming intra-regional tensions between Côte d’Ivoire, 
Ghana and Nigeria. 
EU Influence in West Africa: Helping or Hindering  
Regional Actorness? 
While the EU does exert a (mild) disintegrative influence on West Africa, through 
the provision of differentiated trading options, albeit not taken up by West African 
states, and divisive negotiating tactics, it is not enough to outweigh the EU’s 
integrative influence (see Figure 5.4). While ECOWAS was relatively neglected by 
the EU in funding terms until relatively recently, the EU has nevertheless had a 
deep integrative influence on it from its inception, primarily by serving as a 
reference point or model to be emulated by ECOWAS (Sohn and Oppong 2013; Bilal 
2013; Piccolino and Minou 2014). More recently ECOWAS has to a certain extent 
become the darling of the EU’s experiment in ‘regionalism through interregionalism’, 
as evidenced by the large amount of EDF funding available for regionalism in 
West Africa. The material incentives for West African states to cooperate under the 
auspices of ECOWAS are high, as there are now literally billions of euros worth of 
resources on offer under the EDF. The EPA itself has successfully encouraged the 
deepening and widening of ECOWAS’ regional integration agenda, facilitating 
the design and implementation of the Common External Tariff, with the help of 
resources available under the EDF instrument. At the same time the EU disintegrative 
influence is not particularly high. There were no pre-existing bilateral deals with 
individual member states, and despite the option of differentiated trading regimes, 
no member states opted for bilateralism over interregionalism, despite the EC’s 
divisive lobbying of individual states. Furthermore, the EU did not insist on 
differential treatment for Nigeria. By encouraging regional integration and 
cooperation in West Africa, the EU has (indirectly) contributed to the actorness of 
ECOWAS. By providing large amounts of funding at the regional level, the EU 
encourages member states preferences in favour of regionalism (where otherwise 
the prospects of material gain from regional cooperation are low due to low levels 
of intra-regional trade). Stronger and more autonomous regional institutions – 
such as a Commission, a Community Court of Justice, and a regional Parliament 
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– are built to manage regional cooperation, thereby increasing the region’s 
international recognition and overall actorness. 
5.5  Conclusion
ECOWAS is a relatively strong African regional organization and has displayed a 
moderate level of actorness in relation to the Economic Partnership Agreements. 
The West African case illustrates the importance of formal institutional design in 
obtaining actorness. The region does not have a strong sense of identity, nor did it 
have much leadership from the regional power, Nigeria. Although the region did 
have a relatively high degree of initial preference homogeneity among member 
states, nevertheless there were states (Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire ) that could have opted 
for extra-regional privileges in the form of bilateral interim EPAs at the end of 
2007. The ECOWAS Commission was granted the mandate to negotiate on behalf 
on member states, and its strong role in coordinating regional positions and 
conducting negotiations played a role in convincing Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire  to 
refrain from taking their interim EPAs forward, thereby maintaining regional 
unity. The Commission’s strong role also contributed to West Africa’s relatively 
successful negotiating strategy, which was to resist and delay the negotiations as 
long as possible while holding firms on its demands, and deploying development- 
orientated arguments that had the strong backing a regional civil society 
organizations. The region was able to hold firm until a favourable opportunity 
structure opened up in the form of the five EU member states’ admonishing letter 
to the European Commission. West African negotiators apparently coordinated 
with French officials to time the release of the letter just prior to a crucial meeting 
of West African and European negotiators, at which the West Africans were able to 
Figure 5.4  Integrative versus Disintegrative Influence of the EU on West Africa
Integrative Influence Disintegrative Influence
Direct
Financial incentives: high  
(increasing over time)
Divide-and-rule strategies: mild
Indirect
EPA: successful in encouraging 
deeper integration
Rambo’s: none  
(temporary threat from Ghana,  
Côte d’Ivoire  and Nigeria)
Source: author’s illustration
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exploit the letter to rhetorically entrap the Europeans and obtain their most 
important concessions on market access and development funding. West Africa’s 
win on market access is especially remarkable given the EU’s strong opposition to 
anything below 80 percent, and its reluctance to make concessions with precedent- 
setting implications for other trade negotiations. In all the West African region 
was fairly effective in obtaining ‘good’ negotiating outcomes. The region’s negotiators 
were successful or partially successful on obtaining concessions on six out of eight 
key issues, and effective on its two most important issues. Meanwhile the West 
African agreement has been described as a suboptimal outcome for the EU, due to 
the prevalence of loopholes that favour West Africa, and the failure to include new 
generation issues and sustainable development issues in the agreement.   
The region’s success could be interpreted as a somewhat surprising outcome, given 
that the region is composed of poor, weak and underdeveloped states. But their 
success is less surprising when we look at the role of actorness in obtaining 
effective negotiating outcomes. Perhaps even more surprising in the West African 
case was the role played by Nigeria. It is quite remarkable that the regional power 
subordinated its preference not to sign the EPA to the regional position. Whether 
Nigeria choose this course of action out of a belief that the long-term gains of 
regional cooperation would outweigh the sort-term benefits of opting out of the 
EPA or out of a sense of regional solidarity is not immediately clear. However 
Nigerian civil society remains strongly opposed to the EPA, which may yet hinder 
its progress through the ratification phase.   
In any case, the overall outcome of the negotiations is an agreement that both 
reflects regional concerns and is generally conducive to future regional cooperation 
in West Africa. The EPA coheres with the borders of ECOWAS, and acted as a 
mid-wife to the region’s Common External Tariff. The Commission has also 
managed to consolidate and strengthen its role, and in this way the EU and the 
EPA have (indirectly) contributed to the strengthening of ECOWAS actorness. The 
EU has acted as a paymaster to regional cooperation in West Africa through the 
provision of large amounts of funding and technical assistance via the EDF 
mechanism. The EU has also acted as a template of successful regionalism to 
be emulated by West Africa, and there is certainly a degree of institutional 
isomorphism, not least in the design of the Commission and its role in trade 
negotiations. While the EU does exert a (mild) disintegrative influence on West 
Africa through the provision of differentiated trading options such as EBA and 
interim EPAs, and there is some evidence of divisive negotiating strategies, it is 
not enough to significantly undermine actorness. The EU’s influence has been 
generally beneficial to the actorness of ECOWAS, building the capacity of regional 
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institutions, and providing greater incentives for intra-regional cooperation than 
might otherwise be the case. This has (indirectly) led to the European Commission 
having to make more concessions in EPA negotiations with West Africa than it 
may originally have expected.
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6.1  Introduction 
The EU is Southern Africa’s largest trading partner, with trade with South Africa 
accounting for the bulk of EU imports and exports (European Commission 2015). 
Similar to ECOWAS, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
consists of 15 member states (see Figure 6.1) and is a recipient of European 
Development Funding intended to promote regional cooperation and integration 
among member states. However the level of funding provided to SADC is much 
lower than that provided to West Africa. SADC’s level of integration also lags 
several steps behind that of ECOWAS. Regionalism in Southern Africa is 
characterized by a great deal of overlap. Although SADC is considered the region’s 
lead organization, several SADC states are also members of the Common Market of 
Southern and Eastern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC), 
and have opted to negotiate EPAs under different regional configurations (see 
Figure 6.2). Similar to West Africa, the SADC region encompasses a smaller 
organization with a higher level of integration. The Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU) consists of five members (all are also SADC members) that operate a 
common external tariff and monetary union among themselves. SACU restricts 
itself to economic matters and does not pursue a political agenda. Although there 
is no concrete plan to merge the two organizations, there are repeated assertions 
from heads of state that SACU should be the driving engine of future regional 
integration within SADC. For the same reason UEMOA’s coexistence with ECOWAS 
is not necessarily considered to be problematic for actorness, neither is SACU’s 
presence within SADC. However, the prevalence of various overlapping regional 
initiatives is certainly a problem for actorness and effectiveness. Overlap between 
SADC and COMESA contributed to the initial split in the SADC EPA Group at the 
outset of the EPA negotiations, which has prevented the SADC Secretariat taking a 
stronger role in the negotiations. 
As outlined in Chapter Three, regions with greater actorness are more likely to be 
effective in their interregional relations. Unfortunately the SADC Group’s level of 
actorness was very low, at least until mid-2010. Member state preferences were 
heterogeneous, and without regional institutions or effective leadership from 
South Africa or another member state, the region was often unable to formulate a 
coherent common position. South Africa certainly tried to fulfill the role of 
regional leader, but this was heavily contested by other states in the region until 
2010, when they had little choice to fall in line with the South African position or 
risk the disintegration of SACU. 
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As a result of this lack of internal cohesion, the SADC Group’s effectiveness in 
obtaining concessions was relatively low, especially in the 2004-2010 period. The 
group became more effective post-2010, but the concessions won are more a 
reflection of South African interests than regional ones. In total, the SADC group 
was (partially) effective in obtaining concessions on six out of eight key negotiation 
issues, and only moderately effective on its two most important issues: agricultural 
market access and the harmonization of the disparate trade regimes within the 
region. This is a somewhat surprising outcome, given that the SADC Group is 
composed of economically stronger and more developed states than those found in 
West Africa, but is explainable in terms of the region’s low degree of internal 
cohesion. 
The SADC Group’s lack of actorness is explainable partly in terms of the overlapping 
initiatives prevalent in the region, a factor which the EU’s behaviour certainly 
inflamed, but also in terms of the EU’s disintegrative influence on the region. 
Although the EU does provide material incentives in favour of regional cooperation 
Figure 6.1  Map of SADC Region
Source: Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 2008
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and integration, these are not sufficient to overcome the incentives to defect 
from regional cooperation in favour of bilateral cooperation with the EU via 
differentiated trading options. It is South Africa’s pre-existing FTA with the EU 
that has contributed to its self-interested behaviour in the negotiations. Furthermore, 
the SADC Group’s obvious lack of cohesion made it easier for European negotiators 
to deploy divisive negotiating tactics, inflaming intra-regional divisions and 
further reducing the group’s actorness. The result is sub-optimal agreement that 
is not particularly conducive to the future of regional integration in Southern 
Africa.  
6.2  SADC Actorness
This section explores SADC’s actorness in relation to the EPAs. Each component of 
actorness is assessed at a general level before focusing on the component in relation to 
trade. An analysis of SADC’s identity, formal and informal institutions, preference 
Figure 6.2  Overlapping Regionalism in Southern Africa
Source: Lorenz 2012
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homogeneity, and regional capabilities indicates that the region’s trade actorness 
in relation to the EPAs has remained low. SADC has a strong identity rooted in the 
shared experience of the Liberation era. Although this identity contributes to a 
strong sense of regime solidarity and political community at elite level, it also 
inhibits the delegation of authority to the regional level, as states are loath to give 
up their hard won sovereignty. For similar historical reasons, South Africa, the 
regional power, is constrained in exercising regional leadership. The differences 
in member states’ economic development mean that they have disparate trade 
preferences vis-à-vis agreements with external powers. Without strong regional 
institutions to mediate and amalgamate member state preferences, preference 
convergence in the region has remained low. Combined with a relatively small 
budget and limited evolution of instruments for external action, SADC is 
characterized by a weak degree of actorness. 
SADC Identity 
The history of SADC is key to understanding its present day organizational culture 
and operations. SADC’s roots lie in the Frontline States (FLS), an organization 
formed in 1970 by the region’s independent and majority-ruled states, with the 
aim to facilitate the liberation of neighbouring states still under colonial or 
minority-rule.32 Relations between the FLS and Western countries were somewhat 
strained throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. The liberation movements were 
considered alarmingly revolutionary and anti-Western by the US and UK. 
Apparently perceiving the Apartheid government as a bastion against the spread 
of Communism in the region, for many years the US, UK and Germany refrained 
from condemnation of the Apartheid regime, a historical fact the region’s elites 
have not forgotten (Thompson 2000). In 1980, after Zimbabwe’s transition to 
majority-rule, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
(SADCC) was formed. The FLS remained as a separate but parallel institution that 
continued to provide support to the liberation movements in South Africa. SADCC 
served both local interests, as its primary objective was to mobilize development 
assistance to the region as part of the anti-Apartheid struggle (Söderbaum 2004); 
as well as western interests, who wanted to maintain regional stability without 
compromising their political and economic ideology (Adelmann 2008). SADCC 
was fairly successful in its aim to mobilize development assistance throughout the 
1980s (Adelmann 2008). However the aim of reducing economic dependence on 
32 The founding members of the FLS were Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia, 
with Tanzania playing a key role in the organization. The Portuguese colonies of Angola and 
Mozambique joined in 1975 after achieving independence through armed insurrection. Zimbabwe 
joined in 1980 after 15 years of civil war between the white minority government and revolutionary 
liberation movements, which were supported by the FLS.    
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South Africa was not met, as neighbouring countries were too enmeshed in 
regional trade networks dominated and controlled by South Africa. With the end 
of the Cold War and Apartheid in sight, in 1992 SADCC was transformed into 
SADC. Relations with the formally hostile South Africa were normalized, and the 
‘New South Africa’ became a member of SADC in 1995.
In total, five SADC countries experienced violent armed struggle to achieve 
independence or majority-rule. Liberation parties have ruled these five countries 
– Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia, Angola and Mozambique – ever since. 
Neighbouring states provided assistance and safe havens for exiled Liberation 
leaders, many of whom went on to become the ‘Founding Fathers of SADC’. The 
influence of the Liberation era on today’s SADC is strong. The Liberation era is of 
such importance to the region that from 2005 to 2014 SADC funded the Hashim 
Mbita project, a large research project dedicated to documenting Southern Africa’s 
liberation struggles through the collection of oral histories and other data, both 
within Southern African and beyond. More than a quarter of Summit speeches 
from the 2000-2010 period reference the Liberation struggles in some way, usually 
in the same breath as the importance of unity and solidarity.
Paying tribute to the Liberation struggles and the Founding Fathers is something 
of a convention at Summit meetings, amongst ‘core’ and ‘outsider’ states alike (see 
Table 6.1).33 As some of the excerpts illustrate, the liberation era’s anti-imperialist 
and anti-Western sentiment is still fairly prevalent among SADC elites. Summit 
speeches often contain denunciations of unfair terms of trade, the debt burden 
placed on Southern African states by international financial institutions, 
(Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa 2004; South African President Jacob Zuma, 
2009) and ‘neo-colonial tendencies’ (Namibian President Sam Nujoma, 2004). The 
influence of the Liberation era has carried through to the present day organizational 
identity of SADC. Hard and recently won sovereignty makes Southern African 
governments reluctant to surrender it to regional integration (Nathan 2012). 
Beyond the rhetorical gestures of solidarity, southern African states are not 
prepared to share sovereignty because of the region’s history, in which SADCC/
SADC was conceived as a collective attempt to defend the sovereignty of individual 
states from Apartheid-era destabilization (Vale 2003: 122).34 Accordingly, the 
33 The ‘outsider’ states are those that were not original members of the FLS or SADCC, nor otherwise 
involved in the region’s Liberation struggles, only joining SADC in later years. These are the island 
nations of Mauritius (joined 1995), the Seychelles (joined 1997), Madagascar (joined 2006), and the 
DRC (joined 1997).
34 In order to create a zone of politically compliant surrounding states, the Apartheid regime pursued 
a destabilization policy vis-à-vis neighbouring states, which involved the backing of rebel groups 
in Angola and Mozambique, the occupation of Namibia, military incursions into Botswana and 
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Amended Treaty of 2001 and key policy documents such as the Regional Indicative 
Strategic Development Plan and Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ emphasize 
the ‘sovereign equality of all states’. ‘Political independence’ and ‘non-interference 
in the affairs of other states’ (SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security 
Cooperation 2001) are the other key norms guiding regional cooperation and have 
directly influenced the formalized decision-making structures institutionalized 
within SADC, which are strictly intergovernmental.
SADC’s Formal and Informal Institutions
SADC is an entirely intergovernmental organization. Indeed, SADC Heads of State 
(known as the Summit, and the organization’s ultimate authority) were so 
reluctant to grant authority to the regional level that until 2001 SADC was entirely 
decentralized. Instead of maintaining a Secretariat, each member state was 
granted responsibility for a particular sector, with the sector being run from 
within the member state’s national ministries. This proved to be inefficient, as the 
effectiveness of each sector was highly dependent on the resources a member state 
was willing to devote to it (Former SADC Official, 7th September 2011) and the vast 
majority of SADC programmes had a strongly national character, with only a 
minority having a regional character in line with the strategic goals of SADC 
(SADC Secretariat 2001). To rectify this inefficiency, in 2001 SADC’s institutional 
structure was improved and strengthened with a major reform, which centralized 
the organization into a regional secretariat located in Gaborone, Botswana. 
However it remains a weak institution with little formal autonomy (van der 
Vleuten and Hulse 2013: 167).
These institutional weaknesses have been apparent in the EPA negotiation 
structure. At the outset the SADC configuration opted for an intergovernmental 
negotiating framework. Botswana was designated the overall coordinator of the 
SADC Group, while each member state was assigned a negotiation issue to 
coordinate (see Table 6.2). The SADC Secretariat was allowed only a minor 
administrative role.  
The Joint SADC-EU Roadmap (2004) sets out the framework for the negotiations. 
A three-tiered negotiating structure of technical experts, senior officials and chief 
negotiators was set up (see Figure 6.3), but the negotiating team was made up of 
officials from national ministries, rather than regional officials. The bottom tier 
of the SADC EPA group’s negotiating structure consisted of three technical 
working groups: one for market access, one for trade in services and one for 
Lesotho, and economic embargoes against landlocked Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana.    
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Table 6.1   References to Liberation struggles in SADC speeches
SADC is rooted in Struggle, from which we have much to learn…the first lesson is unity. Without 
unity the armed struggle would have buckled in the face of the superior weaponry of our erstwhile 
enemies. And today, as we wage the struggle to carve for ourselves a place at the table of a global 
economy, we must remain united (Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa, 2002) 
I would be failing in my duty if I did not pay tribute…to the liberation struggle of the countries of 
the region, a contribution that will… be remembered with deep emotion and gratitude (Prime 
Minister of Mauritius, Anerood Jugnauth, 26 August 2003)
Namibia is indebted to the…Members of the Frontline States…who provided not only rear bases, but 
also diplomatic, political and material support towards our struggle for freedom and 
independence… Dr. Kenneth Kaunda and Comrade Robert Mugabe deserve special mention for 
their selfless commitment towards the total liberation of Southern Africa from foreign occupation, 
as leaders of the Frontline States at a critical stage in the history of the region (President of 
Namibia, Sam Nujoma, 17 August 2004)
It is important that at this opening ceremony we all pay tribute to the founding fathers of SADC…
Your Excellency President Robert Gabriel Mugabe, you did it all for us, thank you! It was fitting that 
you had the foresight to do it as the advent of freedom and democracy in Zimbabwe 25 years ago is 
specially linked to the birth of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
(President of Botswana, Festus Mogae, 17 August 2005)
Allow me also to salute our Founding Fathers for their tireless efforts in bringing about political 
solidarity and a sense of regional identity for which SADC is renowned (SADC Executive 
Secretary, Prega Ramsamy, 17 August 2005)
Only an effective regional economic integration will…allow us to face the dramatic legacy that our 
countries inherited from the past...[including] the permanent destabilization imposed by those 
interested in perpetuating the exploitation of our peoples and the riotous pillage of our riches 
(President of Angola, Eduardo dos Santos, 17 August 1999). 
There is much for which we can blame rich industrialized countries for the unfairness and inequity 
of globalization…these include unfair rules, applied unfairly. They include frustrations with policies 
and attitudes of institutions of global governance, whose genesis goes back to the post-war era 
when all of our countries were not participants in international dialogue… We are tired of being 
lectured on democracy by the very countries, which under colonialism, either directly denied us the 
rights of free citizens, or were indifferent to our suffering and yearning to break free and be 
democratic (President of Tanzania, Benjamin Mkapa, 16 August 2004)
The strategy of ‘divide and rule’ that was adopted in the colonial era of our history is still prevalent 
today and comes in various subtle forms. None of us can single handedly face the industrialized 
counties and come out winning…if we do not learn to close our ranks and work together as a 
community should, we stand the risk of continued exploitation (President of Malawi, Bingu wa 
Mutharika, 16 August 2004)
Above all, we should not compromise with the forces that have a hostile agenda of neo-colonial 
tendencies. We must guard our national sovereignties so as to ensure genuine economic development 
(President of Namibia, Sam Nujoma, 17 August 2004)
Source: SADC Summit and Council Records, 2000-2010
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unresolved issues. The technical working groups reported to the Senior Officials, 
who were tasked with formulating a common SADC position to take to the 
negotiating table. Led by an official from Botswana’s Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, the Senior Officials bore the bulk of the negotiating responsibility. The 
highest level of the negotiating structure was the ministerial level. In theory, 
ministers of the SADC EPA Group were to meet when there was a need to give 
strategic or political guidance to the negotiators. They also met with their 
European counterparts when there was a need for political guidance or when 
negotiations reached an impasse. In theory, decisions at this level should have 
reflected those made at lower levels, but in practice this did not happen, ‘as 
political supremacy controlled the negotiating process’ and national interests 
dominated the process (McCarthy et al. 2007: 12; Lorenz and Cornelissen 2011).
The Roadmap made provision for both a SADC EPA Unit and a Regional Preparatory 
Task Force (RPTF) to support the negotiations. In theory the EPA Unit was supposed 
to lead the technical experts level, but there is little evidence to suggest that the 
Unit did anything other than provide secretarial duties. Granted an initial three 
years of funding by the EU, the EPA Unit was institutionalized within the SADC 
Secretariat at the start of the negotiations in 2004. It was staffed by officials 
seconded from the SADC EPA Group, but at the end of the Unit’s mandate the 
Table 6.2   SADC states areas’ of responsibility
State Area of responsibility 
Lesotho Rules of origin
Lesotho Legal and institutional issues
SADC Secretariat Database
Angola Agriculture
Angola and Mozambique Fisheries
Botswana SPS and standards
Namibia Development cooperation
Namibia Trade facilitation
Mozambique Non agricultural market access
Tanzania* Services
Tanzania* Investment and completion policy 
Swaziland Other trade related issues
* Tanzania left the SADC EPA group in 2007 
Source: McCarthy, Kruger and Fourie (2007)
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negotiations were still on-going. Funding was no longer available after the initial 
three-year period and the seconded officials returned home. A proposal was made 
to permanently integrate the EPA Unit into SADC’s Trade, Industry and Finance 
Directorate was made, but this was rejected by member states (SACU Official, 
Windhoek, 24th June 2013). For almost a year the Unit was inoperable due to a lack 
of funding, and during this period the SACU Secretariat took over the role of 
coordinating and providing secretarial support to the negotiations. Funding was 
finally restored in 2008, but the Unit’s capacity was much reduced, to just two staff 
members: one for technical support and one for secretarial support. Lacking any 
substantive mandate to negotiate on behalf of the SADC EPA Group, its role was 
primarily administrative: it organized meetings and helped member states to 
identify capacity-building needs and facilitating training to meet those needs. The 
Figure 6.3  SADC EPA negotiating structure
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Unit continued to rely on funding from the EU for its operations, which was 
perceived as problematic in two respects. Firstly, inconsistency of funding was 
identified as a hindrance to the Unit’s capacity (SADC EPA Unit Official, Gaborone, 
11th July 2013). Secondly, there was a perception within SADC and the national 
ministries that EU funding of the Unit created an obligation to go along with the 
EU position or risk losing funding (SACU Official, Windhoek, 24th June 2013; 
Namibia Agricultural Trade Forum Official, Windhoek, 28th June 2013). On the 
other hand, others claim this perception was misplaced and in practice EU funding 
of the Unit did not directly compromise the autonomy of the SADC EPA group in the 
negotiations (SADC EPA Unit Official, Gaborone, 11th July 2013). However they did 
concede that it created a degree of indirect pressure. As negotiations continued to 
drag on, the EU may be inclined to withdraw their financial support for the 
negotiations, putting pressure on southern African stakeholders to conclude. 
Overall the Unit appears to have consistently lacked both resources and influence 
(McCarthy et al. 2007: 12). The Unit had an uneasy relationship with the national 
ministries as Ministers tended to give preference to domestic concerns and 
information (Lorenz and Cornelissen 2011: 248), and relations were characterized 
by a ‘general sense of distance and lack of understanding as to what exactly the 
EPA Unit is doing’ (McCarthy et al. 2007: 12). More recent interviews (in 2013) 
supported this view, with respondents characterizing the Unit as ‘not being that 
strong or having the capacity to support the SADC member states’ (Department of 
Trade and Industry Official, Pretoria, 31st July 2013). Some negotiators were not 
even entirely certain whether the Unit continued to exist or not (EPA Negotiator, 
Windhoek, 27th June 2013; Namibia Agricultural Trade Forum Official, Windhoek, 
28th June 2013). 
The Joint SADC-EU Roadmap also made provision for a Regional Preparatory 
Taskforce (RPTF), which was intended to enforce the strategic link between EPA 
negotiations and development cooperation by encouraging the developmental 
aspect of the EPA by asking relevant civil society stakeholders to identify areas in 
which the EU could provide support to facilitate trade. However its existence did 
not lead to effective support for the negotiations, with some stakeholders 
identifying it as ‘unnecessary’ and a ‘pseudo-forum’ (Lorenz and Cornelissen 2011: 
249). In recent years the Taskforce was inactive, and not ‘given the attention it 
deserved’, with unclear terms of references and lack of capacity at the EPA Unit 
identified as reasons for its inactivity (SADC EPA Unit Official, Gaborone, 11th July 
2013). Instead, member states were tasked with the responsibility for consulting 
with the relevant civil society groups and formulating a national position before 
coming to the regional level (EPA Negotiator, Windhoek, 27th June 2013). Some 
countries were better than others in consulting civil society, and despite the 
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provisions of the Joint Roadmap, in practice there was no real regional platform 
for civil society engagement with the EPA negotiations. Ultimately, SADC had very 
little institutional capacity at the regional level for handling trade relations and 
negotiations with external parties. Regional bodies were either defunct (the RPTF) 
or tasked with clerical duties (the EPA Unit). Capacity at the SADC Secretariat was 
so weak in relation to the EPAs that in 2008 the SACU Secretariat in Windhoek 
stepped in to help coordinate the process (SACU Official, Windhoek, 24th June 
2013), and continued to play a significant role in the process, although ultimately 
all formal decision-making remained in the hands of national officials.
On an informal level, one might expect South Africa to play an important role in 
regional decision-making, and while it is certainly influential, one might question 
whether its role is truly one of beneficial leadership, especially when it comes to 
trade matters. South Africa is indisputably the de facto, if ‘reluctant’ hegemon of 
the region (Vickers 2011: 185). South Africa has ambitions to continental and 
regional leadership, as evidenced by its promotion of ‘big ideas’ such as the African 
Renaissance and NEPAD; 35 the fiercely fought election of prominent South African 
diplomat Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to the position of Chairperson of the AU; the 
broadening of SADC’s security agenda (Alden and Le Pere 2009), and the recent 
establishment of the South African Development Partnership Agency. However 
South Africa’s ambitions of political leadership remain unrealized. Due to its 
economic size and level of development, South Africa has cache as an ‘African 
leader’ in international circles such as the G8 and G20, but within Africa itself 
South Africa’s soft power, through the attraction of ‘big ideas’ like NEPAD and the 
African Renaissance, is not only limited, but in some places actively viewed with 
suspicion, due to a historical mistrust of South African hegemony and economic 
dominance (Alden and Le Pere 2009). South Africa pursues a moralistic foreign 
policy, promoting human rights, democracy, peace and stability, but not when it 
comes to trade and economic affairs (Geldenhuys 2010). Indeed, in 1998 Foreign 
Affairs Minister Jackie Selebi stated that ‘South Africa can raise questions of 
human rights without any inhibitions. However, we will only be able to articulate 
respect for human rights if we separate human rights from questions of trade’ 
(quoted in Vickers 2003). 
South Africa certainly has a history of self-interested economic behaviour in 
Southern Africa. The legacy of colonial and Apartheid-era economic policy continues 
to benefit South Africa at the expense of neighbouring states. This legacy finds 
35 The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), the brainchild of Thabo Mbeki, and 
Olusegun Obasanjo, is an economic development programme that has been adopted by the African 
Union.   
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expression in SACU, the world’s oldest customs union. It was established in 1910 
when the British colony of the Union of South Africa signed an agreement with the 
British protectorates of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland.36 At the time 
the guiding principle was that the protectorates would eventually be integrated 
into the Union of South Africa, so for much of the pre-Independence era they were 
governed as if they were already part and parcel of the South African economy. In 
1969 the SACU Agreement was renegotiated after Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland 
(known as the BLS) gained their independence. Politically, these newly independent 
states were opposed to the Apartheid regime, but highly integrated into and 
dependent on the South African economic system. From the other side, the 
Apartheid government had a vested interest in maintaining access to these 
markets and retaining some degree of political control over their neighbours 
through SACU. The 1969 Agreement did grant the BLS a larger share of the revenue 
generated by the common external tariff, but in practice South African dominance 
of SACU was maintained. South Africa retained the right to unilaterally determine 
tariffs, which led to economic development at the expense of the BLNS, and 
unilaterally negotiate trade agreements with third parties. After the end of 
Apartheid it was decided to again renegotiate the SACU Agreement in order to 
update and democratize it. Negotiations began in 1994 and lasted eight years, with 
the new Agreement signed in 2002, entering into force in 2004 and implementation 
beginning in 2007. During the same period, South Africa entered into negotiations 
with the European Union for a Free Trade Area, without consulting the BLNS. The 
SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) was signed in 
1999, while the 1969 SACU Agreement was still in place, meaning that SA’s 
unilateral FTA with the EU was within the letter of the law, if not the spirit. The 
TDCA effectively forced the BLNS into a free trade agreement with the EU, 
something they had not consented to, and in the case of Lesotho, which is a Least 
Developed Country, the EU’s own guidelines should not allow. This was problematic 
for the BLNS as it allowed European goods into their markets ‘through the back 
door’, something they were ‘obviously not happy about’ (SACU Official, Windhoek, 
24th June 2013). As the cost and difficultly of implementing internal border controls 
to distinguish between European and South African goods was too great, the BLS 
have formally granted European goods the same treatment as South African 
goods, while Namibia has given de facto recognition. Signing the TDCA was 
perceived by the BLNS as a self-interested move on South Africa’s part. Even with 
the new SACU Agreement in place and in the process of implementation, South 
Africa is still perceived as a self-interested actor that blocks the implementation of 
36 Although its roots can be traced as far back to the 1889 Customs Union Convention signed between 
the British Colony of the Cape of Good Hope and the Orange Free State Boer Republic (Gibb 1997: 
67-86). 
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policies and institutions (such as a tariff board and Tribunal) designed to make the 
agreement fairer for the BLNS (SACU Official, Windhoek, 24th June 2013). South 
Africa’s tardiness in signing and ratifying the SADC Trade Protocol has also 
contributed to perceptions of SA as a self-interested economic actor. Bowing to 
pressure from trade unions and local industries, which did not want to compete 
with cheaper imports from neighbouring countries, it took South Africa four 
years to ratify the Trade Protocol, which had already been signed by 11 other 
members in 1996, and thus blocking the implementation of liberalized 
intra-regional trade. This irritated other SADC members and further damaged 
SA’s reputation regarding leadership on trade and economic matters (Weiland, 
2005: 191). Whatever leadership South Africa does display in the trade realm tends 
to be perceived as being more about capturing a greater market share for the 
competitive sectors of its economy, rather than promoting genuine economic 
development in the rest of the region. So while South Africa certainly has both the 
ability and willingness to lead the region on trade matters, neighbouring states 
perceive South Africa as a self-interested actor that does not have their best 
interests at heart, and as a result, South Africa’s attempts at regional leadership 
are heavily contested.  
Member states’ initial preferences on trade policy 
SADC member states’ preferences regarding trade policy are quite heterogeneous. 
The 15 members of SADC are characterized by differing levels of development and 
industrialization (see Table 6.3). It includes South Africa, an industrialized, 
upper-middle income country with a well-developed manufacturing sector; 
Swaziland and Lesotho, two tiny economies heavily dependent on inputs from 
neighbouring countries; exporters of raw commodities such as the DRC and 
Angola; and several states reliant on agricultural exports (Namibia, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe). Eight out of fifteen are Least Developed Countries. This heterogeneity 
among member states, combined with the degree of overlapping regionalism 
found in southern Africa, contributed to a major split in the SADC Group at the 
outset of the negotiations, when seven SADC members opted to negotiate with the 
EU under other regional configurations, instead of the SADC framework. The DRC 
opted to negotiate as part of the Central African configuration, while Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, the Seychelles, Zambia and Zimbabwe, who are also all members 
of COMESA, opted to negotiate as part of the Eastern and Southern Africa 
configuration.  
Opinions on whether this initial split was driven by a political or an economic 
logic are mixed. The most commonly cited factor was the overlapping membership 
and institutional rivalry between SADC and COMESA (SACU Official and EPA 
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Negotiator, Windhoek, 27th June 2013; EPA Negotiator, Pretoria, 25th July 2013; 
Department of Trade and Industry Official, Pretoria, 31st July 2013). COMESA is a 
more trade-orientated organization than politically-minded SADC, so states may 
have felt they would receive better support from the COMESA Secretariat. The 
second most commonly cited reason was the concern that South Africa would join 
Table 6.3  SADC Member States
Country Developmental Status
(UN)
Regime Type 
(Polity IV)
GNI, PPP per capita (World 
Bank 2012) 
Main exports
(CIA Factbook) 
Top 3 Export Partners, 2013*
(Observatory of Economic Complexity) 
Angola LDC Closed anocracy 5,490 crude oil, diamonds, refined petroleum 
products, coffee, sisal, fish 
China, USA, India
Botswana Developing Country Democracy 15,880 diamonds, copper, nickel, soda ash, meat, 
textiles
No data 
DRC LDC Open anocracy 370 diamonds, copper, gold, cobalt, wood products, 
crude oil, coffee
China, Zambia, Italy
Lesotho LDC Democracy 2,210 manufactures (clothing, footwear), wool and 
mohair, cattle
No data
Madagascar LDC Open anocracy 950 coffee, vanilla, shellfish, sugar, cotton cloth, 
clothing, chromite, petroleum
France, USA, China, Germany 
Malawi LDC Democracy 880 Tobacco, tea, sugar, cotton, coffee, peanuts, 
wood products, apparel
Canada, South Africa, China
Mauritius Small Island Developing State Democracy 15,820 clothing and textiles, sugar, cut flowers, 
molasses, fish
UK, France, Italy
Mozambique LDC Open anocracy 1,020 aluminium, prawns, cashews, cotton, sugar, 
citrus, timber; bulk electricity
South Africa, Netherlands, India
Namibia Developing Country Democracy 7,390 diamonds, copper, gold, zinc, lead, uranium; 
cattle, processed fish, 
No data
Seychelles Small Island Developing State No data 25,760 canned tuna, frozen fish, cinnamon bark,  
copra, re-exported petroleum 
France, UK, Italy
South Africa Developed/Developing Country Democracy 11,190 gold, diamonds, platinum, other metals and 
minerals, machinery 
China, USA, UK 
Swaziland Developing Country Autocracy 4,840 soft drinks, sugar, wood pulp, cotton yarn, 
refrigerators, canned fruit
No data
Tanzania LDC Open anocracy 1,590 gold, coffee, cashew nuts, manufactures, cotton South Africa, India, China 
Zambia LDC Democracy 1,620 copper, cobalt, electricity; tobacco, flowers, 
cotton
Switzerland, China, DRC
Zimbabwe Developing Country Open anocracy No data platinum, cotton, tobacco, gold, ferroalloys, 
textiles/clothing
South Africa, China, Mozambique
Note: shaded areas denote SADC EPA Group member state
*no data available for the small SACU states
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the negotiations, and the TDCA would become the baseline from which the EPA 
would be negotiated, a level of ambition many SADC states were not comfortable 
with (EPA Negotiator, Pretoria, 25th July 2013; EPA Negotiator, Skype interview, 20th 
August 2014). Related to this is the economic rivalry and balancing between the 
larger African economies, particular South Africa, Kenya, and Zimbabwe (which 
Table 6.3  SADC Member States
Country Developmental Status
(UN)
Regime Type 
(Polity IV)
GNI, PPP per capita (World 
Bank 2012) 
Main exports
(CIA Factbook) 
Top 3 Export Partners, 2013*
(Observatory of Economic Complexity) 
Angola LDC Closed anocracy 5,490 crude oil, diamonds, refined petroleum 
products, coffee, sisal, fish 
China, USA, India
Botswana Developing Country Democracy 15,880 diamonds, copper, nickel, soda ash, meat, 
textiles
No data 
DRC LDC Open anocracy 370 diamonds, copper, gold, cobalt, wood products, 
crude oil, coffee
China, Zambia, Italy
Lesotho LDC Democracy 2,210 manufactures (clothing, footwear), wool and 
mohair, cattle
No data
Madagascar LDC Open anocracy 950 coffee, vanilla, shellfish, sugar, cotton cloth, 
clothing, chromite, petroleum
France, USA, China, Germany 
Malawi LDC Democracy 880 Tobacco, tea, sugar, cotton, coffee, peanuts, 
wood products, apparel
Canada, South Africa, China
Mauritius Small Island Developing State Democracy 15,820 clothing and textiles, sugar, cut flowers, 
molasses, fish
UK, France, Italy
Mozambique LDC Open anocracy 1,020 aluminium, prawns, cashews, cotton, sugar, 
citrus, timber; bulk electricity
South Africa, Netherlands, India
Namibia Developing Country Democracy 7,390 diamonds, copper, gold, zinc, lead, uranium; 
cattle, processed fish, 
No data
Seychelles Small Island Developing State No data 25,760 canned tuna, frozen fish, cinnamon bark,  
copra, re-exported petroleum 
France, UK, Italy
South Africa Developed/Developing Country Democracy 11,190 gold, diamonds, platinum, other metals and 
minerals, machinery 
China, USA, UK 
Swaziland Developing Country Autocracy 4,840 soft drinks, sugar, wood pulp, cotton yarn, 
refrigerators, canned fruit
No data
Tanzania LDC Open anocracy 1,590 gold, coffee, cashew nuts, manufactures, cotton South Africa, India, China 
Zambia LDC Democracy 1,620 copper, cobalt, electricity; tobacco, flowers, 
cotton
Switzerland, China, DRC
Zimbabwe Developing Country Open anocracy No data platinum, cotton, tobacco, gold, ferroalloys, 
textiles/clothing
South Africa, China, Mozambique
Note: shaded areas denote SADC EPA Group member state
*no data available for the small SACU states
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at that stage still had a decent economy); ‘each fearing domination of the one over 
the other’ (SACU Official and EPA Negotiator, Windhoek, 27th June 2013). Finally, 
some claim the EU ‘nudged’ countries towards particular configurations ‘through 
subtle directives, promises of development aid, the way the European Development 
Fund would be dispersing finance, not to regional economic communities that 
exist as building blocks of the African Union, but through regional communities 
reconfigured in terms of the EPAs’ (Department of Trade and Industry Official, 
Pretoria, 31st July 2013; see also Tandon 2009). In 2007, South Africa joined the 
SADC Group, a decision that ‘made it clear that the other SADC members – 
especially Zimbabwe and Zambia – would never join the group’ (SACU Official and 
EPA Negotiator, Windhoek, 27th June 2013). Tanzania left shortly afterwards to 
negotiate as part of the newly formed East African Community configuration. This 
left a final configuration of the five SACU members – South Africa, Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland – plus Angola and Mozambique.37 The fact that 
half of SADC’s members preferred to negotiate outside of the SADC framework was 
a blow to the region’s overall actorness in the negotiations.  
Of the seven members of the SADC EPA Group, only three are LDCs. Outside of 
SACU, Angola and Mozambique are LDCs and former members of COMESA.38 
Angola is a post-conflict LDC that mainly exports oil and diamonds to the USA, 
China, and other emerging economies, and was not very involved in the 
negotiations (EPA Negotiator, Windhoek, 25th June 2013; SACU Official and EPA 
Negotiator, Windhoek, 27th June 2013). There is very little evidence of Angolan 
business groups or civil society getting involved in the EPA process, and as a closed 
anocracy one would assume they would hold little sway over government policy in 
any case. The country tended to side with the South African position mainly for 
undisclosed ‘political reasons’ (EPA Negotiator, Windhoek, 25th June 2013). 
Mozambique – although also an LDC – had very different preferences. The EU is its 
second biggest export market (after South Africa), and it could have maintained 
non-reciprocal access under EBA. However the Mozambican government is 
generally in favour of liberalization under the EPA, believing it to be the best way 
to develop their economy (EPA Negotiator, Windhoek, 27th June 2013). Mozambican 
trade unions, NGOs, and parliamentarians have not been very visible throughout 
the EPA process (Lorenz 2011; Kwa et al. 2014), hardly surprising given the country’s 
status as an open anocracy. 
37 Many observers referred to this configuration as ‘SACU+’, which is more representative of the 
actual membership of the group, but here I stick to the official terminology of ‘SADC EPA Group’. 
38 Mozambique left COMESA at South Africa’s behest in 1997. Angola left COMESA in 2007. 
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The SACU members have an interest in harmonizing their trade relations with 
external parties in order to maintain the integrity of their common external 
tariff. This is particularly important for Swaziland and Lesotho, both of which are 
heavily dependent on the revenue generated by SACU for day-to-day government 
operations. But given SACU members’ differing levels of development and indus-
trialization, they have different sensitive products and divergent preferences 
regarding external trade policy. Lesotho, as the only LDC within SACU, could 
benefit from EBA and in theory should not have felt under undue pressure to 
conclude an agreement. However the country’s clothing industry relies on inputs 
from South Africa, and the rules of origin under EBA are more restrictive than 
those under the EPA, and it found itself aligned with Swaziland and Botswana in 
its preference to sign an EPA sooner rather than later. Like Lesotho, Swaziland is 
also economically reliant on South Africa and the revenue generated by SACU. 
However unlike Lesotho it could not fall back on EBA in the event of no agreement, 
and was more interested in a quick conclusion to the EPAs. The country is one the 
world’s last remaining absolute monarchies, and civil society is weak, fragmented 
and unable to access and influence decision making procedures at national 
and local levels (Joubert et al. 2008: 85), while trade unions are perceived to be part 
of the opposition movement and subject to state repression (Stuart 2009). 
Unsurprisingly, domestic interest groups have little sway over the monarchy’s 
policy decisions. 
Botswana does not trade that much with the EU: its main exports are diamonds 
destined for the European Free Trade Area (World Factbook 2014), therefore it was 
not as invested in the EPA as states more dependent on exports to the EU (Munyi 
2014). The trade union movement in Botswana is not politically influential (Lorenz, 
2011), and the Botswana government has been criticized for excluding civil society 
and other non-state actors from the EPA process (Toka 2009). The Botswana 
government was already committed to a liberal development strategy prioritizing 
competitiveness in the international economy even prior to the introduction of 
EPAs (Murray-Evans 2015). The country was also united with Lesotho, and 
Swaziland in their shared dissatisfaction with the high cost of services imported 
from South Africa, and therefore in favour of introducing liberalization in services 
through the EPAs (Vickers 2011; Draper et al. 2007), putting them at odds with 
South African preferences. 
Namibian preferences were quite closely aligned with those of South Africa, with 
the notable distinction that it did not have an acceptable alternative to the EPA to 
fall back on. As an upper-middle-income country, failure to conclude an EPA in the 
allowed timeframe would result in Namibia falling back to the MFN regime, 
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incurring serious costs to its agricultural and fisheries sectors. Namibian civil 
society and business groups were well organized and vocal in their opposition to 
certain clauses in the EPA. Nangof, the umbrella organization for Namibian NGOs, 
voiced their concerns over certain clauses, including MFN, infant industry 
protection, and export taxes (Duddy 2009). Field research highlighted that in 
practice there is very close cooperation between (agricultural) interest groups and 
the state. In many instances representatives of national interest groups were also 
state-appointed EPA negotiators and were directly involved with negotiating with 
the EU, which fits with the assessment that state-society relations in Namibia are 
characterized by a ‘substantial degree of cooperation between the state and the 
private sector’ (Taylor, 2007: 203). 
Like the LDCs in the group, South Africa has always had the option of being able to 
fall back on its bilateral TDCA with the EU in the event of an unsatisfactory 
agreement. Unlike Namibia, Botswana, and Swaziland, South Africa had nothing 
to lose by participating in EPAs, only the opportunity to improve on the terms of 
the TDCA. South African business groups are well organized and represented at 
the national level and the state is generally responsive to business interests (Taylor 
2007). Likewise, civil society in South Africa is also well organized (Development 
Researchers Network et al. 2007), particularly the trade unions, which are 
politically influential. As part of South Africa’s governing tripartite, the Congress 
of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), has had extensive input, both formally 
and informally, in relation to the EPAs (Bilal and Laport 2004; Lorenz 2011).39 
While having a strong leftist opposition to liberalization, globalization and a 
general anti-EU sentiment, COSATU was in favour of SA joining the EPA group on 
grounds of regional solidarity, although strongly opposed to the inclusion of 
clauses regarding service liberalization (Lorenz 2011), while civil society groups 
such as the Southern Africa People’s Solidarity Network and the Southern African 
Christian Initiative were not opposed to the EPA per se, but were opposed to the 
inclusion of services and the EC’s demand for reciprocity (The Voice of Africa 2010). 
The South Africa government tends to prefer a protectionist foreign economic 
policy, favouring a sector-based industrial policy with potential tariff increases, a 
renewed emphasis on state-owned enterprises and retaining as much policy space 
as possible (Draper and Khumalo 2009). 
While the SADC group was united in their preferences for retaining as much 
policy space for agri-business and industrial development as possible, there was a 
39 The African National Conference has governed South Africa since 1994, supported by a strategic 
tripartite alliance with COSATU and the South African Communist Party.  
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major fault line regarding states’ preferences on service liberalization. South 
Africa was vigorously opposed due to its regionally strong but internationally 
uncompetitive services sector, while the other members of SACU favoured divers-
ification away from South African economic space through liberalization of the 
services and some import tariffs (Draper and Khumalo 2009).  The fault-line also 
reflected a divergence regarding economic ideology, with Namibia, Angola and 
South Africa favouring protectionist/leftist economic policies, while Botswana, 
Swaziland, Mozambique (and Lesotho, although to a lesser extent) bought into the 
liberal logic of the EPAs as presented by the EU (Murray-Evans 2015). The group’s 
intergovernmental decision-making structures and the lack of informal leadership 
throughout most of the negotiations made it difficult for the group to overcome 
their heterogeneous and at times conflicting preferences, negatively impacting 
actorness 
Capabilities 
SADC’s budget is made up partly by member state contributions, calculated 
according to their GDP, and partly by funding from International Cooperation 
Partners (ICPs). ICP contributions often make up over half of SADC’s budget (see 
Figure 6.4).40 SADC relies heavily on donor funds to cover the Secretariat’s operating 
costs, pay staff salaries and convene meetings (Saurombe, 2009), leading some to 
wonder whether SADC is uncritically adopting ‘donor-driven, neo-liberal policies’ 
that undermines its autonomy (SADC 2012). Overreliance on donor funds is 
considered a significant problem within SADC, and in recent years the Council of 
Ministers has repeatedly recommended the creation of a SADC Development Fund 
to reduce donor dependence. 
Regarding diplomatic tools, like other ACP regions, SADC does not have the 
capability to make credible threats and bribes in interregional trade negotiations 
with a more powerful actor such as the EC.41 SADC is not a member of the WTO in 
its own right and therefore cannot bring a case. In theory individual member 
states could bring a case on behalf of the region, and South Africa is one of the few 
African states with the financial, institutional and human capacity to actually 
make use of the court. South Africa has never actually initiated a case at the WTO, 
but it has received requests to participate at the consultative stage, all from other 
40 For example, the top four donors to the 2008 budget were: the EU (US$9 million); the African 
Development Bank (US$4.3 million); a consortium of donors going by the acronym JFTCA, including 
the Swedish International Development Association, Irish Aid, Netherlands, DFID and UNAIDS 
(US$1.5 million); and the World Bank (US$1.4 million) (SADC Record of the Council of Ministers 
Meeting 2007). 
41 Like the other African RECs, SADC has a military Standby Force that was established in 2007. 
However this is not relevant to SADC’s trade affairs.  
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developing countries. It has participated once as a third party in bringing a 
complaint to the court, but its capacity for following through remained ‘untested’ 
due to the suspension of the complaint (Zunckel and Botha 2012). Despite limited, 
mostly defensive participation in international trade litigation, for the most part 
South Africa suffers from the same entry barriers to international dispute 
settlement as other African countries, albeit to a lesser degree. 
In practice, SADC’s diplomatic toolbox is limited to instruments of socialization 
and persuasion. SADC has several avenues for formal diplomatic engagement with 
external actors, the most important of which are the annual Consultative 
Conference, intended to provide a platform for SADC, ICPs (including the European 
Commission and EU Member States), civil society, and the private sector to ‘engage 
in policy dialogue, forge consensus, and review progress of the integration agenda’ 
(Southern Africa Today 2008). The biennial Berlin Initiative allowed for political 
dialogue between the EU and SADC, although this has been inactive since 2008 
due to differences of opinion over the situation in Zimbabwe.42 The institutionaliz-
ation of other dialogue forums, such as the EU-Africa Partnership (since 2007), 
NEPAD, and the EU-South Africa Cooperation Council have also diverted 
42 The Consultative Conference has also suffered from tensions between SADC and ICPs over 
Zimbabwe, with ICPs pushing for enhanced political dialogue while SADC prefers a focus on 
technical questions surrounding aid effectiveness (Adelmann 2009).
Figure 6.4  SADC annual operating budget 2001-2012
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international diplomatic attention away from the Berlin Initiative, and arguably 
SADC itself (Brocza and Brocza 2011).
SADC makes efforts to coordinate the diplomatic positions of individual embassies 
in various strategic cities such as Addis Ababa, Geneva, Berlin, Brussels and Tokyo. 
For example, the Strategic Plan for the SADC Ambassadors to Berlin includes 
encouraging trade with the SADC region by advocating for market access for goods 
and services as one of its objectives (SADC Ambassadors’ Group to Germany 2008). 
The SADC Ambassadors in Brussels are integrated into SADC’s EPA negotiating 
structure at the level of Senior Officials, and were involved in lobbying activities 
related to the EPA negotiations, particularly as regards the removal of Market 
Access Regulation 1528. However, Martin Adelmann (2009) points out that the 
problem with these ambassadorial committees is the weak capacity of many 
member states’ embassies and the frequently divergent preferences of member 
states. Indeed, a 2012 report highlighted the limited coordination of SADC member 
states in Brussels and Geneva, the marginal role of the SADC Secretariat, and the 
weak collaboration between the SADC Secretariat and the ambassadorial missions 
in Geneva and Brussels (Trade and Development Studies Centre 2012).
Conclusion on SADC trade actorness 
With a cumulative actorness score of 7, SADC has displayed a relatively weak 
degree of actorness in relation to the EPAs (see Table 6.4), even despite its strong 
and distinctive sense of regional identity. Possibly this is because SADC’s identity, 
which is rooted in its political past, does not translate well to more ‘technocratic’ 
issues such as international trade, but mostly it is because SADC’s history and 
identity mean that member states are reluctant to surrender authority to the 
regional level. As a result, the SADC Secretariat has remained a weak and 
ineffectual organization, while all decision-making within the region is conducted 
on an intergovernmental and consensual basis. Also (partly) the result of history 
and identity, SADC suffers from a lack of regional leadership, especially in the 
economic realm. South Africa is the only state with the capacity to lead, but is 
perceived as a self-interested actor and its leadership is heavily contested by the 
other states in the region. Member states have heterogeneous preferences regarding 
the EPAs due to their differing levels of development, and the lack of effective 
formal and informal institutions in place for the EPA negotiations did nothing to 
overcome their divergent preferences. Combined with a moderate, donor-depend-
ent budget, and a limited toolbox of diplomatic instruments for external action, 
SADC was characterized by weak actorness throughout the course of the EPA 
negotiations. In fact, the divergent preferences and overall low actorness of SADC 
at times made it difficult (if not impossible) to identify a coherent ‘SADC negotiating 
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position’ vis-à-vis the EU. For a large chunk of the negotiations the group was 
characterized by shifting and competitive alliances between states (Lorenz 2011), 
making it more difficult to analyze the negotiations on an issue-by-issue basis. 
6.3  From Lack of Actorness to Patchy Effectiveness
Main issues in the SADC EPA
In the SADC Group, the most contentious issues in the EPA negotiations were 
market access, especially for agricultural goods; and the harmonization of the 
different trade regimes existing in the region, which meant an extensive debate 
on how South Africa should be treated in relation to its neighbours. Also important 
were the clauses on export taxes, the Most Favoured Nation clause, infant industry 
protection, the so-called ‘new generation’ issues, particularly service liberalization, 
agricultural safeguards and the rules of origin. Industry-related issues, such as 
export taxes and infant industry protection, were more salient in the SADC Group 
due to the region’s relatively high level of industrialization. Nevertheless, market 
access for agricultural goods was the most contentious issue during the 
negotiations due to South Africa’s strong offensive interests in improving access 
for its agricultural produce. This section is structured differently from the 
equivalent section in the previous chapter, as the shifting alliances, breakdowns 
Table 6.4   SADC actorness in relation to EPA negotiations
Aspect of actorness Qualitative assessment Numerical score
Identity Strong, but inhibits pooling  
of sovereignty  
2
Member state preferences Heterogeneous 1
Institutions Formal Operates on 
intergovernmental principles 
(unanimity and consensus) at 
a general level, negotiating 
machinery intergovernmental 
and somewhat dysfunctional 
1
Informal 
leadership 
Attempted leadership 
from SA, but contested by 
neighbouring states
1
Capabilities Budget Low and donor-dependent 1
Diplomatic 
instruments
 Diplomatic representation 
and  lobbying 
1
Cumulative score 7
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in the regional position, and pursuit of unilateral strategies by member states 
makes it difficult to present the analysis on an issue-by-issue basis that compares 
initial objectives with final outcomes. Instead I opt for a more chronological 
approach, to show how the region’s lack of actorness for a large part of the process 
hindered the emergence of common positions and effective negotiating strategies, 
and resulted in a high level of defections with almost-disastrous consequences. It 
was only from mid-2010 onwards that the SADC EPA Group was able to present an 
outwardly more unified front vis-à-vis the EU. With the forced acquiescence of the 
other states, South Africa took the helm and was able to extract some concessions 
from the EU, although these are more reflective of South African concerns than 
regional ones.   
Phases I and II of the negotiations: Struggling to formulate  
a common position 
From the very start of the negotiations the region was poorly organized, and it 
took some time for the SADC EPA configuration to emerge from the all-ACP phase 
of consultative negotiations. Southern African states were not enthusiastic about 
the prospect of interregional EPA negotiations, and expressed a preference for 
continuing on an all-ACP basis (Bilal 2002). The SADC Secretariat carried out 
several impact studies to prepare for interregional negotiations, but even as the 
deadline for Phase I of the negotiations loomed, southern African states were still 
undecided on their configuration and negotiating mechanisms (EPA Update 
August 2003). Finally, in October 2003, a SADC configuration of Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia, Swaziland, Mozambique, Angola and Tanzania emerged, with South 
Africa as an observer. The group produced some internal guidelines, agreeing to 
negotiate trade in goods in a first step, then trade in services in a second step.43  
EU-SADC Group negotiations were finally launched on 8th July 2004, almost a full 
year after the date scheduled for the start of Phase II. The SADC Group was the 
second-to-last region to launch negotiations with the EU, and SADC Trade Ministers 
acknowledged that the SADC Group was ‘behind schedule compared to other 
regions’ (Qualmann 2004; EPA Update Sept 2004). Despite the official commencement 
of the negotiations, for almost two years there was little substantial negotiation 
with the EU, as the region struggled with identifying priority areas, concrete 
negotiating objectives, and strategies for dealing with the region’s various 
overlapping regimes in conjunction with the EPA (EPA Update Nov 2004; EPA 
Update Sept/Oct 2005). The region struggled to formulate an internal position for 
43 The group at this point was one of the few ACP regions enthusiastic about the prospect of service 
liberalization under the EPAs. 
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so long partly due to the region’s high degree of overlap. Apart from the overlap 
between SADC and COMESA, which contributed to the initial split of the SADC 
membership into different EPA configurations, an additional problem within the 
SADC Group was the overlap between SACU, South Africa’s bilateral TDCA with 
the EU, and the proposed EPA.44 Under the TDCA, South Africa agreed to an overall 
level of liberalization of 85 percent of EU imports, while the EU reciprocated with 
95 percent liberalization on South African goods. However for agricultural goods, 
the level of liberalization on the South African side was 90 percent, and only about 
65 percent on the European side (EPA Negotiator, Pretoria, 25th July 2013). With the 
benefit of hindsight, the South Africans felt that they did not get a good deal on 
agricultural market access under the terms of the TDCA (EPA Negotiator, Pretoria, 
25th July 2013; Department of Trade and Industry Official, Pretoria, 31st July 2013; 
EPA Negotiator, Pretoria, 30th July 2013). As explained above, due to South Africa’s 
membership of SACU, the BLNS were granting de facto access to European goods 
under the terms of the TDCA, as they did not have the capacity to distinguish 
between South African and European goods at the border. European goods were 
already entering their markets without their consultation or permission, and 
without taking into account their domestic sensitivities. Introducing an EPA that 
excluded South Africa, the key member of SACU, created a number of problems on 
how to reconcile the proposed EPA with SACU’s external tariff and the TDCA, 
hence the long period of internal consultations.  
Finally in February 2006, almost two years after the start of Phase II of the 
negotiations, and with only ten months to go before the EPAs were supposed to 
conclude, the SADC EPA Trade Ministers adopted the EPA Strategic Framework in 
an attempt to harmonize the TDCA, Cotonou Agreement, and Everything But 
Arms regimes in order to create a single regime to govern trade relations between 
SADC and the EU. This Strategic Framework outlined a common regional position 
and contained several key objectives: 
44 It is worth pointing out that the TDCA was not South Africa’s preferred option for trading with the EU. 
After the end of Apartheid in 1994, the EU indicated that it wanted to support South Africa’s democratic 
transition with an economic relationship (South African Trade Official and EPA negotiator, 25 July 
2013). After national and regional consultations, the South African government suggested that the EU 
allow them to join the Lomé Convention, offering to forego access to European Development Funding 
in favour of benefitting from the same trade preferences as the rest of the ACP, which would aid the 
SADC Trade Protocol, under negotiation at the time (South African Trade Official and EPA negotiator, 
25 July 2013). The EU refused on the grounds of South Africa’s status as an industrialized, upper-middle 
income country, and instead proposed a bilateral trade agreement, the TDCA. The EU was South Africa’s 
largest export market at the time, and with no existing trade preferences, and no other options on the 
table, the South Africans felt they had little choice but to embark on negotiations for a bilateral deal. As 
South African negotiators pointed out, this detail is important, as the EU’s refusal to treat South Africa 
similarly to its ACP neighbours ‘in some ways set us up for the difficulties we’ve been facing’ (South 
African Trade Official and EPA negotiator, 25 July 2013). 
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1) South Africa to formally join the SADC EPA Group;
2) The TDCA to form the basis of the BLNS market access offers to the EU,  
but taking into account the sensitivities of the BLNS;
3) Market access for South Africa to move towards DFQF access over time;
4) LCDs to be exempt from reciprocal market access;
5) Full EBA access to the EU for all SADC member states from 2008 on; 
6) No binding commitments on new generation issues; 
7) Simplified rules of origin and full cumulation between SADC states, other ACP 
states, and all other countries that have signed a trade agreement with the EU 
(EPA Update, March/April 2006; Kamidza 2007) 
Although not formally a member of the group, South Africa was heavily involved 
in the formulation of the document. As an observer of the group, South African 
officials felt the negotiations were ‘not being organized in the best possible way… 
and it became clear that South Africa should play a bigger role in thinking through 
the negotiating approach of the SADC Group’ (South African Trade Official and 
EPA Negotiator, 25 July 2013). They were also concerned at the SADC Group’s 
apparent willingness to negotiate and make binding commitments on new 
generation issues, especially services, which would present a challenge to the 
regional dominance of South African services, so they stepped in to informally 
‘guide’ the Group. A mid-term review of the TDCA was coming up, and the South 
Africans saw an opportunity to join the EPA negotiations and pursue their interests 
under the EPA framework, including enforcing greater coherence on the region, 
improving the market access for their agricultural goods, and preventing the 
region from making binding commitments on service liberalization. 
The region presented their Framework to the EU in March 2006 at a meeting of 
Senior Officials. EU negotiators responded that although the proposals appeared 
to be WTO compatible, they ‘raised very complex political and economic issues 
which could set precedents for other EPA negotiations’ (EPA Update, July/August 
2006). The EU indicated that it would have to request an amended negotiating 
mandate from its member states in order to negotiate an EPA that included South 
Africa and modifications to the TDCA (EPA Update May/June 2006), and the SADC 
proposals remained ‘under consideration’ for over a year while the EU conducted 
internal consultations with member states, during which time negotiations 
between the SADC group and the EU were effectively suspended. Finally, at a 
meeting of Senior Officials in March 2007, the EU conceded to South Africa 
becoming a full member of the group and the modification of the TDCA to take 
account of the BLNS’ sensitivities, however they emphatically rejected any proposal 
of DFQF access for South Africa, and instead proposed differentiated market access 
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offers between South Africa and the rest of the SADC Group. The EU also agreed in 
principle on the need for simplified and more flexible rules of origin, but without 
putting forward any concrete proposals. The other proposals were rejected, with 
the EU insisting on reciprocity from LDCs and the inclusion of new generation 
issues, even going a step further and linking binding commitments on new 
generation issues to EPA-related development assistance (Kamidza 2007).  
Things Fall Apart 
The inclusion of South Africa in the group and modification of the TDCA certainly 
eased some of the region’s difficulties, but with most of the SADC Group’s other 
proposals on market access rejected, any semblance of a coherent regional position 
promptly fell apart. SADC Ministers were extremely frustrated with the long wait 
for the EU’s response, and by the time the response was given, there were only ten 
months left in which to actually conduct the negotiations before the deadline of 
December 2007. The non-LDCs were eager to have an EPA signed by the end of year 
for fear of disrupting their exports to Europe, and in the case of Botswana and 
Swaziland, were not particularly opposed to the proposed content of the EPA that 
was on the table at the time. On the other hand, South Africa (and to a lesser 
extent, Angola) was vehemently opposed to what was on the table and far from 
prepared to sign off on an agreement that included binding commitments on 
services and a whole host of clauses on export taxes, MFN, and other provisions 
which had been introduced at the last minute, on the day before the last round of 
negotiations scheduled for 2007 (South African Trade Official and EPA Negotiator, 
25 July 2013). In such a context, the region did not have time to formulate common 
positions on these issues, nor did they have a cohesive position on market access in 
place, and the round was conducted in a disorderly fashion (McCarthy 2008: 128). 
Nevertheless the BLS and Mozambique were inclined to sign up for the interim 
EPA. Namibia was more reticent, but an informal promise from European 
Commission President Manuel Barroso that unresolved issues could continue to be 
negotiated allayed Namibian concerns about initialing the EPA (Roux 2010). 
Ultimately, the SADC Group was unable to overcome its internal differences prior 
to the initial deadline of December 2007, and Phase II of the negotiations ended 
with five of the seven members – Botswana, Swaziland Lesotho, Mozambique and 
Namibia – initialling interim EPAs. Like South Africa and Angola, Namibia had 
deep reservations about the interim EPA, and only initialled the agreement on the 
understanding that doing so would avoid disrupting trade while negotiations on 
the contentious and unresolved issues, attached as an annex to the agreement, 
would continue in Phase III (Roux 2010). The interim EPA contained clauses 
restricting signatories’ use of export taxes and infant industry protection 
measures; an MFN clause granting the EU equal treatment to any third state with 
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a share of world trade of more than 1 percent; and a binding commitment to start 
negotiating on services in 2008. The initialling of the interim agreement caused a 
hugely contentious split in the group, with Angola, Namibia and South Africa (a 
coalition known as ANSA) on one side, and Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland (known 
as the BLS) and Mozambique on the other.  
Phase III of the negotiations (January 2008 – December 2009):  
Further Defections and a Region on the Brink 
SADC Ministers convened on 18 February 2008 to address the fallout from the 
interim EPAs. Amidst a fractious atmosphere, South Africa tried to convince the 
BLNS and Mozambique to back out of the interim EPA and start negotiations 
afresh, a proposal they resisted (EPA Update March 2008). Ten days later, Trade 
Commissioner Peter Mandelson arrived for a five-day tour of the region, during 
which he accused South Africa of obstructing the negotiations, and – contradicting 
Barroso’s promise at the EU-Africa Summit two months earlier – stated that 
renegotiation of commitments made in the interim EPAs was not an option 
(Hazelhurst 2008). Likewise, he told the European Parliament that any renegotiation 
of interim EPAs would be a ‘disaster’, and introduce a ‘renewed threat of legal 
uncertainty, and risk unraveling everything we have achieved’ (Sempere 2009: 8). 
However, an opinion by the European Parliament’s legal service declared that 
there was no legal prohibition on renegotiating the terms of interim EPAs. In 
response to Mandelson’s words, South African President Thabo Mbeki claimed 
that it was actually the interim EPAs that were an ‘obstacle’ to regional integration, 
and there should be greater flexibility from the EU to resolve the situation (EPA 
Update March 2008). South Africa and Angola added their signature to Namibia’s 
list of concerns, and the ANSA-list, as it came to be known, was submitted to the 
EU for consideration.45 In the meantime, Peter Mandelson resigned as Trade 
Commissioner, and was replaced by Catherine Ashton in October 2008, heralding 
a more conciliatory approach towards the SADC Group’s concerns.46 In a letter to 
Action for Southern Africa, dated 15 December 2008, Ashton wrote that 
45 The ANSA list of concerns included the SACU market access offer, the definition of ‘parties to the 
agreement’, the MFN clause, export taxes, infant industry protection, quantitative restrictions, 
food security, and the free circulation of goods in the region. 
46 The personality and approach of the Trade Commissioner was widely recognized as an important 
variable in the manner in which negotiations were conducted. During the Mandelson era 
(November 2004 – October 2008) the signing of EPAs was prioritized over that of preserving 
regional integration. This was the case for all ACP regions, but it was especially deleterious for the 
SADC Group due to many of them being non-LDCs and therefore susceptible to pressure to sign 
interim EPAs at the expense of regionalism. However the replacement of Peter Mandelson with 
Catherine Ashton heralded a more conciliatory approach to the negotiations from the EU and the 
re-prioritization of regional integration over the hasty conclusion of EPAs.
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Our objective remains to consolidate regional integration and if possible include South 
Africa in the EPA. To that effect we have started to negotiate the concerns expressed by 
South Africa, Namibia and Angola. Our objective is to reach agreement on all these issues 
that would be acceptable to the region as a whole, including those who have not raised 
these concerns (quoted in Roux 2010). 
The EU conceded that these contentious issues could be open to renegotiation, 
albeit in a parallel negotiation process. SADC and EU negotiators thus met for a 
key round of negotiations in March 2009, in Swakopmund, Namibia. Over two 
days, EU and SADC negotiators were able to agree on most of the unresolved issues, 
with only MFN, the definition of parties to the agreement, and the SACU market 
access offer outstanding (EPA Update 29 March 2009). Given this progress, both the 
EU and the BLS and Mozambique wished to move ahead with adding their 
signatures to the interim EPAs, text unchanged since the 2007 version they 
initialed, with the agreements reached at Swakopmund attached as annexes, until 
such time as an agreement on a ‘full’ EPA could be reached. The ANSA coalition 
were unhappy with this proposal as it meant there were no legal guarantees that 
the Swakopmund agreements would actually be included in the full and final EPA 
(Roux 2010). 
Despite South Africa and Namibia’s best efforts to convince them not to sign (EPA 
Negotiator, Pretoria, 30th July 2013), on the 4th of June 2009, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Swaziland and Mozambique signed the interim EPA, effectively breaking the 
recently introduced SACU rule that member states are not to sign agreements with 
third parties without the consent of all members. The signing of the interim EPA 
infuriated South Africa and Namibia, and aggravated the split within the group to 
such an extent that some observers predicted the break-up of SACU (Draper and 
Khumalo 2009). The signing of the interim EPA by the BLS is best explained as a 
Botswana-led power play against South Africa, motivated by a belief that interim 
EPAs would provide a counterweight to South Africa’s economic dominance of the 
region, and allow the BLS to introduce greater competition in service sectors 
dominated by South African companies (Murray-Evans 2015). This was a risky, 
even reckless, gamble on their behalf, as the disintegration of SACU would have 
resulted in an overnight loss of 25 percent of GDP for Lesotho, and 20 percent for 
Swaziland, with government revenue cut in half for both countries (Stern 2009). 
Unfortunately for the BLS, South Africa proved itself willing to play hardball. The 
South African Trade Minister threatened to introduce border controls with the 
BLS, ‘and if they have to do likewise, so be it’, while the country’s chief trade 
negotiator said that the distribution of the revenue generated by SACU may have 
to be reassessed: 
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The impact of this has not been thought through, but there could be implications for the 
customs pool and the way revenue is shared between members, because the pool functions 
on the assumption that the common external tariff is intact (quoted in Ensor and Le 
Roux 2009)
Note that the collection and distribution of SACU revenue is totally controlled by 
South Africa, as is most of the policing and enforcement of the CET, as the BLS do 
not actually have the capacity to enforce border controls themselves. With these 
pointed threats and hints about the future of SACU and the revenue generated by 
it, South Africa was able to assert its authority, leaving the BLS with little choice 
but to fall in line with South African preferences on the EPAs, or else risk the 
disintegration of SACU (Murray-Evans 2015). 
Phase III (January 2010 – July 2014): SADC Group Pulls Together 
From this point on, the SADC EPA Group presented a more unified front vis-á-vis 
the EU. SADC EPA Ministers met in January 2010, and under South Africa’s 
influence, resolved that SADC EPA states will move forward in the negotiations as 
a united block. Accordingly, the SACU Heads of State wrote a letter to Trade 
Commissioner Karel de Gucht (who had replaced Catherin Ashton in February 
2009) notifying the EU that the interim EPA would not be notified to the WTO, 
ratified, nor provisionally implemented (EPA Update Feb 2010). However the EU 
continued to press the SADC Group to sign and implement the interim agreement 
as soon as possible. The SADC Group continued to resist, while conducting ongoing 
negotiations on the unresolved contentious issues, although at this point it was 
more a negotiation between South African and Namibia on one side, the EU on the 
other, with the BLS and the two other LDCs along for the ride. 
In a move that took SADC negotiators by surprise, in September 2011 the EU 
announced a unilateral deadline of 1st January 2014 for the conclusion of the EPAs. 
The South African and Namibian negotiators were furious: they had been given no 
indication that this deadline was in the pipeline when they met with Trade 
Commissioner De Gucht just a few weeks earlier (EPA Update Nov 2011). The SADC 
EPA Group promptly launched a lobbying strategy targeting MEPs in the European 
Parliament, the European Council, and EU ambassadors based in Southern African 
capitals in order to extend the deadline by two years to January 2016 (Kamidza 
2011). SADC Ambassadors in Brussels, part of the SADC negotiating structure at 
the level of Senior Officials, proceeded to send delegations to lobby the European 
Parliament, held meetings with Members of the European Parliament’s Committee 
on International Trade, engaged MEPs at meetings of the EU-ACP Joint Parliamentary 
Assembly, and petitioned EU Ministers and Council members at meetings of the 
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Joint ACP-EU Council meetings (Kamidza 2011). As the non-LDC with the most to 
lose, Namibia led the lobbying efforts and allegedly sent letters to every MEP, over 
750 in total, in order to lobby for support for extending the deadline (Duddy 2012). 
This was at least partially successful, as British MEP David Martin tabled a report 
recommending the extension of the deadline (European Parliament 2012), after 
which both the EP’s Committee on International Trade and the European 
Parliament as a whole also voted in favour of extending the deadline to January 
2016 (EPA Update September 2012). However SADC’s lobbying efforts, while 
successful in persuading the European Parliament of the virtues of an extended 
deadline, were not sufficient to persuade either the European Council or 
Commission, and in April 2013, under pressure from both the Commission and 
Council, the European Parliament endorsed the 2014 deadline against opposing 
votes from leftist and Green MEPs (EPA Update May 2013). 
With the 2014 deadline set in stone, relations between the EU and South Africa 
took an even more acrimonious turn. Between September 2012 and November 
2013, South Africa cancelled five Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) with EU 
member states (Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain), and 
in July 2013, Commissioner De Gucht travelled to South Africa for a SA-EU Business 
Forum, at which he gave the South African government what the local media 
described as a ‘tongue-lashing’ for suspending BITs without consulting the EU 
(Allix 2013a).47 He said the EU had agreed to opening their markets to South 
Africa’s agricultural produce in the EPA negotiations, but when the EU took into 
account the unilateral cancelling of BITs, ‘it did not feel like a reciprocal 
relationship’ (Allix 2013a). The media speculated that the BITs issue had been 
introduced as a bargaining chip in the EPA negotiations, with the EU prepared to 
offer better access for South African wine and sugar in exchange for renewing the 
BITs. In a second visit to South Africa in November 2013, the Commissioner stated 
that the cancellation of BITs would have a ‘negative impact on trade and investment’ 
relations between South Africa and the EU (Allix 2013b). 
In addition to the BITs issue, both South Africa and the EU accused each other of 
being responsible for the acrimonious state of the negotiations, and of being 
obstacles to regional integration within the region. With the BLS brought to heel, 
the South African negotiators deployed a rhetorical strategy laying the blame for 
the near-disintegration of SACU at the EU’s door, and highlighted the apparent 
hypocrisy of the EU in claiming to promote regionalism in Southern Africa while 
47 He also visited Botswana and Namibia, where his public statements were far less inflammatory (cf. 
European Commission MEMO/13/695 and MEMO/13/709). 
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at the same time taking steps to actively undermine it (Murray-Evans 2015). At the 
same time it presented itself as a defender of the LDCs’ developmental interests, 
highlighting the apparent unfairness of forcing LDC’s into reciprocal trade 
agreements with the EU, quite ignoring the fact that two of the three LDCs were 
generally in favour of the EPA agenda and it was South Africa’s actions in the 1990s 
that forced Lesotho into a de facto free trade area with the EU without its 
consultation. 
Backed by Namibia and Angola, and with the acquiescence of the BLS and 
Mozambique, South Africa’s rhetorical strategy became quite effective in the final 
stages of the negotiations. Although South African President Jacob Zuma did not 
attend the Franco-African Summit in December 2013, all SADC EPA states were 
represented and present at discussions concerning the status of EPA negotiations. 
Likewise, they had equal opportunity to capitalize on the December 5th letter 
criticizing the European Commission’s lack of flexibility, even if there was less 
coordination with France. Indeed, a witness at a subsequent negotiating session 
between EU and SADC negotiators described the Namibian ambassador to Belgium 
holding up the letter and extolling EU negotiators: ‘your own ministers are telling 
you to be more flexible, why aren’t you doing it?’ (International Trade Expert, 
Skype interview, 13th June 2014). As well as calling on the European Commission 
to display greater flexibility, the letter also asked the Commission to adopt a 
case-by-case approach on the issue of export taxes, one of the last outstanding 
issues in the SADC Group, along with agricultural market access and agricultural 
safeguards. These last three issues were dealt with over the following six months, 
albeit not always in the SADC Group’s favour and finally, on 15 July 2014 the group 
concluded a deal, the second African grouping to do so. Despite participating in 
the negotiations (albeit in a limited capacity), Angola opted-out of signing the EPA 
on the basis of being a post-conflict country aiming to restructure its industry and 
agriculture, which the EPA would hinder (Kwa et al. 2014). However it retains the 
right to join to the SADC EPA in the future. At the time of writing [July 2015] the 
EPA text was still going through a process of ‘legal scrubbing’ in preparation for 
signature by Heads of States, with the ratification phase yet to commence.
Agricultural Market Access and Trade Regime Harmonization 
Market access in the agricultural sector was ‘a tough nut to crack’ in the SADC 
negotiations, due to both the EU’s defensive and South Africa’s offensive interests 
in agricultural market access (SACU Official and EPA Negotiator, Windhoek, 27th 
June 2013). The issue of market access was also closely connected with that of 
regime harmonization and the debate of how South Africa, as a more developed 
economy, should be treated by the EU in relation to its neighbours. 
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Agricultural market access was a major sticking point with the SADC group even 
though agriculture accounts for a mere 5.3 percent of regional GDP (World 
Factbook, 2014). This was mainly due to South Africa’s influence, as it was seeking 
to improve its position over that of the TDCA. There was very little room to improve 
on market access for industrial products, but some room for improving access for 
agricultural products (EPA Negotiator, Pretoria, 25th July 2013). Namibia and 
Botswana also had strong offensive interests in improving market access for 
agricultural produce. As in all EPA negotiations, the EU insisted on reciprocal 
trade preferences, including with LDCs, and a minimum of 80 percent opening 
over 15 years from the Southern African side in order to meet the WTO requirement 
of ‘substantially all trade’, however the interpretation of ‘substantially all trade’ 
was not a point of dispute in the SADC EPA as it was in other ACP regions. 
As previously mentioned, the 2006 Strategic Framework contained five key 
demands on market access and harmonization: South Africa to formally join the 
SADC EPA Group; the TDCA to form the basis of the BLNS market access offers to 
the EU, but taking into account the sensitivities of the BLNS; market access for 
South Africa to move towards DFQF access over time; LCDs to be exempt from 
reciprocal market access; and full Everything But Arms access to the EU for all 
SADC member states from 2008. The EU conceded the first two demands, but 
rejected the others outright. The request for DFQF access for South Africa, although 
it would help to harmonize the overlapping regimes in the region, was unlikely to 
be seriously entertained by the EU, due to its strong domestic agricultural lobby, 
and the fact that southern European countries produce a similar range of 
agricultural produce as South Africa (SACU Official and EPA Negotiator, Windhoek, 
27th June 2013). The EU also insisted that South Africa should be subject to 
differential treatment due to its higher level of development. The degree of 
(agricultural) market access opening between SA and the EU continued to be a 
sticking point in the negotiations until the EU introduced the issue of Geographic 
Indicators (GIs) and linked South Africa’s willingness to negotiate on GIs to 
improved access for South African produce in mid-2011.48 A South African 
negotiator noted that ‘we made a major concession in 2011 when we agreed to 
negotiate geographical indicators for food beyond wines and spirits’. However, the 
EU ‘came up with a ridiculous list of products and they were…[at first] not prepared 
48 The EU has an interest in promoting legally binding Geographic Indicators in order to promote 
and protect the reputation of products with a traditional link to a specific geographic locale, such 
as champagne. Technically, GIs are a form of intellectual property protection and have been at the 
heart of the debate surrounding the controversial Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) Agreements at the WTO (Claessens 2008). As such it would usually be considered one 
of the new generation issues, but I include it here under market access as it appears to be the case 
that South Africa agreed to negotiate on GIs in exchange for improved market access.
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to reciprocate with concessions to pay the price’ (Department of Trade and Industry 
Official, Pretoria, 31st July 2013). ‘Substantive progress’ was made in late-2011, 
however the EU still felt that the SADC Group’s market access offer was ‘insufficient’ 
(EPA Update, Jan/February 2012; EPA Update, May 2012). After arduous internal 
regional consultations, the SADC Group added several tariff lines to its offer, 
which it again presented to the EU in June 2013 (EPA Update, December 2012). 
However the EU declined the renewed offer on the grounds that it did not match 
the market access offered by the EU (EPA Update, September 2013). As SADC seemed 
unwilling to offer a more generous offer, the EU instead tabled a more conservative 
offer, indicating it would accept SADC’s offer if they accepted the EU’s (EPA Update 
December 2013/January 2014). 
As a group, the SADC configuration agreed to liberalize around 85 percent of trade 
with the EU, although there are differences in the market access opening of the 
SACU group (86 percent liberalization), Mozambique (81 percent, which was 
agreed when it initialled an interim EPA in December 2007) and Angola (no 
liberalization as of yet). The BLNS and Mozambique, in exchange for opening their 
markets, will receive 100 percent DFQF access to European markets, thereby 
maintaining the status quo on the Lomé preferences. South Africa will receive 98 
percent duty free access to EU markets for industrial products, and 60 percent 
duty free for agricultural products with schedules for immediate liberalization to 
10 years depending on product category (see Ramdoo 2014 for a list of products 
excluded and phase-down periods). The final agreement includes protection of 251 
European Geographic Indicators, and 105 South African Geographic Indicators, 
including Karoo lamb and Rooibos tea. Although this is quite far away from the 
initial market access proposals put forward in the 2006 Roadmap, it does represent 
an improvement for South Africa on the terms of the TDCA. South Africa is the 
main beneficiary of this long fight over market access: while market access for the 
BLNS has remained unchanged, and Mozambique has agreed to liberalize EU 
imports, South Africa has improved access for 32 key tariff lines, including wine, 
sugar, fisheries products, flowers, some dairy products and canned fruits (Davies 
2014; EC September 2014). 
The negotiations on the agricultural market access and regime harmonization 
issues can be considered a qualified success for the SADC Group. They did not get 
most of their initial demands on market access (however they must have known 
that the EU would never agree to grant South Africa DFQF). However, South Africa 
was allowed to join the group, and it was able to improve on the terms of the TDCA. 
Although SA was the main beneficiary of this, the BLNS also benefited (perhaps 
more indirectly) as they were de facto implementing the terms of the TDCA. 
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Additionally the market access granted to the EU under the EPA now takes into 
account the sensitivities of the BLNS, whereas the TDCA offer did not. However, the 
concessions obtained on this issue cannot be attributed to SADC actorness. Rather 
they are the result of South Africa’s offensive interests in agriculture and their 
primary objective to obtain improved market access over the terms of the TDCA, 
while making as few liberalization commitments in return (Murray-Evans 2015). 
Overall, the outcome on market access was ‘quite far apart from the starting point’ 
(EPA Negotiator, Pretoria, 25th July 2013), and reflective of South African interests, 
as opposed to regional ones. As for the harmonization of the differing regimes, 
it was agreed that once the EPA enters into force, South Africa’s previous TDCA 
agreement with the EU falls away and all states trade de jure and de facto under the 
EPA. However there is not full harmonization between South Africa and its 
neighbours due to the EU’s insistence on differentiation. Additionally Angola has 
for the time being opted to trade under EBA, with the option to join the EPA as and 
when it is ready to do so. This means there will be three different trade regimes 
with the EU in operation within the SADC EPA Group, although admittedly there 
is now greater coherence between regimes than there was before. But once we look 
at the wider SADC group of all 15 members, there will be five or six different 
regimes with the EU in operation.49 How this situation will be handled in achieving 
regime harmony within SADC, in line with its aspirations to implement a customs 
union in the near future, remains unclear. 
Export Taxes
Export taxes are levies applied to products as they leave a country for export. In 
contemporary trade relations these are primarily used on mineral, petroleum and 
agricultural exports in order to encourage value-addition and industrialization in 
the country of origin. In the context of EPAs, the EU wishes to restrict the use of 
export taxes by ACP states by introducing a veto clause into EPA texts. They argue 
that the usefulness of export taxes has ‘not been conclusive from a development 
point of view, but instead has discouraged exports and contributed to bringing 
down the price of agricultural commodities’ (Bilal and Ramdoo 2010: 4), an 
argument that wouldn’t seem to hold much legitimacy in view of the EU’s 
continued use of domestic agricultural subsidies. One might rather locate the 
underlying rationale for the EU’s position in the Raw Materials Initiative of 2008, 
which identifies continued access to raw materials as critical for European growth 
and jobs. The Initiative states that
49 Angola under EBA; Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique under the SADC EPA; 
South Africa under a differentiated SADC EPA; the DRC under either the Central African EPA or 
EBA (decision not taken at the time of writing – January 2015); Tanzania under the EAC EPA; and 
the remaining SADC member states under the Eastern and Central African EPA.
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access to primary and secondary raw materials should become a priority in EU trade and 
regulatory policy… The EU should promote new rules and agreements on sustainable 
access to raw materials where necessary…[and] act against the protectionist use of export 
restrictions by third countries (European Commission 2008: 7).  
In this sense it is competing with other major manufacturing economies, such as 
China and the USA, for access to Africa’s vast reserves of raw materials. Note that 
WTO rules do not explicitly prohibit the use of export taxes, and therefore the 
inclusion of a clause forbidding export taxes or a clause giving the EU veto rights 
over the introduction of such taxes in the SADC group would be considered a 
WTO-plus issue. In principle all ACP regions are opposed to the inclusion of 
WTO-plus issues in the EPAs, and states that produce and export minerals, metals 
and other natural resources (of which many Southern African states do) were 
likely to be strongly opposed to the EU’s proposal to ban export taxes. Indeed, 
export taxes were a contentious issue in the SADC Group, especially for South 
Africa and Namibia, both of which have implemented beneficiation strategies 
focused on metals and minerals, and in such a context allowing the EU veto power 
over the use of export taxes would directly undermine government policy. Given 
how strategic raw materials are to growth in both Europe and Southern Africa, it 
is hardly surprising that the issue was extremely contentious and subject to ‘tense 
debate’ throughout the EPA process (Ramdoo 2014). Along with agricultural 
safeguards, it was one of the last two issues on the table towards the end of the 
negotiations. At the Swakopmund negotiations of March 2009, the EU appears to 
have backed down from its blanket opposition to the use of export taxes, instead 
settling for a provision calling for export taxes not to violate WTO rules, and that 
any new export taxes – when justified by the needs of industrial development – 
should require the EU’s consent (Woolfrey 2009).  Existing export taxes would be 
allowed to remain in place (EPA Update March 2009). 
The final text of the EPA, as agreed in July 2014, contains a clause on export taxes 
broadly in line with what was agreed in Swakopmund. The BLNS and Mozambique 
may introduce export taxes in order to raise revenue, protect infant industries or 
the environment, or for food security purposes (Ramdoo 2014). This does not 
however apply to South Africa, but in a concession to South Africa’s beneficiation 
programme, the EU agreed that SADC group states can apply export taxes to a 
limited number of products (eight per country), for a limited period (maximum of 
12 years), if they can justify industrial development needs. At first glance this 
would appear to be a concession in favour of the SADC Group, but in reality the 
clause is so watered down as to be almost meaningless (EPA Negotiator, Skype 
interview, 20th August 2014). Exports to the EU, to the value of the average volume 
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of exports of the good to the EU in the three years preceding the introduction of 
the tax, will be exempt for the first six years, giving the EU time to diversify 
sources. For the following six years, 50 percent of the average volume of exports to 
the EU will be exempt from the taxes. Additionally, export taxes shall not exceed 
10 percent of the value of the product (Ramdoo 2014: 8). This effectively means 
that SADC countries will not really be able to impose export taxes on minerals 
exported to the EU, but the region does retain the policy space to impose export 
taxes on mineral exported to other parts of the world (i.e. China). Clearly this 
preserves European access to strategic metals and minerals while allowing the 
SADC Group some face-saving concessions (EPA Negotiator, Skype interview, 20th 
August 2014). The SADC Group was not an effective negotiator on this issue. Even 
though in theory SADC may apply export taxes, in practice they will not be able to 
apply taxes on the metals and mineral exported to the EU. 
Most Favoured Nation 
As in all ACP regions, the MFN clause was a sticking point throughout the 
negotiations. However it was relatively higher on the list of salient issues in the 
SADC Group due to SACU’s ambitions to negotiate trade agreements with other 
regional organizations and major economies, including Mercosur, the East African 
Community, India, the USA and China. The EU’s position was that inclusion of an 
automatic MFN clause was a ‘matter of fairness’. For its part, the SADC Group was 
opposed to its inclusion due to its potential to undermine the region’s bargaining 
power in any future trade negotiations. 
The interim EPAs initialed by the BLNS and Mozambique in December 2007 
contained the MFN clause. South Africa claimed that the MFN clause was one of 
the main reasons why it did not sign the interim EPA, as concluding trade 
agreements with other emerging economies is a cornerstone of its economic 
strategy (Woolfrey 2009). At the make-or-break negotiations at Swakopmund in 
March 2009, the MFN clause remained unresolved. The EU was unprepared to back 
down on MFN, even proposing a more restrictive version of the clause than 
previously appeared in the Lomé Treaty. The EU proposed that MFN be automatically 
extended to cover ‘major world trading economies’ and developed countries, 
although it was willing to grant exceptions to trade agreements signed with 
African countries and raise the threshold of what constitutes a ‘major trading 
economy’ to 1.5 percent share of world trade. However, this was still not acceptable 
to South Africa, which maintained that the crux of the issue was that the clause 
should not be automatically applied to the EU (EPA Update, March 2009). The issue 
remained highly contentious and was not resolved until the final rounds of 
negotiation in 2014. 
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Finally, the SADC Group and the EU agreed that trade agreements with African 
countries and regions, other ACP countries and other developing countries and 
LDCs shall be exempt from the clause. The MFN clause will only apply, after 
consultation between partners, to trade agreements signed with ‘major trading 
partners’, which the SADC EPA text defines as a country whose share of world trade 
is higher than 1 percent, or 1.5 percent for a group of countries (Ramdoo 2014). 
However, according to South Africa’s chief negotiator, there will be no obligation 
for SACU to automatically extend preferences granted to other trading partners to 
the EU (quoted in Woolfrey 2014). Any future preferences in these agreements will 
be subject to examination and consultation between partners before being 
extended to the EU (Ramdoo 2014). In this sense South African demands for the 
non-automatic nature of the clause were realized, but apparently at the expense of 
the definition of ‘major trade partner’, which shifted from 1.5 percent to 1 percent 
of world trade, and is more restrictive than the definition found in other EPA 
agreements. The region was therefore moderately effective on the issue, although 
it was more of a South African concern than a SADC one.  
Infant Industry Protection 
Infant industry protection involves the selective use of tariffs to protect domestic 
industries, shielding them from external competition and giving them time to 
become more internationally competitive. These kinds of policies can be 
instrumental in promoting food security and industrialization strategies. The 
SADC group, especially Namibia, wanted to include a clause similar to the infant 
industry clause found in the SACU Agreement, something the EU refused as they 
felt that infant industry protection was adequately provided for under a general 
safeguard clause. The interim EPA initialed by the BLNS and Mozambique 
contained a general safeguard clause, which ANSA later identified as incompatible 
with pre-existing SACU provisions on infant industry protection, potentially 
undermining the use of this tool to promote food security and value-addition 
processing, with potentially negative impacts on Namibia’s nascent pasta industry 
(AgriTrade 2010). The wording of the general safeguard clause implied that 
protection could only be applied to pre-existing industries, and not nascent 
industries that may be established in SADC EPA states in the future (Erasmus 
2008), and that the clause would only be applicable for the first 10-15 years of the 
agreement, on the assumption that after that period there were no longer any 
infant industries (Makombe 2010). SADC states were unhappy with this provision, 
as it would limit their ability to develop and protect new industries in future. 
Additionally the SADC Group also argued that safeguard clauses and infant 
industry clause should be dealt with separately, as is the case at the WTO so as to 
avoid a ‘convoluted and conceptually ambiguous arrangement’ (Erasmus 2008). 
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At the Swakopmund talks in March 2009, the EU agreed to more favourable terms 
for infant industry protection in the SADC Group, allowing SADC states to exclude 
some sectors from liberalization for development reasons (EPA Update, March 
2009). However this provision was not extended to South Africa (Woolfrey 2009).  
The text of the final agreement included a specific infant industry protection 
clause. Proposed measures must be submitted to the Trade and Development 
Committee, but in ‘exceptional circumstances’ (such as a large influx of a particular 
type of European good that threatens a local industry) SADC EPA states can take 
unilateral measures for a maximum of 200 days, whereupon it must be referred to 
the Joint Committee. If no satisfactory solution is reached within 30 days, infant 
industry protection measures can be applied for up to eight years and may be 
renewed, subject to agreement by the Joint SADC EPA-EU Council (South Centre 
2010; Ramdoo 2014; EU-SADC EPA 2015). The clause is similar to a clause included 
in the ECOWAS EPA (Article 23), but this was a far more salient issue for SADC. 
However, analysis by the South Centre (2010) suggests that it is ‘a Pyrrhus victory’. 
Although the clause is an improvement over the general safeguard clause in the 
interim EPA, as there are now increased grounds for invoking the clause, more 
policy space for imposing restrictive measures of longer duration, and no date of 
expiry on the clause; SADC states now appear to be left in a ‘legal quagmire’ due to 
discrepancies between the SACU infant industry clause and the EPA clause (South 
Centre 2010). Additionally, the clause imposes a ceiling on tariffs imposed on 
‘threatening’ products (cannot exceed the MFN rate), which in some case may not 
be high enough to adequately shelter threatened industries. The region therefore 
was only moderately effective on export taxes. 
‘New Generation’ Issues 
In the context of the EPAs, new generation issues refer to trade-related issues such 
as trade in services, competition policy, investment policy, government 
procurement, intellectual property rights, and labour and environmental 
standards. These are WTO+ standards and the ACP as a whole is opposed to their 
inclusion in EPAs. At the start of the negotiations the EU was insistent that EPAs 
should cover new generation, trade-related issues. The 2006 SADC Roadmap called 
for these issues to be excluded from the agreement, noting that they are not 
required for WTO compatibility, nor are there any obligations on these issues in 
either the TDCA or the Cotonou Agreement (Kruger 2009). They opposed the 
inclusion of these subjects mainly on the grounds of limited capacity and the lack 
of common regional policies in these areas (EPA Update, March/April 2006). The EU 
responded by saying that the exclusion of trade-related issues ‘would be very 
difficult to reconcile with Cotonou’, as they regarded trade-related new generation 
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issues as essential for meeting the development dimension of the EPA and 
facilitating regional integration (Kruger 2009:203). In fact the EU went on to insist 
that there would be no assistance with capacity-building in this area without 
binding commitments on the SADC group’s behalf (Kruger 2009; EC 2006).  
Despite the SADC position articulated in the Roadmap, SADC EPA states were 
divided on their preferences regarding trade-related issues, especially service 
liberalization. South Africa (as well as Angola and Namibia) was opposed to 
making any commitments on services, arguing that there is no pre-existing 
agreement on services within the SADC region (although a SADC Protocol in Trade 
in Services was signed in 2012), and therefore there should be no binding 
commitments on services in the EPA. However the suspicion was that South Africa 
wished to protect its domestic service industry – which also dominates 
neighbouring states – from competition with EU service providers (McCarthy 
2008: 127). For their part, the BLS were not opposed to making binding 
commitments on services, seeing it as a way to diversify their service sectors and 
escape South African dominance. The signing of interim EPAs by Botswana, 
Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique in June 2009 committed them to return to 
negotiations with the EU on trade in services, investment, government 
procurement and competition in the near future (EPA Update, June 2009), much to 
the concern of ANSA, which preferred to keep services out of the EPAs altogether. 
In a round of negotiations in September 2013 the SADC Group agreed to include a 
rendez-vous clause on competition, government procurement and services and 
investment in the final EPA text (EPA Update November 2013). Thus far [as of 
December 2014] all other EPA agreements also include a rendez-vous clause on 
trade-related issues. Some trade experts doubt the appetite for both sides to 
actually return to the issue as prescribed by the EPA text, noting that negotiating 
fatigue and the lack of a legal deadline for concluding further negotiations 
effectively renders the rendez-vous clause meaningless. However, the BLS and 
Mozambique appear to be committed on moving forwards on services, in line with 
the (binding) commitments they made when they signed the interim EPA in 2009. 
The EU and the BLS and Mozambique have already swapped draft texts on service 
liberalization, with ANSA standing by as observers to further negotiations on the 
issue. In conclusion, from the SADC perspective the negotiations on this issue are 
a failure: services are being negotiated by some countries, despite the Roadmap’s 
call to leave the issue out of EPAs. Additionally the fact that some members are 
moving ahead with the EU on service liberalization will likely complicate SADC’s 
plans for intra-regional negotiations on services in the near future (SADC 2012). 
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Agricultural Safeguards
Agricultural safeguards are similar in nature to infant industry protection clauses 
as they can be used to shield a sector from cheaper imports, but agricultural 
safeguards are more specific, and more relevant to food security.  Most African 
countries, given the importance of agriculture to their economies, wanted to have 
a separate clause on agricultural safeguards (Bilal and Ramdoo 2010), and 
agricultural safeguards were a big issue for the SADC Group, especially Botswana 
and Namibia, which were worried about the effect of European competition on 
their domestic food processing industries, especially poultry and pasta. Namibia 
and South Africa are also set on improving their value-chain development in 
agri-business, so for them this was also a contentious issue. For their part, the EU 
argued that a specific safeguard clause was not necessary as protection for strategic 
agricultural sectors was sufficiently covered by a general bilateral safeguard 
clause that was to be included in the text of all EPAs (Bilal and Ramdoo 2010). The 
SADC Group refused to accept this argument, and the final agreement includes a 
specific agricultural safeguard clause, which – in addition to the general bilateral 
safeguard clause – allows provisional safeguard measures on specific products 
(Ramdoo 2014; EU-SADC EPA 2015). In addition to this there are specific measures 
for the BLNS as a compensation for opening their market to the EU on potentially 
sensitive products as a result of making a common SACU market access offer. This 
allows them to apply safeguard measures to a list of 60 products (mostly food 
items) for a maximum of four years, however this option on this list of products is 
only temporarily available, for a period of 12 years after the EPA enters into force 
(Ramdoo 2014). Therefore the region can be considered effective on the agricultural 
safeguards issue: not only did they get a specific clause included in the text (which 
other regions did not), but the BLNS were granted safeguards on a range of sensitive 
products, albeit on a temporary basis. 
Rules of Origin 
As was the case in other ACP regions, the EU’s precise position on rules of origin 
was hard to pin down, but if it genuinely wished to facilitate regional integration 
and development within the ACP it should be in favour of harmonized rules. The 
SADC group, as with the rest of the ACP, desired simplified and harmonized rules 
of origin in order to promote the development of regional value chains. In SADC a 
particular concern was how to treat goods originating in South Africa, but further 
processed in neighbouring countries. This was a major concern for Lesotho, whose 
garment industry depends on inputs from South Africa, and apparently it was this 
issue that motivated Lesotho’s initially puzzling decision to sign the interim EPA 
(Walker 2009). As an LCD, Lesotho was not faced with the threat of losing market 
access, but the rules of origin under the interim EPA were more favourable than 
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those available under EBA.50 At the Swakopmund meeting the differing rules of 
origin between the TDCA and interim EPA were not addressed (Woolfrey 2009). 
This lead to criticism within the region that the EU’s position on the issue was 
undermining regional integration in SADC (EPA Negotiator, Pretoria, 25th July 
2013). In the end, the rules of origin agreed on in the final text are quite flexible. 
SADC states may cumulate among themselves as well as with other ACP states that 
have signed EPAs. They may also cumulate with non-ACP states that have FTAs 
with the EU, or trade with the EU under EBA or GSP. Note that this does not apply 
to agricultural produce, only industrial inputs (Ramdoo 2014). The region can be 
considered moderately effective on this issue, as there is increased flexibility, but 
still cumulation with South Africa is restricted. However this qualified success 
cannot be attributed to SADC actorness, as a similar policy applies to all ACP 
regions and appears to be due to the efforts of all-ACP lobbying. Thus effectiveness 
cannot be attributed to SADC actorness.
Patchy Effectiveness
The SADC EPA Group was moderately effective in obtaining its negotiating 
objectives (see Table 6.5). The region’s negotiators were effective in obtaining an 
outcome close to their original objectives on only one issue (agricultural 
safeguards), and a relatively less important issue at that. For most other issues, 
including the two most important issues, the region was only moderately effective, 
having to settle for compromise with the EU, and in some cases (i.e. export taxes) 
the concessions were so great that ultimately the region was not effective at all. 
This can be considered a somewhat surprising outcome, given that the SADC 
Group is made up of more economically developed states than other ACP regions, 
and the inclusion of South Africa, with its relatively high institutional capacity 
and prior experience of negotiating with the EU. However the outcome is less 
surprising in light of the region’s weak actorness. 
The lack of a supranational authority to coordinate the negotiations made it 
difficult for SADC EPA states to overcome their divergent preferences towards the 
EPA, and on many issues it was hardly possible to identify a ‘regional’ position due 
50 Although this explanation of Lesotho’s decision to sign is not entirely convincing, as by signing the 
interim EPA, Lesotho contributed to the major split between SACU members. As over 60 percent of 
Lesotho’s government revenue is generated by SACU, Lesotho would stand to lose up to 25 percent 
of its GDP overnight if the split were to destroy SACU (Walker 2009). It seems unlikely that an LDC 
would gamble 25 percent of its GDP for improved rules of origin. Some have suggested that Lesotho 
signed the interim EPA due to the immense pressure from the EU towards the end of 2007, and fear 
of ‘unknown consequences’, such as a loss of development aid (SACU Official and EPA Negotiator, 
Windhoek, 27th June 2013), although it is also possibly partly a political move to reduce South 
African dominance of the region. 
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Table 6.5  Initial preferences versus final outcomes, EU-SADC
EU initial preference SADC initial preference Opportunity Structure Final outcome Analysis
Agricultural  
market access
Minimum of 80% opening 
over 15 years,
Market access for South Africa to move 
towards DFQF access over time; LCDs 
to be exempt from reciprocal market 
access; full Everything But Arms access 
to the EU for all SADC member states 
from 2008 onwards
Degree of opposition from EU: 
very high (unfavourable)
Interpretation of WTO law 
supports SADC position: Yes 
(favourable) 
Influence of other parties*: 
EU member state intervention 
in form of Dec 2013 letter 
(favourable)
86% opening by SACU members, 
81% for Mozambique, for a 
regional total of approx. 85%; 
DFQF access for all states except 
SA; improved access for SA in 
exchange for GI for European 
goods; reciprocity from all SADC 
states;
Outcome is a compromise: 
Moderately effective
Regime  
harmonization
Differentiation between SA 
and its neighbours, reciprocity 
from all states 
South Africa to formally join the SADC 
EPA Group and receive same treatment; 
TDCA to form the basis of the BLNS 
market access offer to the EU, but taking 
into account the sensitivities of the BLNS
Degree of opposition from EU: 
high on first point, moderate on 
second (unfavourable-neutral) 
Interpretation of WTO law 
supports SADC position: Yes 
(favourable)
Influence of other parties: n/a
SA formally recognised as part 
of SADC EPA group, modified 
version of TDCA adopted as EPA 
baseline, but still EU insists on 
deferential treatment of SA 
Outcome is a compromise: 
Moderately effective
Export taxes No clause allowing the use of 
export taxes 
Maintain right to use export taxes 
without restrictions
Degree of opposition from EU: 
very high (unfavourable) 
Interpretation of WTO law 
supports SADC position: n/a
Influence of other parties: EU 
member state intervention 
in form of Dec 2013 letter 
(favourable)
SADC states may make very 
limited use of export taxes, 
requires EU consultation 
Clause is weak, face-saving 
clause for SADC: Not 
effective
Most favoured 
nation
Automatic extension of MFN 
to EU should SADC negotiate 
new trade agreements with 
third parties
No automatic extension of MFN Degree of opposition from EU: 
very high (unfavourable)
Interpretation of WTO law 
supports SADC position: yes 
(favourable)
Influence of other parties: n/a
MFN to be extended after 
consultation between partners 
only in cases where new trade 
agreement covers major trade 
partners
Moderately effective
Infant industry 
protection
No specific clause on IFP Specific clause on IFP, should be 
applicable to existing and new industries 
in all member states, clause should not 
have expiry dates
Degree of opposition from EU: 
moderate (neutral) 
Interpretation of WTO law 
supports SADC position: Yes 
(favourable) 
Influence of other parties: n/a
Specific IFP clause that can be 
unilaterally applied by SADC 
states for limited time, no expiry 
date on clause, however tariff 
on threatening goods limited to 
MFN rate
Moderately effective
New generation 
issues
EPA should make binding 
commitments on new 
generation issues
Official Roadmap: no binding 
commitments on any of the new 
generation issues
Degree of opposition from EU: 
high (unfavourable)
Interpretation of WTO law 
supports SADC position: yes 
(favourable) 
Influence of other parties: n/a
Rendez-vous clause on new 
generation issues committing 
SADC states to return to the 
issues within 6 months of the 
EPA 
Not effective
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New generation 
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to shifting alliances within the region. What common positions were put forward 
was generally more reflective of South African interests than regional ones. 
Although informal leadership from a regional power is certainly a means through 
which actorness and effectiveness can be achieved, especially in a context in which 
formal institutions are weak or absent, one might question whether South Africa’s 
role within the region is one of genuine leadership in pursuit of the common good, 
or rather one of self-interested dominance. The analysis of the course of EPA 
negotiations in Southern Africa suggests the latter. Many of the positions put 
forward as the ‘SADC position’ are reflective of South African interests rather than 
regional ones, which fits with the country’s prior (even self-declared) reputation as 
a self-interested economic actor. South Africa’s self-interested positions tended to 
work against the emergence of a common position up until 2010, due to smaller 
states resistance to and contestation of South African dominance (Murray-Evans 
2015). It was only at the critical juncture of early 2010, when speculation that 
SACU would disintegrate as a result of the interim EPAs, that South Africa was able 
to obtain the acquiescence of the smaller states. The BLS signed the interim EPAs 
in part in order to diversify their economies away from South African dominance, 
but once it became clear that South Africa would rather let SACU disintegrate and 
risk economic ruin of Swaziland and Lesotho than concede to it neighbours, the 
BLS had little choice but to fall in line with South Africa’s preferences, at which 
point the South African position became the ‘regional’ position. 
Table 6.5  Continued
EU initial preference SADC initial preference Opportunity Structure Final outcome Analysis
Agricultural 
safeguards
No specific clause on 
agricultural safeguards 
Specific agricultural safeguard clause Degree of opposition from EU: 
moderate (neutral) 
Interpretation of WTO law 
supports SADC position: n/a
Influence of other parties: EU 
member state intervention 
in form of Dec 2013 letter 
(favourable)
Specific clause included, but 
expires 12 years after EPA enters 
into force
Outcome is an equitable 
compromise: Effective
Rules of origin Simplified rules in textiles and 
agriculture
RoO to be simplified and harmonized 
across all regions and sectors, allowing 
full cumulation between African 
countries, including SA
Degree of opposition from EU: : 
low (favourable)
Interpretation of WTO law 
supports SADC position: 
Influence of other parties: ACP 
Group (favourable)
SADC states can cumulate 
amongst themselves as well as 
with other EPA signatories and 
states that benefit from EBA, GSP 
or other FTA with the EU
Moderately effective, but 
not due to SADC actorness
Source: own compilation
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There was no coherent negotiating strategy until South Africa had taken control 
of the negotiations, at which point they adopted a strategy of rhetorical entrapment 
vis-à-vis the EU. South African negotiators laid the blame for the poor situation in 
the region at the EU’s door, and highlighted the apparent gap in the EU’s normative 
promotion of regionalism as a development strategy, and the EPA’s apparent 
undermining of regional integration at the expense of LDCs. South Africa 
presented itself as a defender of the interests of the BLNS from an aggressive and 
mercantilist EU uninterested in the development concerns of LDCs and other ACP 
states, thereby legitimizing its national interests as regional ones. The SADC Group 
made some use of its capacity for overseas lobbying by deploying Brussels-based 
ambassadors to lobby European institutions for the extension of the deadline, 
however the region was ultimately unsuccessful in having the deadline extended 
to 2016. Unsurprisingly, the region experienced a high level of defections during 
the negotiations. Five member states initialed interim EPAs at the end of 2007, and 
four of them added their signatures in 2009, much to the surprise of the other 
member states. The EU was very resistant to allowing the renegotiation of 
commitments made under the interim EPA in order to conclude a regional EPA, 
and even though the signatories of the interim EPA ultimately agreed not to ratify 
or implement the interim EPA in favour of reaching a region-wide deal, it is highly 
likely that the commitments made under the interim EPA restrained the region’s 
effectiveness in the final deal. 
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6.4  EU influence on SADC 
As pointed out in Chapter Three, the actorness and effectiveness of ACP regions is 
conditioned by the influence of powerful external actors, especially the EU. This is 
in part due to their member states’ structural weakness in the global economy, 
but also their dependence on donor funding, much of which originates from the 
European Union. The (effective) promotion of regional cooperation and integration 
in SADC – most obviously via financial incentives, but also socialization and 
emulation – is taken to increase regional actorness by strengthening regional 
institutions and member states’ preferences for cooperation at the regional level. 
On the other hand, the EU’s influence may have the opposite effect of promoting 
disintegrative tendencies within the region, either indirectly through the provision 
of differentiated trading options which reduce member states’ preferences for 
regional cooperation; or directly, through the use of divide-and-rule tactics in the 
negotiations themselves. In the case of SADC, the EU’s provision of material 
incentives to promote regional integration has been steadily declining, while at 
the same time the pre-existing TDCA with South Africa contributed to divergent 
member state preferences and exacerbated cooperation problems within the 
region.  
The EU’s Integrative Influence on Regionalism in Southern Africa 
The EU has long professed to support the development of regional integration and 
cooperation in southern Africa. It has done so (and continues to do so) via the 
provision of material incentives, socialization of regional elites, and by simply 
providing a model of ‘successful’ regional integration to be copied by other regions. 
Taken together, these incentives have contributed to a process of ‘spurred 
emulation’ of EU-style institutions in the economic and political realm (Lenz 
2012). While this has increased regional institutional capacity, and created 
incentives for regional cooperation in some sectors where previously there were 
few, the tendency to adopt standards without real ownership or the political will 
to actually implement them inhibits the emergence of regional actorness. 
The European Development Fund is the EU’s main instrument for promoting 
regional cooperation in southern Africa. It provides funding not only to SADC, but 
also COMESA, and other overlapping regional organizations. Historically, SADC, 
and its predecessor SADCC, were extremely dependent on EU donor funds 
(Adelmann 2008; van der Vleuten and Hulse 2013). Without EDF money the SADC 
Secretariat and many regional projects would cease to function. Throughout the 
various EDF cycles, approximately 70-80 percent of the funding committed to the 
SADC Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs) is earmarked for facilitating regional 
Processed on: 19-7-2016
504439-L-bw-Hulse
213
SOUTHERN AFRICA
6
economic integration. Specific programmes aim to deepen regional integration by 
providing support to the development of regional infrastructure, food security, 
and investment policies and other common regional programmes (SADC 2012). 
The remainder is committed to programmes supporting regional political cooperation, 
such as capacity building for democratic governance, and various non-focal 
sectors, such as streamlining the coherence of regional and national programmes 
and facilitating the inclusion of non-state actors in regional governance. EDF 
money programmed via Regional Indicative Programmes has been a decisive 
factor in bringing about institutional change within SADC. In the early 1990s, 
against a backdrop of declining geostrategic importance and declining donor 
funding, the region moved from a decentralized, sectoral-developmental model of 
regionalism to a EU-style model of linear market integration aiming to culminate 
in a common market (Hartzenburg 2011; Lenz 2012). The Regional Indicative 
Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) of 2003 sets out an integration agenda that 
emulates the EU’s Maastricht Treaty (Lenz 2012). In order to achieve these new 
integration goals, the region also established a centralized regional Secretariat in 
Gaborone, Botswana. EDF money has also been used to build up the capacity of the 
regional Secretariat (SADC 2013), although severe capacity constraints continue to 
hinder the organization. However, as Table 6.6 indicates, EDF support to SADC has 
been steadily declining over the past three funding cycles. 
The prospect of inter-regional EPAs – unilaterally put on the agenda by the EU in 
late 1990s/early 2000s, introduced a competitive element to the regional integration 
in the ACP. The EU introduced the prospect of regionally-based FTAs as a means to 
prompt ACP regions to a greater degree of integration than might otherwise be the 
Table 6.6   European Development Funding to SADC
Framework Funding period SADC 
Lomé IV 1995-2000 Regional Indicative 
Programme (8th EDF)
121 million
Cotonou Agreement 2002-2007 Regional Indicative 
Programme (9th EDF)
161 million
Cotonou Agreement 2008-2013 Regional Indicative 
Programme (10th EDF) 
116 million
Cotonou Agreement 2014- 2020 Regional Indicative 
Programme* (11th EDF) 
Approx. 90 
million
*Final amounts not confirmed at time of writing (January 2015) 
Source: European Commission 2015
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case (Lorenz 2011; Krapohl, Meissner and Muntschick 2013), and as regions 
compete with each other for market share, those with a deeper level of integration 
and more comprehensive agreements with the EU are likely to have a competitive 
advantage over regions with lesser levels of integration. In some regions (ECOWAS, 
the EAC) the EPAs have forced the regional agenda and acted as a mid-wife to 
greater regional integration and cooperation than would otherwise have been the 
case. However one cannot make the argument in the SADC case. Instead of 
implementing a Common External Tariff in order to sign a more harmonious 
agreement, SADC has allowed its membership to split and delayed implementing 
its planned customs union. Instead of contributing to deeper integration, the EPA 
has in southern African contributed to a high degree of fragmentation that is 
likely to inhibit future integration (Jakobeit et al. 2005). SADC’s material 
dependence on EU funding has been an important driver of diffusion of the 
EU-model of linear regional integration (Lenz 2012), which has facilitated 
integrative tendencies within SADC at least on a rhetorical, de jure level. The region 
has adopted a model of market integration based on that of the EU, and institution-
alized a stronger secretariat when EU-orientated elites, often funded by European 
money, advocated EU-style institutions under the assumption that the European 
model is the ‘default’ model of regionalism (Lenz 2012). Yet SADC’s tendency to 
‘read from the donor script’ and adopt EU-style institutions without the political 
will to delegate meaningful authority to the regional level (Hulse and van der 
Vleuten 2015) means there is a limit to the autonomy and authority of said 
institutions. Combined with the decline of EDF resources and the generally poor 
state of EU-SADC relations since 2008, the EU’s external influence has hardly 
promoted integrative tendencies in the region since the early 2000s. 
The EU’s Disintegrative Influence on Regionalism in Southern Africa 
At the same time as it has been promoting regional integration and cooperation in 
southern Africa, the EU has also been exerting a disintegrative influence on the 
region. Disintegrative influences can be exerted deliberately, as the result of 
divide- and-rule negotiating tactics, or indirectly, via the provision of differentiated 
or alternative trading options to the (inter-)regional option (the EPAs). As outlined 
in Chapters One and Three, the Cotonou Agreement’s principles include the 
promotion of regional cooperation and integration, but also differentiation based 
on states’ development status. LDCs are able to avail of the EBA regime, while all 
states can opt for GSP, or GSP+ if they have ratified the required UN conventions. 
The interim EPAs that the EU offered at the end of 2007 as an ad hoc substitute to 
regional EPAs can also be considered an additional differentiated trade option, 
even though there was no formal provision for these under the terms of the 
Cotonou Agreement. As pointed out by several commentators, the ad hoc invention 
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of bilateral interim EPAs was ‘totally against the spirit of the original EPA 
framework’ and contrary to the principle of promoting regional integration (Roux 
2008). Likewise, Namibian negotiators have been outspoken on the divisive effect 
of the principle of differentiation. The Minister of Trade and Industry, Hage 
Geingob noted that  
Other negotiating configurations have not signed EPAs, yet we seem to be singled out for 
rebuke… Is this perhaps part of the tactics of divide and rule and playing us off against 
our fellow African countries? We face this predicament for highly artificial reasons. Our 
sister country Angola, to mention an example, also has not signed the interim EPA, but is 
not under pressure. Angola enjoys the Everything-But-Arms market access given by the EU 
to all Least Developing Countries. In our case, the European powers and others simply 
divided our GDP by our population, and classified us as a Middle Income Country. Thus 
by ignoring our dualistic economy, and the real prevalence of rural poverty, this artificial 
status is now jeopardizing our ability to trade with Europe (Geingob 2010).  
Out of SADC’s broader membership of 15 states, eleven are LDCs and in theory 
have a greater interest in trading under EBA than a region-wide EPA. Of the 
remaining four member states, South Africa had a pre-existing FTA with the EU. 
The Bamberg Cluster scholars have shown how the EU’s differentiated trading 
options have contributed to the development of a Rambo situation in Southern 
Africa, preventing the harmonization of SADC’s external trade policies and 
undermining SADC’s plans to implement a customs union (Muntschick 2012 
Krapohl et al. 2013).51 The provision of a bilateral deal to South Africa reduced its 
incentive to cooperate in further regional integration. Instead of providing much 
needed leadership to implement the planned customs union, South Africa opted 
to pursue its particularistic interests over that of its neighbours. Even though the 
conclusion of the final EPA sees the partial harmonization of the TDCA with the 
EPA, the EU insists on differential treatment for South Africa.  If the EU truly 
wished to promote regional integration in SADC, it should not differentiate 
between South Africa and its smaller neighbours, especially if SACU is to form the 
‘fast-track’ core of deeper southern African integration (Draper et al. 2007).
51 The picture is more mixed beyond the economic/trade realm, where EU influence via the provision 
of material incentives has kept regional cooperation on electricity online; and in relation to the 
establishment of a regional peace-keeping force, where EU aid temporarily drove its establishment, 
but a decline in funding led to it paralysis (Muntschick 2012).   
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Accusations of divide and rule tactics on the part of the EU were common in the 
SADC EPA negotiations.52 There was some speculation within the region that the 
initial split within SADC between different EPA configurations was the result of 
EU ‘nudging’, via ‘subtle directives’ and ‘hints’ about the way in which future EDF 
envelopes would be distributed: ‘not to the regional economic communities that 
exist as building blocks of the African Union, but through regional communities 
reconfigured in terms of the EPAs’ (Department of Trade and Industry Official, 
Pretoria, 31st July 2013; see also Roux 2008; Tandon 2010). Divide and rule tactics 
were most apparent in the run-up to the 2007 deadline. Some SADC negotiators 
perceived the ‘undue pressure’ from the EU to sign an interim agreement as a 
divide- and-rule tactic (Department of Trade and Industry Official, Pretoria, 31st 
July 2013), while at the same time the public rhetoric deployed by Trade Commission 
Peter Mandelson was deeply divisive and served to inflame intra-regional tensions. 
In September 2007 he accused South Africa of playing a ‘deeply negative’ role in 
the negotiations and ‘preventing others much less well off then them in the region 
from moving forward’ (Nzioki 2007). Two months later, he accused South Africa of 
an ‘inability to commit’ to the EPA and therefore adversely affecting the BLNS:
Am I – because of South Africa’s inability finally to commit – to say there should be no EPA 
for Southern Africa; that there should be a disruption of trade with Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia and Swaziland? (quoted in Cronin 2007). 
After the 2007 deadline, the EU continued to publicly lay the blame for the fraught 
state of negotiations at South Africa’s door (Keet 2008). In a January 2009 letter 
addressing the ANSA concerns, the EU wrote that ‘once South Africa decided not 
to join the four other SACU members in initialling the interim EPA, thus creating 
a split across SACU, it became clear that this would at least temporarily affect the 
smooth functioning of SACU’. Even non-South African negotiators from the SADC 
region felt that the EU played a deliberate divide-and-rule strategy by stoking 
tensions between South Africa and its neighbours: 
The EU played a huge role in stoking the fire. I know of instances when the chief negotiator of 
the EU called aside the chief negotiator of SADC and asked ‘what are you doing about South 
Africa?’ Really putting pressure on the BLNS to get rid of South Africa. The EU only reluctantly 
allowed South Africa to enter the negotiations…[and] They used every opportunity, every tactic 
to get South Africa out (SACU Official and EPA Negotiator, Windhoek, 27th June 2013).
52 In 2009 Corporate Europe Observatory uncovered evidence, via freedom of information requests, 
that one of the EC’s chief negotiators on the SADC EPA was tasked with ‘manufacturing support’ 
for the SADC EPA through the establishment of a EU-Southern African Business Forum that would 
lobby national governments in favour of the EPA (Corporate Europe Observatory 2009). 
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EU Influence: Helping or Hindering Regional Actorness? 
As is the case in most ACP regions, the EU exerts a simultaneously integrative and 
disintegrative influence on SADC. However in the case of SADC, the EU’s 
disintegrative influence prevailed over its integrative influence. The incentives on 
offer via the EDF were not sufficient to overcome the incentives to defect from 
regional cooperation via bilateral cooperation with the EU (see Figure 6.5). 
A major problem for the region was the pre-existing TDCA, which for a long time 
encouraged South Africa to favour bilateral cooperation with the EU over regional 
cooperation. Even once South Africa was able to find a point of agreement with its 
neighbours, the EU insisted on differential treatment for South Africa, preventing 
a harmonious agreement among all SADC member states. Added to the overlapping 
initiatives, the introduction of the EPAs in Southern Africa has had the effect of 
‘locking in’ fragmentation and overlap, rather than solidifying regional 
integration. As one interviewee pointed out, the EU may have had ‘noble intentions’ 
at the start, but as the negotiations proved tougher than expected and dragged on, 
the EU became ‘desperate’ to show some, any, success, thereby allowing things 
detrimental to regional integration, such as the interim EPAs, to happen (SACU 
Official and EPA Negotiator, Windhoek, 27th June 2013). Although in the end the 
SADC Group did sign a regional EPA, it only includes seven members of the wider 
SADC group, still contains elements of differentiation and fragmentation in the 
differential treatment of South Africa, and differing commitments between 
members on the new generation issues that are the result of the interim EPA. In 
light of this it is hardly surprising that regional policy-makers claim that ‘the EU’s 
actions show they are not serious about promoting regional economic integration 
in SADC’ (Department of Trade and Industry Official, Pretoria, 31st July 2013). 
Indeed, the EU has contributed to ‘locking-in’ fragmentation in southern Africa, 
with the effect that future integration will be extremely difficult to achieve. 
Figure 6.5  Integrative versus disintegrative influence of the EU on southern Africa
Integrative Influence Disintegrative Influence
Direct
Financial incentives: moderate 
(and declining over time)
Divide-and-rule strategies: high
Indirect EPA: ‘locking-in’ of fragmentation Rambo(s): South Africa
Source: author’s illustration
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6.5  Conclusion
The SADC EPA Group was characterized by a lack of actorness throughout most of 
the EPA negotiations. The primary reason for this was the lack of formal regional 
institutions tasked with formulating common positions and negotiating on behalf 
of member states. In this respect the region fell at the first hurdle, when almost 
half the membership of SADC opted to negotiate under other EPA configurations, 
which from the outset imposed a limitation on how engaged the SADC Secretariat 
could be in the process. A secondary factor inhibiting the region’s actorness was 
the lack of informal leadership from South Africa. Although it certainly tried to 
fill that role, South Africa’s leadership was so contested by the smaller states that 
it could not impose a degree of coherence on the group, and several states signed 
interim EPAs. It was only from April 2010 onwards, when the divisions within the 
group threatened to break apart SACU that a degree of coherence emerged within 
the group. At this point it became clear that South Africa was not willing to 
compromise, and the BLS had little choice but to fall in line with South African 
preferences regarding the EPA, else face severe economic consequences.  
The EU’s disintegrative influence on SADC certainly played a role in undermining 
the region’s actorness in relation to EPAs. First of all, the FTA signed with South 
Africa in 1999 confers extra-regional privileges on South Africa, which it is 
unwilling to give up under regional cooperation, unless regional cooperation 
would improve on the terms of the pre-existing FTA. This has contributed to South 
Africa’s ‘selfish’ behaviour in the negotiations and regional integration more 
generally. Secondly, the incentives on offer via the EDF mechanism are not 
sufficient to overcome this Rambo game, and have been declining over the last 
three funding cycles. Third, the EPA configuration does not cohere with any 
pre-existing regional organization. Although the EU cannot be directly blamed for 
this state of affairs, as member states ultimately chose for themselves what 
configuration to negotiate under, the EU added fuel to the fire by ‘nudging’ states 
in certain directions. Finally, there is substantial evidence that EU negotiators 
stoked intra-regional tensions between South Africa and the smaller states in 
order to divide ranks and avoid making concessions. As one interviewee put it, the 
EU’s ‘actions show they are not serious about promoting regional economic 
integration…its all about trade liberalization rather than regional integration…so 
much for Europe being a normative power’ (Department of Trade and Industry 
Official, Pretoria, 31st July 2013). However South Africa was able to turn the tables 
on the EU’s divisive negotiating strategy at the critical juncture of April 2010, 
when it obtained the acquiescence of the BLS, and was able to blame the EU for 
creating a situation in which SACU’s existence was threatened. It was only at this 
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point that the group was able to negotiate more effectively and extract concessions 
from the EU, but even so the group was not as successful as their West African 
counterparts. The region’s negotiators were clearly effective in only one issue (and 
a relatively less important one at that), and only moderately effective on five more 
issues. Furthermore, what concessions were won are more a reflection of South 
African interests than regional ones. The EPA serves South African interests far 
more than those of other countries, or of regional integration and cooperation 
more generally. The end result is an agreement that locks-in fragmentation, and 
will make future integration among the 15 member states of SADC extremely 
difficult on both a technical and political level. 
A Kiswahili proverb makes a fitting epitaph for the EU-SADC EPA negotiations: 
‘when elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers’. The negotiations were dominated 
by a defensive EU and an aggressive South Africa at loggerheads with each other. 
Both were responsible for walking out of the negotiations at critical moments, 
exacerbating intra-regional differences. Both accused the other of bullying the 
smaller states and causing the split within SACU, and both lay the blame for the 
fragmented nature of Southern African regionalism at each other’s door, while 
the interests of the smaller states and SADC’s broader regional integration agenda 
have been trampled by the South African and European leviathans.
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7.1  Introduction 
The previous chapters set out to explore the outcomes of interregional cooperation 
and negotiation, and asked: what makes one region more effective in interregional 
trade negotiations than another? This research question was motivated by the 
apparent puzzle of why the West Africa region had obtained a faster and better 
outcome in Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations than the SADC region, 
which is composed of wealthier and more developed states with greater experience 
of international trade negotiations. The puzzle was investigated within the 
framework of interregional cooperation between the EU and the ACP, and the 
theoretical framework developed in Chapter Three posited that actorness – the 
ability of regions to become identifiable, formulate common positions and act 
cohesively – is one of the main determinants of effectiveness in interregional 
negotiations. Yet the EU’s external influence on structurally weaker ACP regions 
plays an important role in promoting or inhibiting the evolution of their regional 
actorness, carrying through into their degree of negotiating effectiveness. The 
findings raise some interesting implications not only for the study of interregion-
alism, but also for the study of ‘Normative Power’ Europe. 
Section 7.2 sets the two case studies in comparative perspective, outlining the 
empirical findings of the project, and the extent to which they confirm or 
disconfirm the hypotheses of Chapter Three. Section 7.3 examines the feasibility 
of rival explanations, while Section 7.4 sets out the significance of the project’s 
findings for the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter Three as well as the 
broader literature on interregionalism. Section 7.5 explores the wider applicability 
and generalizability of the findings beyond the two case studies, as well as some of 
the limitations of the research. Section 7.6 sets out some implications and recom-
mendations for both EU and ACP policy-makers, as well as speculating on the 
future of interregional cooperation. Section 7.7 suggests some avenues for future 
research, calling for deeper investigation of the actorness of regions in multilateral 
cooperation and negotiation, further research into South-South interregionalism, 
and the role of regional powers in the provision of regional governance. 
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7.2  West Africa and SADC in comparative perspective
Actorness and Effectiveness
H1: Regions with greater (trade) actorness are likely to be more effective negotiators in 
interregional negotiations than those with less.   
The first hypothesis posited a correlational link between higher levels of actorness 
and greater negotiating effectiveness, and indeed the empirical chapters confirm 
the correlation between actorness and effectiveness. The West Africa/ECOWAS 
group was characterized by both a higher degree of actorness and effectiveness 
than the SADC Group (see Table 7.1 and Figure 7.1). West Africa’s relatively high 
level of actorness was the result of more homogenous member state preferences at 
the outset of the negotiations, and stronger and more autonomous regional 
institutions with the mandate to negotiate on behalf of member states. The SADC 
Group’s actorness was lower, but can be divided into two distinct periods: one from 
the start of negotiations to 2010, when actorness was very low and the negotiations 
were conducted in an uncoordinated fashion; and a second part, in which South 
Africa was able to exert its leadership of the group and enforce a unified regional 
position. The main culprit in the SADC Groups’ lack of actorness was the lack of 
formal institutions at the regional level for formulating disparate member state 
preferences into a coherent regional position. The prevalence of overlapping 
regional initiatives, in conjunction with geo-economic rivalries, was a major factor 
in this, as most SADC states opted to negotiate EPAs outside of the SADC framework 
in order to avoid becoming further enmeshed in South Africa’s economic 
dominance of the region. Under such circumstances, the potential role of the 
SADC Secretariat was fairly limited. Lacking formal regional institutions, South 
Africa tried to provide informal ‘guidance’ to the negotiations, but this early 
attempt at leadership was heavily contested by the smaller states. Finally the small 
states had no choice but to fall in line with South African preferences on the EPA, 
or else risk the disintegration of the Southern African Customs Union, a severely 
negative outcome for the smaller states. From that point onwards the SADC Group 
was characterized by a somewhat higher level of actorness due to the informal 
‘leadership’ of South Africa, after which the group was able to win some concessions 
from the EU. 
West Africa has also been more effective in EPA negotiations than the SADC region 
(see Figure 7.2). Most importantly, it has been more effective on the issues that 
matter the most to it, namely market access and development financing, compared 
to SADC’s (agricultural) market access and regime harmonization. West Africa 
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won a major concession from the EU in its agreement to liberalize 75 percent of 
European imports over a 20-year period. Given the EU’s prior firm insistence that 
EPAs must liberalize at least 80 percent over 15 years, the agreement on market 
access is quite impressive and likely to set unwelcome precedents for the EU’s 
future trade negotiations with other states and regions. West Africa was also 
effective in retaining the community levies used to finance ECOWAS and UEMOA. 
It was moderately effective in acquiring financing for the PAPED, the region’s 
EPA-related development mechanism, and in limiting the use of the non-execution 
clause. The region was relatively less interested in the remaining four issues, and 
Table 7.1   West Africa/ECOWAS and SADC actorness in comparative perspective
Aspect of actorness West Africa/
ECOWAS
Numerical 
score
SADC Numerical 
score
Identity Weak, but does 
not inhibit 
pooling of 
sovereignty
1 Strong, but 
inhibits pooling of 
sovereignty  
2
Member state  
preferences 
Fairly 
homogenous
2 Heterogeneous 1
Institutions Formal 
institutions
Robust and 
autonomous 
Commission, 
supranational 
negotiating 
machinery 
4 Operates on 
intergovernmental 
principles 
(unanimity and 
consensus) at 
a general level, 
negotiating 
machinery 
intergovernmental 
and somewhat 
dysfunctional
1
Informal 
leadership 
Absent 0 Attempted 
leadership from SA, 
but contested by 
neighbouring states
1
Capabilities Budget High 2 Low and donor-
dependent
1
Diplomatic 
instruments
Diplomatic 
representation, 
lobbying 
1 Diplomatic 
representation and  
lobbying
1
Cumulative 
score
10 7
Source: own compilation
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the effective outcomes that were obtained here, on agricultural subsidies and 
rules of origin, were not so much the result of West African actorness, but rather 
related to factors in the external opportunity structure. In the case of agricultural 
subsidies the EU was already phasing out subsidies on produce exported to 
developing countries, in line with internal reforms to its Common Agricultural 
Policy, while the outcome on rules of origin was shared across all EPA regions 
(except the SADC Group), and related more to the all-ACP argument that rules of 
origin needed to be reformed in order to promote regional integration and 
cooperation. The SADC Group was less effective than West Africa on its most 
important issues. The region did not obtain most of its objectives relating to 
market access and harmonization of the various trade regimes within the region. 
However the outcome on both counts was an improvement on what was previously 
in place, and did go some way to harmonizing Southern Africa’s overlapping 
regimes and improving on market access conditions. The outcomes on export 
taxes and new generation issues were disappointing according to the official 
position of the region, but in the case of the new generation issues the BLS group 
may have been unofficially pleased to have forced the regional agenda on service 
liberalization by making binding commitments under the interim EPA. Finally, 
like West Africa, the SADC Group did win improved rules of origin, but this was 
not due to the region’s actorness, but rather the strength of the all-ACP argument. 
However South Africa was (again) not granted the same treatment as its neighbours, 
thus limiting cumulation among the member states of the region. 
West Africa’s effectiveness in the EPAs is somewhat surprising given the structural 
weakness of West African states compared to southern African ones. The SADC 
region is historically a more important destination for European goods.53 Southern 
African states are typically more developed and have better governance institutions 
at the national level, in theory granting them greater capacity for engaging in 
complex international trade negotiations. They even had amongst their midst a 
member state with prior experience of negotiating with the EU. Yet greater 
capacity at the national level did not translate into greater regional effectiveness, 
due to the lack of regional actorness. 
It is interesting to note that three out four of West Africa’s top concerns, namely 
development financing, community levies and the non-execution clause, were 
more political than economic in nature. Development financing and the 
non-execution clause were entirely absent from the SADC Group’s concerns, and 
53 However the EC’s own balance of trade statistics show this changing over the past three years, as 
the EU is exporting less to SADC and more to ECOWAS (DG Trade website).  
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the SADC Group did not spend time arguing about the definition of ‘substantially 
all trade’, the development dimension of the EPAs, or whether political condition-
alities were appropriate for the EPAs. This is indicative of a general difference in 
perception of the EPAs and the ‘rules of the game’ between the two regions. The 
SADC Group accepted the EPA at face-value as a commercial trade agreement, 
while West Africa perceived the EPA as a trade and development agreement 
(Weinhardt 2014) that could not be viewed in isolation from the developmental 
provisions of the Cotonou Agreement. This difference in the perception of EPAs 
may be related to West Africa’s identity as a developing region, whereas Southern 
African states are more economically developed and more likely to view themselves 
as peers and equals to the EU.
From Actorness to Effectiveness
Hypotheses two, three and four concerned the three-step causal process whereby 
higher levels of actorness are transformed into greater effectiveness.
Figure 7.1   Effectiveness of West Africa and SADC EPA Group in EPA negotiations
West Africa 16 SADC 7
Issue Outcome Issue Outcome 
Market access Effective Agricultural 
market access 
Moderately effective 
Development 
financing
Moderately effective Regime 
harmonization 
Moderately effective 
Community levies Effective Export taxes Not effective 
Non-execution 
clause
Moderately effective MFN Moderately effective 
Agricultural 
subsidies
Effective, but not 
due to actorness
IFP Moderately effective
Agricultural 
safeguards
Not effective New generation Not effective 
MFN Not effective Agricultural 
safeguards 
Effective 
RoO Effective, but not 
due to actorness 
RoO Moderately effective, 
but not due to 
actorness 
Source: own compilation
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H2: A region with greater actorness will produce a common position faster than regions 
with less actorness. 
The West African region acted as a fairly cohesive block during the EU – all-ACP 
phase of EPA negotiations. Both ECOWAS and UEMOA were enthusiastic about the 
prospect of conducting EPA negotiations on an interregional basis, and the West 
African configuration was one of the first EPA groups to embark on the second 
phase of region-to-region negotiations. The region produced a common roadmap 
to guide the negotiations eight months into phase two, and there was little 
indication that any member states were dissatisfied with the regional position in 
these early stages. In contrast, the SADC Group was far less organized during the 
early stages of the negotiations. During the EU – all-ACP phase it was unclear 
which regional framework Southern African states would negotiate under. The 
SADC Group’s negotiations were launched almost a year late, and the region did 
not produce a common framework to guide the EPA process until February 2006, 
twenty months after the start of EU-SADC negotiations. The slow start to the SADC 
negotiations was an indication of the intra-regional differences within the SADC 
Group, and moreover it quickly became apparent that several SADC member states 
had very different preferences on service liberalization than that expressed in the 
official regional framework paper. Evidence from the empirical chapters therefore 
supports part one of the causal mechanism; that regions with greater levels of 
actorness produce a common position relatively quickly in the negotiation process.
H3: A region with greater actorness will implement a more coherent negotiating strategy 
and better deploy diplomatic tools in pursuit of goals than regions with less actorness
West Africa’s negotiating strategy was for the most part based on making a low 
offer, and then delaying and stalling for as long as possible, while making 
normative, development-orientated arguments intended to appeal to the EU’s 
self-image as a ‘force for good in the world’. Evidence from the case study would 
suggest that the second part of this strategy – normative arguments intended to 
appeal to the EU’s self-image – were hardly effective in swaying European 
negotiators. It was only when the West Africans began arguing their position in 
more technical, legal terms exploiting the shadow of WTO law that they started to 
make real headway in the negotiations. On the other hand it would appear that 
the long delays and stalling tactics employed by West Africa (and indeed the rest of 
the ACP) contributed to the European Commission’s negotiating fatigue and 
eagerness to conclude an EPA deal, even if it meant making previously unpalatable 
concessions. To make matters worse for the Europeans, the West Africans 
suspended negotiations for almost two years, from April 2012 to February 2014, 
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ostensibly to work on the details of its intra-regional customs union, but it is 
possible that during this time regional elites were engaged in behind-the-scenes 
lobbying of EU member states, who preceded to pressure the Commission to 
conclude the EPAs. Unfortunately there is no ‘smoking gun’ to conclusively support 
claims of behind-the-scenes lobbying and/or diplomatic coordination between 
West African elites and EU member states, only coincidental evidence and 
second-hand observations.
The SADC Group did not really have an identifiable negotiating strategy until 
South Africa was able to assert its authority over the rest of the group. Lead by 
experienced South African negotiators, from 2010 onwards the region deployed a 
strategy of rhetorical entrapment. SADC negotiators blamed the EU for the 
near-disintegration of SACU, and highlighted the EU’s apparent hypocrisy in 
undermining regional integration and the developmental interests of LDCs in 
Southern Africa, while downplaying the intra-regional differences among member 
states that had contributed to the situation. Once the EU announced the unilateral 
deadline of January 2014 for the conclusion of the negotiations, the SADC Group 
adopted a high profile lobbying campaign targeted at European decision-makers 
to have the deadline extended. Although SADC’s lobbying efforts were ultimately 
not successful, it represented a more directly observable use of the region’s 
diplomatic toolbox than that seen in West Africa. 
H4: The member states of a region with greater actorness will resist defection better than 
those with less actorness. 
Both West Africa and the SADC Group experienced member state defections from 
a common position at key junctures in the negotiations. However the scale of 
defections in West Africa was less severe than in the SADC Group. In West Africa, 
Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana initialled interim EPAs at the first ‘crunch point’ at the 
end of 2007. Negotiators from the region allege this was with the full knowledge 
and consent of the ECOWAS Commission, however intra-regional tensions were 
apparent in both countries’ assertions that they would be willing to take their 
bilateral interim agreements forward if there was insufficient progress towards a 
regional EPA. At the second crunch point, towards the end of 2008, Côte d’Ivoire 
signed its interim EPA. Ghana never signed its interim EPA, and both iEPAs were 
scrapped in favour of the more favourable region-wide EPA. In the SADC Group, 
five out of the seven member states initialled interim EPAs in December 2007. 
South Africa and Angola were the only ones who refrained from initialling the 
iEPA, while Namibia did so with certain reservations. The severity of the defections 
worsened in June 2009 when four of the five added their signatures to the interim 
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EPAs, much to the shock and surprise of the remaining three states. As in West 
Africa, these interim agreements were never ratified or implemented, and were 
eventually replaced with a region-wide EPA. Yet unlike the West African case, 
certain provisions in the interim EPAs were not renegotiated and made it into the 
final EPA, albeit selectively applied to the signatories of the interim EPAs. The scale 
of the defections within the SADC Group certainly undermined the region’s 
effectiveness and cohesiveness.   
Scope Conditions
Hypotheses five and six concerned the scope conditions under which weaker 
regions (such as the ACP regions) can be effective when negotiating with much 
stronger regions (such as the EU) 
H5: Lower actorness regions (i.e. ACP regions negotiating with the EU) require a favourable 
opportunity structure in order to be effective
All ACP regions negotiated with the EU under broadly similar conditions. All were 
included under the wider umbrella of the ACP Group and the Cotonou Agreement, 
and under the shadow of WTO law. As Chapter Three pointed out, when negotiating 
with a far powerful partner such the EU, relatively less powerful regions such as 
SADC or West Africa require a somewhat favourable opportunity structure in 
order to be effective negotiators. Luckily for the ACP regions, since the start of 
negotiations in 2002 the external opportunity structure has been changing in 
their favour. The rise of the BRICS, China’s joining of the WTO and the ongoing 
Eurozone crisis have resulted in a shift in power and influence away from Europe 
in favour of emerging and developing countries, and delaying the conclusion of 
negotiations seven years past the initial deadline allowed ACP regions to negotiate 
better agreements than if they had concluded them in 2007. Both regions, and 
Sub-Saharan Africa in general, have benefited from increased Chinese engagement 
in Africa over the period EPA negotiations were conducted. Both Western and 
Southern Africa greatly increased their trade with China since the turn of the 
millennium, with the great bulk of increased trade centered on Nigeria and South 
Africa. Clearly some aspects of the EPAs (especially the clauses concerning export 
taxes and the Most Favoured Nation principle) were motivated by European fears 
of losing access to Africa’s raw materials and its emerging markets to China. 
African states are clearly aware of the enhanced leverage vis-à-vis the EU this 
grants them (see for example the Nigerian Trade Minister’s pointed comments at 
the Élysée Summit in December 2013 on page 118), and this is probably one of the 
major factors why the EPAs were less far-reaching than the EU desired. While 
increased trade with China has contributed to a more favourable opportunity 
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structure for African states and regions across the board, there is no evidence that 
this was skewered towards one region over another (see Section 7.3). Other 
favourable changes in the opportunity structure include the WTO’s adoption of 
the Trade for Aid agenda, and the EU’s internal reforms to the Common Agricultural 
Policy, which affected all ACP regions equally. 
H6: Those ACP regions with higher levels of actorness will be better able to exploit 
favourable opportunities structures as part of their negotiating strategy, resulting in 
greater effectiveness. 
Some regions leveraged the changing opportunity structure (that affected all ACP 
regions equally) better than others. As previously mentioned, both regions 
negotiated EPAs under the shadow of WTO law, however there were differences in 
how they utilized WTO rules to their own advantage. West Africa leveraged the 
shadow of WTO law as part of its negotiating strategy on a number of occasions: 
once to argue for the inclusion of financing the PAPED to complement the WTO 
Trade for Aid agenda; and once again to justify the region’s market access offer 
with reference to the GATT Agreement. On the other hand, there is no evidence 
that the SADC Group adopted changes in the WTO agenda or alternate interpreta-
tions of WTO law as part of its negotiating strategy. 
A key window of opportunity for ACP regions was the letter of 5th December 2013. 
As Chapter Five points out, the letter was issued the day after African ministers 
had warned France of ‘missing the boat’ in Africa (see pg. 118), and interviewees 
suggested that there may have been some diplomatic coordination between France 
and some African nations in the timing and release of the letter (pg. 119). Certainly 
the letter created a window of opportunity that West Africa capitalized on in the 
next round of negotiations. But even though the SADC Group may not have played 
a role in actively creating this particular window of opportunity, there was 
nothing to preclude SADC negotiators from similarly capitalizing on the letter, 
which evidence from interviews suggests they indeed did (pg. 173). The letter was 
publicly issued, and Southern African ministers were also present at the December 
4th summit at which France pledged to facilitate an Afrocentric outcome to the 
EPAs. The letter was also signed by the United Kingdom, which like France, has 
maintained post-colonial links with its former colonies. There is even an instance 
of possible British intervention in favour of the SADC Group, as it was a British 
MEP that tabled a report of the extension of the negotiating deadline to the 
European Parliament, a result of the SADC Group’s lobbying campaign (pg. 
171-172). Neither the letter nor the report on the deadline were targeted at a 
specific region, but rather the ACP and the various EPA processes as a whole. These 
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were windows of opportunity for any ACP region, but their ability to exploit it was 
dependent on their actorness, and the evidence suggests that West Africa was able 
to better exploit favourable opportunity structures in order to achieve their goals. 
EU Influence 
The final hypothesis concerned the EU’s influence on the actorness of ACP regions:
 
H7: Where an integrative influence prevails (material incentives are sufficient to promote 
regional cooperation, no bilateral FTAs, EPAs cohere with boundaries of regional 
organization, lower prevalence of divide and rule tactics), regional actorness is likely to 
be greater. Where a disintegrative influence prevails (material incentives are insufficient 
to promote intra-regional cooperation, there are bilateral FTAs with the regional power 
or other differentiated trade regimes that prevent the emergences of a common regional 
position, EPAs do not cohere with pre-existing regional organizations, high prevalence of 
divide and rule tactics), regional actorness is likely to be lower.  
As explained in Chapter Five, the EU’s influence has been generally beneficial to 
the evolution of ECOWAS’ actorness. There are increasingly large amounts of 
development funding available for regionalism, giving West African states, which 
may otherwise have little to gain from regional integration due to low levels of 
intra-regional trade an incentive to cooperate at the regional level. Financial and 
technical assistance from the EU, as well as the prospect of the EPAs, encouraged 
ECOWAS to strengthen its institutional capacity. There were no pre-existing FTAs 
with the regional power or any other member states to undermine member states’ 
interests in regional cooperation. The West African EPA closely cohered with the 
borders of ECOWAS, and divide-and-rule tactics were not as prevalent a feature of 
the negotiations as in Southern Africa, due to the ECOWAS Commission’s strong 
role in the negotiations. On the other hand, the SADC Group’s lack of actorness 
and South Africa’s self-interested behaviour in the EPA negotiations can be 
(partially) attributed to the EU’s disintegrative influence on the region. The 
pre-existing TDCA with South Africa had caused South Africa to become a Rambo 
and cease constructive contribution to SADC’s integration agenda, depriving the 
regional of an internal paymaster. Declining amounts of European Development 
Funding for SADC’s regional agenda, on top of low levels of intra-regional trade 
mean that SADC member states lacked strong incentives to participate in regional 
cooperation and integration. The introduction of an EPA that did not cohere with 
the borders of the existing regional organization worsened the region’s problem 
with overlap, and allowed several SADC members to negotiate under alternative 
configurations. The European Commission’s use of divisive negotiating tactics 
further undermined the region’s actorness and effectiveness by increasing the 
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pressure and incentives for some member states to initial and sign interim EPAs at 
the expense of regional ones. 
While it would appear that the EU’s (dis)integrative influence on Southern and 
Western Africa has had an effect on the evolution of regional actorness, as 
predicted by hypothesis seven, ECOWAS’ higher and SADC’s lower levels of 
actorness cannot be attributed solely to the influence of the EU. The EU’s financial 
and technical assistance and interregional approach to trade and aid cooperation 
certainly contributed to the evolution of actorness, but there are also likely to be 
several domestic material and normative factors that encourage or inhibit the 
emergence of regional actorness. These are discussed in further detail in Section 7.4.
The EU’s differential treatment of West Africa/ECOWAS and Southern 
Africa/SADC 
The EU’s influence clearly has a different effect on the two regions. Part of this 
differing experience of the EU’s influence is due to factors within the region itself. 
Local choices regarding which negotiation configuration to join and the 
institutional design of the region’s negotiating machinery affect the likeliness of 
regions experiencing the EU’s influence as positive or negative for regional 
cooperation and integration. Yet the EU clearly treats these regions differently. 
Why does West Africa receive more favourable treatment from the EU than SADC? 
We might find an explanation for the differences in the EDF allocations in West 
Africa’s geographical proximity to Europe, and its willingness to emulate EU-style 
regionalism. As pointed out by one interviewee, West Africa is a lot closer to Europe 
than Southern Africa. Underdevelopment and poverty contributes to instability, 
which produces negative externalities for Europe in the form of illegal migration, 
drug trafficking, and terrorism.54 Where poverty and instability create negative 
externalities for the EU, it has a vested interest in promoting peace and prosperity 
via its trade and aid policies, and as Chapter Two and the opening quotations of 
this manuscript point out, the EU holds causal beliefs in the value of regionalism 
as a means to securing peace and prosperity, based on its own historical experience. 
ECOWAS has proven itself more willing to adopt this perspective and copy EU-style 
institutions than its Southern African counterpart (Kufuor 2006), and ECOWAS is 
also perceived by European donors to be a good ‘student’ of regionalism (Piccolino 
and Minou 2014). European observers noted that ECOWAS was one of the few ACP 
regions sorting their internal processes relatively well, while West African 
54 West Africa is a significant source of illegal migration into Europe, and the EU has in the past 
pushed ECOWAS to develop a common approach on migration, and a joint EU-ECOWAS working 
group on migration was established in 2007 (Managala 2013: 206).
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policy-makers likewise noted that ‘we are better integrated and take a more 
harmonized approach, which perhaps other regions don’t, and the EU believes 
there is greater efficiency if projects are conducted at the regional level’ (ECOWAS 
Official, Skype interview, 13th August 2014). EU-ECOWAS relations are characterized 
as ‘a good working relationship, and one of the signs of this being the agreement 
between the EU and West Africa on the level of the EDF, which is now double the 
previous envelope’ (ECOWAS Official, Skype Interview, 12th June 2014). On the 
other hand, SADC’s EDF envelope has been steadily declining over recent years. All 
indicators suggest that the EU is dissatisfied with SADC for both bureaucratic and 
political reasons. On the bureaucratic level, despite centralization of the Secretariat 
and various capacity-building initiatives, SADC has been characterized by poor 
institutional capacity to absorb development funding. Throughout the 1990s, 
SADC performed very poorly in absorbing EDF money (Adelmann 2008), and more 
recently Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa stated that member states and 
international cooperating partners were unhappy with the SADC Secretariat’s 
ability to absorb financial aid, and failure to perform even perfunctory 
administrative tasks such as the timely circulation of documents prior to regional 
meetings (Mangwato 2008). Even the Secretariat itself has admitted to ‘delays, 
inefficiencies, reduced impact and limited sustainability’ (SADC 2013) and various 
initiatives to improve SADC’s internal accounting and auditing processes have 
done little to staunch the decline in donor funding.55 On the political level, the EU 
has been frustrated by SADC’s handling of the situation in Zimbabwe. SADC’s 
mediation efforts, led by South African president Thabo Mbeki, in the wake of the 
controversial 2008 elections were perceived as ‘too soft’ (Darracq 2010). SADC 
refused to exclude Zimbabwe from participating in interregional dialogue with 
the EU, leading to the suspension of the EU-SADC Berlin Initiative in 2008, and 
more recently, the SADC Heads of States’ collusion with the Zimbabwean 
government in suspending the European-funded and promoted Tribunal prompted 
the head of the EU delegation to SADC to state that ‘we have principles that we feel 
strongly about, including the respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law. EU support is linked to performance in these areas’ (quoted in Hulse and van 
der Vleuten, 2015: 110). As the Tribunal incident illustrated, SADC has been far less 
willing to adopt EU-style regionalism, and its tendency to ‘read from the donor 
script’ without real ownership of the norms and institutions adopted to satisfy 
donors (Hulse and van der Vleuten, 2015) has contributed to a degree of cynicism 
55 Its worth pointing out that in 2009 the EU’s own Court of Auditors critiqued ECOWAS’ poor 
performance in absorbing EDF money, in light of which the allocation for West African may be ‘too 
high’. It was not reduced in the next EDF cycle, so it would appear that previous poor performance 
on absorbing funding is not necessarily a determinant of how much money is allocated to ACP 
regions. 
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and dissatisfaction among the donor community. Southern Africa is both more 
politically stable and physically further away from Europe than West Africa, and 
the region is not a significant source of negative externalities for the EU. Increasing 
or maintaining funding for SADC is unlikely to deliver increased benefits to the 
EU, whereas increasing funding for regionalism in West Africa is likely to bring 
the EU greater dividends than it does in Southern Africa. 
A second factor in the EU’s differential treatment of Southern and Western Africa 
lays in the EU’s commercial competition with the regions’ largest economies, 
South Africa and Nigeria. Although Nigeria overtook South Africa as Africa’s 
largest economy in 2014, Nigerian exports do not represent a threat to European 
products in the same way that South African ones do. Nigeria primarily exports oil 
and cocoa products, for which there is little competition with EU member states 
on European markets. South Africa exports fruit, wine and other agricultural 
produce that directly competes with produce from southern EU member states. 
The EU has always been reluctant to let South Africa join the ACP group and offer 
it the same treatment as its ACP neighbours (duty free quota free access to the 
European market), even though the insistence on differential treatment for one 
member of a customs union is harmful for regional integration. This would 
suggest that, when push comes to shove, in the case of South Africa, the EU’s 
commercial interests trump its normative commitments to promote regionalism. 
The within and cross-case analysis support the hypotheses developed in Chapter 
Three. Unfortunately however the quality of the available evidence is not always 
sufficient to conclusively support a specific interpretation of events. For example it 
is difficult to conclude one way or another whether France’s traditionally close 
relationship with its former colonies gave West Africa an advantage over other 
regions. The comparison of the two regions also suggests that the SADC Group 
may have faced a higher degree of commercially motivated opposition from the 
EU than West Africa, primarily because of South Africa’s eventual inclusion in the 
group and the threat of competition with South African exports on European 
markets. The SADC Group also focused on negotiating on issues that, if successful, 
would curtail Europe’s access to raw materials and the local market. West Africa 
focused its energies on issues that posed less of an immediate threat to Europe’s 
commercial interests, but if successful had the potential to set very unwelcome 
precedents for the EU’s future trade negotiations (the interpretation of 
‘substantially all trade’, additional development funds for signing the agreement, 
and the appropriateness of political conditionalities in trade agreements). So while 
the threat of commercial competition from West Africa was certainly lower than 
from the SADC Group, opposition from the EU was still high due to the preced-
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ent-setting nature of the requested concessions, particularly on West Africa’s 
market access offer. 
7.3  Rival Explanations
The empirical analysis raises a number of rival explanations for West Africa’s 
negotiating effectiveness. First among these is the possibility of French intervention 
in favour of West Africa as a result of the clientelism and neopatrimonialism that 
has traditionally characterised Franco-African relations.
Nine out of the 16 West African states are former colonies of France, and historically 
France maintained close ties with its former colonies through the back-channel 
system of Françafrique. Certainly there is some second-hand and circumstantial 
evidence in favour of French intervention in the timing of the release of the 
December 5th letter. Yet at the same time one should not overstate the importance 
of French influence in contemporary EU-Africa relations. While it is true that the 
Gaullist system of Françafrique saw large tracts of Africa being essentially run from 
inside the Elysée Palace through networks of personal influence, clientelism and 
patronage (Howorth 2013), the system of Françafrique is a relic of the past (Bourmaud 
2012). Once elected in 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy abolished the secretive Africa cell at 
the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while current president Francoise Hollande 
has fewer personal links with African leaders than any of his predecessors 
(Howorth 2013). Relations have become more transparent and normalized as 
France has moved away from the Françafrique system in favour of working through 
and with EU and African Union channels (Howorth 2013). French investment and 
business interests in Africa have also been declining over recent decades. The 
result has been a decline in the ‘special relationship’ between France and 
(Francophone) Africa (Bourmaud 2012). One should also keep in mind that the UK 
has also maintained historical relationships with its former colonies, many of 
them located in southern Africa, and that the UK, alongside France, was also a 
signatory of the Dec 5th letter. So if one considers the letter a French intervention 
in favour of West Africa, then one should equally consider it a UK intervention in 
favour of southern Africa. Indeed the letter mentions specific issues troubling both 
the West African and SADC negotiations, giving negotiators from both regions 
equal opportunity to capitalize on the letter. 
A second potential explanation, deriving from an IPE approach, might explain 
West Africa’s relative success in terms of a variance in the interests of the big 
economic powers (namely China) other than the EU. If China’s economic influence 
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is greater in one region, it gives that region more options to leverage against the 
EU, including the option to walk away from a substandard agreement. It also 
means the EU has competition from a third party, giving it a greater incentive to 
make concessions towards the region so as to avoid losing markets and access to 
resources to a competitor. As explained in the sections on opportunity structure, 
the increase in Chinese influence in Africa over the lifespan of the negotiations 
more than likely granted African regions greater leverage vis-à-vis the EU. But has 
Chinese influence granted West Africa a greater advantage than southern Africa? 
As Table 7.2 illustrates, the share of total exports going to China and Europe is 
fairly similar across both regions. The share of exports going to China is actually 
slightly less in West Africa’s case than the SADC Group’s case, meaning it is 
unlikely that Chinese influence has given West Africa a greater negotiating 
advantage than the SADC Group. 
7.4  Theoretical implications 
Implications of findings for the theoretical framework 
The comparison of the two regions generates some interesting insights into the 
regional specificities of actorness, and how the components of actorness, 
specifically shared identity, formal institutions and the role of the regional powers, 
interact with each other and the external environment to produce (or not, as the 
case may be) effective outcomes. 
Identity
Many models of actorness consider regional identity an important component of 
actorness (Wunderlich 2012b, Bretherton and Vogler 2006). Yet the analysis of West 
Africa showed that actorness can exist in the absence of a strong sense of regional 
identity; while the SADC case illustrates that the presence of a strong sense of 
regional identity does not necessarily translate into higher levels of actorness. This 
Table 7.2   West Africa vs SADC Group percentage of total exports to China  
and Europe, 2013
China Europe* China Europe
West Africa 16% 29% SADC Group 21% 31%
*includes non-EU European states
Source: Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2015
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empirical finding calls into question the relevance of identity for actorness, and 
perhaps for regionalism more generally. At first glance, the null finding on the 
shared identity à actorness relationship would appear to fit with Jeffrey Checkel’s 
(2016) assessment that there is little systematic evidence of a causal relationship 
between identity and regionalism. However, his review of the existing literature 
on identity and regionalism does not suggest that identity doesn’t matter, but 
rather that existing studies on the relation between regionalism and identity are 
less than convincing due to a lack of methodological rigor. Indeed, the creation of 
some regional organizations, such as the African Union, are ‘hard to explain in 
the absence of some prior regional identity’ (Checkel, 2016: 562), while pre-existing 
collective identities, particularly those emphasizing post-colonial nationalism, 
may inhibit the creation of robust and effective regional organizations (Checkel, 
2016: 567; see also Barnett and Solingen 2007). Rather than directly impacting on 
actorness, it is more the case that identity has an indirect effect on actorness via 
the design of formal (and informal) regional institutions. As explained in Chapter 
Three, the constitutive norms and values associated with a particular collective 
identity have an impact on the design of regional institutions. There is some 
support for this in the literature (see Lenz and Marks 2016 for an overview). For 
example, democratic states are more likely to consent to intrusive regional design 
features than autocratic regimes (Acharya and Johnston 2007), while regional 
organizations whose member states are dominated by a tradition of civil law tend 
to opt for more standardized rules and stronger dispute settlement mechanisms at 
the regional level than regions whose member states have a tradition of common 
law (Duina 2010). Constitutive norms and values have influenced the institutional 
design of SADC. There is a strong sense of identity based on the collective 
revolutionary experience of the anti-Apartheid struggle, but the foundational 
norms of that identity (the battle for sovereignty and self-determination, solidarity 
vis-à-vis hostile outside forces, and rejection of outside intervention) are such that 
it inhibits the emergence of robust formal regional institutions. This is in line 
with the suggestion that an identity as a post-colonial state may inhibit the 
delegation of authority to the regional level, but as the comparison of ECOWAS 
and SADC shows, this may not be a constant across all post-colonial states. It may 
be the case that the length of time since independence has an effect on post-colonial 
states’ willingness to pool sovereignty, or it may be related to the type and intensity 
of conflict experienced within a region. The SADC region experienced many wars 
of independence, in which national sovereignty was hard-won from colonial 
powers or minority-rule governments, and subsequently jealously guarded, 
against both foreign intervention and sovereignty infringing regional institutions. 
West Africa transitioned to independence relatively peacefully, but afterwards 
experienced many civil conflicts in which sovereignty may have come to seem a bit 
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overrated. Building relatively strong regional institutions may have offered a 
means of overcoming the region’s propensity to violence fuelled by ethnic 
chauvinism at the national level. While West Africa is not characterized by a 
strong sense of regional identity, interestingly the ECOWAS Commission has 
embarked on an ambitious identity-building campaign, explicitly intended to 
build a sense of West African community as a conflict prevention measure (cf. 
ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework 2008). However shared identities tend to 
be sticky and resistant to rapid change over time, unless faced with an extreme 
event or crisis (Risse 2010), so the results of such efforts will not be apparent for 
some time. In the meantime, further research is needed to properly establish the 
constitutive relationship between shared norms and regional institutional design. 
One might subsequently argue that if the relevance of identity is subordinated to 
that of institutions, its inclusion is not necessary in a model of actorness. If we 
wish to be deterministic about the social world, perhaps this is a justifiable 
argument. Yet as Chapter Four pointed out, ideational factors (i.e. collective 
identity) do not ‘cause’ action in the same way as material facts (i.e. institutions). 
Rather they provide ‘reasons for action, which is not the same as causes for actions’ 
and play a role in explaining why something is historically so and not otherwise 
(Ruggie 1998: 869). Thus including identity in actorness takes us beyond a 
superficial understanding of ‘region Y has a comparatively low degree of actorness’ 
to a more nuanced understanding of the historical reasons behind region Y’s 
relative lack of actorness, and also of what type of actor it is likely to be on the 
international stage. Identity and shared norms may provide the reason why a 
region has weak institutions, thereby inhibiting actorness, but it is still primarily 
the institutions that are contributing to higher or lower degrees of actorness, and 
not identity. This leads to the observation that in practical terms of measuring 
actorness, not all components are equally weighted, and that shared identity 
should be considered less important in producing actorness than the other 
components of actorness.  
Formal institutions
Perhaps the biggest difference between the two regions was the role granted to 
regional institutions in the EPA negotiations. Following the EU model, West 
African states granted the ECOWAS Commission the power to negotiate the 
agreement on their behalf. This facilitated the emergence of a common regional 
position early on in the process, and prevented the shifting alliances and 
intra-regional squabbling that characterized the SADC EPA from dominating the 
negotiations. However ECOWAS’ institutional machinery did experience some 
failures, as Nigeria’s list of last-minute objections in March 2014 threatened to 
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scupper the deal, and illustrated a lack of feedback between the national ministries 
and regional institutions. The SADC Group’s institutional machinery was 
hampered by SADC’s insistence on intergovernmental principles and the wider 
membership’s refusal to contribute to institutional capacity that would only serve 
the interests of those states that opted to negotiate under the SADC configuration. 
As a result the SADC Secretariat had very little input in the negotiations, and the 
EU-funded Unit that was set-up was restricted to clerical and administrative duties. 
The SACU Secretariat had a bigger role in the negotiations from 2008 onwards, 
albeit on an ‘unofficial’ basis for which there was no formal provision in the 
regional Roadmap, yet even the SACU Secretariat could not prevent the near-disas-
trous split amongst its own member states in 2009. This fits with the model’s 
expectations that supranational institutions that have the mandate to negotiate 
and take decisions on behalf of member states are beneficial to actorness, while 
intergovernmental institutions are less so.  However the empirical analysis also 
suggests that a regional power can compensate for weak institutions, provided the 
regional power’s leadership is relatively uncontested (see below). 
Informal institutions (regional leadership) 
As explained in Chapter Three, informal institutions and practices are included in 
the actorness model in order to move away from the Eurocentric approach of 
focusing purely on formal institutional design, as many non-Western regions are 
characterized by informal modes of decision-making. There are many types of 
practices that constitute informal institutions, but the project focused on patterns 
of regional leadership from regional powers. The empirical cases highlighted an 
interesting interplay between formal institutions and informal leadership from 
regional powers in producing actorness. In the SADC group, South Africa saw the 
EPA as an opportunity to improve the terms of its trade arrangements with the EU 
and the lack of formal institutions for conducting the negotiations allowed South 
Africa to effectively ‘hijack’ the negotiations and pursue its own interests, often at 
the expense of the smaller states. Although leadership from a regional power is 
certainly a means to producing actorness, it is not necessarily a fair or representative 
one, and arguably the interests of the region as a whole would have been better 
served by formal institutions with codified means of formulating common 
positions. In the West Africa group, where formal regional institutions were given 
a much stronger role, the regional power ultimately subordinated its national 
interest to the regional position, and signed an agreement it had deep reservations 
about for the sake of maintaining regional unity. 
One could hardly imagine South Africa, notorious for its mercantile behaviour, 
taking a similar course of action within SADC. The external influence of the EU is 
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one significant factor in explaining the behaviour of regional powers within their 
regions. South Africa’s pre-existing TDCA contributed to its ‘selfish’ behaviour 
within SADC, while the lack of such an agreement in Nigeria’s case gave it fewer 
opportunities to become a regional Rambo.  One might legitimately wonder why a 
state such as Nigeria, which struggles with underdevelopment, high unemployment 
and widespread poverty, would sign a trade agreement that most impact studies 
agreed would be of little economic benefit. The explanation may have more to do 
with ideological/normative factors than economic ones: Nigeria championed the 
formation of ECOWAS and bears the brunt of its financing (Nwoke 2009: 29). If 
Nigeria had refused to sign the EPA, it would almost certainly have spelled the end 
of regional integration in ECOWAS, leaving the organization empty of its economic 
mandate. Presumably Nigeria did not wish to be responsible for the death of an 
organization it helped to create, nor does it wish to aggravate its neighbours, 
especially when it is engaged in a fierce tussle with South Africa over the claim to 
continental leadership of Africa (Adebajo and Landsberg 2003). So there are 
certainly other factors at play in explaining regional powers’ patterns of behaviour, 
such as the role of domestic interest groups, elite beliefs about the value of regional 
cooperation, or even shadow regionalism, in which state behaviour reflects the 
(illicit) interests of a niche rentier class. More research is needed to understand the 
reasons behind the behaviour of regional powers (see Section 7.7), and how the 
behaviour of regional powers effects regional governance.  
The above analysis of the components of actorness highlights that it is a regionally 
specific concept: in different regions the components interact in different ways to 
produce higher or lower levels of actorness. Although there is no guaranteed 
template to produce high levels of actorness, the comparison of the two cases 
suggests some general principles that are broadly in line with the general 
expectations of IR theory: In principle, the homogeneity of member state 
preferences and the presence of a supranational agent, such as the ECOWAS 
Commission, are likely to produce higher levels of actorness, but as the SADC case 
illustrates, the lack of a supranational agent can be compensated by regional 
leadership, provided that leadership is relatively accepted (by coercive or persuasive 
means) by the smaller states of the region. Shared identity is relatively less 
important and should be weighted accordingly. 
Implications for the broader literature 
Chapter Two identified several lacunae in the existing literature that this project 
aimed to address: the role of actorness, the lack of comparative and theoretically 
informed empirical analyses, and the Eurocentric nature of many studies on inter-
regionalism. 
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Firstly, the existing literature tended to focus on the ‘functions’ of interregional-
ism, where it might be more useful to focus on the drivers and outcomes of inter-
regionalism. As Chapter Two pointed out, the functional approach views inter-
regionalism as performing balancing, bandwagoning, rationalizing, agenda-
setting, and identity-building functions. These functions have supposedly differing 
implications for the drivers and outcomes of interregional cooperation. The 
findings suggest that drivers of EU-ACP interregionalism are different on either 
side of the partnership, as the ACP’s reasons for engaging in interregional 
cooperation are quite different from those of the EU’s. The EU’s motivations for 
engaging in interregionalism with the ACP are best understood as a mixture of 
the agenda-setting and rationalizing motivations as a primary driver, combined 
with a normative motivation for constructing an external identity for the EU as a 
specific kind of international actor, and an interest in constructing other regions 
in the image of the EU as a secondary driver. The rationalizing and agenda-setting 
drivers can be seen in the EU’s claim that the Lomé preferences needed to be 
renegotiated as they were not WTO compatible. However the EU went beyond a 
rationalizing motivation in its pursuit of a WTO+ agenda. The European 
Commission clearly saw the EPAs as an opportunity to pursue an agenda-setting 
programme intended to advance the EU’s global strategic interests as outlined in 
the Global Europe strategy (European Commission 2006). If ACP regions could be 
convinced to adopt EU-approved regulations on service liberalization, intellectual 
property protection, government procurement and investment, it would make it 
easier to advance these issues at the multilateral level. On the other hand, the 
ACP’s motivations are best understood from a realist perspective. Most ACP states 
would have preferred to continue trading under the Lomé preferences, and the 
introduction of reciprocal market opening was an unwelcome development in the 
history of EU-ACP cooperation. ACP states had little to gain commercially from 
EPAs, and only agreed to embark on EPA negotiations due to the EU’s insistence 
that Lomé had to be renegotiated, the promise that EPAs would be accompanied by 
Aid for Trade programmes to compensate for the loss of government revenue, and 
the fear that failure to do so would have a negative effect on the political and 
development pillars of interregional cooperation with the EU. EPAs were concluded 
in both West Africa and SADC despite high levels of domestic opposition, and 
various studies highlight the EPAs’ potential negative effects on the development 
and industrialization policies of African states and regions. This fits with the 
assessment that despite the strength of the EU’s normative rhetoric vis-à-vis its 
most asymmetric interregional partners, its relations with Africa represent a 
‘triumph of realism over idealism’ (Farrell 2005: 263). Interregionalism with the 
ACP serves a number of European interests – increased market access for European 
firms, advancing its strategic global economic interests, constructing a foreign 
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policy identity for the EU as a whole, and diffusing a set of regulatory norms 
associated with a particular form of regional governance that fits with its long-term 
strategic interests. ACP states have little choice but to bandwagon with the EU, and 
in doing so hope to gain some advantages via increased developmental and 
political cooperation, as well as greater leverage vis-à-vis other powerful actors.
As for the outcomes of interregional cooperation, the EPAs represent the most 
highly institutionalized and legally-binding examples of interregionalism, as they 
offer both sides long-term legal certainty and the possibility of legal mediation. 
However, excluding the legalization of trade preferences in the EPAs, the Cotonou 
provisions are actually less binding on the EU than those of the Lomé Convention 
(Ravenhill 2004). While the EU certainly attempted to use the EPAs as a vehicle to 
advance its strategic regulatory interests by pushing the inclusion of WTO-plus 
issues (the agenda-setting function), for the most part ACP regions were able to 
resist this agenda and limit the scope of the EPAs to WTO-compatibility (the 
rationalizing function), although some regions were more successful than others 
in this respect, due to their differing levels of actorness. The findings would appear 
to fit with neoliberal institutionalist expectations regarding the degree of institu-
tionalization and the rationalizing/agenda-setting functions of interregionalism, 
yet they do not necessarily contradict the expectations of institutional realism. 
The EU can ‘afford’ greater institutionalization with ACP regions due to the great 
asymmetry of power between them, while the changes from Lomé to Cotonou 
reflect the EU’s interest in greater flexibility and fewer binding obligations in the 
political and development realm, while at the same time the EPAs lock-in access to 
the ACP’s resources, in the face of increased competition from emerging economic 
actors. These insights paint broad brushstrokes about the flexibility and 
compatibility with multilateral rules of interregional agreements, however they 
cannot account for variation of outcomes within otherwise similar cases of inter-
regionalism. Focusing on the actorness of regions that actually engage in inter-
regionalism fills this gap, and explains why some regions are likely to benefit 
more from interregional cooperation and negotiation than others. 
Actorness is a useful concept for understanding interregionalism as it challenges 
the problematic unitary actor assumption. Chapter Two problematized the 
application of state-centric theories to understanding interregionalism and the 
concurrent implicit assumption that regions are unitary actors along the same 
lines as states. Actorness questions this assumption and also allows for the 
possibility that regional organizations are more than mere conveyor belts for state 
interests, having their own agency and ability to persuade and socialize their 
member states. But due to the almost exclusive focus on EU actorness, there was no 
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generalizable, non-EU specific model of regional actorness. I addressed this gap by 
contributing a systematic and generalizable conceptualization of actorness, which 
unlike previous formulations can be applied to any region and used to assess the 
level of actorness in a given policy sector (trade, security, development, etc). This is 
valuable because actorness is not a quality unique to the EU, nor the Westphalian 
state. Globalization is eroding traditional national sovereignty and fostering the 
emergence of a post-Westphalian order in which regional organizations, civil 
society organizations, private interests and other non-state actors have a greater 
role to play in global governance. Of course the state continues to play a central 
role, as they are the constitutive units of regions, and the legitimacy of regional 
actors ‘is premised on the sovereignty of its state units’ (Doidge 2011: 22), but they 
are no longer the only actors of consequence (Wunderlich 2008). Examining the 
capacity of regions to act allows us to take a more nuanced view of contemporary 
international relations and assess the impact of regional organizations on the 
provision of global governance. 
Chapter Two also noted the lack of comparative case studies and the lack of 
empirical and methodological rigor within the existing literature on interregion-
alism. The project addressed this gap by contributing a rare comparative case 
study on two cases of asymmetric interregionalism. It also offers a rare study of 
trade negotiations between developing countries and the EU, shedding light on 
the motivations, preferences, and tactics of developing countries/regions in 
international negotiations. Taking a theoretically informed approach takes us 
beyond the descriptive and anecdotal approaches so deplored by many scholars of 
interregionalism (cf. Hänggi et al. 2006; Robles 2008). 
Finally, Chapter Two noted the Eurocentrism that characterizes much of the 
literature on interregionalism and attempted to deal with this by focusing on the 
‘other’ region, and by being aware of potential biases in theories and concepts 
borrowed from EU Studies. In some instances theories and concepts required 
modifications in order to better suit a non-European context. For example the 
institutional aspects of actorness were adapted to take account of informal 
institutions, as research into non-Western regions has highlighted the fact that 
the informal institutional rules can be as important as the formal ones. Theories 
of national preference formation had to be modified to take account of the capacity 
constraints and sometimes less-than-liberal environment of African states, while 
understanding the logic of regional cooperation in Africa and other developing 
regions requires an understanding of its ‘extra-regional logic’ (cf. Krapohl and Fink 
2013). While it is possible to translate concepts and theories from the European 
context, successful translation requires an understanding of the regional 
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specificities and the structural constraints faced by many developing states/
regions. One might point out that for a project that aims to move away from 
Eurocentrism, the manuscript contains rather a lot on the EU. But as Bjorn Hettne 
states, Eurocentrism is not solved by ‘closing our eyes on Europe’ (2014: 76). Indeed, 
eliminating Europe from the study of interregionalism would eliminate about 
half of the existing cases. Rather, combating Eurocentrism is about being aware of 
cognitive biases and methodologies that position the EU as the normative baseline 
against which all other cases are measured. 
While Chapter Two argued that the EU is not a sui generis example of regional 
cooperation and integration in and of itself, it is perhaps sui generis when it comes 
to interregionalism, due to the fact that it is the only region that engages in inter-
regionalism in order to promote regionalism in other parts of the world. This 
insight into the EU’s uniqueness in interregionalism, and the empirical findings 
of Chapters Five and Six raise some interesting implications for the concept of 
Normative Power Europe. If promotion of regionalism in other parts of the world 
is the European norm par excellence (Schimmelfennig 2009), and if the EU 
successfully promotes integrative tendencies within target regions, thereby 
contributing to regional actorness, the EU is effectively empowering these regions 
to become stronger and more cohesive bargaining partners. The research questions 
explored in this manuscript could therefore be considered an investigation of the 
claim that the EU is a normative power: is the EU willing to promote regionalism 
in ACP regions, even if doing so ultimately undermines its own negotiating 
effectiveness? The findings lend little support to the idea of Normative Power 
Europe when it comes to the (genuine) promotion of regionalism in ACP regions. 
Time and again the commercial interests of the EU trumped its normative 
commitment to regionalism. In the EPA negotiations the EU was quick to abandon 
normative principles if they had the potential to become costly or threaten its 
commercial interests. For example the EU’s opposition to community levies, 
harmonized rules of origin, binding commitments on Aid for Trade, and treating 
South Africa the same as its neighbours, seems hypocritical when juxtaposed 
against its normative claim to promote regional integration. But it fits with studies 
that attribute the EU’s foreign policies to self-interest and the expectation of 
material benefit, rather than normative idealism (Hyde-Price 2006, Youngs 2004), 
and may go some way to explain the EU’s differential treatment of Southern and 
Western Africa. Simply put, a more cohesive and integrated West African region 
that grants West African states greater international voice represents less of a 
commercial threat to the EU than an integrated and cohesive Southern African 
region. South Africa’s commercial interests clash with those of many European 
states, and a more integrated and cohesive SADC region could see South Africa 
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utilizing regional structures to enhance its international position and bargaining 
power at Europe’s expense. This does not mean the EU is not a normative actor. The 
political conditionalities attached to the Cotonou Agreement and the regulatory 
norms and standards contained within the EPAs prove that it is. Rather it suggests 
that the strand of theorizing that attributes the EU’s normative behaviour to its 
unique constitutional basis or moral superiority (cf. Manners 2002) downplays the 
self-interest contained within the EU’s foreign policy. The EU does not pursue 
‘regionalism through interregionalism’ purely to promote the development of ACP 
regions, it does so because it suits the EU’s strategic interests in pursuing a 
particular set of regulatory norms and standards at the global level, and reduces 
negative externalities on Europe by reducing instability in proximate regions. For 
this reason, perhaps Chad Damro’s (2010) concept of ‘Market Power Europe’ is a 
more fitting term for the EU’s role in the world than ‘Normative Power Europe’. 
7.5   Generalizability and limitations  
of the research project 
Generalizability
Generalizability in qualitative research is often considered a problem, particularly 
by those that have a ‘statistical worldview’ of qualitative research. Even the newer 
approaches to qualitative research and process tracing are ambiguous about 
whether causal inferences derived from within case analysis are only applicable to 
that specific case, or can be generalized to other similar cases (Bennett and Checkel 
2012). However the project applied the hypothesised theoretical framework to two 
case studies, which should increase the framework’s generalizability, at least to 
other similar cases of interregionalism.   Thus one might reasonably expect the 
theoretical framework to be applicable to all seven cases of EU-ACP interregional-
ism, in which the EU is a major trade partner of the relevant states and regions, 
promotes regionalism through its development funding and other policies, and 
negotiates interregional EPAs. Here we might expect the level of actorness of 
regions to be a major factor in explaining the success or failure of negotiations. Of 
the seven ACP regions, West Africa and the SADC Group are the two with the most 
actorness, and have successfully concluded (to varying degrees) agreements with 
the EU. We might expect the other regions with sufficient amounts of actorness to 
conclude full regional EPAs sooner rather than later, while those with very low 
levels of actorness struggle to conclude regional EPAs. The Caribbean states were 
represented by a supranational agency – the specialized Regional Negotiating 
Machinery for conducting trade negotiations as a block (in place since 1997), had a 
Common External Tariff in place, and fairly homogenous member state preferences, 
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and was the first ACP region to conclude a full EPA in 2007. The East African 
Community has a highly ambitious integration agenda since being revived in the 
mid-2000s. Despite only forming an EPA configuration in 2007, it was nevertheless 
able to sign an interim EPA covering all five member states by the end of 2007. 
Kenya, the regional power, was willing to subordinate its national interests to the 
regional position, and the region could agree on common position despite the 
rushed timeline and pressure from the EU (Lorenz 2012), and the region concluded 
a full EPA on 14th October 2014. The remaining three regions (the Pacific, Central 
Africa, and Eastern and Southern Africa) are plagued with heterogeneous 
preferences, a high degree of overlapping initiatives, and weak institutional 
machinery. These regions are yet to conclude regional EPAs, and in all three 
regions non-LDCs have not only initialed and signed interim EPAs, but also ratified 
and implemented them, placing the conclusion of full regional EPAs severely 
under doubt.56 Analysis of the content of the EAC and CARIFORUM EPAs is beyond 
the scope of this brief synopsis, but the theoretical framework would predict 
CARIFORUM to have been as effective in obtaining its objectives as West Africa or 
SADC (and possibly more so due to their prior experience of negotiating as a block), 
and EAC to have been somewhat less effective in obtaining its objectives than 
either West Africa or SADC, due to its intergovernmental approach, depending on 
the role of the regional power. A more generous approach to generalizability and 
applicability could apply the framework to all cases of asymmetric interregional-
ism involving the EU, where the EU offers development funding in support of 
regionalism and is a major trade partner, and negotiates FTAs. This could include 
EU-Mercosur and EU-CAN relations.
Limitations 
As identified in Chapter Four, the lack of transparency surrounding trade 
negotiations and difficulties in accessing information on African regional 
organizations causes some issues in the ‘conclusiveness’ of findings derived from 
cross-case comparison and process tracing. For example, from the evidence 
available one cannot be absolutely certain about the degree of coordination 
between West African and French diplomats in the release of the December 5th 
letter. There is no smoking gun or doubly-decisive piece of evidence to prove 
back-channel diplomacy, rather the evidence is circumstantial. The unavailability 
of key informants and classified documents contributes to temporal, spatial and 
informational gaps in our knowledge of the hypothesized causal mechanism 
linking actorness to effectiveness. In such instances it is helpful to remember 
56 This includes Papua New Guinea and Fiji in the Pacific Group, Cameroon in Central Africa, and 
Madagascar, Mauritius, the Seychelles and Zimbabwe in the EAS Group. 
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Bennett and Checkel’s (2012) assertion that conclusive process tracing is good, but 
good process tracing is not always conclusive. When studying sensitive and 
relatively recent political events, it is likely that researchers will encounter 
obstacles regarding access to information, therefore reducing certainty in one’s 
findings. Researchers can counteract missing evidence by gathering information 
from a wide variety of sources, and this project certainly attempted to do this by 
using interviews, new reports and documentary evidence in piecing together 
almost 12 years of negotiations. However gaps remain in the evidential record.  
7.6  Policy implications 
Relatively little is known about the actual outcomes of interregional cooperation. 
Likewise trade negotiations between the developed and developing world have 
rarely been studied. Given that there is little research available to inform 
evidence-based policy-making, the research presented here raises several points 
that may be useful to policy-makers in both Europe and ACP countries.  
Overlapping regionalism continues to inhibit the emergence  
of coherent external trade policy and international actorness in ACP 
regions
The findings of this project highlight the importance of having coherent regional 
groupings and common regional policy in place prior to engaging in relations 
with external actors. The SADC Group’s disappointing performance shows that 
embarking on trade negotiations with third parties without these requirements 
in place results in sub-optimal agreements that lock-in fragmentation and overlap. 
African policy-makers are already taking steps to address Southern Africa’s overlap 
problem, via the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite, which aims to harmonize the 
trade commitments of these three overlapping regions in order to create a free 
trade area stretching from Cape Town to Cairo. However this is just kicking the 
can down the road, as it does not address the problem of conflicting commitments 
on customs unions, nor does it address the fact that the member states of these 
regional organizations have made differing and potentially conflicting commitments 
to the EU under various EPAs. A potential solution would be for SACU to form a 
Southern African integration hub, and the EAC (also a customs union) to form an 
East African hub, expanding outwards as states decide which customs union to 
join. Indeed, Mozambique is currently in negotiations to join SACU, and other 
countries may follow suit.  The EU may have to allow for some flexibility and/or 
renegotiation on certain EPA issues in order to promote greater harmonization 
and reduce overlap in southern and eastern Africa. 
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Inconsistencies in the EU’s trade and aid policies undermine its 
comparative advantage in promotion of regionalism 
The promotion of regionalism and ‘regionalism through interregionalism’ offers 
the EU a comparative advantage in its foreign policy and development policy 
vis-à-vis other powerful international actors such the USA, China and the BRICS. 
Regional cooperation and integration is an attractive option for many developing 
states, as they stand to benefit from increased economies of scale and greater 
visibility on the international stage. As the world’s most developed and successful 
example of regional integration, the EU has much to offer these developing states, 
not only in terms of being a model to emulate, but also in terms of technical 
expertise and experience. However the high point of the EU’s ‘regionalism through 
interregionalism’ approach to developing states, the EPAs, have ended on a sour 
note. ACP states are disillusioned about the concept of the EU as a normative power. 
From the European perspective, the negotiations dragged on seven years longer 
than expected, and many European member states were dissatisfied with the 
Commission’s handling of the negotiations. There are several factors contributing 
to unsatisfactory outcomes of the EPAs, but perhaps the most significant is the 
inherent inconsistency in the Cotonou Agreement’s principles of regionalization 
and differentiation in the trade dimension. The principle of differentiation is 
unproblematic in the development dimension of Cotonou and allows the EU to 
distinguish between middle-income and low-income countries for more targeted 
and effective aid. However it becomes problematic in the trade dimension when 
accompanied by differentiated trading options that allow certain states to ‘opt 
out’ of regional EPAs. Putting LDCs in a position where they must choose between 
conducting their trade relations with the EU under Everything But Arms (which 
represents ‘extra-regional privileges’ with the EU as it is non-reciprocal) and 
regional EPAs (solidarity and regional integration with their neighbours, but they 
must open their markets to European goods) is unfair, inflames intra-regional 
tensions, and places some of the world’s poorest countries in a very difficult 
position where they must choose between the certainty of short-term gain (or at 
least loss-aversion) under EBA, and the more uncertain, long-term option of 
regional integration and development. The introduction of EBA facilitated a 
breakdown in the alignment of ACP preferences, ‘radically establishing the 
distinction between LDC ACPs and non-LDC ACPs’ (Orbie 2009: 58). ACP states are 
all too aware of these hard choices and resentful that they are forced to make 
them. The EU should take steps to resolve this contradiction as the disparity 
between its discourse and practices in trade and aid is contributing to political 
tensions between Africa and the EU (Kohnert 2014) and undermining the EU’s 
attractiveness and comparative advantage as a development partner. The EU can 
take steps to rectify this inconsistency in its trade policy vis-à-vis the ACP. One 
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option is to extend EBA to all ACP states. Indeed, Pascal Lamy, the Trade 
Commissioner at the start of the EPA process, did initially consider this option, 
however it was dropped by the time the EU mandate was adopted (Trade Negotiation 
Insights, June 2002). The SADC group also put forward this proposal at the start of 
its negotiations. However the European Council’s rejection of this proposal shows 
that it is not a palatable solution for some EU member states, especially where ACP 
regions contain upper-middle income states, which in some cases have a higher 
GDP per capita than some of the newer EU members, or where they compete on 
similar agricultural produce.57 The other option would be to scrap EBA altogether, 
and compensate LDCs for opening their markets to European goods by directing 
development funds to trade capacity building projects at the national level, to 
encourage the development of local industries. This already takes place through 
the EU’s development programming, but the removal of EBA would facilitate 
greater coherence between the EU’s external trade and development policies.  
Uncertain future for the ACP Group…
The ACP Group is for the most part an ‘imagined region’, invented and funded by 
the EU solely for the purposes of managing cooperation between the EU and the 
former European colonies (Holland 2006). The change from Lomé to Cotonou has 
seen a down-grading of the ACP Group as a whole, while the regional groupings 
and accompanying regional organizations have gained in relevance. As the EU 
considers its post-2020 development agenda, one rather wonders about the ‘added 
value’ of the ACP as an organization. Currently its mandate overlaps with that of 
many other international and regional organizations, it is becoming less visible 
and relevant on the international stage, and the shared interests of the group that 
were a result of the ‘colonial hangover’ no longer seem sufficient to generate 
effective collective action amongst a diverse group of 79 states (Laporte 2014). If 
the post-Cotonou agenda carries on the region-to-region focus, the ACP Secretariat’s 
future remit remains unclear. It could remain as an umbrella organization whose 
main function is to provide an exchange of information between regions, but it 
would have much work to do on how to effectively facilitate the exchange of 
information between regions, as during field research it became apparent that 
EPA negotiators did not interact with the ACP Secretariat, nor did Southern African 
negotiators have much idea of developments in the West African negotiations, nor 
vice versa. 
57 Botswana has a higher GDP per capita than Bulgaria. 
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…But value of regionalism for African, Caribbean and Pacific states  
is reinforced
As EU-ACP relations currently lack a solid political foundation and the future 
remit of the ACP as an institution remains unclear, one possible scenario is that 
the overarching EU-ACP framework will be scrapped in favour of region-to-region 
cooperation with the existing ACP regions only. This is the preferred approach of 
European policy-makers, but ACP states and regions may also gain from this 
approach. The Cotonou Agreement emphasized the role of regional governance in 
development, and arguably the more regionalized approach will allow ACP regions 
to shape cooperation with the EU in a manner better suited to their regional 
specificities, instead of a catch-all framework intended to cover 79 ACP states in 
several world regions. Previous research has suggested that ACP states, if not 
particularly successful in advancing their offensive interests in trade negotiations, 
can successfully resist the offensive interests of the EU if they are united (Jones 
2014, Chapters Five and Six of this book). In light of the potential demise of the 
ACP organization, regionalism may form an appropriate strategy for developing 
states to shield their economies from the more destructive forces of liberalization, 
as well as providing an interregional framework with which to structure 
cooperation with the EU post-Cotonou. ACP regions may thus reconsider their 
regional initiatives, prevalence of overlap, and consider investing in the 
strengthening of regional institutions in order to better cope with an even more 
‘interregionalized’ relationship with the EU post-2020.   
Interregionalism is likely to remain a feature of cooperation  
between Europe and Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific, but EU’s appetite 
for interregional trade agreements with (non-Western) regions beyond 
Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific may be limited
With the long awaited conclusion of EPAs and their implementation on the 
horizon, interregionalism is likely to remain a feature of EU trade and aid 
cooperation in the post-2020 period. However, given the extremely drawn out 
nature of the EPA negotiations and the EU’s failure to use EPAs as a means to 
advance its trade agenda (liberalization beyond trade in goods) outside the 
multilateral system, even while negotiating against structurally weak regions 
with limited experience of such negotiations, the EU might think twice about 
pursuing interregional trade agreements with regions more powerful than those 
in the ACP. As the EU’s international leverage declines due to internal crises, 
economic stagnation and the rise of the BRICS, it has increasingly moved towards 
signing agreements with key strategic states rather than trying to facilitate re-
gion-to-region deals. Agreements with Mexico, Korea, Columbia and Peru have 
already been signed, and FTAs with Brazil and the USA are currently under 
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negotiation. Things may change if and when the TTIP negotiations are successfully 
concluded. The EU already has an agreement with Mexico and has recently signed 
one with Canada. If there is to be an agreement with the USA, it may be expedient 
to harmonize these agreements under a mega EU-NAFTA interregional deal. This 
would give Europe and America a head start on China in the setting of global 
regulatory standards, however the relatively limited commercial gains to be 
reaped from an EU-NAFTA deal may put a damper on the prospect (Aggarwal and 
Fogarty 2005). 
7.7  Conclusion and avenues for future research  
The research presented here raises several avenues for future research. Firstly, one 
might investigate the actorness of non-European regions in multilateral settings 
and interregionalism not involving the EU. If engaging in interregional cooperation 
and negotiation with the EU facilitates the actorness of regions in Africa, Caribbean 
and the Pacific, do the benefits carry through to relations in multilateral forums? 
There is already a body of research investigating EU actorness at international 
institutions, including the UN, WTO, and IMF (Wunderlich 2012a; Gehring et al. 
2013). Although no other regions currently have the level of supranationalism of 
the EU, research into the extent that regions display actorness at multilateral 
institutions would provide empirical insight into the ‘regionalization’ of world 
politics. Secondly, the project raises several questions regarding the behaviour of 
regional powers. The research showed how the role of regional powers is key in 
facilitating actorness, while several studies on regionalism highlight the necessity 
of leadership from a powerful state for successful regional cooperation (Mattli 
1999; Gilpin 2001). Regional powers such as Nigeria or South Africa can provide 
informal leadership, and contribute to the design and implementation of regional 
institutions. Yet only sometimes do they behave towards their sub-regions as a 
benevolent leader. Other times they behave as self-interested hegemons, and other 
times as imperial powers, using coercive measures to design regional structures 
that serve their interests (Destradi 2010). Yet to date the relationship between the 
behaviour and impact of regional powers on regional governance has been little 
explored (Nolte 2010: 894). In line with the Bamberg Cluster scholars, this 
manuscript has suggested that the external influence of more powerful actors can 
have an effect on how regional powers behave in their own regions, but future 
research could further investigate the extent to which ‘selfish’ or ‘benevolent’ 
behaviour from regional powers is the result of external influences, domestic 
interest groups, or even elite beliefs and shared identities. Future research could 
tease out the factors underlying the behaviour of regional powers by comparing 
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regions whose pivotal states have bilateral deals with external powers (e.g. Brazil 
in Mercosur) versus those that don’t (e.g. Kenya in the EAC). Thirdly, more research 
on South-South regionalism is required to better understand interregionalism as 
a general phenomenon. Empirical investigations of interregional relations 
between non-EU regions are exceedingly rare and sorely needed in order to know 
whether such South-South interregionalism is more than just empty declarations 
(Ribeiro Hoffman, 2016). What (if any) are the concrete outcomes of relations 
between ASEAN and SADC, or Mercosur and the Gulf Cooperation Council? How 
do relatively low levels of actorness in Southern regions impact on their ability to 
actually achieve anything through interregional cooperation? Without detailed 
empirical work on such examples of South-South interregionalism it is hardly 
surprising that some authors have labeled interregionalism a purely European 
enterprise (Camroux 2010).
As the opening quotations of this manuscript illustrated, the EU envisages itself 
leading the world towards ‘a G8 of regional groupings’. Certainly regionalism 
remains a distinctive feature of contemporary international relations and several 
scholars note the emergence of ‘a world of regions’. The promotion of regionalism 
in other parts of the world remains a distinctive feature of the EU’s foreign policy, 
yet the research presented here suggests that it does not always have the intended 
effect. Indeed, as the final opening quote illustrates, the EU’s perceived hypocrisy 
in not always practicing what it preaches has already damaged relations with 
developing regions, and so long as it fails to ‘walk the talk’, is likely to damage 
future relations with ACP states. The Cotonou Agreement will expire in 2020 and 
EU-ACP relations will have to be harmonized with the post-2015 global agenda on 
development. All indications suggest that regional organizations will play a 
stronger role than ever in both the global and European agendas. As global politics 
becoming increasingly regionalized it may indeed come to resemble a ‘G8 of 
regions’, a world in which interregionalim will become an ever more prevalent 
feature of international relations. 
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ANNEX I  Chronology of EPA negotiations 
West Africa/ECOWAS SADC
2000: signing of the Cotonou 
Agreement
27 Sept 2002
all-ACP-EU talks start
EU-West Africa negotiations 
begin
Oct 2003
Initial SADC configuration 
formed
West Africa produces 
Roadmap to guide 
negotiations
June 2004
8th July 2004
Launch of EU-SADC 
negotiations
Nov 2004: Peter Mandelson 
appointed EU Trade 
Commissioner
Feb 2006
SADC produces Strategic 
Framework to guide 
negotiations
March 2006
Framework presented 
to EU
March 2007
EU responds to SADC 
Framework; SA allowed to 
join SADC EPA Group
Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire 
initial interim EPAs
31 Dec 2007: initial deadline 
for conclusion of negotiations 
(missed)
Botswana, Swaziland 
Lesotho, Mozambique and 
Namibia initial interim 
EPAs
Feb 2008
SADC Ministers met to 
address fallout of interim 
EPAs
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Oct 2008: Catherine 
Ashton appointed Trade 
Commissioner
Côte d’Ivoire 
signs interim EPA
28 Nov 2008
31 Dec 2008: second deadline 
for conclusion of EPA 
negotiations (missed)
March 2009 Swakopmund meeting
4 June 2009
Botswana, Lesotho, 
Swaziland and 
Mozambique sign  interim 
EPAs
June 2009-Jan 2010 Intra-regional tensions
Jan 2010
SA asserts its leadership, 
SADC EPA states resolve to 
move forward as a block
Feb 2010: Karel de Gucht 
appointed EU Trade 
Commissioner
Sept 2011-Sept 2012
SADC lobbies EU decision-
makers to extend deadline 
for negotiations
EU-West Africa negotiations 
on hold (April 2012-Feb 2014) April 2012
May 2013: EU announces 
unilateral decision to revoke 
MAR 1528 on 1 Oct 2014 (final 
deadline)
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4 Dec 2013: Franco-African 
Economic Conference
5 Dec 2013: France, UK, 
Ireland, the Netherlands 
and Denmark issue letter 
admonishing the European 
Commission
1 Jan 2014: third deadline 
for conclusion of EPA 
negotiations (missed) 
West African and European 
negotiators conclude full EPA
Feb 2014
Nigeria raises list of last-
minute objections to the EPA
March 2014
EPA endorsed by ECOWAS 
Heads of State
10 July 2014
15 July 204
SADC negotiators 
conclude full EPA with EU
Oct 2014: final deadline 
for conclusion of EPA 
negotiations, end of MAR 
1528
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INTERVIEWS 
Note: Interviews were conducted during research stays in Southern Africa in 
September 2011 and May-July 2013. Snowball sampling was the method used to 
identify potential respondents. The response rate was low and it was often difficult 
to schedule interviews with those that did respond. Unfortunately, a lack of access 
and transparency is a common experience for those researching regional 
organizations in Africa. Interviews were conducted on a semi-structured basis and 
were recorded, expect where respondents denied permission to record. Respondents 
are not named either here or in the text of the manuscript due to the small size of 
the community working in/on EPAs and my promise of anonymity. Transcripts of 
recorded interviews and reports of unrecorded ones may be consulted by contacting 
the author at merranhulse@gmail.com.  
West Africa EPA Negotiator, Skype interview, 20th August 2014
ECOWAS Official, Skype interview, 13th August 2014
International Trade Expert, Skype interview, 13th June 2014
ECOWAS Official, Skype Interview, 12th June 2014
Department of Trade and Industry Official, Pretoria, 31st July 2013
EPA Negotiator, Pretoria, 30th July 2013 
EPA Negotiator, Pretoria, 25th July 2013
SADC EPA Unit Official, Gaborone, 11th July 2013
SADC TIFI Official, Gaborone, 11th July 2013
Namibia Agricultural Trade Forum Official, Windhoek, 28th June 2013
EPA Negotiator, Windhoek, 27th June 2013 
SACU Official and EPA Negotiator, Windhoek, 27th June 2013 
EPA Negotiator, Windhoek, 25th June 2013
SACU Official, Windhoek, 24th June 2013
SADC Official, Cape Town, 16th May 2013
AU Official, Germany, 4 September 2012
Southern Africa Security Analyst, Johannesburg 24th September 2011
Former SADC Official, Johannesburg, 7th September 2011 
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